The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and InterrogationProgram

by Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Dianne Feinstein (Foreword)

“The most extensive review of U.S. intelligence-gathering tactics in generations.” —Los Angeles TimesMeticulously formatted, this is a highly readable and fully searchable edition of the official summary report of the Senate Intelligence Committee’s investigation of Central Intelligence Agency interrogation and detention programs launched in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.   Based on over six million internal CIA documents, the report details secret prisons, prisoner deaths, interrogation practices, and cooperation with other foreign and domestic agencies. It also examines charges that the CIA deceived elected officials and governmental overseers about the extent and legality of its operations.  Over five years in the making, and withheld from public view since its declassification in April, 2014, this is the full summary report as finally released by the United States government on December 9th, 2014.

Genres: Politics, Nonfiction, History, War, Audiobook, Military Fiction, Crime

1277 pages, Kindle Edition

First published December 3, 2014

Reviews

[J · Rating 5 out of 5]

Of the many profoundly uncomfortable decisions our Government made during the early years of the 'War on Terror', this book is a vital and disturbing chronicle of one of the darkest and most mysterious.

What really shocks about this report is not merely the descriptions of torture, though I found reading about people being stripped naked and handcuffed in stress positions for days at a time, deprived of sleep for weeks at a time, being force fed rectally, being made to wear diapers to defacate in, and of course, being water-boarded (is there a more frightening or definitive image of secretive American power in the last quarter century?) to send me into a head space beyond simple moral outrage and verging into sheer horror and revulsion.

No, what really REALLY shocks about this is the almost gleeful incompetence of everyone involved. The CIA at various times had essentially no idea how many people it detained, who those people actually were, and what if anything their value was for intelligence gathering, or if they even had any intelligence to offer at all. And this incompetence was hidden and obfuscated time and time again, not just from the public and the media, but from the Bush administration, from foreign governments, from the judicial branch, and from true congressional oversight. The CIA's rendition, detention and interrogation program was literally power run amok, justifying itself by deception, attempting to prolong itself based on faulty information, and making itself accountable to no meaningful set of standards or restraints.

There's been lots of talk about this report being politically and ideologically motivated (as if ANY report created by congress isn't full of such motives). But the investigation which produced this began well after the program in question ended, and under a completely new administration. The full report (of which this book is merely the summary) is over 6,000 pages in length and took 5 years to create; hardly a time frame in which to score a few cheap political points. The senate torture report is as sincere an attempt at an official reckoning with these issues as we will likely ever see without possessing a high level security clearance.

It showcases one of the most famously secretive organizations in our government engaging in behavior that blatently contradicts some of our most hallowed legal and constitutional principles. And all of it was paid for by our tax dollars, tacitly approved by our elected representatives, and done in the name of the American people. Whether what the CIA did in its secretive black sites will be repudiated and deplored or held up as a valid standard of counter-intelligence in future times of conflict is, ultimately, up to us.

Any American with even a tangential interest in government accountability, transparency, and constitutional and human rights should read this. This is an essential document of our time.

[Jacob Steckbeck · Rating 5 out of 5]

An unpleasant but important read. A very well done report.

[BAM doesn’t answer to her real name]

There is just so much redacted and repeated that I’m not sure I’m getting everything. So I just stopped with a few hours remaining and I’m not rating it

[Alex Linschoten · Rating 4 out of 5]

Not as coherent a read as the 9/11 report, but worth dipping into nonetheless. I've written up some general thoughts that I jotted down while reading, now reordered but still somewhat disjointed.

The book was a far more argumentative document than the 9/11 report. With the latter, the goal was (in part) to explain to the American public how this happened, what happened etc. As a result, they really tried hard to make it readable, accessible, and to give it some sort of narrative momentum. You can read all about this in the memoirs of the people who were involved with the 9/11 Commission. With the torture report, something far more legalistic seems to have been at the forefront of their goal and approach. It was far less generally expansive and expressive than I might have hoped, and there was *a lot* of repetition.

The repetition stems from how the document is structured. Quite often, because each section is making a different case, we have to revisit each separate interrogation. As a result, I feel like I read dozens of slightly different versions of the KSM or Abu Zubayda interrogation history.

