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Dos conceptos de libertad: el fin justifica los medios. Mi trayectoria intelectual
Defensa encendida del valor de la filosofía política y del estudio de la historia de las ideas políticas, “Dos conceptos de libertad” (1958) -el texto más célebre y comentado de Isaiah Berlin (1909-1997)- es también un análisis de los dos sentidos de la libertad política, el negativo y el positivo, que se resuelve a favor del primero y de un liberalismo escéptico que busca hacerse cargo del irreductible pluralismo de valores de nuestro mundo. Esta edición se completa con el alfa y el omega del autor: “El fin justifica los medios” (1922), su primer ensayo conocido, y “Mi trayectoria intelectual” (1996), el último dado a la prensa: un recorrido autobiográfico sobre la evolución de su pensamiento y sobre los temas y autores que le han interesado, y que constituye, sin duda, la introducción más clara y sintética a su obra.
160 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1958
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About the author
Isaiah Berlin
200 books780 followersSir Isaiah Berlin was a philosopher and historian of ideas, regarded as one of the leading liberal thinkers of the twentieth century. He excelled as an essayist, lecturer and conversationalist; and as a brilliant speaker who delivered, rapidly and spontaneously, richly allusive and coherently structured material, whether for a lecture series at Oxford University or as a broadcaster on the BBC Third Programme, usually without a script. Many of his essays and lectures were later collected in book form.
Born in Riga, now capital of Latvia, then part of the Russian Empire, he was the first person of Jewish descent to be elected to a prize fellowship at All Souls College, Oxford. From 1957 to 1967, he was Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory at the University of Oxford. He was president of the Aristotelian Society from 1963 to 1964. In 1966, he helped to found Wolfson College, Oxford, and became its first President. He was knighted in 1957, and was awarded the Order of Merit in 1971. He was President of the British Academy from 1974 to 1978. He also received the 1979 Jerusalem Prize for his writings on individual freedom. Berlin's work on liberal theory has had a lasting influence.
Berlin is best known for his essay Two Concepts of Liberty, delivered in 1958 as his inaugural lecture as Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory at Oxford. He defined negative liberty as the absence of constraints on, or interference with, agents' possible action. Greater "negative freedom" meant fewer restrictions on possible action. Berlin associated positive liberty with the idea of self-mastery, or the capacity to determine oneself, to be in control of one's destiny. While Berlin granted that both concepts of liberty represent valid human ideals, as a matter of history the positive concept of liberty has proven particularly susceptible to political abuse.
Berlin contended that under the influence of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant and G. W. F. Hegel (all committed to the positive concept of liberty), European political thinkers often equated liberty with forms of political discipline or constraint. This became politically dangerous when notions of positive liberty were, in the nineteenth century, used to defend nationalism, self-determination and the Communist idea of collective rational control over human destiny. Berlin argued that, following this line of thought, demands for freedom paradoxically become demands for forms of collective control and discipline – those deemed necessary for the "self-mastery" or self-determination of nations, classes, democratic communities, and even humanity as a whole. There is thus an elective affinity, for Berlin, between positive liberty and political totalitarianism.
Conversely, negative liberty represents a different, perhaps safer, understanding of the concept of liberty. Its proponents (such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill) insisted that constraint and discipline were the antithesis of liberty and so were (and are) less prone to confusing liberty and constraint in the manner of the philosophical harbingers of modern totalitarianism. It is this concept of Negative Liberty that Isaiah Berlin supported. It dominated heavily his early chapters in his third lecture.
This negative liberty is central to the claim for toleration due to incommensurability. This concept is mirrored in the work of Joseph Raz.
Berlin's espousal of negative liberty, his hatred of totalitarianism and his experience of Russia in the revolution and through his contact with the poet Anna Akhmatova made him an enemy of the Soviet Union and he was one of the leading public intellectuals in the ideological battle against Communism during the Cold War.
Born in Riga, now capital of Latvia, then part of the Russian Empire, he was the first person of Jewish descent to be elected to a prize fellowship at All Souls College, Oxford. From 1957 to 1967, he was Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory at the University of Oxford. He was president of the Aristotelian Society from 1963 to 1964. In 1966, he helped to found Wolfson College, Oxford, and became its first President. He was knighted in 1957, and was awarded the Order of Merit in 1971. He was President of the British Academy from 1974 to 1978. He also received the 1979 Jerusalem Prize for his writings on individual freedom. Berlin's work on liberal theory has had a lasting influence.
Berlin is best known for his essay Two Concepts of Liberty, delivered in 1958 as his inaugural lecture as Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory at Oxford. He defined negative liberty as the absence of constraints on, or interference with, agents' possible action. Greater "negative freedom" meant fewer restrictions on possible action. Berlin associated positive liberty with the idea of self-mastery, or the capacity to determine oneself, to be in control of one's destiny. While Berlin granted that both concepts of liberty represent valid human ideals, as a matter of history the positive concept of liberty has proven particularly susceptible to political abuse.
Berlin contended that under the influence of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant and G. W. F. Hegel (all committed to the positive concept of liberty), European political thinkers often equated liberty with forms of political discipline or constraint. This became politically dangerous when notions of positive liberty were, in the nineteenth century, used to defend nationalism, self-determination and the Communist idea of collective rational control over human destiny. Berlin argued that, following this line of thought, demands for freedom paradoxically become demands for forms of collective control and discipline – those deemed necessary for the "self-mastery" or self-determination of nations, classes, democratic communities, and even humanity as a whole. There is thus an elective affinity, for Berlin, between positive liberty and political totalitarianism.
Conversely, negative liberty represents a different, perhaps safer, understanding of the concept of liberty. Its proponents (such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill) insisted that constraint and discipline were the antithesis of liberty and so were (and are) less prone to confusing liberty and constraint in the manner of the philosophical harbingers of modern totalitarianism. It is this concept of Negative Liberty that Isaiah Berlin supported. It dominated heavily his early chapters in his third lecture.
This negative liberty is central to the claim for toleration due to incommensurability. This concept is mirrored in the work of Joseph Raz.
Berlin's espousal of negative liberty, his hatred of totalitarianism and his experience of Russia in the revolution and through his contact with the poet Anna Akhmatova made him an enemy of the Soviet Union and he was one of the leading public intellectuals in the ideological battle against Communism during the Cold War.
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October 30, 2021
آزادی مثبت و منفی
در سادهترین معنی، آزادیِ مثبت یعنی آزادیِ عمل کردن مطابقِ خواستهها و آزادیِ منفی یعنی نداشتنِ مانع در عمل. ولی کتاب بیش از این حرف دارد. هر دو برداشت را میآزماید و با نگاهی تجربهگرا، آزادیخواهانه، و ضدِ ایدهآلیستی از هر دو سخن میگوید.
