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Chicago Studies in American Politics
Why Washington Won't Work: Polarization, Political Trust, and the Governing Crisis
Polarization is at an all-time high in the United States. But contrary to popular belief, Americans are polarized not so much in their policy preferences as in their feelings toward their political To an unprecedented degree, Republicans and Democrats simply do not like one another. No surprise that these deeply held negative feelings are central to the recent (also unprecedented) plunge in congressional productivity. The past three Congresses have gotten less done than any since scholars began measuring congressional productivity.
In Why Washington Won’t Work, Marc J. Hetherington and Thomas J. Rudolph argue that a contemporary crisis of trust—people whose party is out of power have almost no trust in a government run by the other side—has deadlocked Congress. On most issues, party leaders can convince their own party to support their positions. In order to pass legislation, however, they must also create consensus by persuading some portion of the opposing party to trust in their vision for the future. Without trust, consensus fails to develop and compromise does not occur. Up until recently, such trust could still usually be found among the opposition, but not anymore. Political trust, the authors show, is far from a stable characteristic. It’s actually highly variable and contingent on a variety of factors, including whether one’s party is in control, which part of the government one is dealing with, and which policies or events are most salient at the moment.
Political trust increases, for example, when the public is concerned with foreign policy—as in times of war—and it decreases in periods of weak economic performance. Hetherington and Rudolph do offer some suggestions about steps politicians and the public might take to increase political trust. Ultimately, however, they conclude that it is unlikely levels of political trust will significantly increase unless foreign concerns come to dominate and the economy is consistently strong.
In Why Washington Won’t Work, Marc J. Hetherington and Thomas J. Rudolph argue that a contemporary crisis of trust—people whose party is out of power have almost no trust in a government run by the other side—has deadlocked Congress. On most issues, party leaders can convince their own party to support their positions. In order to pass legislation, however, they must also create consensus by persuading some portion of the opposing party to trust in their vision for the future. Without trust, consensus fails to develop and compromise does not occur. Up until recently, such trust could still usually be found among the opposition, but not anymore. Political trust, the authors show, is far from a stable characteristic. It’s actually highly variable and contingent on a variety of factors, including whether one’s party is in control, which part of the government one is dealing with, and which policies or events are most salient at the moment.
Political trust increases, for example, when the public is concerned with foreign policy—as in times of war—and it decreases in periods of weak economic performance. Hetherington and Rudolph do offer some suggestions about steps politicians and the public might take to increase political trust. Ultimately, however, they conclude that it is unlikely levels of political trust will significantly increase unless foreign concerns come to dominate and the economy is consistently strong.
256 pages, Paperback
First published September 14, 2015
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April 30, 2018
During the 2016 election cycle Americans were bombarded with polarizing rhetoric from both major parties (Jacobson, 2017). Even after claiming the White House Donald Trump continued to make polarizing statements and appointed a “thoroughly partisan and divisive administration” (Jacobson, 2017, p. 37). Hetherington and Rudolph’s book, Why Washington Won’t Work, provides valuable background information and insights as to why Americans may have been so receptive to this kind of partisan and divisive political environment.
Hetherington and Rudolph (2015) provide much evidence to support their assertion that “political trust has polarized” (p. 226). Data on feelings about the political parties shows that individuals are becoming increasingly polarized along party lines (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015, p. 31). In 2000, Republicans noted that Democrats were at 38 degrees on a favorability scale and Democrats concluded that Republicans were at 41 degrees (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015, p. 30). In 2012, 60 percent of Democrat respondents and 58 percent of Republican respondents reported favorability ratings at or below 30 degrees for the other party, which shows evidence of increasing polarization (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015, p. 31). These negative feelings are tied to polarized governmental trust because “people do not tend to trust things that are run by people they do not like,” and these favorability scales show the two parties are at odds (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015, p. 38). Many issues arise out of the polarized electorate.
