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Before and After Hegel: A Historical Introduction to Hegel's Thought
In this engaging and accessible introduction to Hegel's theory of knowledge, Tom Rockmore presents the philosopher's ideas the way Hegel himself saw as coming to grips with, even competing with, prior philosophical positions. Carefully laying out the philosophical tradition of German idealism, he concisely explicates the theories of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, essential to an understanding of Hegel's thought.
Rockmore shows how Hegel first formulates his own position in relation to the philosophical discussion of his own historical moment, before extending the discussion, in a second phase, to the entire historical tradition. The Hegelian system, according to Rockmore, remains an essentially modern conception of knowledge, surprisingly relevant to our contemporary intellectual situation.
Rockmore's remarkably lucid book will interest general readers as well as students of philosophy, intellectual history, politics, culture, and society.
Rockmore shows how Hegel first formulates his own position in relation to the philosophical discussion of his own historical moment, before extending the discussion, in a second phase, to the entire historical tradition. The Hegelian system, according to Rockmore, remains an essentially modern conception of knowledge, surprisingly relevant to our contemporary intellectual situation.
Rockmore's remarkably lucid book will interest general readers as well as students of philosophy, intellectual history, politics, culture, and society.
- GenresPhilosophyHistoryGermany
224 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1993
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March 7, 2015
System in Philosophy
Modern philosophy since descartes is increasingly concerned with system. Hegel is reputed to be the most systematic of philosophers. It is Hegel who finally presents the system on which Kant insists, but which is absent in the Critique of Pure Reason, and whose absence determines the entire discussion following the appearance of this work.
This is the author’s central thesis. The book is an attempt to establish this — as well as is possible, considering the arena in which the author finds himself!
Rockmore explains that he is going to limit the scope of his discussion to a crucial aspect of the pre- and post-Hegelian arguments: The requirement and nature of a System to underlie any philosophic argument. This is based on Descartes, who claimed that a proper philosophic approach cannot begin without a first principle upon which to construct it — it depends on a solid foundation. Once the first principle/foundation is established, all that is needed is sound water tight reasoning - in short anything can be constructed once the foundation is irrefutable. This would go contrary to Kant’s view that there are upper limits to possible metaphysical derivations too, but that was a later revolution!
Once we come to Kant, Rockmore seems to indicate that Kant accepted the need for a foundation and a system even while maintaining that despite a rock-solid foundation, the structure would/should have other constraints on how high it can grow. And the author lets us know that in his view (as in Hegel’s) Kant only put upper limits to all possible structures, but did not build a solid enough foundation for his own system and hence the whole thing is suspect. In short he imposed a new limitation on the construction projects, but did not honor an existing one.
But a side-effect of this was that the need for a foundation, stablished seemingly irrefutably by descartes, was itself now called into question. Perhaps, since there are limits, there can be no completely secure foundation to build any system on either?
In any case, this new found freedom allowed the next generation of philosophers such as Fichte and Schelling to expire alternate ways to building a system, with/without the foundation-problem sabotaging their attempts.
This atmosphere allowed Hegel the freedom to take a leap and decide that a foundation-in-itself is not necessary after all. Instead he proposes a circular system that will loop back and prop itself up, making it stronger in every iteration. So the argumentative system itself becomes its own foundational principle. And this also means that philosophy could now start from anywhere and not only from the so-called first principles, or so Hegel claimed.
With this much established, Rockmore takes his chance to elaborate on Hegel’s own system and prove that his is a much less ambiguous system than Kant’s. Hegel is shown to be completing the great project begun by Kant but in the process setting it right.
But though Hegel establishes his claim to having founded the final system from which all further thought has to emanate, the system was again found to be not entirely convincing, or all together lacking, by later thinkers. Hence the quest continues and we are given brief glimpses of how different thinkers engage with the Hegelian system — Kierkegaard rejecting, Marx modifying and Nietzsche ignoring — until with the rise of Empiricism, Pragmaticism, etc, system-building itself drops out of fashion. But not Hegel himself. He stays relevant. Whether one accepts or rejects him, and even irrespective of one bothers to study him or just ignores him. Hegel’s wake, just like Kant’s and Plato’s are broad enough to encompass large swathes of time.
March 6, 2015
Hegel in an Historical Context
At the time of publication in 1993, Rockmore reveals that there were 9,000 philosophers or teachers of philosophy in America (not counting undergraduate students). No wonder that, in his view, "the field of Hegel studies had become a minor philosophical cottage industry".
This work is mainly intended to contextualise Hegel's philosophy, both chronologically and thematically.
It describes the debates at the time of Hegel's emergence (about a quarter), explains some key ideas in the context of his predecessors (about half), and summarises his impact on subsequent nineteenth century philosophy (about a quarter).
At 174 pages, it doesn't purport to be detailed or complete. It was actually written in French as part of a series for French college students with only a tangential interest in philosophy. The aim was to make Hegel's theory accessible to those who are not professionally engaged in philosophy. It gives students of philosophy and allied disciplines "a way into the theory of one of the most important thinkers in the philosophical tradition".
This wasn't my first book on Hegel. As lucid as it is, I wouldn't recommend it as an entry point. It's clear that Rockmore holds back a lot of his expertise and personal perspective in order to meet the requirements of the series. I would love to see him let loose on a more academic or specialist work. In the meantime, this book is better suited to somebody who already has some understanding of a wider range of Hegel's key ideas.
Does a System Require a Foundation?
The most valuable aspect of the book is its location of Hegel in a debate about the extent to which a philosophical system has to have a foundation or a grounding in a first principle whose truth can be proved.
Descartes and Kant regarded such a foundation as essential to the quest of philosophy to be considered a science.
Before Hegel, philosophers like Fichte and Schelling never quite agreed about the need for such a foundation or whether Kant had satisfied it in his system of critical philosophy.
Ultimately, Fichte asserted that the first principle didn't need to be provable. It was sufficient that it be compatible with the theory that follows on from it. He spoke in terms of a circularity in which the first principle underlies the theory, and the theory returns to the first principle. In his view, this didn't detract from the scientific pretensions of philosophy.
The Circular Legitimacy of a Philosophical System
In the second part of the book (which is subtitled "An Unfounded System of Knowledge"), Rockmore asserts that Hegel "breaks with the entire prior discussion on this most important point in arguing that a system without a foundation is still able to legitimate its claim to knowledge".
Fichte argued that, if a system was circular, its claim to knowledge would be hypothetical. However, he wasn't deterred by this.
In contrast, Hegel argues that the legitimacy of the system derives not from the beginning or first principle. Instead, the end justifies the beginning. The end justifies what has come before it. The result of a theory justifies its becoming.
In this way, Hegel makes of the circle a virtue or a strength, rather than a hypothesis or a weakness. Hegel "substitutes a concept of a philosophical system that justifies itself progressively through the process of its constitution."
Equally importantly, once the emphasis is shifted to the end, the starting point becomes less crucial. The significance of the journey depends less on where you started than where you ended up. It is enough to begin, and we can begin anywhere.
Truth doesn't derive from the beginning, but from the completion or realisation of the circle.
Experience and History
This theory accommodates experiences that appear to contradict or refute our expectations or theories. All that is necessary is an adjustment. This is consistent with Hegel's view of history:
"Human history consists in a long effort to construct a trustworthy view, a theory that emerges from our history and which is constantly updated as a function of our further experience."
To this extent, knowledge and truth reflect our personal experience and history: "a given theory is abandoned only because its limits appear."
For a long time, I wasn't sure why Rockmore had singled out system and foundation as such primary issues in his book. However, eventually it became clear that this was the mechanism by which Hegel attached his philosophical system to the march of history.
In his own way, Marx would later attempt to point the march of history in a particular direction, that of Communism.
Time for a Refresher
Having read "The Phenomenology of Spirit" last year, I wanted to retain (or at least recall) as much of what I had learned from it, even if my understanding proved to be misguided or inaccurate. I didn't want it just to go in one year and out the next.
One of my motives in reading Rockmore, therefore, was to refresh my memory and confirm or alter my hard-earned understanding of Hegel.
I found it more useful as a refresher than as what might otherwise have been an entry point.
My main criteria were how Rockmore dealt with three issues of particular interest to me: the explanation of consciousness and self-consciousness, the Master/Slave relationship and the dialectic.
Consciousness
Of the first, Rockmore explains that "Hegel speaks of the experience of consciousness...our experience of the external world is not something that remains external to us...experience presupposes that its object is, so to speak, in consciousness."
There should be emphasis on the word "in".
Once you've read both Hegel and other philosophers, you'll realise just how economically Rockmore conveys this idea. His brevity is a good way to lock in what you have already learned.
The Master/Slave Relationship
Rockmore's explanation of the Master/Slave relationship is cogent, even if the underlying idea is unfamiliar or difficult:
"...the basic human need to acquire recognition by another creates a double dependency. For the relation to another, to someone who could acknowledge me, is the mediation of my relation to myself that necessarily passes through a relation to another person.
"It follows that this double relation takes shape as a double opposition in which each person strives to achieve recognition through the other, in the first place through the means of suppressing the other, so to speak, in order to discover only oneself in his or her place...he calls this struggle the struggle of opposed self-consciousness...each person satisfies his or her desires at the expense of the other who, in turn, does the same.
"We arrive, then, at a rather realistic view of modern social life where, more often than not, each exploits the other to satisfy his or her own needs."
Hegel's Dialectic
Perhaps the least satisfying aspect of the book is the failure to devote much time to Hegel's dialectic. What little discussion there is of it in the middle section doesn't relate to its role in "The Phenomenology of Spirit".
In the last section, we simply learn Marx' criticism, without much context to assess its merits:
"The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell."
Unfortunately, Rockmore doesn't explain Hegel's views on the operation of the dialectic or Marx' reason for suggesting that it needs to be inverted or turned right side up.
Marx' Inversion of Hegel
It's often suggested that Marx felt that Hegel paid undue attention to the mind as opposed to experience in the material world.
Marx' inversion was therefore supposed to mean that experience in the material world should have a greater prominence in philosophy and history.
However, I think there's a sense in which Marx used the inversion as a metaphor that would allow the dialectic to stand on its feet instead of its head, at which point it could start walking in the direction of a revolution.
Thus, the inversion was a precondition of getting the slaves (the working class) to overcome the masters (the capitalists) by way of revolution.
Hegel linked philosophy to history for the first time. However, he didn't purport to anticipate where it might be headed (except, perhaps, towards Absolute Truth). Marx, however, tried to determine the direction and speed of history by harnessing the potential of the working class. In a way, history in his view had become a vehicle with both a steering wheel and an accelerator.
Rockmore doesn't discuss this aspect of the relationship between the two philosophers. However, if my speculation is accurate, then the main difference between the two philosophers was their embrace of activism and proactive attempts to shape the direction of history.
Hegel definitely created a foundation upon which Marx could develop his ideas about an alternative philosophical, political and economic system. Whatever the view of Marxists, the influence of Hegel on Marx (and Engels) cannot be overerestimated.
After Hegel
Rockmore briefly discusses Hegel's positive or negative influence on Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. However, again, he just doesn't allow himself time or space for a sufficiently robust discussion. I would love to have read more about Hegel's influence on twentieth century Continental Philosophy. (This is a major theme of my planned reading in 2015.)
For all its merits, Rockmore's otherwise excellent achievement is compromised by the limitations he imposed on himself when he undertook this project.
This is definitely a case where I was hungry for more of the quality of scholarship that Rockmore hinted at. I hope to read much more of him in the future, particularly his writing on Heidegger as well as "Cognition: An Introduction to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit".
At the time of publication in 1993, Rockmore reveals that there were 9,000 philosophers or teachers of philosophy in America (not counting undergraduate students). No wonder that, in his view, "the field of Hegel studies had become a minor philosophical cottage industry".
This work is mainly intended to contextualise Hegel's philosophy, both chronologically and thematically.
It describes the debates at the time of Hegel's emergence (about a quarter), explains some key ideas in the context of his predecessors (about half), and summarises his impact on subsequent nineteenth century philosophy (about a quarter).
At 174 pages, it doesn't purport to be detailed or complete. It was actually written in French as part of a series for French college students with only a tangential interest in philosophy. The aim was to make Hegel's theory accessible to those who are not professionally engaged in philosophy. It gives students of philosophy and allied disciplines "a way into the theory of one of the most important thinkers in the philosophical tradition".
This wasn't my first book on Hegel. As lucid as it is, I wouldn't recommend it as an entry point. It's clear that Rockmore holds back a lot of his expertise and personal perspective in order to meet the requirements of the series. I would love to see him let loose on a more academic or specialist work. In the meantime, this book is better suited to somebody who already has some understanding of a wider range of Hegel's key ideas.
Does a System Require a Foundation?
The most valuable aspect of the book is its location of Hegel in a debate about the extent to which a philosophical system has to have a foundation or a grounding in a first principle whose truth can be proved.
Descartes and Kant regarded such a foundation as essential to the quest of philosophy to be considered a science.
Before Hegel, philosophers like Fichte and Schelling never quite agreed about the need for such a foundation or whether Kant had satisfied it in his system of critical philosophy.
Ultimately, Fichte asserted that the first principle didn't need to be provable. It was sufficient that it be compatible with the theory that follows on from it. He spoke in terms of a circularity in which the first principle underlies the theory, and the theory returns to the first principle. In his view, this didn't detract from the scientific pretensions of philosophy.
The Circular Legitimacy of a Philosophical System
In the second part of the book (which is subtitled "An Unfounded System of Knowledge"), Rockmore asserts that Hegel "breaks with the entire prior discussion on this most important point in arguing that a system without a foundation is still able to legitimate its claim to knowledge".
Fichte argued that, if a system was circular, its claim to knowledge would be hypothetical. However, he wasn't deterred by this.
In contrast, Hegel argues that the legitimacy of the system derives not from the beginning or first principle. Instead, the end justifies the beginning. The end justifies what has come before it. The result of a theory justifies its becoming.
In this way, Hegel makes of the circle a virtue or a strength, rather than a hypothesis or a weakness. Hegel "substitutes a concept of a philosophical system that justifies itself progressively through the process of its constitution."
Equally importantly, once the emphasis is shifted to the end, the starting point becomes less crucial. The significance of the journey depends less on where you started than where you ended up. It is enough to begin, and we can begin anywhere.
Truth doesn't derive from the beginning, but from the completion or realisation of the circle.
Experience and History
This theory accommodates experiences that appear to contradict or refute our expectations or theories. All that is necessary is an adjustment. This is consistent with Hegel's view of history:
"Human history consists in a long effort to construct a trustworthy view, a theory that emerges from our history and which is constantly updated as a function of our further experience."
To this extent, knowledge and truth reflect our personal experience and history: "a given theory is abandoned only because its limits appear."
For a long time, I wasn't sure why Rockmore had singled out system and foundation as such primary issues in his book. However, eventually it became clear that this was the mechanism by which Hegel attached his philosophical system to the march of history.
In his own way, Marx would later attempt to point the march of history in a particular direction, that of Communism.
Time for a Refresher
Having read "The Phenomenology of Spirit" last year, I wanted to retain (or at least recall) as much of what I had learned from it, even if my understanding proved to be misguided or inaccurate. I didn't want it just to go in one year and out the next.
One of my motives in reading Rockmore, therefore, was to refresh my memory and confirm or alter my hard-earned understanding of Hegel.
I found it more useful as a refresher than as what might otherwise have been an entry point.
My main criteria were how Rockmore dealt with three issues of particular interest to me: the explanation of consciousness and self-consciousness, the Master/Slave relationship and the dialectic.
Consciousness
Of the first, Rockmore explains that "Hegel speaks of the experience of consciousness...our experience of the external world is not something that remains external to us...experience presupposes that its object is, so to speak, in consciousness."
There should be emphasis on the word "in".
Once you've read both Hegel and other philosophers, you'll realise just how economically Rockmore conveys this idea. His brevity is a good way to lock in what you have already learned.
The Master/Slave Relationship
Rockmore's explanation of the Master/Slave relationship is cogent, even if the underlying idea is unfamiliar or difficult:
"...the basic human need to acquire recognition by another creates a double dependency. For the relation to another, to someone who could acknowledge me, is the mediation of my relation to myself that necessarily passes through a relation to another person.
"It follows that this double relation takes shape as a double opposition in which each person strives to achieve recognition through the other, in the first place through the means of suppressing the other, so to speak, in order to discover only oneself in his or her place...he calls this struggle the struggle of opposed self-consciousness...each person satisfies his or her desires at the expense of the other who, in turn, does the same.
"We arrive, then, at a rather realistic view of modern social life where, more often than not, each exploits the other to satisfy his or her own needs."
Hegel's Dialectic
Perhaps the least satisfying aspect of the book is the failure to devote much time to Hegel's dialectic. What little discussion there is of it in the middle section doesn't relate to its role in "The Phenomenology of Spirit".
In the last section, we simply learn Marx' criticism, without much context to assess its merits:
"The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell."
Unfortunately, Rockmore doesn't explain Hegel's views on the operation of the dialectic or Marx' reason for suggesting that it needs to be inverted or turned right side up.
Marx' Inversion of Hegel
It's often suggested that Marx felt that Hegel paid undue attention to the mind as opposed to experience in the material world.
Marx' inversion was therefore supposed to mean that experience in the material world should have a greater prominence in philosophy and history.
However, I think there's a sense in which Marx used the inversion as a metaphor that would allow the dialectic to stand on its feet instead of its head, at which point it could start walking in the direction of a revolution.
Thus, the inversion was a precondition of getting the slaves (the working class) to overcome the masters (the capitalists) by way of revolution.
Hegel linked philosophy to history for the first time. However, he didn't purport to anticipate where it might be headed (except, perhaps, towards Absolute Truth). Marx, however, tried to determine the direction and speed of history by harnessing the potential of the working class. In a way, history in his view had become a vehicle with both a steering wheel and an accelerator.
Rockmore doesn't discuss this aspect of the relationship between the two philosophers. However, if my speculation is accurate, then the main difference between the two philosophers was their embrace of activism and proactive attempts to shape the direction of history.
Hegel definitely created a foundation upon which Marx could develop his ideas about an alternative philosophical, political and economic system. Whatever the view of Marxists, the influence of Hegel on Marx (and Engels) cannot be overerestimated.
After Hegel
Rockmore briefly discusses Hegel's positive or negative influence on Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. However, again, he just doesn't allow himself time or space for a sufficiently robust discussion. I would love to have read more about Hegel's influence on twentieth century Continental Philosophy. (This is a major theme of my planned reading in 2015.)
For all its merits, Rockmore's otherwise excellent achievement is compromised by the limitations he imposed on himself when he undertook this project.
This is definitely a case where I was hungry for more of the quality of scholarship that Rockmore hinted at. I hope to read much more of him in the future, particularly his writing on Heidegger as well as "Cognition: An Introduction to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit".
June 20, 2023
An interesting discussion of the historical context of Hegel in the school of German idealism, particularly when discussing the influence of Kant and Fichte upon Hegel's intellectual development. The work suffers generally from its brevity; Rockmore is forced to introduce concepts, such as Reinhold's "capacity for representation," that he cannot adequately explain, and moves on.
Rockmore's discussion of Marx is pathetic and reduces all of Marx's philosophy into the 1844 Manuscripts, and opposes the philosophies of Marx and Engels whilst completely ignoring the actually published Holy Family, jointly written by Marx and Engels, the manuscripts surrounding The German Ideology, as well as the work Marx did for Engels on Anti-Duhring and other explicitly philosophical works that involved what Rockmore terms the "Marxism" as separate from Marx. The anti-Engelsian attitude upheld by those favour the 1844 Manuscripts over all other works of Marx is an academic defanging of the revolutionary nature of Marxism and a supreme example of bourgeois dissection of revolutionary ideology. Shameful.
Rockmore's discussion of Marx is pathetic and reduces all of Marx's philosophy into the 1844 Manuscripts, and opposes the philosophies of Marx and Engels whilst completely ignoring the actually published Holy Family, jointly written by Marx and Engels, the manuscripts surrounding The German Ideology, as well as the work Marx did for Engels on Anti-Duhring and other explicitly philosophical works that involved what Rockmore terms the "Marxism" as separate from Marx. The anti-Engelsian attitude upheld by those favour the 1844 Manuscripts over all other works of Marx is an academic defanging of the revolutionary nature of Marxism and a supreme example of bourgeois dissection of revolutionary ideology. Shameful.
July 17, 2010
This book provides a somewhat interesting description of those philosophical predecessors that influenced Hegel and those who followed and reacted to him. A key Rockmore theme is that philosophers influence each other and more or less implicitly work within this broader philosophical context. That theme leaves open the question whether the larger philosophical questions stand on their own ground and that the philosophical issues themselves dictate how they are treated, not philosophical predecessors per se. In other words, there may be much larger room for independence in philosophical thought than what the author suggests in this book.
Throughout the book, Hegel is referenced as a systems (i.e., a system of knowledge) philosopher, but one does not get a strong sense about what exactly this system is and why Hegel's philosophy stands out in this respect. In particular, Hegel's "Absolute" which pulls his thought together and is the capstone of his philosophical system is given little attention. Hegel's complexity is such that this book does provide good insights into many aspects of his thought. It is interesting that Hegel, according to the author, had a penchant for treaty harshly those who disagreed with him. "All his life," Rockmore writes, "Hegel never tried to hide his conviction of the philosophical incompetence of ordinary mortals." Where truth fits in competitive philosophy is not clear. While Schopenhauer's tempermentalism was well known, especially as directed at Hegel, it seems that Hegel had his own issues in this regard.
Throughout the book, Hegel is referenced as a systems (i.e., a system of knowledge) philosopher, but one does not get a strong sense about what exactly this system is and why Hegel's philosophy stands out in this respect. In particular, Hegel's "Absolute" which pulls his thought together and is the capstone of his philosophical system is given little attention. Hegel's complexity is such that this book does provide good insights into many aspects of his thought. It is interesting that Hegel, according to the author, had a penchant for treaty harshly those who disagreed with him. "All his life," Rockmore writes, "Hegel never tried to hide his conviction of the philosophical incompetence of ordinary mortals." Where truth fits in competitive philosophy is not clear. While Schopenhauer's tempermentalism was well known, especially as directed at Hegel, it seems that Hegel had his own issues in this regard.
November 15, 2019
In this the author takes up the foundations of certain knowledge that laid by Descartes and
Kant's critical approach to knowledge and transition from German İdealists to Hegel. As a speculative system founder Hegel's epistemology is unfoundational according to the author. In the Logic Hegel expalins how being (thesis) changes into nothing (anti-thesis) and then turns into becoming (synthesis). This change is a dialectic process. For Hegel, Geist or as inspired by Plato as absolute idea, Spirit is beind all the developments. Spirit which is in search of complete itself, first of all, has to reach to the phase of recognition through its object or other. In the course of this adventure it always negates itself by reaching perfection and puts an end to the alienation. Hegel is the first thinker who historicized the knowledge. Hegel provided knowledge with a social or historical context. Spirit manifests itself in this historical context sometimes through prophets, heros, soldiers, groups, armies or states. He thought that Spirit could universalize the idea of freedom only through state. The Nation-State was the most perfect rational institution that could be established. So, after that time to expect a new political institution was in vain. Therefore, in a sense it was the end of history. However, dialectic approach is based on a "never ending process" and flow, permant change. In the first place it seems that he contradicts himself.
Just as in Kant, the "essences" and "appearences" of the things were significant to him. In Kant,
"thing in itself" and "thing for itself" is explained as essence and appearence. It is impelmented by Marx as "class in itself" and "class for itself".
True or false, I think this is enough for now.
December 13, 2020
ilginç bir kitap daha doğrusu iyi mi değil mi karar veremedim. Değerli tespitler içeriyor bir kere fikir çok iyi, tam bir felsefe tarihçisi gibi diğer filozofların felsefeleriyle ilişkisi bağlamında ele almak ancak çok fazla yineleme ve -ingilizcede ‘small talk’ denilen diyaloglar gibi gereksiz, hiç bir şey demeyen - girişler yapılmış.
türkçesi için düşündüğüm şey ; keşke aynı kelimenin iki farklı çevirisi (ihtiyaç/gereklilik) verileceğine önemli felsefi kavramların ana dillerdeki karşılığı verilseydi..
türkçesi için düşündüğüm şey ; keşke aynı kelimenin iki farklı çevirisi (ihtiyaç/gereklilik) verileceğine önemli felsefi kavramların ana dillerdeki karşılığı verilseydi..
April 11, 2021
Most excellent! Great telling of upside down basic questions with no answers -- enigmatic as Hegel's Phenomenology...
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