Report of the Marine Board of Investigation Into the Implosion of the Submersible TITAN

by Us Coast Guard

335 pages, Paperback

Published August 5, 2025

Reviews

[Jena · Rating 5 out of 5]

Some of my favorite quotes:

OceanGate’s refund policy prohibited refunds within six months of the expedition, with participants losing their full contributions if they canceled within 180 days of an expedition’s start, unless the cancellation was due to equipment failure, which would then result in a credit for future expeditions. These credits were non-transferable and could not be redeemed for cash.

Despite the team's growing specialization, there was a notable lack of experience in submersible design, as many of the new hires were either current college students or recent graduates.

From 2017 until 2023, OceanGate’s engineering team experiencedsignificant downsizing. In 2017, the team consisted of approximately 20members. By 2019, this number was reduced to approximately 12. As of 2023, the engineering team was comprised of just three members: an electronics engineer, an electronics technician, and a software engineer. According to the Expedition 2023 Execution Plan, the position of Director of Engineering during TITAN’s final expedition was still to be determined.

In May 2017, the collaboration between OceanGate and the UW-APL was terminated due to ongoing engineering disagreements, prompting OceanGate to assume full control over the engineering aspects of their project. The Applied Physics Lab expressed reservations about using glass spheres for housing the propulsion motor controller pod for the manned vehicle. UW-APL was concerned about the reliability of glass spheres in general applications, and they highlighted a concerning history of unexpected failures of the glass spheres at significant depths. Given the extreme pressures associated with the depths OceanGate aimed to explore, UW-APL concluded that using glass spheres posed unacceptable risks, particularly in a crewed context, despite their potential suitability for shallower submersible operations.

In testimony regarding the ANDREA DORIA expedition, the OceanGate Director of Operations, who served as the assistant pilot to Mr. Rush, described a critical moment during a dive when the CYCLOPS I became stuck under the bow of the ANDREA DORIA wreckage. The assistant pilot stated that Mr. Rush experienced a "meltdown" and refused to let him assist in resolving the situation. When a mission specialist suggested that Mr. Rush hand over the controller to the assistant pilot, the assistant pilot reported that the controller was thrown at him. Upon obtaining the controller, the assistant pilot was able to free the CYCLOPS I from the wreckage and safely navigate it back to support vessel WARREN JR.

In correspondence between UW-APL members the following statement was made: “My take then is that OGI (OceanGate Inc.) is looking to implement an unproven technique on a human-inhabited vehicle. It might be fine - but there is no history of data or testing to back that up. Given that, I am inclined to respond with thank-you-but-APL-respectfully-declines. And decline means decline it all: battery selection, control system design, new device integration (acoustic modem, cameras, etc.)”

According to a former OceanGate Director of Engineering, the initial scrubber system in the TITAN, designed and built by Mr. Rush, was a "homemade" system that consistently failed to maintain adequate oxygen levels. This system was not in use on the final TITAN hull. The date of its replacement is unknown. The Director of Engineering provided the following testimony to the
MBI: “The scrubber was a homemade Stockton thing. I tried to get rid of it multiple times. Always was told no. It was literally made from a Tupperware container that came from Walmart or Amazon or somebody like that. It had liked a screen in the bottom with an air space underneath. You would pour the scrubber into this thing which was a granular chemical material, soap and lime is what it is, right. You'd pour that in there, and then there was a lid, a Tupperware lid that went on and in that Tupperware lid there was a computer fan. You'd attach the computer fan to a battery. That
would pull air out of the environment, push it into the scrubber material and then, you know, through the grid at the bottom and out some vent somewhere. So, this thing never really kept up. If you put four people in the sub, it really couldn't keep up with the occupants' breathing rate. So -- and it looked like it was a total piece of junk. I mean it looked like a Tupperware container from Walmart with computer fan on the top.”

