For a thing to be real, it must be able to communicate with other things. If this is so, then the problem of being receives a straightforward resolution: to be is to be in communion. So the fundamental science, indeed the science that needs to underwrite all other sciences, is a theory of communication. Within such a theory of communication the proper object of study becomes not isolated particles but the information that passes between entities. In Being as Communion philosopher and mathematician William Dembski provides a non-technical overview of his work on information. Dembski attempts to make good on the promise of John Wheeler, Paul Davies, and others that information is poised to replace matter as the primary stuff of reality. With profound implications for theology and metaphysics, Being as Communion develops a relational ontology that is at once congenial to science and open to teleology in nature. All those interested in the intersections of theology, philosophy and science should read this book.
A mathematician and philosopher, Dr. William Dembski has taught at Northwestern University, the University of Notre Dame, and the University of Dallas. He has done postdoctoral work in mathematics at MIT, in physics at the University of Chicago, and in computer science at Princeton University. A graduate of the University of Illinois at Chicago where he earned a B.A. in psychology, an M.S. in statistics, and a Ph.D. in philosophy, he also received a doctorate in mathematics from the University of Chicago in 1988 and a master of divinity degree from Princeton Theological Seminary in 1996. He has held National Science Foundation graduate and postdoctoral fellowships. He is the recipient of a $100,000 Templeton research grant. In 2005 he received Texas A&M’s Trotter Prize.
Dr. Dembski has published articles in mathematics, engineering, philosophy, and theology journals and is the author/editor of over twenty books.
His most comprehensive treatment of intelligent design to date, co-authored with Jonathan Wells, is titled The Design of Life: Discovering Signs of Intelligence in Biological Systems.
As interest in intelligent design has grown in the wider culture, Dr. Dembski has assumed the role of public intellectual. In addition to lecturing around the world at colleges and universities, he is frequently interviewed on the radio and television. His work has been cited in numerous newspaper and magazine articles, including three front page stories in the New York Times as well as the August 15, 2005 Time magazine cover story on intelligent design. He has appeared on the BBC, NPR (Diane Rehm, etc.), PBS (Inside the Law with Jack Ford; Uncommon Knowledge with Peter Robinson), CSPAN2, CNN, Fox News, ABC Nightline, and The Daily Show with Jon Stewart.
This purports to be a book about being: about what it means to exist. The question of being has a long and prestigious history: treated by some of the greatest minds of human history. Dembski gives some of them no more than a hand wave (such as Plato or Aquinas), some he routinely discounts (such as Aristotle—based upon a poor understanding of his thoughts…sometimes later agreeing with what they said, but seemingly without realizing it), and some he doesn’t even consider (such as almost all modern and contemporary philosophers, like Hegel, Heidegger, Sartre, or any of the important Twentieth century thomists who wrote on the subject). Being, for Dembski, is at various points in the book, “to be the object of a search (p.167)”, to “interact via information with other” things (p. 197), or, as he says in the introduction “to be in communion, and to be in communion is to exchange information (p.xiii)”.
One example of the confused approach to metaphysics that we find in this book, is his treatment of matter. He tells us that it is best to understand the world as information all the way down (p. 94, 98), that matter is not real (p.88), and that matter is a myth (p. 96, 104, 199); but, he then goes on to flip flop on the reader so much that we start getting sea sick—suggesting that we shouldn’t entirely dispense with matter (p. 95, 199); but, as matter is itself informational (p. 89, 95), or a form of information (p. 75), we might as well dispense with matter, as it is a useless concept (p.95); but, particular material things are real (p. 199). Finally, in the last chapter, the author tells us that he is just trying to get the reader to not be so attached to matter (p. 199). At this point, the reader is only wondering if the author has any notion of what matter even is (at one point he says we don’t know what matter is, p.94). If we pay attention, however, we learn that matter is “a medium for information (p. 97)”, which would be great, if we hadn’t just learned that matter, as a medium for information is useless, because information is able to serve that purpose (p.92-94), and there no need for matter as a fundamental ontological entity (p. 96). But, in the end, we’ll keep matter (p. 97, 199), but, instead of calling it matter, we’ll talk about “embodiment”, because it is a less loaded term (p. 98). But, by the end of the book, “embodiment” has been dropped, and we are back to matter (p. 199). Truly, the author has a dizzying mind.
