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The Making and Breaking of the American Constitution: A Thousand-Year History
A provocative new history of America’s constitution and an urgent call to action for a nation confronted by challenges its founders could never have imagined
The American Revolution occurred at a time when Britain’s constitutional order failed to adapt to the extraordinary growth of its colonies. The framers designed an American constitution to succeed where Britain’s had faltered, planning for continuous population and territorial expansion that would eventually cross the continent. Yet by the end of the nineteenth century, it was already ill-suited for an increasingly urban, industrialized society, and the transformations of the twentieth century have pushed it to a breaking point. This book charts the history and aims of the American constitution from its origins in an agrarian past to the grave crisis we face today.
Mark Peterson traces the American constitutional tradition to the control of land in medieval England, showing how the founders incorporated the aspirations of Magna Carta with the administrative principles of the Domesday Book, a meticulous survey and valuation of landed property commissioned by William the Conqueror. This framework encouraged the growth of democratic self-government in a young nation. It also institutionalized the colonization of territory and the expulsion of Indigenous peoples, establishing a legal blueprint for transforming tribal lands into revenue-yielding real estate for settlers. Peterson’s riveting narrative paints an arresting picture of a dynamic republic whose frame of government has changed enormously to meet the challenges of the modern age but whose written constitution has changed very little.
Marking the 250th anniversary of American independence, The Making and Breaking of the American Constitution reveals how this widening disconnect threatens the very existence of our democracy. It calls for a constitution that sustains the ideals developed over the past thousand years while meeting the challenges of the future.
The American Revolution occurred at a time when Britain’s constitutional order failed to adapt to the extraordinary growth of its colonies. The framers designed an American constitution to succeed where Britain’s had faltered, planning for continuous population and territorial expansion that would eventually cross the continent. Yet by the end of the nineteenth century, it was already ill-suited for an increasingly urban, industrialized society, and the transformations of the twentieth century have pushed it to a breaking point. This book charts the history and aims of the American constitution from its origins in an agrarian past to the grave crisis we face today.
Mark Peterson traces the American constitutional tradition to the control of land in medieval England, showing how the founders incorporated the aspirations of Magna Carta with the administrative principles of the Domesday Book, a meticulous survey and valuation of landed property commissioned by William the Conqueror. This framework encouraged the growth of democratic self-government in a young nation. It also institutionalized the colonization of territory and the expulsion of Indigenous peoples, establishing a legal blueprint for transforming tribal lands into revenue-yielding real estate for settlers. Peterson’s riveting narrative paints an arresting picture of a dynamic republic whose frame of government has changed enormously to meet the challenges of the modern age but whose written constitution has changed very little.
Marking the 250th anniversary of American independence, The Making and Breaking of the American Constitution reveals how this widening disconnect threatens the very existence of our democracy. It calls for a constitution that sustains the ideals developed over the past thousand years while meeting the challenges of the future.
408 pages, Hardcover
Published March 10, 2026
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June 13, 2026
4.5 stars rounded down. The first 2/3 were absolutely 5 star, the big framing issue followed by the actual US Constitution up to 1890. The latter 1/3, though, would probably do only 3.5 stars at best.
This is a long review, with some things hidden behind spoilers.
A magisterial and thought-provoking book that argues the US Constitution was at its core, a land-acquisition, land-development, and land-management tool, along the lines of one of the three written documents that form the core of the British constitution. That said, I don’t totally agree with all of his thought, especially near the end of the book, and will expound further on my site.
First, that word. “Constitution.”s Peterson notes that the US "Founding Fathers" used it for a system as much or more than a single written document, not only under the Articles of Confederation but in the first years after 1789.
Otherwise, Peterson is serious in this framing, complete to using land and realty terms like "allodial" and "cadastral."
First, those three documents? Many fairly serious history buffs recognize two of them — the 1689 Bill of Rights and Magna Carta.
The third? William the Conquerer's 1086 Domesday Book.
