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The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery
A fascinating look at history's losers-the myths they create to cope with defeat and the steps they take never to be vanquished again
History may be written by the victors, Wolfgang Schivelbusch argues in his brilliant and provocative book, but the losers often have the final word. Focusing on three seminal cases of modern warfare-the South after the Civil War, France in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War, and Germany following World War I-Schivelbusch reveals the complex psychological and cultural reactions of vanquished nations to the experience of military defeat.
Drawing on responses from every level of society, Schivelbusch shows how conquered societies question the foundations of their identities and strive to emulate the the South to become a "better North," the French to militarize their schools on the Prussian model, the Germans to adopt all things American. He charts the losers' paradoxical equation of military failure with cultural superiority as they generate myths to glorify their pasts and explain their the nostalgic "plantation legend" after the fall of the Confederacy; the cult of Joan of Arc in vanquished France; the fiction of the stab in the back by "foreign" elements in postwar Germany. From cathartic epidemics of "dance madness" to the revolutions that so often follow battlefield humiliation, Schivelbusch finds remarkable similarities across cultures.
Eloquently and vibrantly told, The Culture of Defeat is a tour de force that opens new territory for historical inquiry.
History may be written by the victors, Wolfgang Schivelbusch argues in his brilliant and provocative book, but the losers often have the final word. Focusing on three seminal cases of modern warfare-the South after the Civil War, France in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War, and Germany following World War I-Schivelbusch reveals the complex psychological and cultural reactions of vanquished nations to the experience of military defeat.
Drawing on responses from every level of society, Schivelbusch shows how conquered societies question the foundations of their identities and strive to emulate the the South to become a "better North," the French to militarize their schools on the Prussian model, the Germans to adopt all things American. He charts the losers' paradoxical equation of military failure with cultural superiority as they generate myths to glorify their pasts and explain their the nostalgic "plantation legend" after the fall of the Confederacy; the cult of Joan of Arc in vanquished France; the fiction of the stab in the back by "foreign" elements in postwar Germany. From cathartic epidemics of "dance madness" to the revolutions that so often follow battlefield humiliation, Schivelbusch finds remarkable similarities across cultures.
Eloquently and vibrantly told, The Culture of Defeat is a tour de force that opens new territory for historical inquiry.
416 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2001
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January 18, 2019
Wow! What a great book. Over years of reading military history it seemed that there were three main perspectives an author could work from: Causes, Conduct (how the war was fought), and Consequences. These three C's seemed quite basic. Schivelbusch, however, has easily outdone this list, here adding Culture, Context and Comparison. His research is extensive, imaginative, and authoritative. His writing is graceful, thoughtful--and thought provoking. His footnotes often provide an extension of the point he is addressing in the text in a manner so engaging that one is disappointed to find a footnote that provides only the source of a quotation. I found myself marking up his footnotes.
The book considers how three nations responded to loss in war: The South in the American Civil War, France after the Franco Prussian war of 1870-1871, and Germany after World War I. His mention of the actual fighting in these conflicts is minimal, his focus is on the coping with loss. This is a complex process, unique to each situation, yet holding many similarities. Schivelbusch writes, "Being defeated appears to be an inexhaustible wellspring of intellectual progress." This is because, invariably, the loser seeks to rebuild in a way that voids the faults that led to defeat. Often, the result is borrowing from the strength of their late opponent. In this regard he cites, "the New South's emulation of the Yankee model, the reforms of the French army and educational system along Prussian-German lines, or the imitation of America by Germany after 1918 and 1945."
Each loser seems to develop a theme that helps to mitigate their grief. For the South it was the "Lost Cause," for the French it was "Revanche--more like redress than revenge", and for WWI Germany it was "The Stab in the Back" from the homefront.
A third commonality he finds is that "defeated nations waste little time after recovering from their initial shock, in finding scapegoats." The old regime is faulted and it's policies and goals are "often abandoned with few second thoughts."
The portrait of each nation is compelling with a wealth of detail drawn from the culture, government, economy, literature, and folk heroes. In discussing the South, for instance, the author notes the heavy reliance on Scottish history because of the many Scots immigrants who moved down the Appalachian chain after coming here. Schivelbusch writes, "the Lost Cause came from that ambivalent consciousness of decline and cultural superiority that manifested itself in the South's identification with Scotland, Bonnie Prince Charlie, and the English Cavaliers." He later notes that this familiarity with loss made adjustment somewhat easier after the Civil War.
