4 things occurred in 1948 that allowed for the ethnic cleansing of Palestinian to happen:
1) the British withdrawal of Palestine after ruling it for 30 years
2) the lingering effects of the atrocities of the Holocaust on western public opinion
3) the disarray in the Arab world
4 )the coordination of a competent and determined Zionist leadership
These factors led to over half of all Palestinians being expelled, half their towns being destroyed, and over 80% of Palestine becoming ruled by Israel. This was the final act of the colonization of Palestine that the Zionist movement had been committed to since the late 1800s. Veterans of this cleansing would later become the very same leaders of Israel in 1967, when Israel came for the remaining 20% of the land. In 1967, however, a second ethnic cleansing was deemed infeasible. There was fear that it would awaken a global anti-Israel consciousness that had been suppressed in 1948 to atone for the Holocaust. The 1967 government was also made up of a larger forum of elites that included those who would have objected to a master plan of cleansing. The solution was to occupy the newly obtained territories in 1967 indefinitely, and put Palestinians living in these new territories into what is, in essence, the largest open air prison in history. In 1948 Israel had imposed a military rule on any Palestinians remaining within Israel, thereby stripping them of any rights or organizational capacity. By conquering the territory it so badly coveted in 1967 without actually annexing it, Israel imposed this military rule onto its newly subjugated Palestinians without actually turning them into citizens of Israel. This allowed Israel to shift its militarized subjugation of Palestinians from domestic Israel to the newly occupied territories.
Many Zionists viewed the compromise with Jordan in 1948, which gave them 22% of historical Palestine, as a mistake. They believed this area (the West Bank as well as Egypt’s Gaza Strip) was to be part of the historical dominion of the Zionist movement. A cross section of the Israeli ruling class, including high ranking military generals, pushed for military intervention into the West Bank so that it could be incorporated into the Israeli state. They first tried to beat the war drums by claiming that Jordan was not following the armistice agreement set down by Israel. Later, these war hawks claimed that a preemptive strike would be necessary to prevent Jordan from falling to the Pan-Arab movement. Besides the West Bank, Israeli elites were also committed to the conquest of the Gaza Strip, a small strip of land most of the ethnically cleansed victims of the Nakba had been pushed into. After the 1948 ethnic cleansing the Strip became governed by Egypt under military rule, with Egypt claiming that it would remain so until Palestinians were given back Palestine. Egypt was led from the early 1950s onward by Gamal Abdel Nasser, the de facto head of the Pan-Arab movement. Zionists portrayed Nasser and the Arab nationalist movement as an existential threat to Israel, but this fear did not equate with reality. Nasser, throughout the early 1950s, actually attempted to make peace with Israel and soften relations between Egypt and the Zionist state. In 1953, using secret channels, Nasser offered to heavily tone down Egypt’s anti-Israel rhetoric in exchange for Israel lobbying America for a more pro-Egyptian policy. Especially important to the Nasser administration was getting the British empire to fully withdraw out of Egypt, which they believed the U.S. could do; Israel refused.
In 1955 Israel bombed an Egyptian military base in the Gaza Strip as punishment for allowing Palestinian guerillas to hide there and use it as a launching pad for attacks into Israel. The effect of this was to humiliate Nasser and completely derail any hopes for cordial relations between Egypt and Israel. Then, in October of 1956, Egypt joined an alliance with France and Britain to overthrow Nasser, and then went to war with Egypt in what was known as the Suez Campaign. During this campaign, which was stopped by discouragement from both the United States and the Soviet Union, Israel seriously considered annexing the West Bank until the United States got wind of these plans, which the hegemon entirely discouraged and prevented.
By 1957 a few developments had transpired that made the Israel elite more hawkish and uncompromising. One was the development of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (A.I.P.A.C), which gave Israel more lobbying influence within the American political system. Next, France began not only sending Israel $30 million worth of high-tech military equipment, but also helped them lay the foundation for their nuclear armament facility. This allowed Israel to further inflame conflicts with Syria over contested territories between the two nations without fear that Syria could seriously retaliate. France agreed to this because of their concerns over Syria’s involvement in the Algerian liberation struggle, and hoped that Israel would help force a regime change in Syria.
