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Hegel and Spinoza
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May 28, 2026
Hegel And Spinoza
Spinoza receives substantial attention in contemporary philosophy as does his relationship to the German absolute idealist Hegel. Hegel wrote a great deal about Spinoza, praising his work and also sharply criticizing it, especially in his late forbidding book, "The Science of Logic". This short monography by James Kreines "Hegel and Spinoza" (2026) examines Spinoza's monism and his understanding of the nature of substance. The monograph is part of the Cambridge Elements Series, "Elements in the Philosophy of Georg Willhelm Friedrich Hegel" edited by Sebastian Stein and Joshua Wretzel which currently includes seven short monographs or "Elements" about Hegel. James Kreines, the author of this Element, is Edward S Gould Professor of Philosophy at Claremont McKenna College, California. He is an authority on German idealism, including the thought of Hegel and Kant.
The thought of both Spinoza and Hegel is difficult and each has been subject to many interpretations. In his great book, "Ethics" Spinoza developed a doctrine of metaphysical monism in which reality consisted of a single substance, with infinite attributes of which the two known to humans are thought and extension, and infinite modes. In Spinoza's thought, many things which might be considered individual substances, such as individual persons (you and I) are thought to be modes, part of the one substance.
Hegel took Spinoza's thought seriously, especially its view of substance and monism. He also, in his "Logic" critiqued it. Many books have examined the relationship between Hegel and Spinoza. Kreine's monograph is divided into three parts. First, he explains Spinoza's metaphysical monism and its strengths. Second, he examines Hegel's critique of Spinoza. Hegel argued, to put it simply, that Spinoza's monism and single substance lead to a philosophical abyss because it could not explain the existence of finite things, tables and chairs, you and me. Reality was one large undifferentiated thing.
Some scholars have found Hegel's critique question-begging as against Spinoza. Kreines examines the critique carefully and agrees with it. The merit of the critique, for Kreines, is that Hegel approaches Spinoza from within the earlier philosopher's own assumptions, from the inside, thus avoiding question-begging. He develops the two bases for Spinoza's doctrine of substance, the first immediate (intuitive) and the second mediate, based upon the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Kreines agrees with Hegel that Spinoza's thought cannot explain the existence of finitude.
The third part of Kreine's study uses the critique of Spinoza to examine some of Hegel's "Logic" a notoriously difficult work, focusing on Hegel's paradoxical statement at the outset that " Being, the indeterminate immediate is in fact nothing, and neither more nor less than nothing." Kreines argues that Hegel's thought, unlike Spinoza's centered upon change, negation, and becoming. So Being, at the outset, is not enough. Hegel in the "Logic" attempts to move from undifferentiated being through self-development in what Kreines calls in his final sentence "From Shapeless Abyss to Self-Developing Thought".
This book, Hegel's thought and Kreine's discussion, is extraordinarily obscure. It adopts a highly metaphysical approach which would be rejected by most contemporary philosophers but, as the book and the series of which it is a part suggests, is enjoying something of a revival. This has value, in my view. As a long time student of Spinoza, I learned from Kreine's Hegelian reading of the philosopher and from his discussion of Hegel's critique. The discussion of Hegel's "Logic" was suggestive as an opening to this difficult work. It was good to struggle with this book,which is intended for serious students of philosophy and not for casual reading.
Robin Friedman
Spinoza receives substantial attention in contemporary philosophy as does his relationship to the German absolute idealist Hegel. Hegel wrote a great deal about Spinoza, praising his work and also sharply criticizing it, especially in his late forbidding book, "The Science of Logic". This short monography by James Kreines "Hegel and Spinoza" (2026) examines Spinoza's monism and his understanding of the nature of substance. The monograph is part of the Cambridge Elements Series, "Elements in the Philosophy of Georg Willhelm Friedrich Hegel" edited by Sebastian Stein and Joshua Wretzel which currently includes seven short monographs or "Elements" about Hegel. James Kreines, the author of this Element, is Edward S Gould Professor of Philosophy at Claremont McKenna College, California. He is an authority on German idealism, including the thought of Hegel and Kant.
The thought of both Spinoza and Hegel is difficult and each has been subject to many interpretations. In his great book, "Ethics" Spinoza developed a doctrine of metaphysical monism in which reality consisted of a single substance, with infinite attributes of which the two known to humans are thought and extension, and infinite modes. In Spinoza's thought, many things which might be considered individual substances, such as individual persons (you and I) are thought to be modes, part of the one substance.
Hegel took Spinoza's thought seriously, especially its view of substance and monism. He also, in his "Logic" critiqued it. Many books have examined the relationship between Hegel and Spinoza. Kreine's monograph is divided into three parts. First, he explains Spinoza's metaphysical monism and its strengths. Second, he examines Hegel's critique of Spinoza. Hegel argued, to put it simply, that Spinoza's monism and single substance lead to a philosophical abyss because it could not explain the existence of finite things, tables and chairs, you and me. Reality was one large undifferentiated thing.
Some scholars have found Hegel's critique question-begging as against Spinoza. Kreines examines the critique carefully and agrees with it. The merit of the critique, for Kreines, is that Hegel approaches Spinoza from within the earlier philosopher's own assumptions, from the inside, thus avoiding question-begging. He develops the two bases for Spinoza's doctrine of substance, the first immediate (intuitive) and the second mediate, based upon the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Kreines agrees with Hegel that Spinoza's thought cannot explain the existence of finitude.
The third part of Kreine's study uses the critique of Spinoza to examine some of Hegel's "Logic" a notoriously difficult work, focusing on Hegel's paradoxical statement at the outset that " Being, the indeterminate immediate is in fact nothing, and neither more nor less than nothing." Kreines argues that Hegel's thought, unlike Spinoza's centered upon change, negation, and becoming. So Being, at the outset, is not enough. Hegel in the "Logic" attempts to move from undifferentiated being through self-development in what Kreines calls in his final sentence "From Shapeless Abyss to Self-Developing Thought".
This book, Hegel's thought and Kreine's discussion, is extraordinarily obscure. It adopts a highly metaphysical approach which would be rejected by most contemporary philosophers but, as the book and the series of which it is a part suggests, is enjoying something of a revival. This has value, in my view. As a long time student of Spinoza, I learned from Kreine's Hegelian reading of the philosopher and from his discussion of Hegel's critique. The discussion of Hegel's "Logic" was suggestive as an opening to this difficult work. It was good to struggle with this book,which is intended for serious students of philosophy and not for casual reading.
Robin Friedman
Displaying 1 of 1 review