In discussing the French reaction to loss against the Prussians, Schivelbusch describes the role of the Paris Commune. It consisted of citizens who volunteered to protect the city from the new French government which had agreed to capitulate after the army failed to defeat the enemy in the field. The army was called in and did defeat the Communards. They were killed, he writes, because they "were no longer in tune with the prevailing national sentiment." That sentiment reflected war-weariness and a desire to move on. Seeking to find a symbol for their ongoing quest for revanche, the government first considered Joan of Arc. However, she proved a difficult choice because she would be offensive to the royalist faction, and to the Catholic Church which had ordered her to be burned. Ultimately the legendary Roland, who had perished in a fight against the Saracens after being betrayed, was selected. He was, according to one of the author's sources, little known before 1870, but "was transformed within a few years from a minor part of the collective unconscious to a national myth." He became a suitable symbol because his sacrifice eventually led to Charlemagne's successful revanche against the Saracens. Thus, Roland fit the desired story line for France in the 1870's (even though revanche is usually considered an immediate response).
The account of Germany's trauma of loss in World War I has the greatest resonance in this book because Schivelbusch carries the aftermath on to the Hitler regime, World War II, and beyond. His primary emphasis in each of the three cases is the formation of a new government. In Germany, as elsewhere, this was a complicated, messy process. After the Kaiser "fled in the night across the Belgian-Dutch border," postwar Germany had the Weimar Republic as their government. However, it was beset with myriad problems including a divided public. Many veterans associated its governing party, the Social Democrats, with the "Stab in the back" betrayal of the soldiers at the front. The hyperinflation that occurred in the early 1920's turned additional Germans against their government. Given this divisiveness, Schivelbusch notes that in 1871 France the "opposing camps" competed over "who would advocate the most promising form of revanche," but the German factions "competed only to assign blame." From this fractioning, a decade later Hitler and his party would assume national leadership. We all know how that turned out.
The author assembles people, issues and events to tell the rich story of each of these epics of recovery from military defeat. In doing so he brings out the connections with our modern world, some more important than others. But, he also takes time and effort to tell fascinating side stories, such as the role of propaganda, of Henry Ford's assembly line innovation, and the utilization of myth and literature in rebuilding national unity. The total is a richness to be treasured.
Do I recommend this book? Yes, highly. However, I can't decide for whom I recommend it. Anyone who reads nonfiction seems a likely candidate. I picked up this book at a used book sale, attracted by the cover, title, and subtitle. When I opened it I found that I had read an earlier book, "Disenchanted Night: The Industrialization of Light in the Nineteenth Century," also by Wolfgang Schivelbusch. How can one not remember a name like that? "Disenchanted" had the same wealth of detail, the same pleasing, story telling voice. I see he also has written, "The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the Nineteenth Century." I've already ordered a copy. This author is habit forming.
The book considers how three nations responded to loss in war: The South in the American Civil War, France after the Franco Prussian war of 1870-1871, and Germany after World War I. His mention of the actual fighting in these conflicts is minimal, his focus is on the coping with loss. This is a complex process, unique to each situation, yet holding many similarities. Schivelbusch writes, "Being defeated appears to be an inexhaustible wellspring of intellectual progress." This is because, invariably, the loser seeks to rebuild in a way that voids the faults that led to defeat. Often, the result is borrowing from the strength of their late opponent. In this regard he cites, "the New South's emulation of the Yankee model, the reforms of the French army and educational system along Prussian-German lines, or the imitation of America by Germany after 1918 and 1945."
Each loser seems to develop a theme that helps to mitigate their grief. For the South it was the "Lost Cause," for the French it was "Revanche--more like redress than revenge", and for WWI Germany it was "The Stab in the Back" from the homefront.
A third commonality he finds is that "defeated nations waste little time after recovering from their initial shock, in finding scapegoats." The old regime is faulted and it's policies and goals are "often abandoned with few second thoughts."
The portrait of each nation is compelling with a wealth of detail drawn from the culture, government, economy, literature, and folk heroes. In discussing the South, for instance, the author notes the heavy reliance on Scottish history because of the many Scots immigrants who moved down the Appalachian chain after coming here. Schivelbusch writes, "the Lost Cause came from that ambivalent consciousness of decline and cultural superiority that manifested itself in the South's identification with Scotland, Bonnie Prince Charlie, and the English Cavaliers." He later notes that this familiarity with loss made adjustment somewhat easier after the Civil War.