No, the US Constitution is not an appraisal district book. But? Peterson notes it establishes a decadal census, that the "enumeration of the populace" already in the 1790 Census included more questions than "how many people live here," and that those questions expanded over time, and that part of the purpose of this was for federal government direct taxation. (Until the 16th Amendment, the US government could only tax directly in proportion to a state's population, thought this was ignored in the Civil War, with taxes levied directly on income regardless of state of residence AND having a multi-tier progressive style of taxation.)
In addition, Peterson doesn't directly mention it, but Article III, about the US Supreme Court and inferior courts, talks about its powers in all cases of "law and equity." That's not equity in the 21st century. That's land.
Peterson explains how, while Britain has an “unwritten” constitution, it has written elements — the 1087 Domesday Book, Magna Carta, original form in 1215 but reissued in rewritten forms at various times (tho not explicitly mentioned by him) and the 1689 Bill of Rights.
And, the US, though backboned by a “written” constitution, has unwritten elements — legal jurisprudence, what might be called constitutional common law and more. That’s contra “originalists” or “strict constructionalists.” He references these and other theories, all of which he considers as overlapping highly, near th e end. Just as different interpretations of the British constitution wound up unconstrainable by the 1770s without some sort of major action, he notes already by 1990 and 200 years of the US written version, we were facing the same thing.
From there, starting with a parallel track, he talks about the Confederation creating the Northwest Ordinance, because Virginia and other states had competing land claims north of the Ohio that they surrendered, but no Southwest Ordinance, because the land claims to the Mississippi south of the Ohio were non-competing and thus not surrendered. From there, he notes that Georgia ratified the Constitution so quickly because it had zero money or troops to fight Indians, and how the Constitution reserved Indian land issues to the federal government.
From there? He excoriates Chief Justice John Marshall for validating the Yazoo land deals, for fetishizing "sanctity of contracts" even in the face of clear fraud, and for also using these cases to put Indian land claims on a lesser tier.
He also notes the Article IV provisions for how states were to be created. (I'll discuss what I see as some issues with his interpretation at my own site.)
Re the 1770s, he notes that the UK constitutional system had evolved for a land-poor, and (relatively) people-heavy situation, while the US colonies faced exactly the opposite, as part of the situation, even problem.
Peterson notes the rhetoric of “permanence” in all written documents. Notes Madison, Federalist 48 and “parchment barriers.”
He notes “revolution,” pre-1776, per etymology, originally meant “restoration — a turn of the wheel back to an earlier condition.”
==
Chapter 1
Part of the Stamp Act’s problem was that it demanded payment in sterling, which Parliament expressly forbade colonies to coin, under the 1764 Currency Act, killing off Connecticut’s nutmeg shilling, etc. Ben Franklin added that, since it was to pay for troops, even if not all the coin went to Britain, much would go to Quebec and the Floridas, the new colonies. Before that, Peterson notes that as “new colonies,” the trio were not considered to be ready for representative government at that time.
Articles of Confederation “a treaty organization for mutual defense.”
==
Chapter 7: The President who failed to bark
I had never before read in detail Jefferson’s constitutional concerns not only about the Louisiana Purchase itself, but, looking forward, over the admission of states from that land, given that he believed the constitution and definitely its state-making process applied only to land east of the Mississippi, the US created by the Treaty of Paris. He thought a constitutional amendment was needed, as part of his strict constructionalism, but Republican allies said no, and he agrees not to raise this in public. Opponents of Louisiana’s admission, like Sens. Josiah Quincey of Massachusetts and Samuel Dana of Connecticut raised just that issue on the Senate floor, Dana even introducing such a proposed amendment requiring each of the original states to consent. Jefferson was the dog that did not bark in 1812. And Peterson fairly excoriates him.
Chapter 8 The Machine Runs Amok: Expansion, Slavery and the Civil War
Peterson talks about the Domesday Machine continuing to the Civil War. The admission of Missouri, Jefferson’s “fire bell,” is next. The Boon’s Lick (as he has it spelled) area was one-third its populatoin then. Next, Texas, and Americans moving there to force eventual union with the US.