By 1963 Israel already had formal plans in place to use their own internal military oppression of internal Arab communities as a model for how they would rule the West Bank should they conquer it. Israel continued to poke, prod, and provoke its neighbors, using their willingness to foster Palestinian guerillas as an excuse for launching violent raids. In 1965 Israel launched a raid into the West Bank where they killed dozens and wounded hundreds, including members of Jordan’s armed forces, in an attempt to collectively punish Palestinians for their incursions into Israel. Israel also provoked their neighbors in Syria by periodically sending settlers into disputed territories and diverting waterways away from Syria and into Israeli reservoirs. These actions would often result in Syrian military retaliation, whose military paled in comparison to Israel’s, especially Israel’s Air Force. In fact, one of the biggest factors leading to Israel's success in 1967 was that they were armed with the most up-to-date tanks and airplanes, courtesy of the United States and the LBJ administration. As the Syrian and Israel militaries went tit-for-tat throughout 1966 on the battlefield, the Syrian government and their Soviet advisors began seeing the pattern of escalation and feared that a war/Israeli invasion would soon be imminent. To prevent this, Syria formed alliances with Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan in the hopes that a formal defensive alliance would deter Israel from invading them. This gambit failed.
The 1967 war is portrayed in Israeli mythology (and therefore in Western canon) as one in which Israel had to preemptively strike its enemies, who were ready to invade and crush the Zionist empire. This is not supported by reality. Most notably, Israel had incorporated a policy of intentional provocation, harassment, and humiliation of its Arab neighbors in order for them to boost their own war rhetoric. For example, Israel attacked the Golan heights in 1967 on the anniversary of the founding of Syria’s ruling Baath Party in an attempt to, in the words of Israel’s defense minister: “humiliate Syria”. It also repeatedly attacked the West Bank with a strategy designed to inflict maximum damage. Humiliated leaders had the options of either losing face with their base by accepting Israeli provocations without protest, or ramping up their own rhetoric/actions to counter Israel’s. Israeli and American intelligence (which was basically also Israeli intelligence, seeing that James Angelton was essentially an Israeli asset) both stressed that Egypt had neither the ability nor intention to invade Israel, and that their troop movements were entirely defensive in the days leading up to the war. During the time frame surrounding the start of the war, the director of the CIA, Richard Helms, stated in newly declassified memos) “who will win?… (we know Israel can) defend successfully against simultaneous attacks on three fronts… while mounting successfully a major offensive on the fourth”. The Israeli Chief of Staff, Yitzhak Rabin, also reported on May 21, 1967 that Nasser’s military moves were a “propagandistic move and not yet an aggressive one as the Egyptians have not yet moved tanks into the (Sinai) Peninsula”. Being aware of this, the decision to intentionally stoke fears of a ‘second Holocaust’ amongst the Israeli public shows that the ruling class was consciously trying to manufacture mass hysteria and consent for a war. After the war in 1968, Rabin would reiterate his point in an interview with Le Monde when he said “I do not think Nasser wanted war”. He was not the only high ranking Israeli official to publicly voice dissent against the prevailing Zionist narrative. Years later, the Israeli Chief of staff during the war, Moshe Dayan, admitted in an interview that Israel’s policy was intentionally provocative at the time in order to appease Jewish settlers near the Syrian border.
3 days into the war Israel controlled all of historical Palestine and ruled over 1 million Palestinians in the West Bank, as well as more than 400,000 Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. One of the first decisions made by Israel was to outright ban any Arab militaries from operating in the occupied territories, which were now firmly to be placed under the control of the state of Israel. Many Israeli government officials and other elites did not believe ethnically cleansing these newly occupied territories would be politically possible, yet it was also widely accepted that integrating such a large number of Arabs into Israeli citizens was not a smart move either. What developed was a ‘carrot and stick’ method of rule over these de facto political prisoners. When the occupied Palestinians were “good” they could be granted rights such as being allowed to commute to Israel for work. However, when they were bad these rights were stripped away and the state’s stick was used; indiscriminate violence became a mass punishment for any behavior deemed unruly in the territories.
Within a year after peace had been declared Israel had already partitioned off sections of the occupied territories into “Jewish” and “Palestinian” areas. Israel used military decrees and military rule as justification for the colonization of the West Bank, which Israel almost immediately colonized around 50% of. By the 1990s Israel had colonized around 65% of the Bank. Colonization had the effect of disconnecting Palestinian towns and population centers from each other. By breaking up the West Bank into many small, disconnected centers of Palestinians, their ability to form any sort of unified state was completely hampered. The colonization process went hand in hand with the turning of the West Bank and Gaza strip into open air prisons.
All this was accompanied by an economic strategy which was originally formulated and implemented around 1967 and still persists today. The goal was to find a way to economically exploit the occupied territories while still keeping their population at arms length in terms of granting them rights and citizenship. Israeli officials, strategists, and a mix of economists developed a strategy that sought to use the basic economic necessities of Palestinians as rewards for ‘good behavior’ that could be stripped away any time Israel wanted to. First, Israel decided that the only legal currency to be used in the occupied territories would be the official currency of Israel. Occupied Palestinians were then transformed into a cheap, totally captive labor force supplemented with cheap wages while being granted none of the rights won by Israeli workers through their trade union movement. This process is described by Pappe as “economic colonization”, under which Israel would export cheap goods into the occupied territories, who in return would provide Israel with unregulated and highly exploited laborers. Israeli industry was gifted a monopoly on the occupied territories, while the labor they provided was colluded against to be kept out of Israel’s unions/labor movement.