The meat of the report/book shows (or, at least, seems to show; I'll come back to this) how the CIA misled, lied and manipulated throughout the post-9/11 period. Public congressional enquiries seem to have been invitations to lie and misrepresent, and the culture of leaking information to the media was embraced as a way of furthering this obfuscation. This seems to have extended to the extent to which the law was followed. Moreover, the compartmentalism (and sheer scale of the bureaucratic system) of government seems to have made it easy to lie, especially when there were low incentives for doing the hard work of checking up on what was happening.

I conclude from reading this report (in tandem with various other reports and stories in recent years) that, most likely, if the CIA or some other unnamed part of the US government wants to detain you and hold you (or kill you) without open legal process, they're probably going to go right ahead. Maybe this is an over-reading of the evidence, but it seems clear that the law is fluid and people in power will do whatever they want.

The legal standards -- and the debate within the system over the details of those standards -- don't seem to have been effective at provoking real reflections among those involved. The main thing they seem to have inspired was semantic squabbling and petty legalism to cheat the system. Internal feedback loops and voices of dissent seem to have been important in not allowing things to get worse, but they had no teeth so were ultimately ineffectual and unheard.

It seemed that the feeling of certainty and a belief of somehow being on the right path led to a variety of the mistakes and crimes described in the report. People pushed through their doubts, or tried to convince others that they just needed more time, or more waterboardings etc. Confirmation bias seems to have been a really serious issue, made all the more salient given the apparent lack of information or understanding at the time, and investigators followed up on a wide variety of lines of enquiry, often finding what they were looking for when subjects responded to their enquiries with information, information that later turned out to be false. As in all research work, you'll find what you're looking for. There should have been more value placed in avoiding these sorts of fundamental biases of analysis.

As a corollary, too much emphasis seems to have been placed on short-term gain to the exclusion of long-term considerations. This is systemic within our culture, it seems -- despite the valiant efforts of organisations like the Long Now Foundation [http://longnow.org/] -- and maybe this is accentuated because of the way our political systems function. Nevertheless, it seems more heed could have been given to thinking more strategically.

Two things were missing, I felt. Some sort of account of CIA anxiety and soul-searching at realising they had dropped the ball with regards to the 9/11 attacks would have helped balance out the report, and could probably help explain at least one factor in how things headed down the path that it did. I also feel that the report could have added some sense of doubt as to their conclusions. They had access to a lot of information and correspondence etc, but this wasn't a report or accounting from the inside of the CIA. Records were destroyed, not everything was written down etc. The actors responsible could have shed light on a bunch of things where the report itself admits it has no idea what happened.

I don't have the exact figures for how much the report cost to produce, but the FAQ suggests that it's in the order of tens of millions of USD, which just goes to show that proper study and historical explanation is worth its weight in gold. [http://opensocietypolicycenter.org/wp...]. The report is really well written, and even though I could have done with something that had more of a narrative flow to it (and much less repetition, I learnt a lot reading through it.

P.S. Melville House did a really great job making this text available in electronic format for ebook readers, taking the non-OCRed PDF and preparing it for publication over December 2014. A real public service.

[Philip · Rating 3 out of 5]

It's really quite difficult to rate something like this. I mean, to say that one "likes" this... yeah, it doesn't compute.

However, everyone should read this report. Especially if you're firmly ensconced on/in your moral high horse of nationalism of either the U.S., its culpable allies, or anyone else who thought if prudent to not look so closely.

However, should you choose not to read it, here are the cliffs notes:
- Yes, the CIA/U.S. did torture a significant number of detainees.
- Their thinly veiled excuse (utilitarianism) was and remains absolute garbage.
- No, it likely didn't do much good; It did, however, do some real damage (including to intelligence gathering).
- Yes, the CIA itself knew all of the above.
- The level of ineptitude of the involved parties is shocking.

But don't take my word for this, read the report!

[Pickles]

7/13/21- thanks john oliver, I guess? I'm very intrigued and I know I'm going to hate every second

[Jillian Powell · Rating 5 out of 5]

I think this is something everyone in the US should read. The title says it all.