In discussing the French reaction to loss against the Prussians, Schivelbusch describes the role of the Paris Commune. It consisted of citizens who volunteered to protect the city from the new French government which had agreed to capitulate after the army failed to defeat the enemy in the field. The army was called in and did defeat the Communards. They were killed, he writes, because they "were no longer in tune with the prevailing national sentiment." That sentiment reflected war-weariness and a desire to move on. Seeking to find a symbol for their ongoing quest for revanche, the government first considered Joan of Arc. However, she proved a difficult choice because she would be offensive to the royalist faction, and to the Catholic Church which had ordered her to be burned. Ultimately the legendary Roland, who had perished in a fight against the Saracens after being betrayed, was selected. He was, according to one of the author's sources, little known before 1870, but "was transformed within a few years from a minor part of the collective unconscious to a national myth." He became a suitable symbol because his sacrifice eventually led to Charlemagne's successful revanche against the Saracens. Thus, Roland fit the desired story line for France in the 1870's (even though revanche is usually considered an immediate response).
The account of Germany's trauma of loss in World War I has the greatest resonance in this book because Schivelbusch carries the aftermath on to the Hitler regime, World War II, and beyond. His primary emphasis in each of the three cases is the formation of a new government. In Germany, as elsewhere, this was a complicated, messy process. After the Kaiser "fled in the night across the Belgian-Dutch border," postwar Germany had the Weimar Republic as their government. However, it was beset with myriad problems including a divided public. Many veterans associated its governing party, the Social Democrats, with the "Stab in the back" betrayal of the soldiers at the front. The hyperinflation that occurred in the early 1920's turned additional Germans against their government. Given this divisiveness, Schivelbusch notes that in 1871 France the "opposing camps" competed over "who would advocate the most promising form of revanche," but the German factions "competed only to assign blame." From this fractioning, a decade later Hitler and his party would assume national leadership. We all know how that turned out.
The author assembles people, issues and events to tell the rich story of each of these epics of recovery from military defeat. In doing so he brings out the connections with our modern world, some more important than others. But, he also takes time and effort to tell fascinating side stories, such as the role of propaganda, of Henry Ford's assembly line innovation, and the utilization of myth and literature in rebuilding national unity. The total is a richness to be treasured.
Do I recommend this book? Yes, highly. However, I can't decide for whom I recommend it. Anyone who reads nonfiction seems a likely candidate. I picked up this book at a used book sale, attracted by the cover, title, and subtitle. When I opened it I found that I had read an earlier book, "Disenchanted Night: The Industrialization of Light in the Nineteenth Century," also by Wolfgang Schivelbusch. How can one not remember a name like that? "Disenchanted" had the same wealth of detail, the same pleasing, story telling voice. I see he also has written, "The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the Nineteenth Century." I've already ordered a copy. This author is habit forming.
May 27, 2015
Pretty good... I just wrote a review of this for class that I'll post on here as soon as the term's over and I can't be told I'm plagiarizing myself.
Read
July 26, 2025I bookmarked this title when I completed Jenny Macleod’s enlightening Defeat and Memory, reviewed earlier. The Culture of Defeat is an impressive undertaking, the substance noteworthy, the research meticulous. The book focuses on three social eras: the antebellum American South, which considers the emergence of the Lost Cause, and also raises a connection to Walter Scott’s writing, especially Waverly, a connection that came as new to me; France in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War, whose people percolated with a desire for revanche; and Germany following the First World War, where citizens initially embraced the slogan im Felde unbesiegt before accepting the more potent and enduring Dolchstoßlegende in late 1919. The central theme is that while the victors in these three examples all wished to inflict sharp defeats, the defeated were to have the final say. The author reminds us of a French essayist’s caution to the Prussians two weeks following the defeat at Sedan: Vae victoribus! – a turn on the classic Vae victis. We can easily conclude that not nearly enough has been written on the lasting inspirational forces that can be unleashed among the defeated through history.
While this author, an independent scholar, should be applauded for his depth of research and range of thought, I feel his commentary aligns too heavily with well-tailored elites and too little with the tattered, or even manicured, masses. Any attempt to discuss a nation’s culture puts logical structure at risk. Where should we begin and end a cultural analysis? To understand the currents and eddies of a Western society, more time should be spent at bars and less time in libraries, I think. Herr Schivelbusch avoids the beer halls, steering instead for discussion of the Nibelungenlied, the Iliad, Uncle Tom’s Cabin, and the Song of Roland.
Measuring social momentum is difficult, in part because a spirited herd leaves little behind for future researchers. For example, we get a sliver of crowd thought today when watching American sporting events that have international competitors where a chorus – I presume anchored with a critical mass of inebriated patrons – chants “U–S–A . . . U–S–A.” What do you suspect is in their minds in those, for me, embarrassing moments? I sense a heavy dose of ethnocentrism and exceptionalism, which naturally lacks either grace or humility, among the loud chanters. Is it not that crowd, and their many cousins, providing the impetus to populist policies across time and place? I imagine these people are not too affected by high culture, whatever its form. What then is the best way to capture their spirit?