Perhaps the biggest concern tied to polarization presented in the book is the idea that a low level of trust reduces the likelihood of reaching agreement in government (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015). The authors argue that “political trust is critical because it helps create consensus in the mass public by providing a bridge between the governing party’s policy ideas and the opinions of those who usually support the other party” (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015, p. 4). Hetherington and Rudolph (2015) find that “people who distrust government are unwilling to make what we call ‘ideological sacrifices,’” which is a trend that we are seeing currently (p. 4). If an individual does not trust the government then they will not compromise or work with the other political party to come to a resolution on issues that they care most for (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015, p. 4). These ideological sacrifices are especially necessary when contentious issues become prominent because if the public does not force their elected officials to cooperate or work together then positive solutions will not be possible (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015, p. 4).
Hetherington and Rudolph (2015) point out that the elite voices in American politics are able to steer the conversation and “convince their own party faithful in the electorate to support their positions” (p. 10). The problem here is that accord can only be achieved when many diverse voices come together on an issue, not just members of one party or group (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015, p. 10). Since the electorate is more polarized on trust than ever before it is difficult to get members of both parties to come together on difficult issues, which causes problems with the creation of policy and legislation (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015, p. 10).
Two dimensions considered throughout the book seem to have great impacts on political trust: the economy and international issues (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015, p. 71). The authors conclude that “since the economy tends to be more salient when times are bad, slumping economies drive trust down more than surging economies drive it up” (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015, p. 71). The authors also contend that “trust tends to go up when international issues are prominent” (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015, p. 72). This phenomenon provides confirmation that context matters and trust levels can change based on what issues are conspicuous at any given time (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015, p. 70). The authors argue that political leaders and other influential individuals use the environment strategically by “selectively focusing on information that favors their political allies or disfavors their political adversaries” (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015, p. 78). Hetherington and Rudolph (2015) analyzed survey data from a study about priming. They discovered that priming does in fact impact how people feel about given issues, which supports their supposition that party leaders can greatly influence public opinion and trust (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015, p. 117). Tactics like this fail to provide the electorate with an understanding of the broad range of issues at play at any moment and drives the wedge separating political party members in even deeper.
Other political science researchers have studied the effect of political polarization on trust. Hooghe and Oser (2017) find that both partisan strength and political trust have diminished over time, but conclude that the stronger the party affiliation an individual has the more political trust he or she will have as well (pp. 137-140). However, the authors also find that stronger partisanship negatively impacts “generalized political trust,” which is in agreement with Hetherington’s and Rudolph’s (2015) findings about increasing polarization between the parties (Hooghe & Oser, 2017, p. 143). Miller and Conover (2015) too describe the growing feelings of “us-them” in the political landscape of the United States (p. 226). They report that “Democrats and Republicans with strong identities perceive the opposing party as rivals who are fundamentally immoral and cannot be trusted; likewise, they are enraged at each other for ‘destroying American democracy” (Miller & Conover, 2015, p. 235). This finding is also in line with Hetherington’s and Rudolph’s (2015) conclusions.
Hetherington’s and Rudolph’s book was full of statistical data and descriptions of research methodology. This is important since it is an academic work, but the authors might have left more of the technical jargon for an appendix entry instead of putting the bulk of it in many chapters throughout the work. The readability of these portions was diminished for all but individuals with advanced knowledge of statistics and social science research practices. Other academic works—like Hibbing’s and Theiss-Morse’s Congress as Public Enemy for example—also employ statistical analysis, but do not go into nearly as much detail in the main body of the text. This helps their studies to be more comprehensible for the public, which was lacking in Why Washington Won’t Work. The conclusion to Hetherington’s and Rudolph’s book was also problematic.
Instead of offering potential solutions to the issues of trust and polarization in the final section of their book, Hetherington and Rudolph (2015) simply end with a summary of their findings and a pessimistic statement explaining that public opinion is not likely to force government leaders to come together and that “this, in turn, allows out-party political leaders to place their short-term gains above the health of the country without risk of reprisal from their reelection constituency. And the beat goes on” (p. 226). Generally, scholars at least end their works with suggestions for future research. The conclusion of Why Washington Won’t Work was as somber as it was disappointing in this regard.