[Marlon Austin · Rating 5 out of 5]

a very important book that is a horrifying read

[David Mills · Rating 5 out of 5]

Favorite Quote = “Torture is wrong. Torture is always wrong. Those of us (who) want to see a safer, more secure world, want to see the extremism defeated. We won't succeed if we lose our moral authority." – British Prime Minster David Cameron

[John · Rating 4 out of 5]

Dark and so incredibly damning. The biggest shock was after lying to the media, the president, congress, and even their own inspector general, the CIA is still a functioning and revered part of our government. What does it say about us?

[Demyan Plakhov · Rating 4 out of 5]

A fascinating account and a must-read for those interested in or working on intelligence, privacy, the questions of torture, and human rights.

A definitive account on how torture is not an effective method of collecting credible information, and an atrocious and unlawful method overall.

[Liz Janet]

I decided to read this due to John Oliver's segment on torture because I too had some misguided ideas of it.
Segment on Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zmeF2...

[kami little · Rating 4 out of 5]

I feel the information in this book is important and, for the most part, well-presented.

[Phil McGyver · Rating 3 out of 5]

Of the many controversial decisions made by the US government in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the establishment of a network of black sites and the employment of enhanced interrogation techniques that would be labeled torture (not just by the usual leftists but by none other than the Red Cross) is definitely one of the most controversial.

If the report’s conclusions are taken at face value and accepted as factually and historically accurate, this is the conclusion you would have to arrive at: a very large number of CIA personnel orchestrated a massive, years-long conspiracy in which they 1) lied to the Justice Department about the EITs they planned to employ to gain formal legal support for them 2) recklessly detained people who met no legal standard for detention, without even properly accounting for their number, 3) systematically lied to their overseers about the detainees’ conditions, 4) impeded oversight by the White House, Congress, and their own IG, 5) ignored numerous critiques and objections from their own workforce, and 6) then managed a coordinated program of targeted leaks of classified information in order to manipulate the media into inaccurately portraying the effectiveness of the EITs — all so that, year after year, they could stubbornly maintain a program that...wait for it...was producing no intelligence of any worth! The report allows for no other conclusion than this one, and accepting the report as a truthful, definitive account requires its acceptance.

Obviously, the report does not get into moral issues, focusing its inquiry around three main questions: 1) did the program follow guidelines set by the Justice Department? 2) did it help prevent terrorist attacks?, and 3) was Congress, the White House, and the Justice Department kept adequately informed? The Senate report tries very hard to make these answers a definitive no, and it reads much more like a prosecutor’s brief than a historical document. Feinstein has been the politician most identified with the report, and its release has done much to appease her leftist base, who apparently have no problem with Feinstein’s support for the NSA’s collection of bulk phone records (“It’s called protecting America,” she says), even though two independent panels have doubted its value, or with the Agency’s drone program.

There’s been a lot of buzz that the release of the report was motivated by politics. Of course it was. The Democrats have long claimed to be against these practices, and are now claiming tohave been kept in the dark regarding the program. Whether you believe that or not is up to you. Another apparent problem with the report is that the authors refused to interview any of the participants. As such, it relies exclusively on cable traffic between Langley and the various black sites. Again, the scope of the report is specific, and, unfortunately, the report has nothing to say about the Agency’s use of aircraft proprietaries to shuttle the detainees between their points of origin and the various black sites.

One of the most striking headings in the conclusions section is this: "CIA's use of enhanced interrogation techniques was not an effective means of acquiring intelligence or gaining cooperation from detainees.” The very next sentence after this conclusion reads, “According to CIA records, seven of the 39 CIA detainees known to have been subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques produced no intelligence while in CIA custody.” In other words, EITs were ineffective because 18% of detainees subjected to the techniques revealed no intelligence---while 82% of detainees subjected to the techniques did. Is this supposed to convince us that the techniques were ineffective? Do these SSCI staffers take us for idiots? Apparently so. In another instance, the authors claim that the CIA learned about Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti “prior to any detainee reporting.” This is misleading: the Agency had information about the Kuwaiti, but none of it was corroborated until it had access to detainee interrogations. Whether these particular interrogations involved EITs, however, is still a matter of dispute, and readers will pick whatever version suits them.