Chapter 9 The Machinery Stalls Out: The Challenge of the Arid West
OK, during the Civil War, as many buffs know, Nevada clearly came in unconstitutionally, but Peterson really picks it up in this chapter. As part of this, he discusses John Wesley Powell and his western drainage basins, and Henry George and his single land tax. After that, it was politics. Republicans split one Dakota Territory into two states and rebuff a Democratic compromise to admit New Mexico. (It already then had more population; remember, Mexican citizens were granted US citizenship by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.) Although the constitutional population is 60,000, the informal rule was that a would-be state should have at least as many people as the smallest current state. Wyoming fell far short in 1890, and until the admission of Alaska, remained short. Eventually, Alaska passed it, and it went back to the smallest US state.)
Chapter 10 is about three distinct sub-nations — North, South and West. Really, the Old Northwest felt this way pre-Civil War, but Peterson picks this up as the first chapter of his Part 3, with the start of the second century of the US Constitution, the immigration to the Old Northwest and its industrialization in Chicago, Milwaukee, etc. Misses Turner’s “close of the frontier” thesis, which would have tied in here. (See how this book is thought-provoking, but yet has a miss here and there?)
I took side notes here about various US Censuses both before and after 1890, re my note above.
Near the end of Chapter 10, on 243-44 he falters, in my opinion, claiming the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amendments undermined the Philadelphia compromise. I can halfway buy that about the Sixteenth, even though Peterson ignores that the Civil War income tax was unconstitutional for not being levied in proportion to state population itself. (And why do either Constitutional or Civil War scholars not pick up on this?) Later on, I started thinking, he is a bit like a more modernized Walter Karp in some ways.
The Seventeenth? I totally reject his thesis here. The only thing changed was going to direct popular election. The equality of states in the Senate was preserved. Frankly, his discussion on 245 seems to misunderstand what was most at concern in the "New Jersey plan," and that was equal state representation, not indirect election. He is right about how the US more and more has the "virtual representation" that the Founders rejected.
Chapter 11: The Great Transformation
Primarily about the rise of regulatory agencies, which of course started with Theodore Roosevelt but really took off with the New Deal. Not much special here.
One side note here: The Federal Housing Authority encouraged banks et al to punish mortgagees that did not install AC. Even "Cadillac Desert" didn't mention this.
Chapter 12: The Long Crisis of the Constitution
This starts with a partial overlap with chapter 11.
His first plaint is the Supreme Court's "insular cases" distinguishing "incorporated" from "unincorporated" territories. It's why there's subminimum wages in Guam today. To put it more bluntly, the rulings were racist for Caribbean and Pacific islands that were non-white. (Hawaii, with its white sugar plantation owners overthrowing the kingdom, was "incorporated."
It's "Brains Trust" as a plural. Surprised Peterson missed that.
He notes the post-WWII national security state was alien to the spirit of 1787. He notes the "War on ... X" mentality. Militarization of the US. Takes Ike’s comment about the military-industrial complex at face value, ignoring that, in exchange, Ike substituted the spying-snooping-overthrowing complex.
A short epilogue "Toward 2090" notes the US has been "constitutionally adrift" since the end of the Cold War. Peterson wonders what the country and Constitution will be "for" in 2090. He cites a 1974 book by Rexford Tugwell et al that notes the founders (and others around the Euro-American world) cited "natural rights" but not "natural duties." Tugwell called for a Bill of Responsibilities, and further empowering the House.
The epilogue concludes with a bit of turd-polishing the Founders. It was, in reality, as he notes in the beginning in discussing "revolution" etymologically, a conservative re-turning in 1787. (Interestingly, Shay’s Rebellion as a partial cause of the Constitutional Convention is never mentioned.) Plus, as he notes, there was not "originary genius" at Philadelphia.
As for replacing today’s constitution, just as the Founders replaced the Articles of Confederation? With the amount of wingnuttery running around America, I’m far less sanguine of a good result from that than Peterson is.
That’s where I really thought of him as a new Walter Karp and falling to 4.5 moved downward. I’ll have more thoughts on my personal site.
This is a long review, with some things hidden behind spoilers.