In his chapter on Germany, the author leads us through the development of industrial policies that had American origins, from Taylorism to Fordism, then on to rationalization, which was an important foundational element for the rise of National Socialism. Increasingly sophisticated tools of mass persuasion were connected to these industrial developments. I caught one particularly interesting comment regarding propaganda:
This feels like commentary appropriate for American national politics today. These remarks on social manipulation also caused me to think about the cycles of moral panics and the significant costs and harms that have resulted therefrom through our history. This last point was not considered directly in this book, though it strikes me as a topic of great significance at this anxious moment.
While this author, an independent scholar, should be applauded for his depth of research and range of thought, I feel his commentary aligns too heavily with well-tailored elites and too little with the tattered, or even manicured, masses. Any attempt to discuss a nation’s culture puts logical structure at risk. Where should we begin and end a cultural analysis? To understand the currents and eddies of a Western society, more time should be spent at bars and less time in libraries, I think. Herr Schivelbusch avoids the beer halls, steering instead for discussion of the Nibelungenlied, the Iliad, Uncle Tom’s Cabin, and the Song of Roland.
Measuring social momentum is difficult, in part because a spirited herd leaves little behind for future researchers. For example, we get a sliver of crowd thought today when watching American sporting events that have international competitors where a chorus – I presume anchored with a critical mass of inebriated patrons – chants “U–S–A . . . U–S–A.” What do you suspect is in their minds in those, for me, embarrassing moments? I sense a heavy dose of ethnocentrism and exceptionalism, which naturally lacks either grace or humility, among the loud chanters. Is it not that crowd, and their many cousins, providing the impetus to populist policies across time and place? I imagine these people are not too affected by high culture, whatever its form. What then is the best way to capture their spirit?
In his chapter on Germany, the author leads us through the development of industrial policies that had American origins, from Taylorism to Fordism, then on to rationalization, which was an important foundational element for the rise of National Socialism. Increasingly sophisticated tools of mass persuasion were connected to these industrial developments. I caught one particularly interesting comment regarding propaganda:
In its methods of mass manipulation and mobilization, National Socialism was thus “more American” than any of the other political movements. Hitler’s public appearances—for instance, his airplane tour through Germany in 1932—have been described as “rituals of German hero worship staged with American know-how,” and the success of Goebbels’s Propaganda Ministry was in no small part due to its entertainment value. As Ernest K. Bramsted points out, “There was a good deal of showmanship and of the American circus à la Barnum in Goebbels’s techniques.”
This feels like commentary appropriate for American national politics today. These remarks on social manipulation also caused me to think about the cycles of moral panics and the significant costs and harms that have resulted therefrom through our history. This last point was not considered directly in this book, though it strikes me as a topic of great significance at this anxious moment.
May 21, 2012
Country xyz "lost the battle for the true interpretation of defeat - and, conseuently, for political power" This is the author's thesis. He covers the American Civil War, one of the French revolutions and Germany after WWI. He scours old written sources for the slogans of the poets and politicians of the time. The P&P probably fly lots of mottos and bon mots but only a few catch on. It is not clear how their power at the time can be measured. This is very different from the great men/wars/dates view of history in most books.Many political groups/nations have been united by the introduciton of a 'common' enemuy - the 'common' theme or world view is proposed as being equally strong and especially useful in the absense of military or financial superiority.
As a non-historian I thought the book was well researched and presented even if I did not buy all the ideas proposed. It was not a difficult read for the most part. I am not sure however if it was worth my time.
As a non-historian I thought the book was well researched and presented even if I did not buy all the ideas proposed. It was not a difficult read for the most part. I am not sure however if it was worth my time.
April 16, 2009
Probably the most compelling book written about a largely misunderstood phenomenon: how the defeated peoples see themselves, and rarely is it defeated. From the Confederate States' "Lost Cause" mythology (which started in the 1850's), the French empire's "Revanche" ideal or the German Empire's "Stab in the Back", the book critically examines the mental impetus that causes defeated people to act as they act and to say what they say.
And its eminently applicable to the US in the post 9/11 world. And how as a people we have tried to turn a defeat into an apparent victory. This book is a must read for understanding the psychology of defeat.
And its eminently applicable to the US in the post 9/11 world. And how as a people we have tried to turn a defeat into an apparent victory. This book is a must read for understanding the psychology of defeat.
November 17, 2020
Very interesting view. Schivelbusch knows well what he is writing about. It can be combined with Ivan Krastev & Stephen Holmes`s book about Eastern Europe and the imitation of the West, The Light that Failed.