این ایده که آزادی میتواند به تنهایی سنگبنای لازم و کافی برای ساختنِ حکومت، نظامِ فکری یا اجتماعیِ آرمانی و ایدهآل باشد، بسیار پرطرفدار و فریبنده است. در تقابل با چنینِ تصوری، برلین از «ارزشهای مهمتر از آزادی» سخن میراند. چنین ارزشهایی لزوماً توسط ایدئولوژی یا سیستمهایی که سنگبنایشان چیزی جز آزادی است، از «بیرون» به آزادی تحمیل نمیشوند. اینها ارزشهایی هستند که از «دورنِ» یک سیستمِ آزادیمحور سبز میشوند و سیستم را دچارِ تضاد میکنند. این ارزشها حاصلِ یک حقیقتِ سادهاند که آزادیِ مثبت هر فردی نمیتواند بدونِ هیچ مانعی در هر جهتی امتداد یابد بیآنکه مانعِ آزادیِ فردِ دیگری یا آزادیِ خودش در برهههای دیگری در آینده شود. دیگر بماند که تجربه، جهانبینی، اعتقادت، قضاوت، و تشخیصِ هر فردی از خوب و بد چقدر میتواند با آزادی در یک سیستم در تضاد باشد.
بریدهها
«اگر انسان اطمینان داشت که میتواند روی همین زمین به دنیایی بینقص برسد که در آن هیچ کدام از اهدافش با یکدیگر تضاد نخواهند داشت ... هر روشی برای سریعتر رسیدن به آن دنیای نهایی کاملاً قابلِ توجیه به نظر میرسید و اهمیتی نداشت که برای دستیابی به آن تا چه مقدار آزادی فدا شود.»
«آزادیِ قدرتمندان، خواه توانایی آنان بدنی باشد و خواه اقتصادی، باید حد و مرزی داشته باشد. باید به این قاعدهی کلی احترام گذاشت؛ اما نه در نتیجه این اصلِ منطقی که احترامِ به آزادیِ یک فرد به طورِ منطقی متضمنِ احترام به آزادی دیگرانی مانندِ او است؛ بلکه تنها به این خاطر باید به آن احترام گذاشت که احترام به اصولِ عدالت، یا شرم کردن از رفتار شدیداً نابرابر، همانند تمایل به آزادی، امری بنیادین در انسان است.»
«اینکه ما نمیتوانیم همه چیز را با هم داشته باشیم، یک حقیقتِ موجود و مشخص است، نه یک اتفاق… حتی در دنیایی آرمانی که مملو از انسانهای خوب و منطقی و نظریاتی کاملاً واضح است نه تنها در عمل، که در نظر نیز غیرممکن است.»
«اسرار بر نگهداری از ... طبقهبندیها یا آرمانهای مطلق به قیمتِ جانِ انسانها، برخلاف اصولِ علم است و به همان اندازه با اصولِ تاریخ ضدیت دارد؛ این گرایشی است که به میزانِ مساوی در جناحهای راست و چپِ دوران ما دیده میشود و با عقایدِ کسانی که به واقعیات و حقایق احترام میگذارند، قابلِ تلفیق نیست.»
«گفتن اینکه در یک سنتزِ قابل دستیابی، نهایی و تلفیق کننده، وظیفه همان منفعت خواهد بود، یا آزادی فردی همانِ دموکراسی خالص یا همان حکومتِ استبدادی خواهد بود، به مثابه فراهم کردن پوششی متافیزیکی بر خودفریبی یا ریاکاری آگاهانه است. از ارزشِ اصول به خاطرِ اینکه تضمینِ ابدی ندارند، چیزی کم نمیشود.»
«باید اعتبارِ نسبی اعتقاداتِ خود را باور کنیم... و با این حال دفاعِ بدونِ تزلزل از این عقاید، چیزی است که انسان متمدن را از یک وحشی متمایز میکند. بیش از این خواستن، شاید یک نیازِ متافیزیکی عمیق و قابل درمان باشد؛ اما اینکه اجازه دهیم تا این نیاز مسیر رفتارمان را تعیین کند، از نشانههای خاماندیشی سیاسی و اخلاقی است که به همان اندازه ژرف، ولی بسی خطرناکتر است.»
نوشتهای دربارهی این دو برداشت از آزادی
https://bourgeois.ir/%D8%A2%D8%B2%D8%...
نسخههای گوناگون
این مقاله نسخههای مختلفی دارد و اوّلبار از یک سخنرانی استخراج شده است. مشخص نیست توانا کدام نسخه را ترجمه کرده است. اطلاعاتِ نسخِ مختلف اینجاست:
http://berlin.wolf.ox.ac.uk/published...
در سادهترین معنی، آزادیِ مثبت یعنی آزادیِ عمل کردن مطابقِ خواستهها و آزادیِ منفی یعنی نداشتنِ مانع در عمل. ولی کتاب بیش از این حرف دارد. هر دو برداشت را میآزماید و با نگاهی تجربهگرا، آزادیخواهانه، و ضدِ ایدهآلیستی از هر دو سخن میگوید.
این ایده که آزادی میتواند به تنهایی سنگبنای لازم و کافی برای ساختنِ حکومت، نظامِ فکری یا اجتماعیِ آرمانی و ایدهآل باشد، بسیار پرطرفدار و فریبنده است. در تقابل با چنینِ تصوری، برلین از «ارزشهای مهمتر از آزادی» سخن میراند. چنین ارزشهایی لزوماً توسط ایدئولوژی یا سیستمهایی که سنگبنایشان چیزی جز آزادی است، از «بیرون» به آزادی تحمیل نمیشوند. اینها ارزشهایی هستند که از «دورنِ» یک سیستمِ آزادیمحور سبز میشوند و سیستم را دچارِ تضاد میکنند. این ارزشها حاصلِ یک حقیقتِ سادهاند که آزادیِ مثبت هر فردی نمیتواند بدونِ هیچ مانعی در هر جهتی امتداد یابد بیآنکه مانعِ آزادیِ فردِ دیگری یا آزادیِ خودش در برهههای دیگری در آینده شود. دیگر بماند که تجربه، جهانبینی، اعتقادت، قضاوت، و تشخیصِ هر فردی از خوب و بد چقدر میتواند با آزادی در یک سیستم در تضاد باشد.
بریدهها
«اگر انسان اطمینان داشت که میتواند روی همین زمین به دنیایی بینقص برسد که در آن هیچ کدام از اهدافش با یکدیگر تضاد نخواهند داشت ... هر روشی برای سریعتر رسیدن به آن دنیای نهایی کاملاً قابلِ توجیه به نظر میرسید و اهمیتی نداشت که برای دستیابی به آن تا چه مقدار آزادی فدا شود.»
«آزادیِ قدرتمندان، خواه توانایی آنان بدنی باشد و خواه اقتصادی، باید حد و مرزی داشته باشد. باید به این قاعدهی کلی احترام گذاشت؛ اما نه در نتیجه این اصلِ منطقی که احترامِ به آزادیِ یک فرد به طورِ منطقی متضمنِ احترام به آزادی دیگرانی مانندِ او است؛ بلکه تنها به این خاطر باید به آن احترام گذاشت که احترام به اصولِ عدالت، یا شرم کردن از رفتار شدیداً نابرابر، همانند تمایل به آزادی، امری بنیادین در انسان است.»
«اینکه ما نمیتوانیم همه چیز را با هم داشته باشیم، یک حقیقتِ موجود و مشخص است، نه یک اتفاق… حتی در دنیایی آرمانی که مملو از انسانهای خوب و منطقی و نظریاتی کاملاً واضح است نه تنها در عمل، که در نظر نیز غیرممکن است.»