A magisterial and thought-provoking book that argues the US Constitution was at its core, a land-acquisition, land-development, and land-management tool, along the lines of one of the three written documents that form the core of the British constitution. That said, I don’t totally agree with all of his thought, especially near the end of the book, and will expound further on my site.
First, that word. “Constitution.”s Peterson notes that the US "Founding Fathers" used it for a system as much or more than a single written document, not only under the Articles of Confederation but in the first years after 1789.
Otherwise, Peterson is serious in this framing, complete to using land and realty terms like "allodial" and "cadastral."
First, those three documents? Many fairly serious history buffs recognize two of them — the 1689 Bill of Rights and Magna Carta.
The third? William the Conquerer's 1086 Domesday Book.
No, the US Constitution is not an appraisal district book. But? Peterson notes it establishes a decadal census, that the "enumeration of the populace" already in the 1790 Census included more questions than "how many people live here," and that those questions expanded over time, and that part of the purpose of this was for federal government direct taxation. (Until the 16th Amendment, the US government could only tax directly in proportion to a state's population, thought this was ignored in the Civil War, with taxes levied directly on income regardless of state of residence AND having a multi-tier progressive style of taxation.)
In addition, Peterson doesn't directly mention it, but Article III, about the US Supreme Court and inferior courts, talks about its powers in all cases of "law and equity." That's not equity in the 21st century. That's land.
Peterson explains how, while Britain has an “unwritten” constitution, it has written elements — the 1087 Domesday Book, Magna Carta, original form in 1215 but reissued in rewritten forms at various times (tho not explicitly mentioned by him) and the 1689 Bill of Rights.
And, the US, though backboned by a “written” constitution, has unwritten elements — legal jurisprudence, what might be called constitutional common law and more. That’s contra “originalists” or “strict constructionalists.” He references these and other theories, all of which he considers as overlapping highly, near th e end. Just as different interpretations of the British constitution wound up unconstrainable by the 1770s without some sort of major action, he notes already by 1990 and 200 years of the US written version, we were facing the same thing.
“No written document can ever completely define, let alone create, a governmental system and the fundamental principals that shape its nature.”
From there, starting with a parallel track, he talks about the Confederation creating the Northwest Ordinance, because Virginia and other states had competing land claims north of the Ohio that they surrendered, but no Southwest Ordinance, because the land claims to the Mississippi south of the Ohio were non-competing and thus not surrendered. From there, he notes that Georgia ratified the Constitution so quickly because it had zero money or troops to fight Indians, and how the Constitution reserved Indian land issues to the federal government.
From there? He excoriates Chief Justice John Marshall for validating the Yazoo land deals, for fetishizing "sanctity of contracts" even in the face of clear fraud, and for also using these cases to put Indian land claims on a lesser tier.
He also notes the Article IV provisions for how states were to be created. (I'll discuss what I see as some issues with his interpretation at my own site.)
Re the 1770s, he notes that the UK constitutional system had evolved for a land-poor, and (relatively) people-heavy situation, while the US colonies faced exactly the opposite, as part of the situation, even problem.
Peterson notes the rhetoric of “permanence” in all written documents. Notes Madison, Federalist 48 and “parchment barriers.”
He notes “revolution,” pre-1776, per etymology, originally meant “restoration — a turn of the wheel back to an earlier condition.”
“Neither the state constitutions begun in 1776 nor the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 was a stroke of originary genius.”
==
Chapter 1
Part of the Stamp Act’s problem was that it demanded payment in sterling, which Parliament expressly forbade colonies to coin, under the 1764 Currency Act, killing off Connecticut’s nutmeg shilling, etc. Ben Franklin added that, since it was to pay for troops, even if not all the coin went to Britain, much would go to Quebec and the Floridas, the new colonies. Before that, Peterson notes that as “new colonies,” the trio were not considered to be ready for representative government at that time.
Articles of Confederation “a treaty organization for mutual defense.”
