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A House Built on Sand: Exposing Postmodernist Myths About Science
Cultural critics say that "science is politics by other means," arguing that the results of scientific inquiry are profoundly shaped by the ideological agendas of powerful elites. They base their claims on historical case studies purporting to show the systematic intrusion of sexist, racist, capitalist, colonialist, and/or professional interests into the very content of science. In this hard-hitting collection of essays, contributors offer crisp and detailed critiques of case studies offered by the cultural critics as evidence that scientific results tell us more about social context than they do about the natural world. Pulling no punches, they identify numerous crude factual blunders (e.g. that Newton never performed any experiments) and egregious errors of omission, such as the attempt to explain the slow development of fluid dynamics solely in terms of gender bias. Where there are positive aspects of a flawed account, or something to be learned from it, they do not hesitate
to say so. Their target is shoddy scholarship.
Comprising new essays by distinguished scholars of history, philosophy, and science, this book raises a lively debate to a new level of seriousness.
to say so. Their target is shoddy scholarship.
Comprising new essays by distinguished scholars of history, philosophy, and science, this book raises a lively debate to a new level of seriousness.
336 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1998
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October 24, 2007
As a university lecturer, I take academic dishonesty very seriously. And while most instances of academic malfeasance involve plagiarism, there is, perhaps, a more egregious sort of intellectual dishonesty: the methodological ignorance of post-modern science studies.
Noretta Koertge is one of those few philosophers of science who has not taken the post-modern turn. In this collection of essays from notable scientists and philosophers of science, the serious, academic fraud perpetrated by those who engage in pomo Science Studies is laid bare. Influential pomo critiques of science are scrutinized for their scientific accuracy, and shown wanting. Embryology is patriarchal? Not if you have read the scientific literature: studies on the active role of the egg outnumber studies on sperm more than 10 to 1. The scientific method is based on an elaborate rape metaphor? Only if you believe that one, out-of-context and vaguely inappropriate 300 year old quote is sufficient evidence. The contemporary mechanical sciences are inherently masculine and should be abandoned in favor of alchemy? Only if you are a complete moron.
Granted, society influences science on a great many ways. For example, studies of female sexuality were hampered for centuries by sexism. But, contra noted feminists such as Sandra Harding, the failure to study the importance of the clitoris in reproduction does not imply that quantum mechanics is also sexist. Koertge shows us that contemporary proponents of Science Studies fail insofar as they lack the intellectual acumen sufficient to realize that science is not a lumbering monolithic beast intent on propagating a patriarchal society.
Koertge reminds us that there is value in sociological studies of the history of inquiry. Yet, she shows us quite clearly that to misrepresent scientific claims, to fraudulently proffer an understanding of scientific theories, and to treat scientific research as yet another "text" to be decontructed, is a form of academic dishonesty far worse than any perceived sexism in 17th century physics.
Noretta Koertge is one of those few philosophers of science who has not taken the post-modern turn. In this collection of essays from notable scientists and philosophers of science, the serious, academic fraud perpetrated by those who engage in pomo Science Studies is laid bare. Influential pomo critiques of science are scrutinized for their scientific accuracy, and shown wanting. Embryology is patriarchal? Not if you have read the scientific literature: studies on the active role of the egg outnumber studies on sperm more than 10 to 1. The scientific method is based on an elaborate rape metaphor? Only if you believe that one, out-of-context and vaguely inappropriate 300 year old quote is sufficient evidence. The contemporary mechanical sciences are inherently masculine and should be abandoned in favor of alchemy? Only if you are a complete moron.
Granted, society influences science on a great many ways. For example, studies of female sexuality were hampered for centuries by sexism. But, contra noted feminists such as Sandra Harding, the failure to study the importance of the clitoris in reproduction does not imply that quantum mechanics is also sexist. Koertge shows us that contemporary proponents of Science Studies fail insofar as they lack the intellectual acumen sufficient to realize that science is not a lumbering monolithic beast intent on propagating a patriarchal society.