Schivelbusch shows well the psychology of the loser and the imitator, and as the author says - the winner can write the history, but the loser has the last word. One star off because I feel the book needs more examples from today`s world.
Schivelbusch shows well the psychology of the loser and the imitator, and as the author says - the winner can write the history, but the loser has the last word. One star off because I feel the book needs more examples from today`s world.
August 29, 2024
Since nations are virtual constructs they really feel nothing, do they? That's a brilliant piece of deduction, also a reductionist nonsense. Wolfgang is here to prove that belonging to a nation can hurt, and the pain is very real. And how can you know if it lives, unless it struggles for survival? A vanquished society does struggle, it copes with reality, it looks for scapegoats, it readily indulges in resentment and hatred. Above all, it needs hope and demands innocence.
Case 1. US Civil War and the Lost Cause
The American South was the driving force of the US economy until the 1830s and was responsible for the initial capital accumulation that helped the northern industrialization take off. The North was also the primary trafficker of slaves, selling them to the South. Yet in a few decades, the situation changed dramatically, and so did the perspectives. The North quickly rebranded itself into a bourgeois stronghold and acknowledged little of its own past. The Old South found itself in a peculiar situation. As the real political weight evaporated and it turned into an inner colony to the North, they looked increasingly into symbolic power and prestige. A blend of American capitalism and European romanticism emerged, further shaped by immigrant memories of the Scottish independence struggle and the English Civil War. The scene was thus set. The South had an upper hand initially, being a militaristic society. The more painful was the eventual defeat. The mercantile North, on the other hand, switched to a total war of attrition to overcome their lack of military prowess.
What follows in the book is a lengthy speculative discussion about the nature of the defeat and the popular sentiments manifested in contemporary press and correspondence. The author argues that a defeat from a single enemy is more bitter than from a coalition. The defeated generation tends to blame their fathers while glorifying their grandfathers' generation, seeking a cultural continuity while excluding the fathers' generation.
The South underwent a painful period of humiliation, way beyond the administrative transformations of the Reconstruction era. To cope with the consequences the nation turned into a psychological block, a coma of sorts that the author calls dreamland. It would take half a century, US expansionism and two World Wars, in which the New South shared a common victory and glory with the North, for the vanquished to come to terms with themselves.
Case 2. France and the Franco-Prussian War
A tail of populist demagoguery and nationalist hysteria, evolving through all the stages of grief and finally culminating in the new imperial designs to expand France into the Sahara and beyond. In the end, the French found a way to channel their national drive and it yielded benefits. The colonial turn of France secured it an economic base, a playground for the army and a much-desired self-reconciliation. The Germans on the other hand enjoyed for too long their European triumph and got late for the colonial scramble. When they realized this it was too late to get an easy piece of the pie. Instead, they bumped into the imperial spheres of England and France, pushing them together into a rare and unholy alliance against Germany. The rest is history. Well played out, France!
Case 3. Germany and the World War I
The Germans never had their Sedan, but what's worse? To be defeated and surrender or not to be defeated and still surrender? The Germans fought with determination, losing was not an option. Once defeated, they ran no short of excuses. Unlike France, which was beaten in a fair duel, Germany was overwhelmed by a coalition. Germany stood against the whole of Europe, only after the US joined was the war decided. The Germans fought fairly, while Antante exploited insidious propaganda. And above all, grew the central myth of interbellum Germany: the stab in the back. The resentment grew, but it was the financial collapse that broke the back of the Weimar Republic. Once the hope of consolation through economic revanche was doomed, the doors were open wide for National Socialism.
P.S.
While it's arguable if the twists of the national psyche can be reflected and understood through the looking glass of text studies, the book amassed a tremendous body of evidence, manifesting the struggle and crisis of the defeated. If anything, the book reveals the crucial elements of nation-building; the importance of pride, self-esteem, the prestige necessary to keep the social tissue together.
Besides the methodological issues, this was just one daunting philological research. Perhaps too philological. I appreciate the academic rigour, abundance of historical material and the myriad perspectives, but I got lost in details, quotes and references. And did I really need to know the 50 shades of the word revanche in French or speculate about European capitulation against the American surrender, the child of total warfare? If anything, these meticulous philological studies only multiplied and entangled the entities endlessly.