«اسرار بر نگهداری از ... طبقهبندیها یا آرمانهای مطلق به قیمتِ جانِ انسانها، برخلاف اصولِ علم است و به همان اندازه با اصولِ تاریخ ضدیت دارد؛ این گرایشی است که به میزانِ مساوی در جناحهای راست و چپِ دوران ما دیده میشود و با عقایدِ کسانی که به واقعیات و حقایق احترام میگذارند، قابلِ تلفیق نیست.»
«گفتن اینکه در یک سنتزِ قابل دستیابی، نهایی و تلفیق کننده، وظیفه همان منفعت خواهد بود، یا آزادی فردی همانِ دموکراسی خالص یا همان حکومتِ استبدادی خواهد بود، به مثابه فراهم کردن پوششی متافیزیکی بر خودفریبی یا ریاکاری آگاهانه است. از ارزشِ اصول به خاطرِ اینکه تضمینِ ابدی ندارند، چیزی کم نمیشود.»
«باید اعتبارِ نسبی اعتقاداتِ خود را باور کنیم... و با این حال دفاعِ بدونِ تزلزل از این عقاید، چیزی است که انسان متمدن را از یک وحشی متمایز میکند. بیش از این خواستن، شاید یک نیازِ متافیزیکی عمیق و قابل درمان باشد؛ اما اینکه اجازه دهیم تا این نیاز مسیر رفتارمان را تعیین کند، از نشانههای خاماندیشی سیاسی و اخلاقی است که به همان اندازه ژرف، ولی بسی خطرناکتر است.»
نوشتهای دربارهی این دو برداشت از آزادی
https://bourgeois.ir/%D8%A2%D8%B2%D8%...
نسخههای گوناگون
این مقاله نسخههای مختلفی دارد و اوّلبار از یک سخنرانی استخراج شده است. مشخص نیست توانا کدام نسخه را ترجمه کرده است. اطلاعاتِ نسخِ مختلف اینجاست:
http://berlin.wolf.ox.ac.uk/published...
June 7, 2016
نمره ی واقعی: سه و نیم
آیزایا برلین در این مقاله در پی اثبات نادرستی یکی از بنیان های اندیشه ی فلسفی و سیاسی غربی در طول قرون است: این باور که وضعیتی را می توان یافت که در آن نزاع میان خواست های بشری رفع شود و همه با هم بالفعل گردند. او معتقد است باور به چنین نقطه ی توازنی منشأ جنایت های متعددی است که علیه مردمان و آزادیشان انجام گرفته است؛ زیرا اگر چنین حالتی بتواند وجود داشته باشد، احمقانه است اگر هر آنچه می توانیم، به هر طریقی، برای رسیدن به آن نکنیم. برلین معتقد است در مقابل این نگاه توازن طلب، باید پذیرفت که خواست های بشری به توازن نخواهند رسید و از همین جا است که آزادی بشر اهمیتی محور می یابد؛ از همین رو کثرت گرایی و آزادی منفی - یعنی از میان برداشت موانع انتخاب افراد - انسانی ترین راه پیش روی ما است
آیزایا برلین در این مقاله در پی اثبات نادرستی یکی از بنیان های اندیشه ی فلسفی و سیاسی غربی در طول قرون است: این باور که وضعیتی را می توان یافت که در آن نزاع میان خواست های بشری رفع شود و همه با هم بالفعل گردند. او معتقد است باور به چنین نقطه ی توازنی منشأ جنایت های متعددی است که علیه مردمان و آزادیشان انجام گرفته است؛ زیرا اگر چنین حالتی بتواند وجود داشته باشد، احمقانه است اگر هر آنچه می توانیم، به هر طریقی، برای رسیدن به آن نکنیم. برلین معتقد است در مقابل این نگاه توازن طلب، باید پذیرفت که خواست های بشری به توازن نخواهند رسید و از همین جا است که آزادی بشر اهمیتی محور می یابد؛ از همین رو کثرت گرایی و آزادی منفی - یعنی از میان برداشت موانع انتخاب افراد - انسانی ترین راه پیش روی ما است
July 11, 2017
Two Concepts of liberty is a treatise by Isaiah Berlin on the enigmatic subject of Liberty. At first it might appear as naïve or simplistic on his part to have a contrived view of ‘Liberty’, a word notorious for being difficult to define. But as we progress, we see that Berlin draws arguments from Kant, Hegel and Plato to make his case which is convincing and thought provoking.
In the very start, he briefly notes how important Political Thought is as a field of inquiry, and how it has far-reaching effects on the society. However, he laments that Political Theory is not given its due. This in turn stagnates the evolution and subsequent development of this most critical subject, as Berlin remarks:
“To neglect the field of political thought, because its
unstable subject matter, with its blurred edges, is not to be caught by the fixed concepts, abstract
models, and fine instruments suitable to logic or to linguistic analysis--to demand a unity of
method in philosophy, and reject whatever the method cannot successfully manage--is merely to
allow oneself to remain at the mercy of primitive and uncriticised political beliefs.”
Political forces cannot bring change, for good or for bad, unless they clothe themselves in ideas and political theory might well be a way of providing structure and discipline to these forces. As a branch of moral philosophy, it is pervasive and profoundly influential in shaping societies and cultural narratives.
Negative liberty is classically defined as absence of coercion. It means to say that an individual’s freedom will be greater if there is little or no interference or coercion to prohibit his actions. Though some limits are quite necessary to secure the rights and freedom of the people around him, this should not hinder the development of the individual in particular and the society in general.
Positive liberty could be summarised as “being your own master”, which entails being an active and thinking individual responsible for his/her actions. This concept of freedom comes with a realisation that one still can be a master of himself and yet be a slave to one’s passions or baser instincts. Would one still be free? Berlin explains that this liberty cannot survive for long without some checks on it.
So the prescription for this crisis would be to rely on reason and common sense. To follow the path prescribed by any organised religion would mean complete submission of one’s liberty, but to put some constraints on individuals is necessary nonetheless. In a democratic system, this goal can ideally be achieved to some extent. Reason and logic are the tools at our disposal that can be utilized to safeguard our liberty all the while putting limits on it. To defend one’s liberty doesn’t necessarily means to fight or rebel against the Authority, but to analyse how pervasive it is. As Berlin says, it is not important who has the authority, what is important is that how much authority do they have?
So there is no single formula to harmonize the various desires that men have, and to choose an individualistic approach here would be to defeat the very purpose of ‘liberty’. Pluralism and Negative freedom are thus the truer and more humane ideals.
In the very start, he briefly notes how important Political Thought is as a field of inquiry, and how it has far-reaching effects on the society. However, he laments that Political Theory is not given its due. This in turn stagnates the evolution and subsequent development of this most critical subject, as Berlin remarks:
“To neglect the field of political thought, because its
unstable subject matter, with its blurred edges, is not to be caught by the fixed concepts, abstract
models, and fine instruments suitable to logic or to linguistic analysis--to demand a unity of
method in philosophy, and reject whatever the method cannot successfully manage--is merely to
allow oneself to remain at the mercy of primitive and uncriticised political beliefs.”