Koertge reminds us that there is value in sociological studies of the history of inquiry. Yet, she shows us quite clearly that to misrepresent scientific claims, to fraudulently proffer an understanding of scientific theories, and to treat scientific research as yet another "text" to be decontructed, is a form of academic dishonesty far worse than any perceived sexism in 17th century physics.
November 22, 2022
Since at least the 1970s there’s been a growing faction of academics in sociology, literary criticism, Women’s studies, Cultural studies, anthropology, journalism, even philosophy, leveling postmodern critiques at science, and at the idea of scientific knowledge itself. This body of criticism is described, by its practitioners, as science studies. By “postmodern”, what is meant is a social constructivist view of knowledge, epistemic and cultural relativism, the insistence that objective and universal knowledge is an impossibility, that truth is indistinguishable from myth, that scientific knowledge is merely social negotiation not backed by any form of objective, empirical record, and that all local, cultural forms of knowledge and belief are equally valid ways of understanding the world.
There’s more. It is also the belief that biases, self-interest, opinions, and bigotry underlie all scientific knowledge and method, and that science is not about knowledge but about power.
Hold on, there’s still more. It’s also the belief that science reflects purely white, Western, capitalist values and is nothing more than an enforcement of imperialism and colonialism and the privileging of masculine traits, like rationality, over all else.
There’s even more to it, but to do justice to the litany of beliefs in the postmodern view would take more space than is allowed, and more time than I’m willing to put in. In summary, the postmodern political critiques of science led to what was called the Science Wars, which perhaps peaked with Alan Sokal’s brilliant satire-parody that showed the vacuousness of much of the postmodern scholarship on the subject. These wars continue today, but have spilled over into other areas of social and political interest. It’s surprising how little has changed in almost 30 years.
In the 90s, philosopher of science Noretta Koertge gathered a group of sixteen scientists, historians, philosophers, and engineers to respond to the most popular and widespread criticisms of science. This book is that response, a collection of 18 exquisite essays dissecting and analyzing, with precision, clarity of thought, soundness of mind, and technical refinement a huge array of bizarre, obtuse, questionable scholarship by some very big names in the academy. Their focus is the postmodern criticisms, and the Strong Programme.
The scientists, historians, and philosophers responding to the Strong Programme are nuanced and fair, recognizing when there are problems in the history of science, or the present, or in how science has been applied in the past, or when personal interest has overshadowed objectivity. They note when the critics are correct, which is rare, and often only in small vague ways, but these moments are treated honestly. The majority of the time they are carefully opening up messy thinking by science studies scholars, and explaining with special attention all the errors that have been made in the scholar’s reasoning, analysis, and conclusions.
The last essay in the book, by historian of science Meera Nanda, should probably have been the first essay, because it perfectly describes the problem, adequately characterizes the broad set of views and ideas of the Strong Programme and related criticisms, and shows their feebleness with three case studies from India, China, and Pakistan. These studies demonstrate that subjectivist, ancestral cultural knowledge is not an adequate substitute, in the world of ideas and knowledge, for scientific rationality. She argues that the epistemic “charity” offered by the Strong Programme is condescending. She shows that its proponents, like Richard Rorty, get many things wrong, such as claiming that a more accurate understanding of the world based on “Western science” could never have an effect on our morality or how we respond to nature. Her essay overflows with exquisite reasoning, meticulously “deconstructing” the deconstructionists, demystifying their dogma for the curious. She is careful to distinguish between scientism and scientific rationality, calling for the latter instead of the former. This essay alone is so good it’s worth reading the whole book to get to it, but almost every essay here is a gem.
I can’t cover them all with the attention they are due, but I’ll comment on a few selections. Physicist Alan Sokal and philosopher of mind Paul Boghossian discuss the Sokal hoax, what it does and doesn’t say about the postmodern academy, and what we can learn from it. Sokal touches on some of the critics who will be discussed in more depth later in the book, briefly explaining their erroneous analyses of science, like Bruno Latour, Sandra Harding, Gilles Deleuze, Barry Barnes, and David Bloor. Boghossian argues that the hoax demonstrates that relativism has caught on in the academy, has become fashionable despite being devoid of substance, and that recognizing this as a problem is not indicative of a specific political point of view, but of a desire for more robust knowledge.