==
Chapter 7: The President who failed to bark
I had never before read in detail Jefferson’s constitutional concerns not only about the Louisiana Purchase itself, but, looking forward, over the admission of states from that land, given that he believed the constitution and definitely its state-making process applied only to land east of the Mississippi, the US created by the Treaty of Paris. He thought a constitutional amendment was needed, as part of his strict constructionalism, but Republican allies said no, and he agrees not to raise this in public. Opponents of Louisiana’s admission, like Sens. Josiah Quincey of Massachusetts and Samuel Dana of Connecticut raised just that issue on the Senate floor, Dana even introducing such a proposed amendment requiring each of the original states to consent. Jefferson was the dog that did not bark in 1812. And Peterson fairly excoriates him.
Chapter 8 The Machine Runs Amok: Expansion, Slavery and the Civil War
Peterson talks about the Domesday Machine continuing to the Civil War. The admission of Missouri, Jefferson’s “fire bell,” is next. The Boon’s Lick (as he has it spelled) area was one-third its populatoin then. Next, Texas, and Americans moving there to force eventual union with the US.
Chapter 9 The Machinery Stalls Out: The Challenge of the Arid West
OK, during the Civil War, as many buffs know, Nevada clearly came in unconstitutionally, but Peterson really picks it up in this chapter. As part of this, he discusses John Wesley Powell and his western drainage basins, and Henry George and his single land tax. After that, it was politics. Republicans split one Dakota Territory into two states and rebuff a Democratic compromise to admit New Mexico. (It already then had more population; remember, Mexican citizens were granted US citizenship by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.) Although the constitutional population is 60,000, the informal rule was that a would-be state should have at least as many people as the smallest current state. Wyoming fell far short in 1890, and until the admission of Alaska, remained short. Eventually, Alaska passed it, and it went back to the smallest US state.)
Chapter 10 is about three distinct sub-nations — North, South and West. Really, the Old Northwest felt this way pre-Civil War, but Peterson picks this up as the first chapter of his Part 3, with the start of the second century of the US Constitution, the immigration to the Old Northwest and its industrialization in Chicago, Milwaukee, etc. Misses Turner’s “close of the frontier” thesis, which would have tied in here. (See how this book is thought-provoking, but yet has a miss here and there?)
I took side notes here about various US Censuses both before and after 1890, re my note above.
Near the end of Chapter 10, on 243-44 he falters, in my opinion, claiming the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amendments undermined the Philadelphia compromise. I can halfway buy that about the Sixteenth, even though Peterson ignores that the Civil War income tax was unconstitutional for not being levied in proportion to state population itself. (And why do either Constitutional or Civil War scholars not pick up on this?) Later on, I started thinking, he is a bit like a more modernized Walter Karp in some ways.
The Seventeenth? I totally reject his thesis here. The only thing changed was going to direct popular election. The equality of states in the Senate was preserved. Frankly, his discussion on 245 seems to misunderstand what was most at concern in the "New Jersey plan," and that was equal state representation, not indirect election. He is right about how the US more and more has the "virtual representation" that the Founders rejected.
Chapter 11: The Great Transformation
Primarily about the rise of regulatory agencies, which of course started with Theodore Roosevelt but really took off with the New Deal. Not much special here.
One side note here: The Federal Housing Authority encouraged banks et al to punish mortgagees that did not install AC. Even "Cadillac Desert" didn't mention this.
Chapter 12: The Long Crisis of the Constitution
This starts with a partial overlap with chapter 11.
His first plaint is the Supreme Court's "insular cases" distinguishing "incorporated" from "unincorporated" territories. It's why there's subminimum wages in Guam today. To put it more bluntly, the rulings were racist for Caribbean and Pacific islands that were non-white. (Hawaii, with its white sugar plantation owners overthrowing the kingdom, was "incorporated."
It's "Brains Trust" as a plural. Surprised Peterson missed that.
He notes the post-WWII national security state was alien to the spirit of 1787. He notes the "War on ... X" mentality. Militarization of the US. Takes Ike’s comment about the military-industrial complex at face value, ignoring that, in exchange, Ike substituted the spying-snooping-overthrowing complex.