OceanGate relied on Chat widget’s limited messaging capability to serve as their sole source of communications between surface support vessel on the POLAR PRINCE and the TITAN’s pilot after the TITAN was submerged (VHF radios were available to provide voice communications when the TITAN was at the surface). After reviewing text communications from previous TITAN dives, it was apparent to the MBI that the limitations created by the Chat widget hindered communications and led to over truncation of important messages, which occasionally led to frustration and miscommunications between the TITAN’s operator and the communications and tracking team. A former OceanGate contractor familiar with the EvoLogics system provided the following testimony to the MBI regarding OceanGate’s decision to combine TITAN’s tracking system and communications capability: “Normally, there would have been two devices there, you know, your communications which is completely separate from your tracking. This is the first case I've ever, ever seen where it was all done on the same thing which basically means that when one failed so did the other so both tracking and communications were down.”

On July 15, 2022, while on Dive 80, the TITAN deviated from its operational dive plan and subsequently violated OceanGate’s stated “look but don’t touch” posture by entering the TITANIC wreck site and becoming entangled with TITANIC wreckage. During the TITAN MBI hearing, a mission specialist testified that the TITAN subsequently became entangled in debris in the vicinity of the main stairwell of the TITANIC wreckage. This entanglement contradicted OceanGate’s statement to NOAA that; “a mission such as this, which will not be conducting any research, exploration, salvage or other activity that would physically alter or disturb the wreck or wreck site of RMS Titanic, does not fall under Section 113 of the 2017 Act, or the International Agreement concerning the Titanic, as it is a non-disturbance data gathering mission.”

OceanGate reported the completion of its 2022 summer expedition to EDVA on November 10, 2022. However, their report failed to mention TITAN’s entanglement event during Dive 80, which is in direct violation of Section 113 and inconsistent with the NOAA guidelines. In their letter to the EVDA, OceanGate's former legal representative stated that all activities adhered to established legal precedent and NOAA guidelines, emphasizing a "look but don't touch" approach. The letter further asserted that no disturbance to the TITANIC or interference with RMST's rights occurred, and that no artifacts or samples (other than seawater) were collected.

After the aborted drive the TITAN and LARS were towed back to the stern of the HORIZON ARCTIC for recovery operations. While the TITAN and LARS were being pulled up the stern ramp and onto the stern of the HORIZON ARCTIC, OceanGate experienced their first “incident” of the 2021 expedition when the forward 3,000 lb titanium dome sheared off of the TITAN and landed on the front of the LARS. According to TITAN’s Maintenance Log, the forward dome was subsequently inspected, reinstalled, and an incident report was completed. The MBI was unable to obtain the incident report filed for the incident. However, OceanGate witnesses testified to the MBI that the dome and installed viewport did not appear to have sustained any damage from the fall. Following the incident, the OceanGate Blog stated, “Necessary adjustments to our operation were notated and a collaborative action plan was developed and implemented. Challenges at sea are often unforeseen and require flexible, creative, and intelligent problem-solving skills.”

The Mission Director who was overseeing Dive 65 from the ARTIC HORIZON instructed the pilot (Mr. Rush) to return to the surface by dropping the TITAN’s weight tray. However, Mr. Rush responded by asking for more time to consider the Mission Director’s order. Mr. Rush was reluctant to release the TITAN’s weight tray because there were no spare weight trays available and doing so would prevent the TITAN from conducting any additional dives for the remainder of the expedition. Instead, Mr. Rush remained persistent that he would rather wait the 24 hours for the sacrificial squibs to discharge the additional weight required to allow TITAN to ascend slowly to the surface. The Mission Director for Dive 65 provided the following testimony to the MBI: “In the sub, we have -- the word I got from the – another crew member of the sub was that Stockton went around to each passenger or mission specialist, and he said, are you, are you willing to stay down here for 24 hours because if you don't, the company's going out of business. So, he pressured those people to say, ‘yes.’ The only person who, from my understanding, wasn't in the conversation, but from firsthand information afterwards, the only person that said no was NAME REDACTED (the co-pilot)45, sorry, one of copilots, and he, he basically texted up to us saying, “I’m, you know, I'm done. Call my wife, tell her get me a plane ticket, I'm saying, right, because when I get back up, I'm quitting."