He also seems to reject a realist approach to knowledge, affirming that we never interact directly with matter or sensory experiences, only information (p. 85), things do not come to us in themselves, but as patterned reflections of our background knowledge (p. 166). His approach seems to be more suggestive of a scientific perspectivalism which affirms that all “knowing” is socio-historically situated. If this is an accurate representation of his claims, then he would appear to back himself into a form of cultural relativism.
I like Dembski's style of writing and I've read several of his books. Having a background in both electrical and software engineering, as well as an interest in philosophy, I thought this was going to be a great read. It was a good read.
As a Christian theist, I agree with most of Dembski's conclusions. In the less controversial areas, the author does a good job of explaining and substantiating his claims. The no-free-lunch (conservation of information) section was a good introduction to a somewhat controversial topic. But the most controversial aspects were not covered as well as I would have liked.
One of the primary conjectures in the book is that information is primary over matter -- reality is information all the way down. Dembski claims we have good reason to reject a hylomorphic view of information where information and matter are always paired. This idea received very little attention in the book. I agree information is primary given an ultimate Mind is primary. But I was struck by how poorly this was substantiated extra-theologically in the book.
The prime example Dembski gives for information existing apart from matter is an example from software. Dembski claims the information in an application running in a virtual machine is somehow detached from the underlying physical hardware. I can assure you it is not. All of the information in an application running in a virtual machine (regardless of how many levels deep of abstraction) eventually finds existence as a material configuration -- as electrons trapped in a floating gate (SSD), a charged capacitor in SDRAM, or some other medium. So a hylomorphic view cannot be rejected using this example Dembski gave. Perhaps in a second edition, he will address this better.
As it is clear from the title, the book establishes the metaphysics of information. An impressive treatise both in knowledge of the topics and the insightful ideas that comprise the book.
Books on the information paradigm fail to impress me, and it’s the same with this one. I don’t like the notion of “matter as a myth and as a convenience to thought”. It’s because I like matter! The argument that matter is a myth because we cannot know matter, as such, but only the information about it, isn’t convincing. After all, per definition, scientific knowledge can only build on information. This doesn’t prove that everything is information.
Knowledge, including scientific knowledge, requires metaphors. It could be argued that matter isn’t only a convenience to thought; it could be necessary to thought, just like the natural numbers. So why shouldn’t both number and matter be regarded as real? Taoists say that “the valley” represents Yin, the feminine element. The valley can be said to exist although it is empty. If the valley is real then matter could be real, too. That’s how I see it.
Information needs a medium. But this medium is also information, which in turn needs a medium, and so forth, ad infinitum. Dembski addresses this problem; but it doesn’t seem to cause him a big headache. He promotes “informational realism”. I fear it’s idealism in disguise. I haven’t sufficient expertise to criticize his philosophy; but I will remain skeptical until theorists come up with something really convincing.
The notion of a purely relational ontology, i.e., that things exist insofar as they interact via information with other things (which are, as such, information), sounds like some sort of philosophical idealism to me. After all, only mind can have a concept of information. I think we need to see matter as real to steer clear of idealism. I prefer the time-honoured concept of Yin and Yang; two very different principles interlocked.
-1- الطبيعة في بناها الاساسي ليست نظام مادي فقط بل يوجد داخلها نظام معلوماتي تشفيري ممثل بالحمض الوراثي و هنا تتحول المادة من قالب باهت ميت الى قالب مادي حيوي لديه القدرة على حمل المعلومة
-2- الطبيعة تحتوي على انماط متكررة يمكن تأطيرها ضمن قوانين يمكن محاكتها و هذه الانماط تتداخل ضمن شبكات اوسع من العلاقات المعقدة
-3- تفاعل القاعدة الاولى مع القاعدة الثانية تحتاج كائن واعي ذكي متجاوز لما يقع داخل النظام ليأسس ما سبق
-4- ما سبق من قواعد لا يتعارض مع امكانية عمل قاعدة البقاء للاصلح او التكيف كجزء من العمليات لا كنموذج تفسيري كامل
-5- كل القواعد السابقة تعمل ضمن غاية و صورة كبرى مصصمة من قبل خالق الوجود
I highly recommend this book. It provides a new and sensible way of understanding our universe. And Dembski makes his ideas easily understood because of the excellence of his writing.
Extraordinary possibilities, precisely because they are extraordinary, are often omitted from the matrix of possibility used in an information-theoretic analysis.