Case 1. US Civil War and the Lost Cause
The American South was the driving force of the US economy until the 1830s and was responsible for the initial capital accumulation that helped the northern industrialization take off. The North was also the primary trafficker of slaves, selling them to the South. Yet in a few decades, the situation changed dramatically, and so did the perspectives. The North quickly rebranded itself into a bourgeois stronghold and acknowledged little of its own past. The Old South found itself in a peculiar situation. As the real political weight evaporated and it turned into an inner colony to the North, they looked increasingly into symbolic power and prestige. A blend of American capitalism and European romanticism emerged, further shaped by immigrant memories of the Scottish independence struggle and the English Civil War. The scene was thus set. The South had an upper hand initially, being a militaristic society. The more painful was the eventual defeat. The mercantile North, on the other hand, switched to a total war of attrition to overcome their lack of military prowess.
What follows in the book is a lengthy speculative discussion about the nature of the defeat and the popular sentiments manifested in contemporary press and correspondence. The author argues that a defeat from a single enemy is more bitter than from a coalition. The defeated generation tends to blame their fathers while glorifying their grandfathers' generation, seeking a cultural continuity while excluding the fathers' generation.
The South underwent a painful period of humiliation, way beyond the administrative transformations of the Reconstruction era. To cope with the consequences the nation turned into a psychological block, a coma of sorts that the author calls dreamland. It would take half a century, US expansionism and two World Wars, in which the New South shared a common victory and glory with the North, for the vanquished to come to terms with themselves.
Case 2. France and the Franco-Prussian War
A tail of populist demagoguery and nationalist hysteria, evolving through all the stages of grief and finally culminating in the new imperial designs to expand France into the Sahara and beyond. In the end, the French found a way to channel their national drive and it yielded benefits. The colonial turn of France secured it an economic base, a playground for the army and a much-desired self-reconciliation. The Germans on the other hand enjoyed for too long their European triumph and got late for the colonial scramble. When they realized this it was too late to get an easy piece of the pie. Instead, they bumped into the imperial spheres of England and France, pushing them together into a rare and unholy alliance against Germany. The rest is history. Well played out, France!
Case 3. Germany and the World War I
The Germans never had their Sedan, but what's worse? To be defeated and surrender or not to be defeated and still surrender? The Germans fought with determination, losing was not an option. Once defeated, they ran no short of excuses. Unlike France, which was beaten in a fair duel, Germany was overwhelmed by a coalition. Germany stood against the whole of Europe, only after the US joined was the war decided. The Germans fought fairly, while Antante exploited insidious propaganda. And above all, grew the central myth of interbellum Germany: the stab in the back. The resentment grew, but it was the financial collapse that broke the back of the Weimar Republic. Once the hope of consolation through economic revanche was doomed, the doors were open wide for National Socialism.
P.S.
While it's arguable if the twists of the national psyche can be reflected and understood through the looking glass of text studies, the book amassed a tremendous body of evidence, manifesting the struggle and crisis of the defeated. If anything, the book reveals the crucial elements of nation-building; the importance of pride, self-esteem, the prestige necessary to keep the social tissue together.
Besides the methodological issues, this was just one daunting philological research. Perhaps too philological. I appreciate the academic rigour, abundance of historical material and the myriad perspectives, but I got lost in details, quotes and references. And did I really need to know the 50 shades of the word revanche in French or speculate about European capitulation against the American surrender, the child of total warfare? If anything, these meticulous philological studies only multiplied and entangled the entities endlessly.
June 29, 2025
What happens when you go to war against another nation and lose? As an 20th century-born American, Vietnam comes to mind. However, most people weren't involved directly and the war took place nearly 8,000 miles from here. What is more relevant, is what happens when you fight your neighboring country and lose? What effects does the loss have on national morale and culture? Schievelbusch has your hookup.
The author examined three separate cases of such conflict; the South after the Civil War, France after the Franco-Prussian War, and Germany after World War I. In looking at these cases, Wolfgang sees a nation going through its own stages of grief. What most intrigued me was essentially the bargaining phase. Here, a losing nation attempts to explain away its loss (we were better but they cheated, the other side had help, etc.). This shows up most prominently in German bargaining after World War I. The aristocracy was prone to the stab in the back theory, while others lamented that they would have won had not the Americans jumped into the war - all the while overlooking their diplomatic buffo0nery that got us pulled in).
All of these made for good studies; however, if Wolfgang were so inclined, he could take on Germany after World War II, America after the Vietnam War, and the post-Soviet Union era. Each one of those would likely point in the same direction, yet to examine how the culture changed or was seen would be an interesting read. Specifically, the difference between American flappers and the German "girls" of the 1920s - same concept (girls dressing more androgynously and dancing) yet seen through totally different lenses.
The book is a challenging read; if you're not well versed in the classics, you're going to struggle with some of his references. A lot of French and German phrases are used without translation which does make it rough to read. It is, though, worth driving over these rough patches to get to understand what is a global issue.