Hetherington and Rudolph (2015) deliver a thorough study that illustrates the growing polarization of the American electorate and its effect on governmental trust. Their work can be used by other political science scholars to better understand the connections between polarization, party affiliation, elites, priming, economic and international issues, and various other topics that are particularly salient in today’s climate. Researchers studying political parties and polarization should be especially interested in this book’s conclusions. Future studies that include the unconventional 2016 election cycle in their data sets could use methods described in Hetherington’s and Rudolph’s (2015) book to determine if the polarization of political trust and the divisive nature of political parties were even more pronounced than in years past. Overall, Hetherington and Rudolph present a work that is thought-provoking and valuable to many across multiple disciplines.
References
Hetherington, Marc J., & Rudolph, Thomas J. (2015). Why Washington Won’t Work. Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press.
Hooghe, Marc & Oser, Jennifer. (2017). Partisan strength, political trust and generalized trust in
the United States: An analysis of the General Social Survey, 1972-2014. Social Science Research, 68, 132-146.
Jacobson, Gary C. (2017). The Triumph of Polarized Partisanship in 2016: Donald Trump’s
Improbably Victory. Political Science Quarterly, 132(1), 9-41.
Miller, Patrick R. & Conover, Pamela. (2015). Red and Blue States of Mind: Partisan Hostility
and Voting in the United States. Political Research Quarterly, 68(2), 225-239.
Hetherington and Rudolph (2015) provide much evidence to support their assertion that “political trust has polarized” (p. 226). Data on feelings about the political parties shows that individuals are becoming increasingly polarized along party lines (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015, p. 31). In 2000, Republicans noted that Democrats were at 38 degrees on a favorability scale and Democrats concluded that Republicans were at 41 degrees (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015, p. 30). In 2012, 60 percent of Democrat respondents and 58 percent of Republican respondents reported favorability ratings at or below 30 degrees for the other party, which shows evidence of increasing polarization (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015, p. 31). These negative feelings are tied to polarized governmental trust because “people do not tend to trust things that are run by people they do not like,” and these favorability scales show the two parties are at odds (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015, p. 38). Many issues arise out of the polarized electorate.
Perhaps the biggest concern tied to polarization presented in the book is the idea that a low level of trust reduces the likelihood of reaching agreement in government (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015). The authors argue that “political trust is critical because it helps create consensus in the mass public by providing a bridge between the governing party’s policy ideas and the opinions of those who usually support the other party” (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015, p. 4). Hetherington and Rudolph (2015) find that “people who distrust government are unwilling to make what we call ‘ideological sacrifices,’” which is a trend that we are seeing currently (p. 4). If an individual does not trust the government then they will not compromise or work with the other political party to come to a resolution on issues that they care most for (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015, p. 4). These ideological sacrifices are especially necessary when contentious issues become prominent because if the public does not force their elected officials to cooperate or work together then positive solutions will not be possible (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015, p. 4).
Hetherington and Rudolph (2015) point out that the elite voices in American politics are able to steer the conversation and “convince their own party faithful in the electorate to support their positions” (p. 10). The problem here is that accord can only be achieved when many diverse voices come together on an issue, not just members of one party or group (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015, p. 10). Since the electorate is more polarized on trust than ever before it is difficult to get members of both parties to come together on difficult issues, which causes problems with the creation of policy and legislation (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015, p. 10).
Two dimensions considered throughout the book seem to have great impacts on political trust: the economy and international issues (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015, p. 71). The authors conclude that “since the economy tends to be more salient when times are bad, slumping economies drive trust down more than surging economies drive it up” (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015, p. 71). The authors also contend that “trust tends to go up when international issues are prominent” (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015, p. 72). This phenomenon provides confirmation that context matters and trust levels can change based on what issues are conspicuous at any given time (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015, p. 70). The authors argue that political leaders and other influential individuals use the environment strategically by “selectively focusing on information that favors their political allies or disfavors their political adversaries” (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015, p. 78). Hetherington and Rudolph (2015) analyzed survey data from a study about priming. They discovered that priming does in fact impact how people feel about given issues, which supports their supposition that party leaders can greatly influence public opinion and trust (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015, p. 117). Tactics like this fail to provide the electorate with an understanding of the broad range of issues at play at any moment and drives the wedge separating political party members in even deeper.