On June 20, 2022, TITAN and crew conducted Dive 73, which reached a maximum depth of 3,840 m (12,598 feet) and lasted for 27 hours. This was the longest recorded TITAN dive ever conducted. A mission specialist on the dive stated to the MBI that “when we got back to the surface (after about 10 or 11 hours), they had trouble getting us into the submersible’s cradle due to the larger waves than when we had launched. So, we ended up spending an extra 15 hours in the submersible for a total of 27 hours.” The co-pilot for Dive 73 stated that the weather had deteriorated and while they were attempting to land on the platform, the TITAN’s main batteries died leaving them with no thrusters. Thus, the TITAN was unable to thrust and lock the TITAN into the LARS platform. OceanGate attempted to use support divers to lock the TITAN into place, but deteriorating weather made that process unsafe. As a result, the Mission Director for Dive 73 made the decision to wait until the morning before attempting another retrieval.

Although the TITAN was successfully recovered the following morning on June 21, 2022, it suffered damage from the unsuccessful attempts to dock the previous day in heavy weather conditions. Specifically, the TITAN’s fairings were ripped off, the mounts for its external lights and cameras were damaged, its VHF radio antenna was bent, its Niskin water sampling bottles were destroyed, and a portion of its syntactic buoyancy foam fell off.

On July 15, 2022, TITAN conducted Dive 80 on the TITANIC wreck site with a pilot, a content expert, and two mission specialists aboard. Once the TITAN arrived at the seafloor and located the TITANIC wreckage, they began to move from the TITANIC’s bow to its mid-section. As the TITAN descended for a closer view of TITANIC's interior, the TITAN became entangled in the TITANIC’s stairwell. The mission specialist, sitting next to the content expert, who was piloting the TITAN at the time, testified to the MBI that he leaned over to say, “(content expert), it seems that we're stuck.” The pilot quietly acknowledged the situation, replying, “Yes, (mission specialist), we are.” For a moment, the TITAN remained trapped, but the content expert was subsequently able to work the controls to free the TITAN from the TITANIC wreckage. Once the TITAN was clear, the mission specialist pushed to continue the dive toward the stern of the wreck, despite the growing concerns of the rest of the crew, who were ready to ascend. Although the team had initially been considering surfacing early, the mission specialist convinced the TITAN’s pilot to press on with the mission.

However, just as the TITAN neared the stern, the Mission Director overseeing Dive 80 on the support ship HORIZON ARCTIC, expressed safety concerns and ordered the TITAN to surface immediately.

On July 19, 2022, the TITAN and its crew commenced Dive 81 to a depth of 3,840 m (12,598 feet), the location of the TITANIC wreck site. During the descent, the pilot experienced a loss of control over the TITAN's maneuvering systems. The thruster control mapping was found to be incorrect, resulting in unexpected rotational movement. As a result, the pilot was unable to operate the submersible as intended. The pilot later reported that the control program for the thrusters had been reversed, causing forward thrust to produce reverse movement and vice versa. The pilot overcame the malfunctioning thrusters by turning the controller around and operating the controls in reverse.

On July 26, 2022, the TITAN, the LARS, and associated equipment were demobilized at the A Harvey Marine Base in St. John’s, Canada. The TITAN and its equipment were subsequently placed in the parking lot of the facility for approximately 7 months of storage. The TITAN’s equipment was stored in two containers; however, the TITAN was not covered nor provided protection from the environment.

OceanGate’s reclassification to mission specialist was an attempt to bypass the small passenger vessel regulations and allow their submersibles (ANTIPODES and CYCLOPS I) to be designated as ORVs. OceanGate also started funneling “mission specialist” payments through the OceanGate Foundation, a strategy designed to bypass passenger-for-hire regulations, since the payments for dive the operations went to the 501(c) nonprofit organization rather than directly to OceanGate Inc.

[Anna · Rating 5 out of 5]

Reads like a Shakespearean tragedy about a billionaire's hubris.