BOTTOM LINE: Fascinating topic with great examples and depth of study.
The author examined three separate cases of such conflict; the South after the Civil War, France after the Franco-Prussian War, and Germany after World War I. In looking at these cases, Wolfgang sees a nation going through its own stages of grief. What most intrigued me was essentially the bargaining phase. Here, a losing nation attempts to explain away its loss (we were better but they cheated, the other side had help, etc.). This shows up most prominently in German bargaining after World War I. The aristocracy was prone to the stab in the back theory, while others lamented that they would have won had not the Americans jumped into the war - all the while overlooking their diplomatic buffo0nery that got us pulled in).
All of these made for good studies; however, if Wolfgang were so inclined, he could take on Germany after World War II, America after the Vietnam War, and the post-Soviet Union era. Each one of those would likely point in the same direction, yet to examine how the culture changed or was seen would be an interesting read. Specifically, the difference between American flappers and the German "girls" of the 1920s - same concept (girls dressing more androgynously and dancing) yet seen through totally different lenses.
The book is a challenging read; if you're not well versed in the classics, you're going to struggle with some of his references. A lot of French and German phrases are used without translation which does make it rough to read. It is, though, worth driving over these rough patches to get to understand what is a global issue.
BOTTOM LINE: Fascinating topic with great examples and depth of study.
May 12, 2025
Culture of Defeat is made up of three interconnected essays, on historical losers:
- Confederate States (loser of U.S. civil war - 1865)
- France (loser of Franco-Prussian War - 1871)
And
- Germany (loser of World War I - 1918)
In each case, defeat led to a national reckoning and a reevaluation of the loser’s role in the world.
I found the book fascinating, though I’m not sure how well it coheres into the unified theory the author aims for.
Three case studies are a limited sample from which to draw general conclusions about the nature of defeat.
I’d be interested in a more global - less Eurocentric treatment of defeat. The Taiping Rebellion, Japan’s loss in WW2 and Spanish conquests of the Aztec and Incas all seem like events that would be interesting subjects for similarly detailed consideration.
I’d also be interested in more detailed discussion of how minority groups responded to the emergence of these national narratives. E.g. the freed-slaves in the U.S. south constitute a sort of third category - obviously “winners” in a certain sense, but they clearly would experienced victory very differently from northern whites.
- Confederate States (loser of U.S. civil war - 1865)
- France (loser of Franco-Prussian War - 1871)
And
- Germany (loser of World War I - 1918)
In each case, defeat led to a national reckoning and a reevaluation of the loser’s role in the world.
I found the book fascinating, though I’m not sure how well it coheres into the unified theory the author aims for.
Three case studies are a limited sample from which to draw general conclusions about the nature of defeat.
I’d be interested in a more global - less Eurocentric treatment of defeat. The Taiping Rebellion, Japan’s loss in WW2 and Spanish conquests of the Aztec and Incas all seem like events that would be interesting subjects for similarly detailed consideration.
I’d also be interested in more detailed discussion of how minority groups responded to the emergence of these national narratives. E.g. the freed-slaves in the U.S. south constitute a sort of third category - obviously “winners” in a certain sense, but they clearly would experienced victory very differently from northern whites.
August 31, 2020
A thoroughly proven thesis that lapses only in some moments (too light on considerations of race in the American South) and becomes a bit repetitive in its emphasis.
But captivating nonetheless. These cultural histories are right up my alley even if the militaristic stuff isn’t. I’m glad I dove in because the cultural considerations are the bulk of everything here. Written in 2003, the epilogue is harrowing in reference to America’s post-9/11 pursuits as response to the unrecognized loss in Vietnam — a conflict not studied in this text but one that has all of the same traits of the ones that are studied (excuses for the loss (Vietnamese guerrilla warfare), rejection of the regime that led them to loss (disapproval of Nixon and the vets of the 70s), and learning from the victor in the worst ways possible).
Required several rereads of sections because of how much relevant information it contains
But captivating nonetheless. These cultural histories are right up my alley even if the militaristic stuff isn’t. I’m glad I dove in because the cultural considerations are the bulk of everything here. Written in 2003, the epilogue is harrowing in reference to America’s post-9/11 pursuits as response to the unrecognized loss in Vietnam — a conflict not studied in this text but one that has all of the same traits of the ones that are studied (excuses for the loss (Vietnamese guerrilla warfare), rejection of the regime that led them to loss (disapproval of Nixon and the vets of the 70s), and learning from the victor in the worst ways possible).