A short epilogue "Toward 2090" notes the US has been "constitutionally adrift" since the end of the Cold War. Peterson wonders what the country and Constitution will be "for" in 2090. He cites a 1974 book by Rexford Tugwell et al that notes the founders (and others around the Euro-American world) cited "natural rights" but not "natural duties." Tugwell called for a Bill of Responsibilities, and further empowering the House.
The epilogue concludes with a bit of turd-polishing the Founders. It was, in reality, as he notes in the beginning in discussing "revolution" etymologically, a conservative re-turning in 1787. (Interestingly, Shay’s Rebellion as a partial cause of the Constitutional Convention is never mentioned.) Plus, as he notes, there was not "originary genius" at Philadelphia.
As for replacing today’s constitution, just as the Founders replaced the Articles of Confederation? With the amount of wingnuttery running around America, I’m far less sanguine of a good result from that than Peterson is.
That’s where I really thought of him as a new Walter Karp and falling to 4.5 moved downward. I’ll have more thoughts on my personal site.
April 27, 2026
I was a fan of this constitutional history, which offered some useful frameworks for thinking about the Constituion.
I cannot imagine the difficulties inherent in naming and marketing a book these days, but I did think to some extent the title was a bit ambitious, At some points, especially early on, it felt more like "[Exploring Some Context Surrounding the Formations and Understanding] of the American Constitution: A Thousand-Year [Partial] History*" but I guess that is a bit toothless and unlikly to drive sales. That being said, I am not trying to be glib or trivialize Peterson's work; the book itself was very interesting and educational. One can easily see what Mark Peterson was trying to do and largely accomplishes.
Peterson takes a very measured tone and starts with the etymology of the term constituion which was thought-provoking. Early on, he tackles a review of the overlap of historical land availability, property law, and constitutional posturing. For me, at least, this is a thought-provoking angle that has potentially interesting implications. Much like the laws of physics, temperature and volume govern interactions, it makes sense that. While that may seem readily obvious, Peterson's way of addressing it may have helped the enormity of the connection fully sink in.
I appreciate his coverage of some of the language used in the colonial charters and the underpinnings of what the colonists understood to be the source of their ownership rights. He goes on to parse through some of the different stakes and considerations for some of the early colonies/states in a way that was interesting and easy to follow.
*if not a 500ish year history with one notable flashback to the Norman Conquest...
I cannot imagine the difficulties inherent in naming and marketing a book these days, but I did think to some extent the title was a bit ambitious, At some points, especially early on, it felt more like "[Exploring Some Context Surrounding the Formations and Understanding] of the American Constitution: A Thousand-Year [Partial] History*" but I guess that is a bit toothless and unlikly to drive sales. That being said, I am not trying to be glib or trivialize Peterson's work; the book itself was very interesting and educational. One can easily see what Mark Peterson was trying to do and largely accomplishes.
Peterson takes a very measured tone and starts with the etymology of the term constituion which was thought-provoking. Early on, he tackles a review of the overlap of historical land availability, property law, and constitutional posturing. For me, at least, this is a thought-provoking angle that has potentially interesting implications. Much like the laws of physics, temperature and volume govern interactions, it makes sense that. While that may seem readily obvious, Peterson's way of addressing it may have helped the enormity of the connection fully sink in.
I appreciate his coverage of some of the language used in the colonial charters and the underpinnings of what the colonists understood to be the source of their ownership rights. He goes on to parse through some of the different stakes and considerations for some of the early colonies/states in a way that was interesting and easy to follow.
*if not a 500ish year history with one notable flashback to the Norman Conquest...
Read
June 9, 2026Warning, this is far from a field I am familiar with.
Peterson's audacious account of a millennium of constitutional history begins with the Norman Invasion. Here, he outlines the guiding thread of the rest of the text: the 'Domesday Machine.' British constitutionalism began with a program to consolidate colonization. A massive survey records near every social and economic relation in England. This program was conservative, seeking to preserve the existing economic relations as much as possible to avoid any discontent. It was also heavily tied to the feudal agrarian system, having relatively stable economic relations that would continue for centuries.