Political forces cannot bring change, for good or for bad, unless they clothe themselves in ideas and political theory might well be a way of providing structure and discipline to these forces. As a branch of moral philosophy, it is pervasive and profoundly influential in shaping societies and cultural narratives.
Negative liberty is classically defined as absence of coercion. It means to say that an individual’s freedom will be greater if there is little or no interference or coercion to prohibit his actions. Though some limits are quite necessary to secure the rights and freedom of the people around him, this should not hinder the development of the individual in particular and the society in general.
Positive liberty could be summarised as “being your own master”, which entails being an active and thinking individual responsible for his/her actions. This concept of freedom comes with a realisation that one still can be a master of himself and yet be a slave to one’s passions or baser instincts. Would one still be free? Berlin explains that this liberty cannot survive for long without some checks on it.
So the prescription for this crisis would be to rely on reason and common sense. To follow the path prescribed by any organised religion would mean complete submission of one’s liberty, but to put some constraints on individuals is necessary nonetheless. In a democratic system, this goal can ideally be achieved to some extent. Reason and logic are the tools at our disposal that can be utilized to safeguard our liberty all the while putting limits on it. To defend one’s liberty doesn’t necessarily means to fight or rebel against the Authority, but to analyse how pervasive it is. As Berlin says, it is not important who has the authority, what is important is that how much authority do they have?
So there is no single formula to harmonize the various desires that men have, and to choose an individualistic approach here would be to defeat the very purpose of ‘liberty’. Pluralism and Negative freedom are thus the truer and more humane ideals.
November 15, 2021
We hebben het momenteel ontzettend vaak over vrijheid, maar verschillende betekenissen en interpretaties lopen regelmatig door elkaar heen. Berlin schreef een klassieke essayreeks (origineel als oratie) die als handvat kan dienen voor het denken over het begrip vrijheid. De ideeëndichtheid is best groot, hoewel ook zeker begrijpelijk. Om die reden las ik ieder essay telkens twee keer achter elkaar.
January 10, 2024
Je ontwaakt wederom ruim na een degelijk Calvinistisch tijdstip om weer een dag te werken aan je afstudeerscriptie. Nou niet bepaald een motiverend begin van de dag. Misschien moet je dan toch maar weer wekkers gaan zetten.
Balend van dit tegenvallende eerste wapenfeit van deze winterse woensdag open je je mailbox, en zie je dat de politiek-theoretische leesclub waar je jarenlang als politicologie-student graag naartoe ging ook nog open is voor ex-studenten. Deze winterse woensdag lacht je toch al iets gemoedelijker toe. Je springt je fiets op en racet naar de boekhandel, om een kwartiertje later met een tijdsbepalend essay in je binnenzak weer op je leesstoel te ploffen. Terwijl je je plannen voor de dag steeds vooruitschuift blader je door en door, tot je het boek opeens uitgelezen weglegt. Wat nu? Hoogste tijd om deze toch-wel-voorspoedige voormiddag te delen met je liefste goodreads-vrinden. Ohja, even iets uit het boek vermelden:
Een sterke aanklacht tegen monisme, ons herinnerend dat harmonische eindoplossingen verdacht zijn, en dat - vergeef de vertroebelde economische blik - tradeoffs overal zijn.
"Ja, misschien is de wens om gegarandeerd te krijgen dat onze waarden in een objectieve hemel eeuwig en veilig zijn, zelf niets anders dan de hunkering naar de zekerheden van onze kinderjaren of de absolute waarden van ons primitieve verleden. 'De relatieve geldigheid van de eigen overtuigingen beseffen,' zei een bewonderenswaardig hedendaags auteur [Schumpeter], 'en ze toch onversaagd verdedigen - dat onderscheidt een beschaafd mens van een barbaar.' Het is wellicht een diepe en ontroeibare metafysische behoefte om meer te verlangen dan dit; maar het getuigt van een even diepe, en nog gevaarlijkere, morele en politieke onvolwassenheid als we de praktijk van ons leven daardoor laten bepalen."
Balend van dit tegenvallende eerste wapenfeit van deze winterse woensdag open je je mailbox, en zie je dat de politiek-theoretische leesclub waar je jarenlang als politicologie-student graag naartoe ging ook nog open is voor ex-studenten. Deze winterse woensdag lacht je toch al iets gemoedelijker toe. Je springt je fiets op en racet naar de boekhandel, om een kwartiertje later met een tijdsbepalend essay in je binnenzak weer op je leesstoel te ploffen. Terwijl je je plannen voor de dag steeds vooruitschuift blader je door en door, tot je het boek opeens uitgelezen weglegt. Wat nu? Hoogste tijd om deze toch-wel-voorspoedige voormiddag te delen met je liefste goodreads-vrinden. Ohja, even iets uit het boek vermelden:
Een sterke aanklacht tegen monisme, ons herinnerend dat harmonische eindoplossingen verdacht zijn, en dat - vergeef de vertroebelde economische blik - tradeoffs overal zijn.
"Ja, misschien is de wens om gegarandeerd te krijgen dat onze waarden in een objectieve hemel eeuwig en veilig zijn, zelf niets anders dan de hunkering naar de zekerheden van onze kinderjaren of de absolute waarden van ons primitieve verleden. 'De relatieve geldigheid van de eigen overtuigingen beseffen,' zei een bewonderenswaardig hedendaags auteur [Schumpeter], 'en ze toch onversaagd verdedigen - dat onderscheidt een beschaafd mens van een barbaar.' Het is wellicht een diepe en ontroeibare metafysische behoefte om meer te verlangen dan dit; maar het getuigt van een even diepe, en nog gevaarlijkere, morele en politieke onvolwassenheid als we de praktijk van ons leven daardoor laten bepalen."
February 6, 2017
This is a well-constructed, internally coherent essay. Strangely, I think one of Berlin's important contributions here is that he recognizes that liberty may not be the only thing we care about.
December 30, 2022
Isaías Berlín es un prolífico ensayista, escritor de temas que iban desde la filosofía y la historia de las ideas hasta la literatura rusa. Fue uno de los defensores intelectuales más importantes de la libertad y el liberalismo del siglo XX.
Este ensayo sobre los dos tipos de libertad es el fruto de su comparecencia a una conferencia en Oxford en 1958, donde se lamentó durante su mejor momento de cómo el pensamiento social y político en las democracias occidentales había caído en días malvados, señalando la alarmante facilidad de cómo los conceptos filosóficos abstractos de un profesor serían armados por aquellos que buscan imponer doctrinas rígidas y asfixiantes a las masas. Berlín no tenía ni idea de cuánto empeorarían las cosas y se sorprendería por el estricto entorno ideológico actual que encadena al individuo.
