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The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America's Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11
Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and bestselling author Ron Suskind takes you deep inside America's real battles with violent, unrelenting terrorists—a game of kill-or-be-killed, from the Oval Office to the streets of Karachi.
Ron Suskind takes readers inside the defining conflict of our the war between the West and a growing, shadowy army of terrorists, armed with weapons of alarming power.
Relying on unique access to former and current government officials, this book will reveal for the first time how the US government—from President Bush on down—is frantically improvising to fight a new kind of war. Where is the enemy? What have been the real victories and defeats since 9/11? How are we actually fighting this war and how can it possibly be won?
Filled with astonishing disclosures, Suskind's book shows readers what he calls "the invisible battlefield"— a global matrix where US spies race to catch soldiers of jihad before they strike. It is a real-life spy thriller with the world's future at stake. It also reveals the shocking and secret philosophy underpinning the war on terror. Gripping and alarming in equal measure, it will reframe the debate about a war that, each day, redefines America and its place in the world.
Ron Suskind takes readers inside the defining conflict of our the war between the West and a growing, shadowy army of terrorists, armed with weapons of alarming power.
Relying on unique access to former and current government officials, this book will reveal for the first time how the US government—from President Bush on down—is frantically improvising to fight a new kind of war. Where is the enemy? What have been the real victories and defeats since 9/11? How are we actually fighting this war and how can it possibly be won?
Filled with astonishing disclosures, Suskind's book shows readers what he calls "the invisible battlefield"— a global matrix where US spies race to catch soldiers of jihad before they strike. It is a real-life spy thriller with the world's future at stake. It also reveals the shocking and secret philosophy underpinning the war on terror. Gripping and alarming in equal measure, it will reframe the debate about a war that, each day, redefines America and its place in the world.
400 pages, Paperback
First published July 20, 2006
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1850 people want to read
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 150 reviews
May 6, 2020
I'll color this one "read' as I plowed through the first 150 pages and then skipped about. The research at the time(2005) was necessary but the delivery is chopped and expressed poorly. Think of Tracy Lord's comments in Philadelphia Story (1940) And all in that horrible, snide, corkscrew English.
And now apply it to the War on Terror, which all to often wasn't the cause of higher oration.
I didn't learn a great detail during my haphazard perusal. Much of Suskind's research has bled through to our larger narratives about that uncertain time. One, I'm afraid, that isn't exactly removed from our own.
And now apply it to the War on Terror, which all to often wasn't the cause of higher oration.
I didn't learn a great detail during my haphazard perusal. Much of Suskind's research has bled through to our larger narratives about that uncertain time. One, I'm afraid, that isn't exactly removed from our own.
December 24, 2014
In his follow-up to the insightful, The Price of Loyalty, Suskind provides crucial insight into the mindset of the inner circle in the Bush White House in the wake of 9-11. The title refers to Dick Cheney's assertion that, if there is even a one percent chance that someone has the desire and the ability to inflict damage on the United States, our government must act as if it were a certainty. It is the panic-driven premise that warranted the administration's promulgation of preemptive war as a principle of national policy(more accurately, the policy is preventitive war, since preemption requires tangible evidence of imminent intention and capacity for attack), that drove our invasion of Iraq, that fueled the move to use torture, and that justifies suspension of habeas corpus, warrantless wiretapping, etc. Well-written and well-documented, this book should be read by anyone who hopes to understand what has happened to our country during the past 7 years.
February 23, 2012
Very interesting. Suskind provides interesting insight into the minds of the Bush administration as they tried to prevent more terrorist attacks after 9/11. It studies the administration's bold, novel doctrine of preemptive war. The title refers to Dick Cheney's assertion that, if there is even a one percent chance that someone has the desire and the ability to inflict damage on the United States, our government must act as if it were a certainty. This was the policy that led to the administration's ever-controversial Iraq war and terrorist detention program. But while Suskind accurately captures the attitude that pervaded the government, he misunderstands its source and significance. It does not result from idiosyncratic Bush and Cheney marching orders. Its source lies deeper, and was not unique to Bush's presidency. Rather, it flowed from the same combination of factors that caused Roosevelt to intern Japanese-American citizens.
Suskind certainly doesn't like Bush or Cheney, but his bias doesn't smear the narrative all that much.
Suskind paints George W. Bush as a global diplomacy neophyte, a visceral fighter prone to bullying, and a faith-based fear monger who leans on Cheney as a funnel that allowed Bush Presidential deniability if any project went sour. But instead of trusting his research and his reader's intelligence, Suskind beats us over the head with his breathlessly reached conclusions and shallow philosophical musings.