Required several rereads of sections because of how much relevant information it contains
March 12, 2022
I read this book as an attempt to undo the anti-intellectual messaging in another book about Confederate monuments being inherently racist (which very well may be true). And to that end, I am satiated but didn't find the exact counter-balance I sought--which is no fault of this book. It is still a well-researched and measured presentation of perspectives.
The fact that the book is translated from German makes the read a bit clunky at times.
I acquired sufficient perspective from the one-third of the book about the Civil War but less so from the other parts of the book that covered European conflict--likely because the book is written for an audience that already has some decent knowledge of those times. I knew far more about the former going into reading the book and much less about the latter. Still, the thesis of the book was made apparent even if my understanding of the details are still lacking (something that could have been remedied by a closer reading on my own part).
The fact that the book is translated from German makes the read a bit clunky at times.
I acquired sufficient perspective from the one-third of the book about the Civil War but less so from the other parts of the book that covered European conflict--likely because the book is written for an audience that already has some decent knowledge of those times. I knew far more about the former going into reading the book and much less about the latter. Still, the thesis of the book was made apparent even if my understanding of the details are still lacking (something that could have been remedied by a closer reading on my own part).
Read
June 15, 2019Food for thought, both historically and turned around as a conceptual framework for producing narratives in a competitive context. While the author limits himself to speaking on the commonalities of Western thought at times, it's handled as a labeling of his sphere of experience rather than a clannish excuse for the behaviors studied as so often happens even in academic historical writing.
It will be interesting to see what commonalities he identified in the eventual reactions begin to take shape around us in the next few years (or have in the past few), as we're approaching the timeframe for post-9/11 America to settle into its own shifted narrative.
It will be interesting to see what commonalities he identified in the eventual reactions begin to take shape around us in the next few years (or have in the past few), as we're approaching the timeframe for post-9/11 America to settle into its own shifted narrative.
January 12, 2025
An excellent and thorough look at how nations, cultures, and political movements mourn, react, and recover from national trauma. Covering 3 nations in their respective defeats of the South after the American Civil War, France after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, and Germany after the First World War. Despite the focus it applies a formula created in the introduction that can neatly apply to all cases of national trauma, as the Epilogue, with its focus on the collapse on the Soviet Union, illustrates.
Thoughtful, insightful, and brilliant, this book is a must read for students of history and political science.
Thoughtful, insightful, and brilliant, this book is a must read for students of history and political science.
October 5, 2024
An full understanding of such breadth is hard to believe but true. A book like this shakes you with how much the author is able to bring together to explore and illuminate the most fascinating patterns.
December 3, 2017
Some interesting points but overly effusive and the writer was pompous. Read 90% of book.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
November 25, 2024
Good book
Translation?
Translation?
February 1, 2008
What do the Civil War, the Franco-Prussian War, and World War One in common? This book argues that the lessons of defeat changed the vanquished, as they grappled with the causes of their defeat. From Woodrow Wilson's childhood memories of the occupying Union Army in Richmond, to French admonishment of their school system, to German mimicing of American wartime propaganda, Schivelbusch has written a book that is thoroughly engaging, showing how soceities rise form the ashes of defeat only when they emulate their victors.
(See Victor Davis Hanson's "Ripples of Battle" for a differnt take on Schivelbusch's unique perspective on the post-war restructuring)
(See Victor Davis Hanson's "Ripples of Battle" for a differnt take on Schivelbusch's unique perspective on the post-war restructuring)
May 27, 2015
Fascinating discussion of a global "era of total war" (1861-1945), which developed a unique culture for vanquished nations. While I'm not crazy about the over reliance on Walter Scott to explain southern culture, the author is smart to connect the South to global patterns of defeat.
April 15, 2016
I have truly missed history class, and this book catered very well to that unquenched hunger in its exploration of snippets of the psychologies of war and defeat in German, French and American pasts.
December 23, 2016
The first third detailing the South’s response to their loss in the American Civil War is masterful and Schivelbusch’s multiple arguments are entirely convincing. His sections on France after the Franco-Prussian war and Germany after WWI can sometimes be thin and reaching.
January 4, 2008
Important book for understanding current situation. See, in particular, section about the Confederacy.
May 15, 2013
Supes quirks. I will never picture the same thing when I think of #DefeatCulture again.
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March 23, 2018Dizzyingly detailed. I guess I was most surprised to discover the semi-famous dictum "Think of it always, speak of it never" in regards to the loss of Alsace-Lorraine was never actually said by the guy assumed to have spoken it (although, why the surprise, nobody ever says what people say they've said, to badly paraphrase Berra) and that the Danny Huston role in 2017's Wonder Woman was even more of an insult to history's dead than it appears at first glance to the under-informed.
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