Sin lugar duda uno de los ensayos más influyentes en la historia de la filosofía política de posguerra en la tradición analítica. Los críticos del ensayo, como ,Quentin Skinner, elogian la clara articulación de Berlín de una distinción entre dos entendimientos opuestos de libertad o libertad. Este texto es una tensión entre libertad y coerción. Si bien reconoce la libertad negativa como la no interferencia por otros, la ausencia de obstáculos, barreras o limitaciones externas al individuo. La persona es libre de elegir su propio camino por su propio bien sin obstrucción por parte de los demás. Podrían hacerlo grande o fracasar miserablemente; pero las puertas de la vida están abiertas a su elección. El individuo no es dictado y se queda solo. Si bien reconoce la libertad positiva como a alguien o algo que actúa para tomar el control de la vida del individuo y ayudar a realizar el propósito del individuo. El concepto positivo de libertad al intentar responder a la pregunta de: "¿Qué o quién puede controlar o interferir con alguien para que haga (o sea) esto en lugar de eso?" La libertad negativa es “libertad de“, mientras que la libertad positiva es “libertad para”, y en la noción de Berlín, esta ultima es mas antigua. La noción de libertad positiva está en el centro de la visión de la Ilustración de una sociedad perfectamente racional, y del deseo de autodeterminación y reconocimiento de los pueblos y las naciones.
Un excelente texto que a modo de sugerencia poner sobre la mesa el dualismo del concepto interpretativo de la libertad, que afinca sus planteamientos sintetizados e inculcados por filósofos políticos anteriores, pero contextualizado a la época que esta viviendo, esquematizado por una libertad idealizada con las dos ramas antes expuestas, sin importar sus detractores, pero debemos verlo como un pequeño paso, así como este ensayo, para una solidad construcción del concepto libertad.
Este ensayo sobre los dos tipos de libertad es el fruto de su comparecencia a una conferencia en Oxford en 1958, donde se lamentó durante su mejor momento de cómo el pensamiento social y político en las democracias occidentales había caído en días malvados, señalando la alarmante facilidad de cómo los conceptos filosóficos abstractos de un profesor serían armados por aquellos que buscan imponer doctrinas rígidas y asfixiantes a las masas. Berlín no tenía ni idea de cuánto empeorarían las cosas y se sorprendería por el estricto entorno ideológico actual que encadena al individuo.
Sin lugar duda uno de los ensayos más influyentes en la historia de la filosofía política de posguerra en la tradición analítica. Los críticos del ensayo, como ,Quentin Skinner, elogian la clara articulación de Berlín de una distinción entre dos entendimientos opuestos de libertad o libertad. Este texto es una tensión entre libertad y coerción. Si bien reconoce la libertad negativa como la no interferencia por otros, la ausencia de obstáculos, barreras o limitaciones externas al individuo. La persona es libre de elegir su propio camino por su propio bien sin obstrucción por parte de los demás. Podrían hacerlo grande o fracasar miserablemente; pero las puertas de la vida están abiertas a su elección. El individuo no es dictado y se queda solo. Si bien reconoce la libertad positiva como a alguien o algo que actúa para tomar el control de la vida del individuo y ayudar a realizar el propósito del individuo. El concepto positivo de libertad al intentar responder a la pregunta de: "¿Qué o quién puede controlar o interferir con alguien para que haga (o sea) esto en lugar de eso?" La libertad negativa es “libertad de“, mientras que la libertad positiva es “libertad para”, y en la noción de Berlín, esta ultima es mas antigua. La noción de libertad positiva está en el centro de la visión de la Ilustración de una sociedad perfectamente racional, y del deseo de autodeterminación y reconocimiento de los pueblos y las naciones.
Un excelente texto que a modo de sugerencia poner sobre la mesa el dualismo del concepto interpretativo de la libertad, que afinca sus planteamientos sintetizados e inculcados por filósofos políticos anteriores, pero contextualizado a la época que esta viviendo, esquematizado por una libertad idealizada con las dos ramas antes expuestas, sin importar sus detractores, pero debemos verlo como un pequeño paso, así como este ensayo, para una solidad construcción del concepto libertad.
July 14, 2025
Two Concepts of Liberty (1958) by Isiah Berlin is a classic essay about freedom. Berlin was a professor at Oxford.
Berlin describes ‘Negative Liberty’ as that where a person has a freedom from others in certain areas. That is they are free to choose for themselves and this kind of liberty is a freedom from coercion. This is contrasted with positive liberty which is a freedom to act rationally or in accordance with true values. Alternatively positive liberty is self-mastery.
Berlin argues that both forms of liberty have some validity. He favours negative liberty. Berlin makes the point that positive Liberty lends itself to people who think they have a ‘rational’ answer that all people would choose if they were truly free.
Two Concepts of Liberty is well worth the time needed to read it.
Berlin describes ‘Negative Liberty’ as that where a person has a freedom from others in certain areas. That is they are free to choose for themselves and this kind of liberty is a freedom from coercion. This is contrasted with positive liberty which is a freedom to act rationally or in accordance with true values. Alternatively positive liberty is self-mastery.
Berlin argues that both forms of liberty have some validity. He favours negative liberty. Berlin makes the point that positive Liberty lends itself to people who think they have a ‘rational’ answer that all people would choose if they were truly free.
Two Concepts of Liberty is well worth the time needed to read it.
December 14, 2025
"Es verdad que ofrecer derechos políticos y salvaguardias contra la intervención del Estado a hombres que están medio desnudos, mal alimentados, enfermos y que son analfabetos, es reírse de su condición; necesitan ayuda médica y educación antes de que puedan entender qué significa un aumento de su libertad".
Aleccione Berlin, aleccione.
Aleccione Berlin, aleccione.
November 4, 2016
In a relatively short book (this was a lecture) Berlin contrasts what he termed 'negative' liberty - or freedom 'from' others - and 'positive' liberty - or the freedom 'to do' or 'to be'. This was written in the midst of the Cold War and the weight of the Soviet Union and other totalitarian regimes is heavy. His model is simplistic and he can't help but lump in any type of rule with totalitarian rule. This means that the lecture often lacks discernment. Where Berlin is not at his strongest when giving general rules-of-thumb as to how to spot freedom-lovers from freedom-haters. He makes for far more interesting reading when analysing specific thinkers or specific ideologies. The book does engage but it is far too theoretical and speculative. Since it amounts to essentially a psychological theory of politics, Berlin seemingly strays into giving his own opinion instead of looking at the facts and drawing more subtle interpretations.
March 3, 2019
Ietwat simplistische argument voor politiek pluralisme. Geeft wel een overzichtelijke inleiding in basale politieke theorie.
April 28, 2021
Explaining or solving
January 23, 2023
boring asf. was forced to read for an essay x
May 22, 2024
"El universo perfecto no sólo no es alcanzable sino inconcebible, y todo aquello que se haga para producirlo está fundado en una enorme falacia intelectual".
Sublime.
Sublime.
June 20, 2023
Mi primera lectura de Isaiah Berlin. Veo en su importante ensayo "Dos conceptos..." una veta de historiador y clarificador muy importante que no debe ser menospreciada. Sin embargo, creo que al final de dicho ensayo (el más importante de los tres textos de este libro) le falta el rigor argumentativo con el que alimenta los conceptos de libertad positiva y libertad negativa. Cuando habla del pluralismo como respuesta sintética a ambos conceptos no desarrolla con suficiente espacio cómo se ha delineado históricamente; y ni siquiera se esfuerza en darle un mayor peso como propuesta política. Eso no me convenció de su talla intelectual. En cuanto a los otros dos textos, son de interés en la persona de Berlin como un antimonista político y un empirista social de corte durkhemiano, pero nada más. Quizá haya otros libros suyos, como "Las raíces del romanticismo", o su biografía de Marx, que estén a la altura de su fama, ya que éstos (con una poca salvedad del primero) quedan a deber.