The report also ignores context to some extent; following 9/11 there was a surge of overseas threat reporting and a widespread perception that there would be some sort of second wave? How did that affect the performance of the Agency or the authorities that the government delegated to the Agency? Isn’t that a reasonable question?

At the same time, the report documents many shortcomings on the Agency’s part. In one instance, the Agency claimed that reports from KSM’s interrogation led to the arrest of Saleh al-Marri---even though al-Marri was captured in December 2001 and KSM was captured in March 2003. Either the officers involved were incompetent or their memories were pretty damn short.

Also, the report claims that "there is no indication in CIA records that Abu Zubaydah provided information on bin al-Shibh's whereabouts.” It cites no evidence to support this claim, even though Zubaydah reportedly identified bin al-Shibh four times, according to the minority report.

The report claims that the CIA impeded oversight by its own inspector general. The law requires the IG to report its level of access to CIA programs and to file reports when its access is impeded. If the CIA really did illegally interfere in this area, one would expect reports to be filed, and for the Intelligence Committee to have enough clout to gain access to them. Unfortunately, the report does not cite any such documentary evidence. The IG made almost 30 reports about the program throughout its duration, visited two of the black sites, and of course, reviewed the 92 interrogation tapes that were eventually destroyed by Jose Rodriguez.

Often the analysis is cursory or convoluted. One particularly glaring problem that is often raised is this: if, as the report claims, the program was ineffective from the start, why was it kept going for four years, even when Congress was briefed? To be clear, only the leadership of the oversight committees was briefed when Abu Zubaydah was interrogated, with the others only briefed in 2006. By all accounts, the leaders posed no objections at this initial briefing. It is entirely possible that this fairly large and expensive detention program was kept going only by default. If it was, why doesn’t the report look into this? Another question is the issue of interviews; the committee did not interview any of the CIA or government personnel involved inthe program. Whether this is the Committee’s fault is unclear, given that Obama’s Justice Department opposed such a move. But I don’t doubt they would have proved useful. The report charges that the CIA “actively avoided or impeded oversight” by Congress. Unlikely; if the committee chairmen wanted to brief the other members, they could have done so on their own initiative, or expressed this wish to the White House. If they really wanted to brief their colleagues, I’m sure they would have found a way to do it. Again, the Study did not conduct any interviews; if they had, we might know what these members were briefed on, but we don’t. And restricting briefings to committee leaders isn’t exactly unprecedented. The Study claims that Bush was not briefed until 2006; Bush’s memoirs indicate he was briefed in 2002. The Study cites this section of the memoir in a footnote somewhere but does not explain the apparent contradiction. The Study also claims that the CIA “blocked State Department leadership” from access to information regarding the black sites, but cites no real evidence.

Another aspect is that the RDI program was basically three different programs: renditions, in which terrorists and terrorist suspects were illegally snatched by CIA paramilitary officers and transported by planes to the various black sites; detention, in which the prisoners were held indefinitely in black sites; and interrogation, in which the prisoners were questioned using both standard rapport-building techniques and the controversial EITs. Were all of these aspects complete failures, or just the EITs? The report constantly hints that detainees were cooperative until subjected to EITs. Were traditional interrogations more successful? These traditional interrogations were part of the program, after all.

As an example, the Study claims that the CIA was inaccurate in asserting that EITs led to the disruption of a terrorist attack on Camp Lemonier. This is misleading; nobody ever claimed EITs led to the plot’s disruption; President Bush asserted that terrorists “in CIA custody” provided this information.

Also, the study does not offer a single recommendation regarding interrogation practices even though this was one the study’s purposes. This is odd, given that it was part of the Study’s terms of reference.

I’m not convinced that this report is completely historically accurate. Is it entirely useless? No. Can it be called “definitive”? Probably not.

[Joe Broadmeadow · Rating 5 out of 5]

The definitive examination of the effectiveness of CIA "enhanced interrogation techniques." Puts the bed the notion that torture, by any other name, is useful as a tool for interrogation. It is immoral, un-American, and ineffective as an interrogation technique.
Well worth the effort to read and examine the conclusions. Without spoiling the story, the total of actionable, real-time intelligence gathered through years of applying these "enhanced" techniques is zero. The only tangible evidence obtained was historical and generally available from other sources before the application of these methods.
Many of the CIA officers involved complained that the procedures were counter-productive. The most frightening thing was the resistance to giving the FBI, and its experienced interrogators, full access. The record shows that high-value targets like Khalid Sheik Mohammed, undergoing enhanced interrogation, fabricated stories to stall or delay the process. He never provided one single bit of actionable material in the years he was in custody.
On the contrary, FBI interrogators did get actionable material when they had the first crack at those in custody.
The study highlights a troubling element of American history.

[Liana · Rating 5 out of 5]

Solidly put together, meticulously researched and utterly damning. I found every aspect interesting, even the references (very thoroughly redacted). It was a particularly good read after John Yoo's "War By Other Means", the book explaining post-9/11 actions by the Bush Administration from the OLC perspective. John Yoo's book made me think and gave me a more nuanced perspective on the issues and actions of the past several years, but the Senate report blew his main argument out of the water, that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were effective and resulted in actionable intelligence that we could not have gotten otherwise. It also throws a bright spotlight on CIA's standard interrogation techniques and broader communication and power dynamic problems. Very interesting read.

[Anna Taylor · Rating 5 out of 5]

I opted to read this prior to watching the movie. I wanted to have a better sense of the recitation vs dramatization.

The poorly conceived, justified and conducted program is a war crime. The people who promoted these actions have not been held responsible. The report repeats information, emphasizing the pattern of lying and deception by program operators. We had better procedures and gained nothing except crippling our moral standing. Leadership should have been better engaged, sought honest evaluations and weighed the costs. The need to know and thwart terrorist attacks was real, but this did not serve.

The unitary executive is present in the arrogance of the CIA in failing to address congress honestly and completely.

[AttackGirl · Rating 5 out of 5]

Be prepared to vomit.

Once you read it you will understand why ...
James Comey, Hillary Clinton, I won't list them all and spoil the fun but you will hear the names and see the game that was played and you will understand why they will never go to jail for "lost email" or be "unfunded".

Where was, no IS the UN Human Rights Council that put to death WWII military leaders and doctors. Where is the outrage at the hubris of the CIA, the FBI, now the public will see how the dont ask dont tell really works.

[Aliya · Rating 5 out of 5]

This may be one of the most disturbing documents I've ever read. It took me a long time to complete it because I needed a breather every few pages. After reading this, I will never put anything past any government ever again. Yup... it's that bad!

Nonetheless, I think every person should read this in hopes of having a more peaceful future. Torture is not the answer.

[James Koehler · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of the most disturbing books i’ve ever read. Not only for the details of torture done by Americans, but the CIA’s consistent deception of what they did and its effectiveness. The lies told to all members of America, congress, president, and the public; shows their lack of respect for all parties.

[Brian McEntire · Rating 2 out of 5]

So heavily redacted as to be unintelligible at times. Read a digital version which likely made it worse.

Of course the CIA complained the report was inaccurate and incomplete, their lack of cooperation ensured that would be the outcome.

The core issue is not one of morality (morality in a fight for your life gets you killed) but the lack of assessment of effectiveness.

[BethyD · Rating 1 out of 5]

Got about 300 pages in...just couldn't finish. Found it to be too repetitive grammar-wise and I got bored. Maybe I didn't get to the good part yet being it's 1000+ pages? I'll never know. Someone had recommended this to me ages ago, so I gave it a shot. DNF

[Gary Bendall · Rating 4 out of 5]

Thorough if repetitive.

[Katelin]

I would leave a review but it would just be redacted. This was torture to read don't know why I read it.

[Pie · Rating 3 out of 5]

Just watch the movie, not worth the slog.

[Nathalie · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of the most messed up things I've read in a while.

[Riley]

A light bedtime story.

[Matthew Callis · Rating 4 out of 5]

It was [Redacted]

[Gregp · Rating 4 out of 5]

7 out of [redacted]

[Rocky · Rating 3 out of 5]

Not as cheery as the title might suggest.