Though this structure would face crises, most notably in 1688, the British constitution remained tied to a well-defined agrarian landscape. The creation of the American colonies would gradually put these relations in jeopardy. The British constitution did not know how to handle expansion. Because they were represented in charters, Americans were not part of the now-dominant Parliament and were unable to exercise their will. The absence of American representation added to the fire that was the Americans' repressed, insatiable desire for indigenous land. Amid constant wars over this land and mounting debt, there would be relentless conflict between the settlers and the metropole, culminating, of course, in the American Revolution.
The new colonies would unite in their pursuit of indigenous land by establishing a federal state that, now in peace with the French, could focus its efforts on killing indigenous people and organizing their land. The key contribution of Peterson's text is its description of how the federal state's constitutional creation was intended to outline an alternative Domesday machine. Instead of recording existing relations, impossible in the new nation, the Domesday machine would turn to a futurity which would speculatively organize land and sell it to raise national income.
However, this new understanding of the state did not avoid contradictions. If America could endlessly expand, how did they differ from the British that oppressed their distinct national spirit? Additionally, a constitution is about a people and a land, but who exactly were the constantly changing American people and the shifting land? In the strongest chapter of the text, Peterson argues that these contradictions were never resolved, but, in a dangerous precedent that continues today, Thomas Jefferson and Congress remained silent about the constitutional nature of the Louisiana Purchase, evading formal institutional constraints to determine whether it would pass and how to amend the Constitution to effect its passage. Therefore, the constitution became loosened from a law above the state to one that can be used at whoever's arbitrary will (though maybe that is every constitution?)
Peterson connects these contradictions to the debates over slavery in the republic. The cotton gin created a brand-new challenge for the generations after the founding fathers: deciding whether the economically booming cash-crop trade's constant need for new lands would erode essential nation-building. This comes back to Jefferson's silence, the silence on what exactly American land would be. Ultimately, the future of the nation could only be decided over a war that would tear the nation open.
Peterson's text begins to wane after this point. He offers histories of how the constitution's concerns with individual states became irrelevant, first due to massive disparities between state populations. Next, he looks at the ballooning of federal powers in post Civil War development to the New Deal making the 1890- state completely different than the 1790 one.
However, his analysis of the above remains confused. Up to the civil war, the Domesday machine is this innovative thread linking this massive history together, but soon we see it fall apart. This is part of his key argument, that we are so far from this original history that we require rethinking what our constitution is for. However, there is more to say about the Domesday Machine.
After the colonization of indigenous land ends, we barely see analysis of America's international relations. There is a brief mention of the Philippines and Puerto Rico as overseas colonies, but this doesn't lead to much analysis. Curiously missing from the text, at least in detailed treatment, is the Monroe doctrine. What exactly is the Domesday Machine guiding America's international vision of Latin America? More crucially, how does that international vision turn to Wilson's post-WW1 League of Nations, and then of course its site as the global hegemon post-WW2.
In addition, Peterson leaves unanswered what the political economic goals are of these international transformations. America's colonization of indigenous lands was linked to an agrarian vision, but we see, especially in the 20th century, new political economic goals. Peterson's economic arguments are weakened by being too tied to the state, unable to articulate the new, powerful industries' international ventures. Expressing these transformations could offer insights into what exactly a Domesday Machine had to confront. Most disappointingly, I would love to see how the speculative future markets undergirding America's original constitutional vision aligned with the neoliberal securities-driven financial economy that we still live under.
Lastly, the question Peterson asks is a poignant one. If the original constitution had the purpose of displacing the indigenous and organizing their land, what goal, in a different context, does our constitution have? What we see is that we have inherited a tradition, from William the Conqueror, of constitutions as colonization. However, could we retain the international basis of the constitution, its fundamental grounding in relations between states, but seek to create an egalitarian order from that premise? Therefore, should considerations of the constitution move beyond the concern of the individual nation-state to a form of 'worldmaking?'
Peterson's audacious account of a millennium of constitutional history begins with the Norman Invasion. Here, he outlines the guiding thread of the rest of the text: the 'Domesday Machine.' British constitutionalism began with a program to consolidate colonization. A massive survey records near every social and economic relation in England. This program was conservative, seeking to preserve the existing economic relations as much as possible to avoid any discontent. It was also heavily tied to the feudal agrarian system, having relatively stable economic relations that would continue for centuries.
Though this structure would face crises, most notably in 1688, the British constitution remained tied to a well-defined agrarian landscape. The creation of the American colonies would gradually put these relations in jeopardy. The British constitution did not know how to handle expansion. Because they were represented in charters, Americans were not part of the now-dominant Parliament and were unable to exercise their will. The absence of American representation added to the fire that was the Americans' repressed, insatiable desire for indigenous land. Amid constant wars over this land and mounting debt, there would be relentless conflict between the settlers and the metropole, culminating, of course, in the American Revolution.
The new colonies would unite in their pursuit of indigenous land by establishing a federal state that, now in peace with the French, could focus its efforts on killing indigenous people and organizing their land. The key contribution of Peterson's text is its description of how the federal state's constitutional creation was intended to outline an alternative Domesday machine. Instead of recording existing relations, impossible in the new nation, the Domesday machine would turn to a futurity which would speculatively organize land and sell it to raise national income.
However, this new understanding of the state did not avoid contradictions. If America could endlessly expand, how did they differ from the British that oppressed their distinct national spirit? Additionally, a constitution is about a people and a land, but who exactly were the constantly changing American people and the shifting land? In the strongest chapter of the text, Peterson argues that these contradictions were never resolved, but, in a dangerous precedent that continues today, Thomas Jefferson and Congress remained silent about the constitutional nature of the Louisiana Purchase, evading formal institutional constraints to determine whether it would pass and how to amend the Constitution to effect its passage. Therefore, the constitution became loosened from a law above the state to one that can be used at whoever's arbitrary will (though maybe that is every constitution?)
Peterson connects these contradictions to the debates over slavery in the republic. The cotton gin created a brand-new challenge for the generations after the founding fathers: deciding whether the economically booming cash-crop trade's constant need for new lands would erode essential nation-building. This comes back to Jefferson's silence, the silence on what exactly American land would be. Ultimately, the future of the nation could only be decided over a war that would tear the nation open.
Peterson's text begins to wane after this point. He offers histories of how the constitution's concerns with individual states became irrelevant, first due to massive disparities between state populations. Next, he looks at the ballooning of federal powers in post Civil War development to the New Deal making the 1890- state completely different than the 1790 one.
However, his analysis of the above remains confused. Up to the civil war, the Domesday machine is this innovative thread linking this massive history together, but soon we see it fall apart. This is part of his key argument, that we are so far from this original history that we require rethinking what our constitution is for. However, there is more to say about the Domesday Machine.
After the colonization of indigenous land ends, we barely see analysis of America's international relations. There is a brief mention of the Philippines and Puerto Rico as overseas colonies, but this doesn't lead to much analysis. Curiously missing from the text, at least in detailed treatment, is the Monroe doctrine. What exactly is the Domesday Machine guiding America's international vision of Latin America? More crucially, how does that international vision turn to Wilson's post-WW1 League of Nations, and then of course its site as the global hegemon post-WW2.
In addition, Peterson leaves unanswered what the political economic goals are of these international transformations. America's colonization of indigenous lands was linked to an agrarian vision, but we see, especially in the 20th century, new political economic goals. Peterson's economic arguments are weakened by being too tied to the state, unable to articulate the new, powerful industries' international ventures. Expressing these transformations could offer insights into what exactly a Domesday Machine had to confront. Most disappointingly, I would love to see how the speculative future markets undergirding America's original constitutional vision aligned with the neoliberal securities-driven financial economy that we still live under.
Lastly, the question Peterson asks is a poignant one. If the original constitution had the purpose of displacing the indigenous and organizing their land, what goal, in a different context, does our constitution have? What we see is that we have inherited a tradition, from William the Conqueror, of constitutions as colonization. However, could we retain the international basis of the constitution, its fundamental grounding in relations between states, but seek to create an egalitarian order from that premise? Therefore, should considerations of the constitution move beyond the concern of the individual nation-state to a form of 'worldmaking?'
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
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