Other political science researchers have studied the effect of political polarization on trust. Hooghe and Oser (2017) find that both partisan strength and political trust have diminished over time, but conclude that the stronger the party affiliation an individual has the more political trust he or she will have as well (pp. 137-140). However, the authors also find that stronger partisanship negatively impacts “generalized political trust,” which is in agreement with Hetherington’s and Rudolph’s (2015) findings about increasing polarization between the parties (Hooghe & Oser, 2017, p. 143). Miller and Conover (2015) too describe the growing feelings of “us-them” in the political landscape of the United States (p. 226). They report that “Democrats and Republicans with strong identities perceive the opposing party as rivals who are fundamentally immoral and cannot be trusted; likewise, they are enraged at each other for ‘destroying American democracy” (Miller & Conover, 2015, p. 235). This finding is also in line with Hetherington’s and Rudolph’s (2015) conclusions.
Hetherington’s and Rudolph’s book was full of statistical data and descriptions of research methodology. This is important since it is an academic work, but the authors might have left more of the technical jargon for an appendix entry instead of putting the bulk of it in many chapters throughout the work. The readability of these portions was diminished for all but individuals with advanced knowledge of statistics and social science research practices. Other academic works—like Hibbing’s and Theiss-Morse’s Congress as Public Enemy for example—also employ statistical analysis, but do not go into nearly as much detail in the main body of the text. This helps their studies to be more comprehensible for the public, which was lacking in Why Washington Won’t Work. The conclusion to Hetherington’s and Rudolph’s book was also problematic.
Instead of offering potential solutions to the issues of trust and polarization in the final section of their book, Hetherington and Rudolph (2015) simply end with a summary of their findings and a pessimistic statement explaining that public opinion is not likely to force government leaders to come together and that “this, in turn, allows out-party political leaders to place their short-term gains above the health of the country without risk of reprisal from their reelection constituency. And the beat goes on” (p. 226). Generally, scholars at least end their works with suggestions for future research. The conclusion of Why Washington Won’t Work was as somber as it was disappointing in this regard.
Hetherington and Rudolph (2015) deliver a thorough study that illustrates the growing polarization of the American electorate and its effect on governmental trust. Their work can be used by other political science scholars to better understand the connections between polarization, party affiliation, elites, priming, economic and international issues, and various other topics that are particularly salient in today’s climate. Researchers studying political parties and polarization should be especially interested in this book’s conclusions. Future studies that include the unconventional 2016 election cycle in their data sets could use methods described in Hetherington’s and Rudolph’s (2015) book to determine if the polarization of political trust and the divisive nature of political parties were even more pronounced than in years past. Overall, Hetherington and Rudolph present a work that is thought-provoking and valuable to many across multiple disciplines.
References
Hetherington, Marc J., & Rudolph, Thomas J. (2015). Why Washington Won’t Work. Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press.
Hooghe, Marc & Oser, Jennifer. (2017). Partisan strength, political trust and generalized trust in
the United States: An analysis of the General Social Survey, 1972-2014. Social Science Research, 68, 132-146.
Jacobson, Gary C. (2017). The Triumph of Polarized Partisanship in 2016: Donald Trump’s
Improbably Victory. Political Science Quarterly, 132(1), 9-41.
Miller, Patrick R. & Conover, Pamela. (2015). Red and Blue States of Mind: Partisan Hostility
and Voting in the United States. Political Research Quarterly, 68(2), 225-239.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
October 31, 2015
Not sure if I'm ready to give this book a 4 star rating, but more of a 3.5 star rating. I thought given the flood of data and evidence in support of their argument on trust issues, commentary, or at least some thoughts going forward could have been given. There indeed were some conclusions of sort given, but nothing that I think really carried it forward. I felt confused on exactly what should be done from here on out. Not to mention the lack of mention on whether or not there are objective truths to hold and whether or not certain political dispositions denying them is contributing to gridlock. This seems to work in conjunction with trust factors, but of course this comes down to "ideological" possibly. Though I didn't know truth, objectivity, and intellectual honesty were partisan issues.
An interesting book that at least sets the groundwork for understanding the increasing polarization in American politics, but in no way could I say that this is exhaustive or the end in any way. This is just focusing on one piece - trust.
An interesting book that at least sets the groundwork for understanding the increasing polarization in American politics, but in no way could I say that this is exhaustive or the end in any way. This is just focusing on one piece - trust.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews