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To Kill Nations: American Strategy in the Air-Atomic Age and the Rise of Mutually Assured Destruction
"Edward Kaplan's To Kill Nations is a fascinating work that packs a thermonuclear punch of ideas and arguments... The work is suitable for anyone from advanced undergraduates to experts in the field."
― Strategy Bridge In To Kill Nations , Edward Kaplan traces the evolution of American strategic airpower and preparation for nuclear war from this early air-atomic era to a later period (1950–1965) in which the Soviet Union's atomic capability, accelerated by thermonuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, made American strategic assets vulnerable and gradually undermined air-atomic strategy. Kaplan throws into question both the inevitability and preferability of the strategic doctrine of MAD. He looks at the process by which cultural, institutional, and strategic ideas about MAD took shape and makes insightful use of the comparison between generals who thought they could win a nuclear war and the cold institutional logic of the suicide pact that was MAD. Kaplan also offers a reappraisal of Eisenhower's nuclear strategy and diplomacy to make a case for the marginal viability of air-atomic military power even in an era of ballistic missiles.
― Strategy Bridge In To Kill Nations , Edward Kaplan traces the evolution of American strategic airpower and preparation for nuclear war from this early air-atomic era to a later period (1950–1965) in which the Soviet Union's atomic capability, accelerated by thermonuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, made American strategic assets vulnerable and gradually undermined air-atomic strategy. Kaplan throws into question both the inevitability and preferability of the strategic doctrine of MAD. He looks at the process by which cultural, institutional, and strategic ideas about MAD took shape and makes insightful use of the comparison between generals who thought they could win a nuclear war and the cold institutional logic of the suicide pact that was MAD. Kaplan also offers a reappraisal of Eisenhower's nuclear strategy and diplomacy to make a case for the marginal viability of air-atomic military power even in an era of ballistic missiles.
276 pages, Hardcover
First published March 24, 2015
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September 21, 2024
Brilliant book about American nuclear strategy in the early Cold War - with implications both for the development of nuclear strategy into today and for understanding the contexts of use of the A-bomb during WW2.
One of the most important takeaways of Kaplan's book is that atomic weapons did not immediately represent a new departure in the history of warfare, at least to the Air Force. "Nuclear strategy" as such did not exist as its own discipline because the Air Force initially understood nuclear weapons completely within the framework of existing ideas about strategic airpower - the power of the fission bomb was a quantitative advance but was not understood as a qualitative break. As Air Force officers created their war plans against the USSR, the fission bomb simply represented the equivalent of 200 conventionally armed bombers. This dovetails nicely with Michael Gordin's arguments about Hiroshima and Nagasaki in "Five Days in August": to the military, nuclear weapons were just another weapon that did not prompt a distinct category of strategizing or moral reflection. As such, early "air atomic" strategy looked a lot like the WW2 strategic bombing. Planners did not expect the a-bomb to automatically win a war against the Soviet Union - it would be used to disrupt Soviet industry and logistics to allow ground forces to win the war more easily. In an era where US had overwhelming superiority in nuclear weapons and in delivery mechanisms, the Air Force's plans for mass nuclear assault on the USSR were an entirely rational approach.
However, with the creation of the hydrogen bomb and the growth of Soviet nuclear forces, the Air Force suddenly was confronted with a weapon that posed a qualitative challenge. Where fission bombs largely presented themselves as very powerful conventional bombs, hydrogen bombs genuinely had the power "to kill nations." Where fission air atomic strategy, it became increasingly difficult to see a path to victory when air atomic strategy was pursued with hydrogen weapons. Ironically, initially this moved civilians farther out of harms way - where fission nuclear weapons were pointed at largely conventional military-industrial targets often in population centers, the Air Force's planning in the thermonuclear era focused almost entirely on eliminating Soviet nuclear forces. With Soviet threat magnified, the difference between victory and defeat would depend on the destruction of as much of the Soviet threat on the ground as possible, and further more it would depend on maintaining as much as possible American materiel superiority. However, even in these circumstances planners had to concede that millions of Americans would die even in a winning scenario. To civilian leadership (and to an Army and Navy battling the Air Force for funding), such scenarios did not seem winnable or worth pursuing at all. If nuclear war wasn't winnable, the stalemate of mutually assured destruction was both more realistic and cheaper, and the Kennedy administration marked the end of conventional military-generated air atomic strategy and the birth of civilian-generated nuclear strategy.
Nonetheless, Kaplan argues that from 1950-1964, the Air Force's approach was rational and served American policymakers well. For most of the 50s, nuclear war was winnable for the US, and the seriousness of Curtis LeMay's Strategic Air Command presented the strongest possible deterrent - a necessity for an Eisenhower administration eager to avoid a conventional arms race with the USSR. The book is immensely successful in making an oft-pilloried worldview (see Dr. Strangelove) make sense in context and is a treasure trove of insights into the cultures of military decision-making; civil-military relations; the history of airpower; and the history of strategy.
One of the most important takeaways of Kaplan's book is that atomic weapons did not immediately represent a new departure in the history of warfare, at least to the Air Force. "Nuclear strategy" as such did not exist as its own discipline because the Air Force initially understood nuclear weapons completely within the framework of existing ideas about strategic airpower - the power of the fission bomb was a quantitative advance but was not understood as a qualitative break. As Air Force officers created their war plans against the USSR, the fission bomb simply represented the equivalent of 200 conventionally armed bombers. This dovetails nicely with Michael Gordin's arguments about Hiroshima and Nagasaki in "Five Days in August": to the military, nuclear weapons were just another weapon that did not prompt a distinct category of strategizing or moral reflection. As such, early "air atomic" strategy looked a lot like the WW2 strategic bombing. Planners did not expect the a-bomb to automatically win a war against the Soviet Union - it would be used to disrupt Soviet industry and logistics to allow ground forces to win the war more easily. In an era where US had overwhelming superiority in nuclear weapons and in delivery mechanisms, the Air Force's plans for mass nuclear assault on the USSR were an entirely rational approach.