December 3, 2025
Een klassiek werk voor het liberalisme
Wil je een basisbegrip van waar het liberalisme voor staat, opdoen? Lees deze teksten. Dit moet en zal altijd een vertrekpunt zijn voor ons denken.
Wil je een basisbegrip van waar het liberalisme voor staat, opdoen? Lees deze teksten. Dit moet en zal altijd een vertrekpunt zijn voor ons denken.
July 10, 2021
Isaiah Berlin hace una magistral exposición de las ideas detrás de la libertad, tanto positiva como negativa, y de sus repercusiones en el debate político de los siglos XIX y XX.
Habla cómo la libertad negativa, entendida como la ausencia de coacción deliberada para efectuar los propios fines, es la libertad en la cabeza de los fundadores de liberalismo político, y fue objeto de debate entre éstos (Locke, Mill y compañía) y aquellos que creían en un Estado fuerte (Hobbes, Rousseau) y Kant.
Mientras tanto, la idea de libertad positiva, entendida como la independencia de la voluntad respecto a fuerzas externas, sirvió como catapulte a loa dictadores, autócratas e incluso gobiernos democráticos, en la idea de que, si estamos de acuerdo en que la verdad es una sola, y los objetivos de los hombres perfectamente racionales deben estar siempre de acuerdo unos con otros. Pero no están de acuerdo con los objetivos de los autócratas. De esto se sigue que los "verdaderos yos" de las personas estarán de acuerdo con uno, una vez que entiendan sus motivos. Funciona tal como la educación, sólo que el gobernante se autoproclama maestro, y determina que la queja externa es ignorancia de sus adversarios.
Los pueblos que piden libertad, lo que en realidad piden es status, el reconocimiento de que sus valores y objetivos son legítimos (aunque no sean los más benignos posibles) y que deban respetarse como autónomos y auténticos. De aquí nace la idea de la libre determinación de los pueblos.
Kant decía que "el paternalismo es el peor despotismo", y, paradójicamente, su discípulo Fichte fue aquel que dio origen al razonamiento del dictador. Berlin lo pone en evidencia, llegando a una descorazonadora conclusión: los valores humanos no son compatibles en su totalidad.
Si tomamos las ideas de libertad, justicia, igualdad, equidad y perfeccionamiento; es evidente ver que si priorizamos unos, tendremos que abandonar otros. Es por esta realidad por la que Berlin expone, justo al principio del ensayo, que la ciencia política estudia problemas que no pueden ser resueltos tecnológicamente. No son problemas científicos, dado que éstos son caracterizados en que ya se está de acuerdo en los objetivos, y la discusión es sobre los métodos.
En ciencia política, la discusión no es sólo sobre los métodos, sino sobre los mismos objetivos.
"Es por esto por lo que aquellos que ponen su fe en algún inmenso fenómeno que transformará el mundo, como el triunfo final de la razón o la revolución proletaria, tienen que creer que todos los problemas morales y políticos pueden ser transformados en problemas tecnológicos".
Habla cómo la libertad negativa, entendida como la ausencia de coacción deliberada para efectuar los propios fines, es la libertad en la cabeza de los fundadores de liberalismo político, y fue objeto de debate entre éstos (Locke, Mill y compañía) y aquellos que creían en un Estado fuerte (Hobbes, Rousseau) y Kant.
Mientras tanto, la idea de libertad positiva, entendida como la independencia de la voluntad respecto a fuerzas externas, sirvió como catapulte a loa dictadores, autócratas e incluso gobiernos democráticos, en la idea de que, si estamos de acuerdo en que la verdad es una sola, y los objetivos de los hombres perfectamente racionales deben estar siempre de acuerdo unos con otros. Pero no están de acuerdo con los objetivos de los autócratas. De esto se sigue que los "verdaderos yos" de las personas estarán de acuerdo con uno, una vez que entiendan sus motivos. Funciona tal como la educación, sólo que el gobernante se autoproclama maestro, y determina que la queja externa es ignorancia de sus adversarios.
Los pueblos que piden libertad, lo que en realidad piden es status, el reconocimiento de que sus valores y objetivos son legítimos (aunque no sean los más benignos posibles) y que deban respetarse como autónomos y auténticos. De aquí nace la idea de la libre determinación de los pueblos.
Kant decía que "el paternalismo es el peor despotismo", y, paradójicamente, su discípulo Fichte fue aquel que dio origen al razonamiento del dictador. Berlin lo pone en evidencia, llegando a una descorazonadora conclusión: los valores humanos no son compatibles en su totalidad.
Si tomamos las ideas de libertad, justicia, igualdad, equidad y perfeccionamiento; es evidente ver que si priorizamos unos, tendremos que abandonar otros. Es por esta realidad por la que Berlin expone, justo al principio del ensayo, que la ciencia política estudia problemas que no pueden ser resueltos tecnológicamente. No son problemas científicos, dado que éstos son caracterizados en que ya se está de acuerdo en los objetivos, y la discusión es sobre los métodos.
En ciencia política, la discusión no es sólo sobre los métodos, sino sobre los mismos objetivos.
"Es por esto por lo que aquellos que ponen su fe en algún inmenso fenómeno que transformará el mundo, como el triunfo final de la razón o la revolución proletaria, tienen que creer que todos los problemas morales y políticos pueden ser transformados en problemas tecnológicos".
June 8, 2020
Isaiah Berlin siendo en su juventud en conjunto con sus familiares, víctima y adolecedor de los efectos de la Revolución Rusa y la instauración del régimen comunista, atrajo para el un pensamiento crítico y duro dirigido hacia esta ideología. Incansable estudioso de la Filosofía moderna de los siglos XVIII y XIX, reflexiona sobre la responsabilidad de dichos pensadores en cuanto a las ideologías políticas surgientes (comunistas, socialistas, liberales, fascistas, etc) formulando bajo lo que en teorías hegelianas sería una síntesis que se sustentan bajo dos matices de la libertad: positiva y negativa. Positiva, en el sentido de que un soberano a nombre de la libertad interviene "representando" el interés colectivo, decidiendo la manera en que debería ser utilizada la libertad. Y negativa, en el sentido de que quien ejercía el poder político se abstuviera de injertar lo menos posible en los derechos y libertades de los ciudadanos, promoviendo la autodeterminación individual. A palabras de Berlín, el modus operandi de los defensores de la libertad positiva ha sido por el reconocimiento social que aclaman las clases bajas y que aprovechándose (o sea traicionando los fines legítimos sociales) de dicha aceptación y admiración de este "heroico" acto se transforman en tiranos o en Napoleones - metafóricamente- como en la novela de Rebelión en la Granja de Orwell. Sin duda, es un ensayo de gran calidad, que resulta ser un precedente en la historia conceptual de libertad, tal como lo hizo uno de los expositores más importantes de la filosofía política: John Stuart Mill. El problema con la concepción de libertad es que es dinámica e indeterminada, más allá de definirlos, Berlín expone sus modalidades y efectos en cuanto a la relación del hombre con el Estado.