Early on, many Israeli leaders saw the Palestinians in the occupied territory as simply unconnected, disparate enclaves rather than a singular community held together by a national consciousness. However, as Palestinian resistance mounted, especially in Gaza, which has always historically resisted Israeli brutalization, the carrot and stick rule of mass/widespread collective punishment became the norm. Collective punishment as a response to Palestinian insubordination included: mass arrest without trial, demolition of houses, long curfews, and mass break-ins into Palestinian homes without warning. Anyone caught aiding or embedding a member of the PLO or PLA was sentenced to 15 years in prison for the first decade of the occupation. This combined with Palestinian curiosity towards their new reality led to low resistance in the first decade of the occupation, allowing for the implementation of what Pappe calls an open prison model, which worked as long as there continued to be little Palestinian resistance. The rewards granted by the open prison model were that local Palestinian municipalities were granted a degree of autonomy, Palestinian labor was allowed to be absorbed into the Israeli labor market, and Palestinian goods were allowed to be freely transported to neighboring Arab countries, through which Israel circumvented embargoes placed upon it by essentially using the territories as middleman for Israeli goods to enter into the wider Arab market.
By 1979, land originally confiscated in the occupied territories for military bases had been converted into Jewish colonies. This process, partially a reaction to urban sprawl and growing settler populations, created major monitoring/observation centers right in the middle of the open prisons. While Jewish settlements/communities expanded, Palestinian communities were legally forced to remain consolidated. This was done by making complex systems of Jewish-only roads, enforcing regulations that prevented Palestinians from extending buildings, excluding Palestinians from joining construction planning committees, and forcing Plaestinians to pay exorbitant licensing fees to build any new buildings. The goal throughout the 1980s and up to today was to limit the growth and expansion of Palestinian communities and their population in favor of Jewish settlements and population growth.
The open prison model began to collapse, starting with the failed assassination of an Israeli ambassador in London, in 1982. The failed assassin was a member of an organization that was founded by a CIA asset. This event was used as a Casus belli to justify launching aerial bombardments into PLO bases in Lebanon, a plan Israel had been desiring to enact for years. Israel then invaded Lebanon and Beirut, resulting in widespread and heavily documented atrocities and war crimes at the hands of Israeli militants. This invasion essentially destroyed any real military capability and political power of the PLO, but it also locked Israel down in a Vietnam-Esq quagmire inside Lebanon against Lebanese guerillas. By 1985, as Israeli soldiers began making tours of duty in both occupied Lebanon and the Occupied Palestine territories, the distinction between the combat zones of Lebanon and the residential zones of Gaza and the West Bank were blurred. The Israeli army employed what it called an ‘iron fist policy’ towards any resistance within either of the 3 territories. This process completely stripped away all features of the open prison model except for the right of occupied Palestinians to work in Israel. From 1969 -1977 the number of people in occupied areas employed in Israel grew from a few thousand to over 100,000 (around 50% of the labor force of the occupied territories). This economic relationship, which simultaneously turned the markets of the occupied territories into Israel’s second biggest export market while converting their labor force into near-slaves with no social/labor rights, unions, or health insurance, was entrenched enough to only become dislodged by the second intifada. As Palestinian laborers began lashing out against their employers and anyone they could get their hands on (often through knife attacks), young males, (the majority of this workforce) had more and more restrictions placed on their ‘right to work’. The oppression resulting from restriction of Palestinian community growth, Israeli control of Palestinian water rights, and the restriction of any economic rights of Palestinians were the main causes of the intifadas.
On December 2, 1987 a truck killed 4 people in a Gazan refugee camp, sparking the first intifada. Although this event is usually pointed to as the first moment of the intifada it was, in fact, one of many simultaneous events that culminated in the uprising. These mainly took the form of civil disobedience through mass demonstrations, peaceful protests, impromptu roadblocks, boycotts, general strikes, refusing to pay taxes to Israel, rock throwing, and the occasional Molotov cocktail attack. The response to this from Israel can best be described as a frenzied rage. Thousands of Palestinians were killed during the intifada (which lasted around 6 years), most of them in peaceful protests that were fired upon by Israeli soldiers; over 120,000 people were arrested, most of them under 16 years old; 10s of thousands of people were beaten, half of which were children under the age of 10. Alongside this display of unhinged raw violence, Israel also forcibly closed thousands of Palestinian businesses and enforced mass curfews. Israel met this Palestine movement of mostly non-violent civil disobedience with untethered hatred and aggression. This ultimately collapsed the open prison model until the Oslo accords.