However, with the creation of the hydrogen bomb and the growth of Soviet nuclear forces, the Air Force suddenly was confronted with a weapon that posed a qualitative challenge. Where fission bombs largely presented themselves as very powerful conventional bombs, hydrogen bombs genuinely had the power "to kill nations." Where fission air atomic strategy, it became increasingly difficult to see a path to victory when air atomic strategy was pursued with hydrogen weapons. Ironically, initially this moved civilians farther out of harms way - where fission nuclear weapons were pointed at largely conventional military-industrial targets often in population centers, the Air Force's planning in the thermonuclear era focused almost entirely on eliminating Soviet nuclear forces. With Soviet threat magnified, the difference between victory and defeat would depend on the destruction of as much of the Soviet threat on the ground as possible, and further more it would depend on maintaining as much as possible American materiel superiority. However, even in these circumstances planners had to concede that millions of Americans would die even in a winning scenario. To civilian leadership (and to an Army and Navy battling the Air Force for funding), such scenarios did not seem winnable or worth pursuing at all. If nuclear war wasn't winnable, the stalemate of mutually assured destruction was both more realistic and cheaper, and the Kennedy administration marked the end of conventional military-generated air atomic strategy and the birth of civilian-generated nuclear strategy.
Nonetheless, Kaplan argues that from 1950-1964, the Air Force's approach was rational and served American policymakers well. For most of the 50s, nuclear war was winnable for the US, and the seriousness of Curtis LeMay's Strategic Air Command presented the strongest possible deterrent - a necessity for an Eisenhower administration eager to avoid a conventional arms race with the USSR. The book is immensely successful in making an oft-pilloried worldview (see Dr. Strangelove) make sense in context and is a treasure trove of insights into the cultures of military decision-making; civil-military relations; the history of airpower; and the history of strategy.
May 24, 2017
Off of Interstate 80, at the Greenwood Exit, is the SAC Museum. Outside of the huge facility are missiles on display, including the Snark and Hound Dog, and indoors is a great array of Air Force airpower. To the casual visitor this is a large building that houses an impressive collection of retired military aircraft. To veterans and historians, it is a history of the Cold War and America's early nuclear delivery systems. These planes and missiles would have been used in the destruction of the Soviet Union if war had taken place. To understand the rise of this arsenal is to gain an appreciation for the power it encompassed. It will also inspire a deep appreciation of the peace that has lasted since 1945 and thankfulness that no such weapons have been unleashed in combat since.
Edward Kaplan brings us a fine history of nuclear policy and the United States Airforce in To Kill Nations. Right off the bat, the reader understands that the USAF's rise after World War II coincided with the need to launch nuclear attacks at the USSR. Following a perceived importance in airpower after the Second World War, this task would fall to SAC and the leaders who pursued an aggressive plan to destroy an enemy nation.
Kaplan's history involves many important aspects of the story such as interservice rivalries, the planning of nuclear war, and the relationships between military and civilian leaders. The cliches and myths surrounding the individuals involved are replaced by sound scrutiny and valid conclusions. Lemay and Twining are not perceived as warmongers but as subordinate soldiers pursuing a doctrine that was in the best interest of the country (at the time). Kennedy and McNamara are not described as civilian peaceniks but rather as leaders who challenged the previous nuclear plans and ushered in a new phase in Cold War strategy.
At times Kaplan's study is dry and jargonesque but the reader will gain insight into how nuclear planning reflected the concerns of the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations. They will also appreciate how the Air Force gained prominence as the keepers of atomic war and destruction. As Kaplan states, they were representative of a leashed pitbull held by a president rather than Strangelove characters focused on global decimation.
Edward Kaplan brings us a fine history of nuclear policy and the United States Airforce in To Kill Nations. Right off the bat, the reader understands that the USAF's rise after World War II coincided with the need to launch nuclear attacks at the USSR. Following a perceived importance in airpower after the Second World War, this task would fall to SAC and the leaders who pursued an aggressive plan to destroy an enemy nation.
Kaplan's history involves many important aspects of the story such as interservice rivalries, the planning of nuclear war, and the relationships between military and civilian leaders. The cliches and myths surrounding the individuals involved are replaced by sound scrutiny and valid conclusions. Lemay and Twining are not perceived as warmongers but as subordinate soldiers pursuing a doctrine that was in the best interest of the country (at the time). Kennedy and McNamara are not described as civilian peaceniks but rather as leaders who challenged the previous nuclear plans and ushered in a new phase in Cold War strategy.
At times Kaplan's study is dry and jargonesque but the reader will gain insight into how nuclear planning reflected the concerns of the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations. They will also appreciate how the Air Force gained prominence as the keepers of atomic war and destruction. As Kaplan states, they were representative of a leashed pitbull held by a president rather than Strangelove characters focused on global decimation.
July 24, 2018
A brilliant study of a previously neglected period in American nuclear strategy. Kaplan excels at explaining an era where destruction in a war was not yet mutually assured, and linking that explanation to the USAF's emerging identity. Well worth reading!
September 17, 2020
Fascinating book of a fascinating time.
February 16, 2026
Interesting account about change in American nuclear policy away from air superiority strategy in early Cold War to mutually assured destruction post Kennedy. Compelling accounts of inter branch debates to get control of nuclear weapons and thus budgets.
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