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The Sky Would Fall: Operation Vulture: The Secret US Bombing Mission to Vietnam 1954
s/t: The U.S. Bombing Mission in Indochina, 1954
This is the true story of Operation Vulture, a plan designed by President Eisenhower & his advisors to provide major US involvement in support of the French at Dien Bien Phu where they were locked in a deadly battle with the Vietnamese. the proposal included heavy bombing missions with the possible use of atomic bombs, grounds troops & the possibility of war with China. Prados recreates the series of meetings from declassified documents, meetings that included Eisenhower, Richard Nixon, Lyndon Johnson, Winston Churchill & other high ranking political figures.
This is the true story of Operation Vulture, a plan designed by President Eisenhower & his advisors to provide major US involvement in support of the French at Dien Bien Phu where they were locked in a deadly battle with the Vietnamese. the proposal included heavy bombing missions with the possible use of atomic bombs, grounds troops & the possibility of war with China. Prados recreates the series of meetings from declassified documents, meetings that included Eisenhower, Richard Nixon, Lyndon Johnson, Winston Churchill & other high ranking political figures.
- GenresHistory
254 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1983
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About the author
John Prados
44 books34 followersDr. John Prados is an American historian & researcher whose primary areas of specialisation are the history of World War II, the Vietnam War, the Cold War and politico-military affairs generally. He earned his Ph.D. from Columbia University in Political Science (International Relations). Dr. Prados is a senior fellow and project director with the National Security Archive at George Washington University (Washington, D.C.).
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
January 12, 2022
John Prados's work is a concise account of Operation VULTURE, a mission that never was.
In February 1954 French Army Chief of Staff General Paul Henri Romuald Ély and Defense Minister René Pleven undertook a reconnaissance mission to Indochina. Afterwards, Ély traveled to Washington to meet with American government officials. He had become convinced that France could not win the war without massive military assistance, and informed Admiral Arthur W. Radford, the commander of the United States Pacific Fleet, that Dien Bien Phu would probably fall soon. The French had already linked the outcome of the upcoming Geneva Conference on Indochina to their defeat or victory at Dien Bien Phu and were convinced that Ho Chi Minh and Giap shared the same view.
Admiral Arthur B. Radford, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, presented Ely with a plan to save Dieu Bien Phu with a massive American air strike code-named Operation VULTURE. The plan called for sixty B-29s, from the US, bases at Clark Field in the Philippines and in Okinawa, to carry out nighttime bombing of Vietminh positions around Dien Bien Phu. The heavy bombers would be protected against possible Chinese air force intervention by 150 fighters from US Seventh Fleet aircraft carriers. Ély took Radford's plan back to Paris, where it received a generally favorable government reception.
Despite opposition from US Army chief of staff, General Matthew B. Ridgway, Radford had led Ély to believe that the Eisenhower administration approved of VULTURE and would intervene if help is needed. His rashness created a sense of false security in the French High Command – a sense they would pay a bitter price for because in reality, neither President Dwight Eisenhower nor Congress had any intention to intervene unilaterally.
After the Viet Minh’s initial advances at Dien Bien Phu in late March 1954, Eisenhower began considering a plan put forth by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles called “united action,” in which the United States would attempt to convince France, Britain, and several Southeast Asian nations to join a coalition to defend Indochina. If such a coalition were built and France agreed to grant full independence to Indochina, then the Americans would make known their willingness use their bombers to demolish the siege at Dien Bien Phu.
But Eisenhower and Dulles saw united action primarily as a threat rather than as a military measure. If America and its allies showed their willingness to act together and strike the Viet Minh, they believed, the Chinese and Viet Minh would back off at Dien Bien Phu and the Americans would not have to bomb at all. In addition, united action would strengthen America’s bargaining position in any negotiations on Indochina.
Therefore, while Dulles was delivering threatening speeches about the multilateral plan, the Eisenhower administration asked America’s allies whether they would participate in united action. The governments of Thailand and the Philippines readily expressed a willingness to participate, convinced that the security of their nations would be harmed by a Communist victory in Indochina. However, Australia and New Zealand were interested in taking part, but they would only act in concert with Britain, and Eisenhower himself was not going to act without British participation, so it all depended on the British government's decision.
To the French garrison's dismay, Britain refused to become involved. The potential danger to Malaya and other British interests was not sufficiently large to justify a possible war. Furthermore, because of the mistaken assertion that the Viet Minh had huge numbers of men hidden elsewhere, the British believed that the French had already lost the Battle of Dien Bien Phu and that dropping bombs would not have much of an effect on total Viet Minh strength, even if it inflicted heavy losses. In America, the Joint Chiefs told Eisenhower that the only way to eradicate the Viet Minh was to destroy China because China was giving the Viet Minh forces military hardware, advice, and sanctuary. The general opinion in Congress was that the Eisenhower administration must not repeat Truman's mistake in Korea where the majority of the troops were American.
Thus, although in reality, bombing would have severely diminished the Viet Minh's forces, Eisenhower backed out. Operation VULTURE was never executed. The French, who had put their faith into the alleged American intervention, were whipped by the technologically inferior Communist forces.
THE SKY WOULD FALL is a very short book, but I believe that it tells the story of the ill-faithed Operation VULTURE better than any other work I have read so far. I recommend it to all Vietnam history buffs.
In February 1954 French Army Chief of Staff General Paul Henri Romuald Ély and Defense Minister René Pleven undertook a reconnaissance mission to Indochina. Afterwards, Ély traveled to Washington to meet with American government officials. He had become convinced that France could not win the war without massive military assistance, and informed Admiral Arthur W. Radford, the commander of the United States Pacific Fleet, that Dien Bien Phu would probably fall soon. The French had already linked the outcome of the upcoming Geneva Conference on Indochina to their defeat or victory at Dien Bien Phu and were convinced that Ho Chi Minh and Giap shared the same view.
Admiral Arthur B. Radford, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, presented Ely with a plan to save Dieu Bien Phu with a massive American air strike code-named Operation VULTURE. The plan called for sixty B-29s, from the US, bases at Clark Field in the Philippines and in Okinawa, to carry out nighttime bombing of Vietminh positions around Dien Bien Phu. The heavy bombers would be protected against possible Chinese air force intervention by 150 fighters from US Seventh Fleet aircraft carriers. Ély took Radford's plan back to Paris, where it received a generally favorable government reception.
Despite opposition from US Army chief of staff, General Matthew B. Ridgway, Radford had led Ély to believe that the Eisenhower administration approved of VULTURE and would intervene if help is needed. His rashness created a sense of false security in the French High Command – a sense they would pay a bitter price for because in reality, neither President Dwight Eisenhower nor Congress had any intention to intervene unilaterally.
After the Viet Minh’s initial advances at Dien Bien Phu in late March 1954, Eisenhower began considering a plan put forth by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles called “united action,” in which the United States would attempt to convince France, Britain, and several Southeast Asian nations to join a coalition to defend Indochina. If such a coalition were built and France agreed to grant full independence to Indochina, then the Americans would make known their willingness use their bombers to demolish the siege at Dien Bien Phu.
But Eisenhower and Dulles saw united action primarily as a threat rather than as a military measure. If America and its allies showed their willingness to act together and strike the Viet Minh, they believed, the Chinese and Viet Minh would back off at Dien Bien Phu and the Americans would not have to bomb at all. In addition, united action would strengthen America’s bargaining position in any negotiations on Indochina.
Therefore, while Dulles was delivering threatening speeches about the multilateral plan, the Eisenhower administration asked America’s allies whether they would participate in united action. The governments of Thailand and the Philippines readily expressed a willingness to participate, convinced that the security of their nations would be harmed by a Communist victory in Indochina. However, Australia and New Zealand were interested in taking part, but they would only act in concert with Britain, and Eisenhower himself was not going to act without British participation, so it all depended on the British government's decision.
To the French garrison's dismay, Britain refused to become involved. The potential danger to Malaya and other British interests was not sufficiently large to justify a possible war. Furthermore, because of the mistaken assertion that the Viet Minh had huge numbers of men hidden elsewhere, the British believed that the French had already lost the Battle of Dien Bien Phu and that dropping bombs would not have much of an effect on total Viet Minh strength, even if it inflicted heavy losses. In America, the Joint Chiefs told Eisenhower that the only way to eradicate the Viet Minh was to destroy China because China was giving the Viet Minh forces military hardware, advice, and sanctuary. The general opinion in Congress was that the Eisenhower administration must not repeat Truman's mistake in Korea where the majority of the troops were American.
Thus, although in reality, bombing would have severely diminished the Viet Minh's forces, Eisenhower backed out. Operation VULTURE was never executed. The French, who had put their faith into the alleged American intervention, were whipped by the technologically inferior Communist forces.
THE SKY WOULD FALL is a very short book, but I believe that it tells the story of the ill-faithed Operation VULTURE better than any other work I have read so far. I recommend it to all Vietnam history buffs.
December 24, 2011
I first learned of US plans to use nuclear weapons in Vietnam to support the French through a computer war simulation encountered in the early nineties. It suprised me, but I recovered quickly. The USA has often contemplated the unthinkable and occasionally acted on such considerations.
This book, by a specialist on the wars in southeast Asia, documents the siege of Dien Bien Phu, focusing on the policies of the USA in support of the beleaguered French, most particularly on the contemplated use of nuclear weaponry against the besieging Vietnamese.
This book, by a specialist on the wars in southeast Asia, documents the siege of Dien Bien Phu, focusing on the policies of the USA in support of the beleaguered French, most particularly on the contemplated use of nuclear weaponry against the besieging Vietnamese.
January 11, 2017
This book makes the understanding of the origins of the U.S. involvment in Vietnam much clearer. The author masterfully weaves the peak time of the crisis for the French at Dien Bien Phu (which is a Vietnamese word which means "large administrative center") during the period from March 1954 to June 1954 when the military/foreign policy crisis was over and the French were summarily routed from their position, into an extended tapestry, explaining the origin of the "Domino Theory" of global communism with Eisenhower, the effect of the obvious overreaching of John Foster Dulles, the American Secretary of State on U.S. foreign policy, and other interesting information, such as the amazing reliance of the French on the Americans for support. It is as relevant today as it was 35 years ago when it was first written. And the seemingly timeless ability of the US national security state to get itself into a jam with no way out, with clockwork precision and eerily increasing momentum is well-documented. The evidence is in. Vietnam was a big, avoidable mistake for America.
May 16, 2014
Following World War II while France was fighting revolutionary communist forces in Vietnam, the USA gave material aid to the French. As the French were losing the war, the American president considered using nuclear weapons to aid the French, all before the active American takeover of the war.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews