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Negative Certainties
In Negative Certainties, renowned philosopher Jean-Luc Marion challenges some of the most fundamental assumptions we have developed about knowledge: that it is categorical, predicative, and positive. Following Descartes, Kant, and Heidegger, he looks toward our finitude and the limits of our reason. He asks an astonishingly simple—but profoundly provocative—question in order to open up an entirely new way of thinking about knowledge: Isn’t our uncertainty, our finitude and rational limitations, one of the few things we can be certain about?
- GenresPhilosophy
288 pages, Hardcover
First published January 13, 2010
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About the author
Jean-Luc Marion
112 books105 followersJean-Luc Marion est un philosophe et universitaire français.
Jean-Luc Marion is a French philosopher and academic.
Jean-Luc Marion is a French philosopher and academic.
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September 24, 2019
In the Foreword Marion states the purpose of this book, namely, to "broaden[..] the theater of phenomenality." The method to do so is by way of "negative certainties," a new(?) concept he wants to introduce to philosophy by "[u]sage." Therefore, readers won't find what the definition of negative certainties is. Definitions are appropriate for objects. Marion will simple show that negative certainties pertain to those phenomena that are irreducible to object and objecthood. Nonetheless, they are certain and not irrational. They are valid subject matters (Sachen) for philosophic inquiry. By bringing them into the theater of phenomenality, however, Marion expands the scope of phenomenology. In his theater of phenomenology religion finds its proper and rightful place on its own right. Like Derrida's "deconstruction," negative certainties may be understood by their usage: in the way in which Marion analyzes or describes the phenomena that exceeds objecthood, the saturated phenomena. Negative certainties can be seen by going through Marion's hermeneutics of the saturated phenomena. There is no other way to "see" them.
But is this so new? Perhaps it is for philosophy. But certainly the mystics such as Denys and others knew it well. See Marion's treatment of Denys in Idol and Distance. What is novel is that Marion wants to bring it to philosophy proper. That is new and daring; and he takes "a fine risk" in doing so, as Levinas does in his (writings of) ethics (Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Essence 20).
Marion gives the following epigram by Novalis to this splendid book, published in French in 2009 and translated in English by Stephen E. Lewis in 2015: "The philosopher lives on problems as man does on food. An insoluble problem is an indigestible food." The insoluble problem in philosophy, however, might be one of philosophy's own making: the problem of being, as Heidegger calls it, or, for Marion, the problem of conceiving all things in terms of objects and to set up the criteria by which to conceive them clearly and distinctly. Thus metaphysics conceives all things in terms of cause and effect (Aristotle) or in terms of the principle of sufficient reason (Leibniz) or in terms of the transcendental a priori structures of possible experience (Kant). What is possible or impossible is strictly determined by these criteria. As Marion lists them, these metaphysical principles are: "Everything is either a source or derived from a source" (Aristotle); "No thing is a being that is neither a cause nor an effect" (Suárez); "No thing exists of which it is not possible to ask what is the cause of its existence" (Descartes); "all things are both caused or causing" (Pascal); and "[E]verything that happens has its cause" (Kant) (169). To this we can add the principle of non-contradiction or that of identity and, as already mentioned, the principle of sufficient reason. But these are not adequate to do justice to the events or the saturated phenomena, according to Marion. Those who dwell on these principles and knows nothing else, the metaphysicians, are "musicians without musical ability," Marion is fond of quoting Rudolf Carnap (158).
The problem or challenge posed to these principles of metaphysics is--as it was to Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Levinas: how to overcome them. Can metaphysics be overcome? This is the problem which Marion addresses by engaging in a radical critique of metaphysics or objecthood. The problem is perhaps an indigestible food for philosophers. Perhaps it is so for Nietzsche and Heidegger but, in my view, not for Levinas and Marion, as difficult though as it is.
Drawing much inspirations from Husserl, Heidegger, and Levinas, Marion brackets the natural attitude of philosophers--who always conceive phenomena as the appearance of objects received in intuition or intelligibility (i.e., noema for noesis)--and employs the phenomenological reduction to the thing in itself, zur Sache selbst, to the appearance of that which cannot be reduced to object but gives itself by itself on its own in the pure givenness, not filtering through rationality, consciousness, or dasein. These phenomena are negatively (i.e., non objectively) certain: God, the self, face, icon, love, birth, fatherhood, gift, sacrifice, forgiveness, etc. These phenomena are the certainties that phenomenology hitherto could not handle without reducing them to the status of objects or eliminating them all together from the inquiry. Heidegger, for one, did just that. He did not reduce theology to ontology but excluded it from ontology altogether, saying:
In broadening the scope of phenomenality, however, Marion dearly holds on to what Husserl calls the principle of all principles:
The event "passes and passes of itself [il passe et se passe], and therefore it does without [se passe de] that which is not itself" (182). Unlike substance or ousia that remains in permanence (like the essence of an object) and that occurs for a reason that lies in something else as its source, the event passes without why and without a cause: "that in which we have being and life, that which we breathe as the air around us, is given to us by events alone" (178). The event happens "by the fait accompli of the happening [l'advenue (the French word for 'advent' used to translate Heidegger's "arrival [Ankunft] of Being" or Ereignis, see Pathmarks 275)] that asks nothing of anyone in order to be accomplished" (182; see also 125 for Marion's explicit references to the Heidegger's term). (Marion avoids the word Ereignis for the event. The word 'advent' (l'advenant) is also a key concept in Derrida.) It happens kath' hauto, by itself on its own, like the expression of the face.
Husserl's principle of all principles is not the only guide Marion follows. Heidegger's notion of "sending" (schicken) is decisive as well, whom he quotes:
If the gift is the primordial category of phenomena, birth equals it: "birth puts into operation the eventness that sustains and triggers every phenomenon as an event that passes (of) itself" (193). What Marion means by birth is not only the coming forth of the self (I don't say 'production' of the self as if it is an object) but also the event of creation. Being does not give itself on its own like an autonomous entity in causa sui but is endowed by the Creator who gives as a gift its being. That the whole creation is a gift from God is not and cannot be a metaphysical assertion. Because if it were, then, God would be conceived as the ultimate cause of all phenomena and thus would be reduced to the status of an object or idol. He would be the self-caused cause, the fullness of being, the eschaton. Marion would declare such a God an idol, that which is created in the image of a creature.
In this book Marion avoids as much theology as possible and endeavors to "ground" the broaden domain of phenomenology in terms of the notions such as the gift or birth. He will attempt to arrive at the certainties of those kinds of phenomena that exceed the metaphysics of presence. He will do so, first, by engaging in a rigorous critique of object (starting from Descartes, through Leibniz, and to Kant) and, second, thereby asserting negatively ("That is not that, an object") the certainties of the extra phenomenality of the events. The certainty of these can only be demonstrated by a hermeneutical endeavor. His argument for the negative certainties is hermeneutical obtained by way of interpreting the event: that of the gift, fatherhood, and birth. Marion proposes: "might not the gift offer itself as the privileged phenomenon, or more exactly, as the paradigm of all phenomenality?" (112).
I pose here before I go on and ask: Why does Marion critique object and not being? Is being innocent? Is "da" (thereness) of dasein justified, as Levinas asks? Marion does not condemn being as violent, as Levinas does. Rather, he wants to enlarge the scope of being to include events (the saturated phenomena). He wants to remain within phenomenology--albeit broadened. What is the price for this insistence to remain within the phenomena? On the other hand, with respect to Levinas, what is the risk of attempting to set aside phenomena in order to turn toward ethics that lies beyond phenomenality--the gesture Levinas sees as having been made first by Kant? What if Kant had pursued his line of thought and develop further into the practical realm of ethics beyond phenomenality, instead of resorting to "the unity of reason" for the sake of upholding the system? Does not the sublime (with respect to the colossal in nature but also and more importantly with respect to the moral law) offers another chance for Kant to venture into the realm of beyond phenomenality? Marion insists that "the fact of reason" (**
[To be continued below in the comments section.]
But is this so new? Perhaps it is for philosophy. But certainly the mystics such as Denys and others knew it well. See Marion's treatment of Denys in Idol and Distance. What is novel is that Marion wants to bring it to philosophy proper. That is new and daring; and he takes "a fine risk" in doing so, as Levinas does in his (writings of) ethics (Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Essence 20).
Marion gives the following epigram by Novalis to this splendid book, published in French in 2009 and translated in English by Stephen E. Lewis in 2015: "The philosopher lives on problems as man does on food. An insoluble problem is an indigestible food." The insoluble problem in philosophy, however, might be one of philosophy's own making: the problem of being, as Heidegger calls it, or, for Marion, the problem of conceiving all things in terms of objects and to set up the criteria by which to conceive them clearly and distinctly. Thus metaphysics conceives all things in terms of cause and effect (Aristotle) or in terms of the principle of sufficient reason (Leibniz) or in terms of the transcendental a priori structures of possible experience (Kant). What is possible or impossible is strictly determined by these criteria. As Marion lists them, these metaphysical principles are: "Everything is either a source or derived from a source" (Aristotle); "No thing is a being that is neither a cause nor an effect" (Suárez); "No thing exists of which it is not possible to ask what is the cause of its existence" (Descartes); "all things are both caused or causing" (Pascal); and "[E]verything that happens has its cause" (Kant) (169). To this we can add the principle of non-contradiction or that of identity and, as already mentioned, the principle of sufficient reason. But these are not adequate to do justice to the events or the saturated phenomena, according to Marion. Those who dwell on these principles and knows nothing else, the metaphysicians, are "musicians without musical ability," Marion is fond of quoting Rudolf Carnap (158).
The problem or challenge posed to these principles of metaphysics is--as it was to Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Levinas: how to overcome them. Can metaphysics be overcome? This is the problem which Marion addresses by engaging in a radical critique of metaphysics or objecthood. The problem is perhaps an indigestible food for philosophers. Perhaps it is so for Nietzsche and Heidegger but, in my view, not for Levinas and Marion, as difficult though as it is.
Drawing much inspirations from Husserl, Heidegger, and Levinas, Marion brackets the natural attitude of philosophers--who always conceive phenomena as the appearance of objects received in intuition or intelligibility (i.e., noema for noesis)--and employs the phenomenological reduction to the thing in itself, zur Sache selbst, to the appearance of that which cannot be reduced to object but gives itself by itself on its own in the pure givenness, not filtering through rationality, consciousness, or dasein. These phenomena are negatively (i.e., non objectively) certain: God, the self, face, icon, love, birth, fatherhood, gift, sacrifice, forgiveness, etc. These phenomena are the certainties that phenomenology hitherto could not handle without reducing them to the status of objects or eliminating them all together from the inquiry. Heidegger, for one, did just that. He did not reduce theology to ontology but excluded it from ontology altogether, saying:
God is not really disclosed except by self-revelation, but philosophy lacks the necessary organ to listen to that revelation. Philosophy is gott-los [godless], which is not to say that there is no God, but that the matter is not clear, neither side has scored (Gesamtausgabe (GA) 23:77 Geschichte der Philosophie von Thomas v. Aquin bis Kant (1926-27 course lectures).Marion thinks that phenomenology has been too restrictive in confining itself to what appears as an object to consciousness or what is received in intuition. By broadening the scope, he endeavors to bring out phenomena into the theater that appear in themselves on their own, ones that impose their self-revelation on their own upon the subject who encounters them in counter-experience or in counter-intentionality, the ones that saturate and overflow one's capacity to encompass or provide reasons for their appearance. "The given rises toward us," says Marion (155).
In broadening the scope of phenomenality, however, Marion dearly holds on to what Husserl calls the principle of all principles:
[t]hat everything that offers itself to us in originary 'intuition' must be received exactly as it gives itself out to be , though only within the limits in which it gives itself there (Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: First Book, § 24, quoted in 202).What gives or what is given is the gift, whether one accepts it or not. More fundamental than the phenomena that appear to consciousness, then, is the phenomenon of the gift, which asserts independence from both the giver and the receiver. It is still a phenomenon, nonetheless, to be deciphered and understood through hermeneutics but not as an object, a being, or in terms of some essence (Wesen) but as the saturated phenomena that overflow one's intuition and exceed metaphysical categories or as that which happens underneath the metaphysical parameters: "everything that gives itself gives itself by itself, happens in itself. The phenomenon appears only to the extent that it happens" (200). They happen as events, as otherwise than being or beyond essence: unforeseeable (193), beyond possibilities bordering on the impossible, and "unrepeatable, irremediable, and irreversible" (193). "The event happens as a call" (187), requiring a response. The event is like the Other in Levinas, the Jewish philosopher who would like to move beyond phenomenality wherein, in contrast, Marion, the Christian philosopher, would like to remain by broadening its theater. The events still appear, whereas the face commands beyond and despite the appearance. Here is the crucial difference between the two: the difference between God who does not show himself but issues his commandments instead (to "love your neighbor--that is you") and the Father who sends his own Son to manifest Himself in the Son, the "icon of the invisible God" (Col. 1:5). In what sense do we understand by manifestation here? To ask: How is the Revelation possible as the saturated phenomena? is already to couch it in terms of metaphysics. Perhaps, the proper way to ask is: How can it be interpreted? Or better, how does it reveal itself? "The Lord is God. / He reveals himself to us. / Blessed is he who comes in the name of the Lord," says the Orthodox Liturgy (the italics added).
The event "passes and passes of itself [il passe et se passe], and therefore it does without [se passe de] that which is not itself" (182). Unlike substance or ousia that remains in permanence (like the essence of an object) and that occurs for a reason that lies in something else as its source, the event passes without why and without a cause: "that in which we have being and life, that which we breathe as the air around us, is given to us by events alone" (178). The event happens "by the fait accompli of the happening [l'advenue (the French word for 'advent' used to translate Heidegger's "arrival [Ankunft] of Being" or Ereignis, see Pathmarks 275)] that asks nothing of anyone in order to be accomplished" (182; see also 125 for Marion's explicit references to the Heidegger's term). (Marion avoids the word Ereignis for the event. The word 'advent' (l'advenant) is also a key concept in Derrida.) It happens kath' hauto, by itself on its own, like the expression of the face.
Husserl's principle of all principles is not the only guide Marion follows. Heidegger's notion of "sending" (schicken) is decisive as well, whom he quotes:
The latter [es gibt [the name Heidegger gives for the arrival of Being]] withdraws in favor of the gift [zugünsten der Gabe] which It gives [...]. A giving [Geben] which gives only its gift [nur seine Gabe gibt], but in the giving holds itself back and withdraws [zurückhält and entzieht], such a giving we call sending [das Schicken] (On Time And Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh (NY: Harper and Row, 1972) 8; quoted on 124).As we will discuss below, Marion draws almost entirely from Heidegger the notion of the gift (111). Heidegger's Being can easily pass for Marion's gift. Being gives without why, like the rose that blooms (See Heidegger's The Principle of Reason and John D. Caputo's analysis of it in Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought, ch. 2). Being gives (the constellation of beings) while withdrawing itself. Its giving is its withdrawal. By this concealment in its disclosure (of beings), in the movement of truth (álētheia), it gives and conceals itself at the same time, leaving behind beings (to be) visible and enduring. In Marion's analysis, as we will see below, the gift as such conceals both the giver and the receiver but also itself as such, leaving behind the visibility of itself as an object of exchange value, thus concealing the character of the gift itself as such.
If the gift is the primordial category of phenomena, birth equals it: "birth puts into operation the eventness that sustains and triggers every phenomenon as an event that passes (of) itself" (193). What Marion means by birth is not only the coming forth of the self (I don't say 'production' of the self as if it is an object) but also the event of creation. Being does not give itself on its own like an autonomous entity in causa sui but is endowed by the Creator who gives as a gift its being. That the whole creation is a gift from God is not and cannot be a metaphysical assertion. Because if it were, then, God would be conceived as the ultimate cause of all phenomena and thus would be reduced to the status of an object or idol. He would be the self-caused cause, the fullness of being, the eschaton. Marion would declare such a God an idol, that which is created in the image of a creature.
In this book Marion avoids as much theology as possible and endeavors to "ground" the broaden domain of phenomenology in terms of the notions such as the gift or birth. He will attempt to arrive at the certainties of those kinds of phenomena that exceed the metaphysics of presence. He will do so, first, by engaging in a rigorous critique of object (starting from Descartes, through Leibniz, and to Kant) and, second, thereby asserting negatively ("That is not that, an object") the certainties of the extra phenomenality of the events. The certainty of these can only be demonstrated by a hermeneutical endeavor. His argument for the negative certainties is hermeneutical obtained by way of interpreting the event: that of the gift, fatherhood, and birth. Marion proposes: "might not the gift offer itself as the privileged phenomenon, or more exactly, as the paradigm of all phenomenality?" (112).
I pose here before I go on and ask: Why does Marion critique object and not being? Is being innocent? Is "da" (thereness) of dasein justified, as Levinas asks? Marion does not condemn being as violent, as Levinas does. Rather, he wants to enlarge the scope of being to include events (the saturated phenomena). He wants to remain within phenomenology--albeit broadened. What is the price for this insistence to remain within the phenomena? On the other hand, with respect to Levinas, what is the risk of attempting to set aside phenomena in order to turn toward ethics that lies beyond phenomenality--the gesture Levinas sees as having been made first by Kant? What if Kant had pursued his line of thought and develop further into the practical realm of ethics beyond phenomenality, instead of resorting to "the unity of reason" for the sake of upholding the system? Does not the sublime (with respect to the colossal in nature but also and more importantly with respect to the moral law) offers another chance for Kant to venture into the realm of beyond phenomenality? Marion insists that "the fact of reason" (**
[To be continued below in the comments section.]
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