June 8, 2019
I believe it is fair to write that this is typical of philosophical writing. Conceptual patches on some ideal too closely examined. Still interesting though.
One notion of Mister Berlin's that will stick with me is people rather the tyranny of the familiar authority than the liberty from some separate fount.
Maybe the online format was to blame, but the cyber-copy I read had paragraphs that were pages long and that's bad.
One notion of Mister Berlin's that will stick with me is people rather the tyranny of the familiar authority than the liberty from some separate fount.
Maybe the online format was to blame, but the cyber-copy I read had paragraphs that were pages long and that's bad.
January 5, 2015
Very nuanced book about liberty that can be liked by proponents of state intervention and the regulation of capital. Isaiah Berlin's stance on the possibility of moral knowledge and universal values has more in common with the early pragmatists (James, Dewey et cetera) than with value relativists.
Read
October 21, 2017An extremely important essay, yet will require from me, continual re-reading. As i cannot master all great thinkers, or perhaps cannot master even one, I find Berlin to be at least one figure whose work can take me to many others, and introduce me to their ideas and thoughts.
July 31, 2018
Libro fundamental para entender la libertad humana frente a la tiranía y ver las distintas aproximaciones a dicha libertad desde un punto de vista negativo y otro positivo. Un clásico que debería leer cualquier persona interesada en la filsoofía política.
January 21, 2016
Highly recommended to read just after Dostoyevsky's "Demons".
March 24, 2025
What are the criteria for determining whether someone is free or not? How can we define ‘liberty’ in the first place?
In this short essay, Isaiah Berlin attempts to provide answers to these questions.
He introduces two concepts of liberty: the negative sense, which defines the sphere within which an individual can act without interference from others; and the positive sense, which refers to self-mastery, both in moral and political terms.
The most prominent defenders of negative liberty were Mill and Smith, who "believed in a large area of private life […] which the State or other authority must not be allowed to overstep," whereas Hobbes, being more pessimistic about human nature, held the opposite view. Mill went so far as to consider any form of coercion to be inherently bad.
Berlin points out that negative liberty is perfectly compatible with autocracy: one could imagine an enlightened tyrant, such as Frederick the Great of Prussia or Joseph II of Austria, granting their subjects wider liberties than other forms of government.
However, the positive sense of liberty is not free of contradictions either: one could argue for splitting the personality into two parts — a "transcendent, dominant controller" and "the empirical bundle of desires […] to be disciplined." According to Berlin, "This desire to be self-directed has […] taken two forms": the first is a "retreat into the private sphere," the second is the overcoming of obstacles. The first form is represented by Kantian obedience to laws invented by the self, often emerging in reaction to authoritarian rule; the second can be achieved through education and is largely associated with the Enlightenment.
Berlin then asks: how can the positive sense of liberty be extended from the individual self to the entire collective? Some might argue that what is rational for one person must also be rational for everyone, and that those deemed irrational must be re-educated — a logic that risks sliding back into authoritarianism.
The bridge between the individual and the public sphere presents another puzzle: how do we reconcile the individual with their position in society? Self-recognition is one of the first steps toward liberty, as it signals that we are not something to be molded at will. This is precisely what oppressed nationalities and social classes demand.
What can modern democracies do? According to Constant, for modern individuals liberty is "the security of the enjoyment of private life," while for the ancients liberty "meant the collective but direct exercise of a large portion of sovereignty," often without recourse against the authorities. For Berlin, "the principal safeguard of democracy resides in retaining political rights with which to protect individual rights […]."
The essay ends with a warning against monism — the reduction of all problems to a single issue to be resolved by some enlightened despot — and a reminder that liberties are not a constant in human history and must be continually defended.
Despite not being a liberal in the strict sense (given my former neoliberal-libertarian background, I admit that Helvetius’ utilitarianism, with its system of ‘carrots and sticks,’ has always fascinated me), I appreciated this essay, even though I disagree with some of Berlin’s notions — for example, I don’t believe that an authoritarian government can grant more ‘negative liberty’ than a democratic one, as the former lacks accountability and can revoke those liberties at any moment.
As others have pointed out in the comments, I also appreciate that Berlin acknowledged that liberty cannot be given to everyone equally, as people may have more pressing needs (the Egyptian poor are a striking example of this), and that for some individuals, liberty may matter less than other priorities.
In this short essay, Isaiah Berlin attempts to provide answers to these questions.
He introduces two concepts of liberty: the negative sense, which defines the sphere within which an individual can act without interference from others; and the positive sense, which refers to self-mastery, both in moral and political terms.
The most prominent defenders of negative liberty were Mill and Smith, who "believed in a large area of private life […] which the State or other authority must not be allowed to overstep," whereas Hobbes, being more pessimistic about human nature, held the opposite view. Mill went so far as to consider any form of coercion to be inherently bad.
Berlin points out that negative liberty is perfectly compatible with autocracy: one could imagine an enlightened tyrant, such as Frederick the Great of Prussia or Joseph II of Austria, granting their subjects wider liberties than other forms of government.
However, the positive sense of liberty is not free of contradictions either: one could argue for splitting the personality into two parts — a "transcendent, dominant controller" and "the empirical bundle of desires […] to be disciplined." According to Berlin, "This desire to be self-directed has […] taken two forms": the first is a "retreat into the private sphere," the second is the overcoming of obstacles. The first form is represented by Kantian obedience to laws invented by the self, often emerging in reaction to authoritarian rule; the second can be achieved through education and is largely associated with the Enlightenment.
Berlin then asks: how can the positive sense of liberty be extended from the individual self to the entire collective? Some might argue that what is rational for one person must also be rational for everyone, and that those deemed irrational must be re-educated — a logic that risks sliding back into authoritarianism.
The bridge between the individual and the public sphere presents another puzzle: how do we reconcile the individual with their position in society? Self-recognition is one of the first steps toward liberty, as it signals that we are not something to be molded at will. This is precisely what oppressed nationalities and social classes demand.
What can modern democracies do? According to Constant, for modern individuals liberty is "the security of the enjoyment of private life," while for the ancients liberty "meant the collective but direct exercise of a large portion of sovereignty," often without recourse against the authorities. For Berlin, "the principal safeguard of democracy resides in retaining political rights with which to protect individual rights […]."
The essay ends with a warning against monism — the reduction of all problems to a single issue to be resolved by some enlightened despot — and a reminder that liberties are not a constant in human history and must be continually defended.
Despite not being a liberal in the strict sense (given my former neoliberal-libertarian background, I admit that Helvetius’ utilitarianism, with its system of ‘carrots and sticks,’ has always fascinated me), I appreciated this essay, even though I disagree with some of Berlin’s notions — for example, I don’t believe that an authoritarian government can grant more ‘negative liberty’ than a democratic one, as the former lacks accountability and can revoke those liberties at any moment.
As others have pointed out in the comments, I also appreciate that Berlin acknowledged that liberty cannot be given to everyone equally, as people may have more pressing needs (the Egyptian poor are a striking example of this), and that for some individuals, liberty may matter less than other priorities.
May 29, 2024
The most impressive work of Berlin is this essay, which distinguishes two concepts of liberty: the negative and the positive. Profound differences lie in that negative liberty asks what area one should not be interfering with, while positive liberty asks for the source of such interference.
Of course, Berlin was not neutral to these two concepts, for he favored the first one. So am I. The negative freedom (freedom is the same as liberty in Berlin’s work, though I believe there are subtle differences) is just what we call “free from...”, which focuses on the area of non-interference. In my opinion, no matter how “just” the source of control seems, the violation of my non-interference area is still a violation. However, positive liberty implies that the intervention is warranted if the source of intervention is justified. Therefore, some philosophers argue that following a rational man is following ourselves, or a democratic polity is meant to be liberal.
This leads to the perversion of positive liberty: by contending that they are representing your interests, they have the right to demand your total obedience. They may be a rational man who understands the true reason or a party that can predict the direction of history. Various dictators and totalitarian states have employed this method to justify their despotic governance, from Nazi Germany to the Soviet Union.
I think an interesting example of this could be the French Revolution. The Jacobins during the Revolution, like Robespierre and Saint-Just, are ardent advocates of positive liberty, demanding “Liberty, Equity, Fraternity” but no responsibilities and duties. No one could deny that the French Revolution was democratic, but few describe people living under the Reign of Terror as free. Meanwhile, the Englishmen across the Channel, at least in my view, enjoyed much more liberty than their French counterparts, even though they had a monarch.
Of course, Berlin was not neutral to these two concepts, for he favored the first one. So am I. The negative freedom (freedom is the same as liberty in Berlin’s work, though I believe there are subtle differences) is just what we call “free from...”, which focuses on the area of non-interference. In my opinion, no matter how “just” the source of control seems, the violation of my non-interference area is still a violation. However, positive liberty implies that the intervention is warranted if the source of intervention is justified. Therefore, some philosophers argue that following a rational man is following ourselves, or a democratic polity is meant to be liberal.
This leads to the perversion of positive liberty: by contending that they are representing your interests, they have the right to demand your total obedience. They may be a rational man who understands the true reason or a party that can predict the direction of history. Various dictators and totalitarian states have employed this method to justify their despotic governance, from Nazi Germany to the Soviet Union.
I think an interesting example of this could be the French Revolution. The Jacobins during the Revolution, like Robespierre and Saint-Just, are ardent advocates of positive liberty, demanding “Liberty, Equity, Fraternity” but no responsibilities and duties. No one could deny that the French Revolution was democratic, but few describe people living under the Reign of Terror as free. Meanwhile, the Englishmen across the Channel, at least in my view, enjoyed much more liberty than their French counterparts, even though they had a monarch.
August 26, 2025
As addressed at the end, it is nothing if not muddled. Some sections are far more coherent than others. Those of use are great, those not... not so much.
In short this lays out a lot of the framework for Positive Liberty as a distinction to Negative Liberty. I will edit this later if I recall, but the arguments for positive liberty around one's want to be governed by one's own people rather than a leader from another social background is quite similar to a piece I read on personhood about how even in instances where the person is deprived of rights that they do not lose their status as a person—in other words, where a person is mistreated on account of a different social feature comprising them, it does not mean that they lose their personhood for they are mistreated on account of variation as a person.
In short this lays out a lot of the framework for Positive Liberty as a distinction to Negative Liberty. I will edit this later if I recall, but the arguments for positive liberty around one's want to be governed by one's own people rather than a leader from another social background is quite similar to a piece I read on personhood about how even in instances where the person is deprived of rights that they do not lose their status as a person—in other words, where a person is mistreated on account of a different social feature comprising them, it does not mean that they lose their personhood for they are mistreated on account of variation as a person.
April 21, 2022
Conferencia brillante en las formas, pero extraordinariamente simple en el fondo. Berlin se limita a añadir una pátina de fundamentación metafísica al brillante ensayo "De la libertad de los antiguos comparada a la de los modernos" de Benjamin Constant. No niego que su idea, contraponiendo empirismo y racionalismo como dos formas indisolublemente unidas a la libertad negativa y positiva respectivamente, sea interesante, pero confieso que esperaba mucho más de un autor cuyo renombre en el mundo académico e intelectual no se ve justificado por esta obra en concreto. Con todo, contiene pasajes memorables y creo que explica gran parte de los fundamentos teóricos de la posterior derecha neoconservadora. Interesante.
February 7, 2025
Berlin uses the Cold War binaries of East vs West to framework positive and negative liberty which oversimplifies the two concepts. This can be seen not only in Berlin's preference for negative liberty but also in his simplification of the Soviet Union as a Utopian project (which he is heavily critical of).
I also find his skepticism of utopia super interesting, arguing that Utopian impulse inherently carries the dangers of totalitarianism. I would love to read more about how modern society could safeguard itself against this risk while still aspiring for [utopian/high-aiming] improvement.
'I prefer coffee, you prefer champagne. we have different tastes. There is no more to be said.' (from The Pursuit of the Ideal, which links to this argument for utopian pursuit)
I also find his skepticism of utopia super interesting, arguing that Utopian impulse inherently carries the dangers of totalitarianism. I would love to read more about how modern society could safeguard itself against this risk while still aspiring for [utopian/high-aiming] improvement.
'I prefer coffee, you prefer champagne. we have different tastes. There is no more to be said.' (from The Pursuit of the Ideal, which links to this argument for utopian pursuit)
June 26, 2025
Normaal ben ik niet zo van reviews, maar hierbij toch eentje.
In de naam van vrijheid kan je heel veel rechtvaardigen. Je kunt vrij zijn “om” iets te doen, maar ook vrij zijn “van” iets te doen. Het boek legt heel goed uit waarom beide kanten (de positieve en negatieve vrijheden) essentieel zijn voor elkaars voortbestaan. De afwezigheid van één van deze soort vrijheden zou leiden tot het tegengestelde van vrijheid: repressie. Deze essay ,hoewel het tamelijk gedateerd is, geeft wel de nodige wijsheid om te navigeren in de huidige maatschappelijke werkelijkheid. Hoe vrij ben je in een samenleving waar je economisch weinig kunt meekomen? Maar, ben je ook vrij als je sociaal weinig mee kunt komen?
In de naam van vrijheid kan je heel veel rechtvaardigen. Je kunt vrij zijn “om” iets te doen, maar ook vrij zijn “van” iets te doen. Het boek legt heel goed uit waarom beide kanten (de positieve en negatieve vrijheden) essentieel zijn voor elkaars voortbestaan. De afwezigheid van één van deze soort vrijheden zou leiden tot het tegengestelde van vrijheid: repressie. Deze essay ,hoewel het tamelijk gedateerd is, geeft wel de nodige wijsheid om te navigeren in de huidige maatschappelijke werkelijkheid. Hoe vrij ben je in een samenleving waar je economisch weinig kunt meekomen? Maar, ben je ook vrij als je sociaal weinig mee kunt komen?
June 16, 2025
It's interesting how he advocates for the system built on negative freedom which allows for plurality of values, yet implies for capitalism/democracy to be form of economic slavery/tyranny by the majority. Plularity of values is precisely what these systems are designed to do - economicaly former, politically latter. The text brings up more questions than answers to be honest, but definitely interesting read.
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