Philosopher Philip Kitcher makes a strong case for the validity of science studies, if done well, but goes on to point out that it is almost never done well, is executed by people with no scientific literacy, and that the worse it is done, the shabbier its scholarship, the more popular and influential it becomes.
Biologist Paul Gross (coauthor of the excellent book Higher Superstition with Norman Levitt) offers two essays. His first discusses the extreme levels of fabrication perpetuated by Evelyn Fox Keller, Helen Longino, Emily Martin, Nancy Tuana, and a seemingly bottomless pit of feminist scholars who published highly read pieces that claim the entire history of biologists’ understanding of human sperm and egg is riddled with sexist metaphors and misogynist representations of a “submissive egg” and a “macho, adventurous sperm”. He shows that not only is this untrue, because the true nature of the egg as anything but submissive has been known and demonstrated since the early 20th century, but that the sociocultural myths being forwarded here are damaging and invent a picture of sexism that does not accurately describe the world of professional biology.
In his other essay he takes a closer look at the argumentation tactics used by science studies writers, like the rhetorical feint, or the intimations of absurdity, a tactic I’ve seen played often. It is when one writes a supposedly scathing takedown of a viewpoint one disagrees with by merely intimating that the view is absurd, but at no point providing an argument for why the view is absurd. The reader has, by the end, hopefully remembered that the view being criticized is labeled absurd, but has forgotten that the writer has failed to explain why. He gives his attention to a bunch of other tactics that I can’t help but see as synonymous with certain forms of empty political writing. His analysis is astute.
Engineer Philip Sullivan writes a technical piece discussing the feminist accusation that scientists made more progress with mathematically describing rigid objects instead of fluids because rigid objects are masculine and fluids are feminine, thus scientists treat them as less important and less worth their time. Sullivan, an expert in fluid dynamics, explains why fluids present a harder problem, and shows that in fact very much mathematical work has been done on them. His beautiful and elegant descriptions of the misreadings by a whole community is spot on.
Philosopher and zoologist Michael Ruse looks at the complex arguments that have popped up regarding Charles Darwin, primarily by those who claim he or his work, but especially his legacy, is sexist. Physicist Allan Franklin writes two detailed essays in which he offers his rebuttals to sociologists making wild claims about the history of certain developments in science and shows that their social constructivist explanations have no merit in light of the basic scientific facts. Physicist John Huth pulls us into the mind-warping world of Bruno Latour, whose perverse misreadings of Einstein’s relativity results in a shaky justification for epistemic relativism, which Huth eloquently and amusingly strips of all seriousness.
A few other contributors discuss Latour, as well as the cottage industry of science studies scholars who found a niche in critiquing and misreading Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, and certain other Enlightenment era thinkers who have been somehow aligned with subjectivism and misogyny. The contributors taking on these critics include philosopher Alan Soble, historian and sociologist Margaret Jacob, philosopher Cassandra Pinnick, and historian and philosopher William Newman. The latter writes an essay arguing that the feminist romanticizing of alchemy exhibits more confusion about the subject than a clear understanding of science or history.
Norman Levitt takes to task a journalist who doesn’t quite fit the bill of postmodern science studies, but who nevertheless makes bold claims about the End of Science, with dozens of shortsighted, out of touch, and wrong assessments. Levitt extends a generous benefit of the doubt to the author, John Horgan, and assumes he is intelligent enough to know why he’s wrong. He follows this with some compelling speculation, backed by evidence, about the intellectual motivation behind much of the scholarship that is blindly critical of a subject its scholars pride themselves on not understanding. I won’t get into it here, because his thesis is too good for me to fairly represent. I’ve already spent enough time here, it’s time to move along.
This is a stellar collection of scientific, philosophical, and historical writing. I’ve had the book for years and put off reading it for too long. I find it difficult to accurately give my thoughts on a book tackling so many diverse but related topics. Even showering it in praise seems insufficient, because that comes off shallow and doesn’t say enough. I recommend the book to anyone interested in science, the history or sociology of science, the culture wars, and who wants to see a more constructive, intelligent way of thinking about problems than what we’re offered by private media corporations or the pop-justice book of the month.
There’s more. It is also the belief that biases, self-interest, opinions, and bigotry underlie all scientific knowledge and method, and that science is not about knowledge but about power.
Hold on, there’s still more. It’s also the belief that science reflects purely white, Western, capitalist values and is nothing more than an enforcement of imperialism and colonialism and the privileging of masculine traits, like rationality, over all else.
There’s even more to it, but to do justice to the litany of beliefs in the postmodern view would take more space than is allowed, and more time than I’m willing to put in. In summary, the postmodern political critiques of science led to what was called the Science Wars, which perhaps peaked with Alan Sokal’s brilliant satire-parody that showed the vacuousness of much of the postmodern scholarship on the subject. These wars continue today, but have spilled over into other areas of social and political interest. It’s surprising how little has changed in almost 30 years.
In the 90s, philosopher of science Noretta Koertge gathered a group of sixteen scientists, historians, philosophers, and engineers to respond to the most popular and widespread criticisms of science. This book is that response, a collection of 18 exquisite essays dissecting and analyzing, with precision, clarity of thought, soundness of mind, and technical refinement a huge array of bizarre, obtuse, questionable scholarship by some very big names in the academy. Their focus is the postmodern criticisms, and the Strong Programme.
The scientists, historians, and philosophers responding to the Strong Programme are nuanced and fair, recognizing when there are problems in the history of science, or the present, or in how science has been applied in the past, or when personal interest has overshadowed objectivity. They note when the critics are correct, which is rare, and often only in small vague ways, but these moments are treated honestly. The majority of the time they are carefully opening up messy thinking by science studies scholars, and explaining with special attention all the errors that have been made in the scholar’s reasoning, analysis, and conclusions.
The last essay in the book, by historian of science Meera Nanda, should probably have been the first essay, because it perfectly describes the problem, adequately characterizes the broad set of views and ideas of the Strong Programme and related criticisms, and shows their feebleness with three case studies from India, China, and Pakistan. These studies demonstrate that subjectivist, ancestral cultural knowledge is not an adequate substitute, in the world of ideas and knowledge, for scientific rationality. She argues that the epistemic “charity” offered by the Strong Programme is condescending. She shows that its proponents, like Richard Rorty, get many things wrong, such as claiming that a more accurate understanding of the world based on “Western science” could never have an effect on our morality or how we respond to nature. Her essay overflows with exquisite reasoning, meticulously “deconstructing” the deconstructionists, demystifying their dogma for the curious. She is careful to distinguish between scientism and scientific rationality, calling for the latter instead of the former. This essay alone is so good it’s worth reading the whole book to get to it, but almost every essay here is a gem.
I can’t cover them all with the attention they are due, but I’ll comment on a few selections. Physicist Alan Sokal and philosopher of mind Paul Boghossian discuss the Sokal hoax, what it does and doesn’t say about the postmodern academy, and what we can learn from it. Sokal touches on some of the critics who will be discussed in more depth later in the book, briefly explaining their erroneous analyses of science, like Bruno Latour, Sandra Harding, Gilles Deleuze, Barry Barnes, and David Bloor. Boghossian argues that the hoax demonstrates that relativism has caught on in the academy, has become fashionable despite being devoid of substance, and that recognizing this as a problem is not indicative of a specific political point of view, but of a desire for more robust knowledge.
Philosopher Philip Kitcher makes a strong case for the validity of science studies, if done well, but goes on to point out that it is almost never done well, is executed by people with no scientific literacy, and that the worse it is done, the shabbier its scholarship, the more popular and influential it becomes.
Biologist Paul Gross (coauthor of the excellent book Higher Superstition with Norman Levitt) offers two essays. His first discusses the extreme levels of fabrication perpetuated by Evelyn Fox Keller, Helen Longino, Emily Martin, Nancy Tuana, and a seemingly bottomless pit of feminist scholars who published highly read pieces that claim the entire history of biologists’ understanding of human sperm and egg is riddled with sexist metaphors and misogynist representations of a “submissive egg” and a “macho, adventurous sperm”. He shows that not only is this untrue, because the true nature of the egg as anything but submissive has been known and demonstrated since the early 20th century, but that the sociocultural myths being forwarded here are damaging and invent a picture of sexism that does not accurately describe the world of professional biology.
In his other essay he takes a closer look at the argumentation tactics used by science studies writers, like the rhetorical feint, or the intimations of absurdity, a tactic I’ve seen played often. It is when one writes a supposedly scathing takedown of a viewpoint one disagrees with by merely intimating that the view is absurd, but at no point providing an argument for why the view is absurd. The reader has, by the end, hopefully remembered that the view being criticized is labeled absurd, but has forgotten that the writer has failed to explain why. He gives his attention to a bunch of other tactics that I can’t help but see as synonymous with certain forms of empty political writing. His analysis is astute.
Engineer Philip Sullivan writes a technical piece discussing the feminist accusation that scientists made more progress with mathematically describing rigid objects instead of fluids because rigid objects are masculine and fluids are feminine, thus scientists treat them as less important and less worth their time. Sullivan, an expert in fluid dynamics, explains why fluids present a harder problem, and shows that in fact very much mathematical work has been done on them. His beautiful and elegant descriptions of the misreadings by a whole community is spot on.
Philosopher and zoologist Michael Ruse looks at the complex arguments that have popped up regarding Charles Darwin, primarily by those who claim he or his work, but especially his legacy, is sexist. Physicist Allan Franklin writes two detailed essays in which he offers his rebuttals to sociologists making wild claims about the history of certain developments in science and shows that their social constructivist explanations have no merit in light of the basic scientific facts. Physicist John Huth pulls us into the mind-warping world of Bruno Latour, whose perverse misreadings of Einstein’s relativity results in a shaky justification for epistemic relativism, which Huth eloquently and amusingly strips of all seriousness.
A few other contributors discuss Latour, as well as the cottage industry of science studies scholars who found a niche in critiquing and misreading Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, and certain other Enlightenment era thinkers who have been somehow aligned with subjectivism and misogyny. The contributors taking on these critics include philosopher Alan Soble, historian and sociologist Margaret Jacob, philosopher Cassandra Pinnick, and historian and philosopher William Newman. The latter writes an essay arguing that the feminist romanticizing of alchemy exhibits more confusion about the subject than a clear understanding of science or history.
Norman Levitt takes to task a journalist who doesn’t quite fit the bill of postmodern science studies, but who nevertheless makes bold claims about the End of Science, with dozens of shortsighted, out of touch, and wrong assessments. Levitt extends a generous benefit of the doubt to the author, John Horgan, and assumes he is intelligent enough to know why he’s wrong. He follows this with some compelling speculation, backed by evidence, about the intellectual motivation behind much of the scholarship that is blindly critical of a subject its scholars pride themselves on not understanding. I won’t get into it here, because his thesis is too good for me to fairly represent. I’ve already spent enough time here, it’s time to move along.
This is a stellar collection of scientific, philosophical, and historical writing. I’ve had the book for years and put off reading it for too long. I find it difficult to accurately give my thoughts on a book tackling so many diverse but related topics. Even showering it in praise seems insufficient, because that comes off shallow and doesn’t say enough. I recommend the book to anyone interested in science, the history or sociology of science, the culture wars, and who wants to see a more constructive, intelligent way of thinking about problems than what we’re offered by private media corporations or the pop-justice book of the month.
June 26, 2008
Do you think that all ways of thinking are equally valid? That science is just one way of 'knowing the world'? Do you consider science to be just our cultures creation story? Noretta Koertge is here to explain why you are wrong.
Her name is pronounced ker-chee, and she is a woman so you can't dismiss her as just another tool of the colonial patriarchy sent here to oppress american graduate students.
Her name is pronounced ker-chee, and she is a woman so you can't dismiss her as just another tool of the colonial patriarchy sent here to oppress american graduate students.
July 28, 2023
In the same vein as Intellectual Impostures, but much more interesting. Should disabuse any reader from taking the "strong programme" seriously.
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