I often found Suskind's colorful interjections irritating and gratuitous in a book so heavily based on analysis. At one point, for example, someone call "his lead FBI agent in Dubai..., a city whose longing, mercantile soul belongs to no country save that of desire." Huh? That kind of stuff just doesn't belong here, Ron.
Do you remember when no WMD were found, and this administration blamed the intelligence community for giving them the wrong information? It turns out, according to Ron Suskind, that the White House kept sending back CIA reports that claimed there was no connection between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin-Laden. We learn that CIA analysts and supervisors were livid when the White House constantly asked them if there was a connection between the two. Their reports were returned with their concluding paragraphs deleted or questions about Hussein and Osama added. In short, they cherry-picked and publicized mischaracterized and misinterpreted information to achieve their political ends.
I was surprised to learn from the book that the United States supplies Israel with tanks, tanks which "kill women and children." Had the author bothered to check, he would have discovered that the Merkava tank is Israeli-manufactured. The emotive reference to inadvertent deaths of noncombatants is callow at best. The error may be minor, but if the author is wrong on basic knowledge, how dependable is the rest of the book? One might conclude that the book is based on one percent facts. Also, this book is unfocused and lacks a central theme.
Even worse, Suskind claims Abu Zubaydah was a nobody in al-Qaeda who was mentally ill, adding that the US "tortured" a would-be bystander. What bullshit. Zubaydah was al-Qaeda's operations chief and the mastermind of the Millenium bomb plots.
The chemical attack on NYC was in the planning stage, not operational as described.
The book is grossly repetitive almost to the point that it becomes infantile. How many times does Suskind need to repeat the same information to get his point across?
The sources paint a picture that makes Bush look like an idiot, Cheney an evil-doer, and Tenet an all-american hero.
Suskind certainly doesn't like Bush or Cheney, but his bias doesn't smear the narrative all that much.
Suskind paints George W. Bush as a global diplomacy neophyte, a visceral fighter prone to bullying, and a faith-based fear monger who leans on Cheney as a funnel that allowed Bush Presidential deniability if any project went sour. But instead of trusting his research and his reader's intelligence, Suskind beats us over the head with his breathlessly reached conclusions and shallow philosophical musings.
I often found Suskind's colorful interjections irritating and gratuitous in a book so heavily based on analysis. At one point, for example, someone call "his lead FBI agent in Dubai..., a city whose longing, mercantile soul belongs to no country save that of desire." Huh? That kind of stuff just doesn't belong here, Ron.
Do you remember when no WMD were found, and this administration blamed the intelligence community for giving them the wrong information? It turns out, according to Ron Suskind, that the White House kept sending back CIA reports that claimed there was no connection between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin-Laden. We learn that CIA analysts and supervisors were livid when the White House constantly asked them if there was a connection between the two. Their reports were returned with their concluding paragraphs deleted or questions about Hussein and Osama added. In short, they cherry-picked and publicized mischaracterized and misinterpreted information to achieve their political ends.
I was surprised to learn from the book that the United States supplies Israel with tanks, tanks which "kill women and children." Had the author bothered to check, he would have discovered that the Merkava tank is Israeli-manufactured. The emotive reference to inadvertent deaths of noncombatants is callow at best. The error may be minor, but if the author is wrong on basic knowledge, how dependable is the rest of the book? One might conclude that the book is based on one percent facts. Also, this book is unfocused and lacks a central theme.
Even worse, Suskind claims Abu Zubaydah was a nobody in al-Qaeda who was mentally ill, adding that the US "tortured" a would-be bystander. What bullshit. Zubaydah was al-Qaeda's operations chief and the mastermind of the Millenium bomb plots.
The chemical attack on NYC was in the planning stage, not operational as described.
The book is grossly repetitive almost to the point that it becomes infantile. How many times does Suskind need to repeat the same information to get his point across?
The sources paint a picture that makes Bush look like an idiot, Cheney an evil-doer, and Tenet an all-american hero.
February 25, 2017
Okay Mr. Suskind, I've checked you out and your credentials are impressive. Did the administration make mistakes? Absolutely! Was there corruption? Absolutely! Did anyone act exclusively in his/her own self interest? Absolutely not! (You'll disagree with me on this one.) Were individuals sacrificed for political ends? Of course! Were many actions taken with the best interest of the nation at heart? Absolutely! Sadly, the politics, shenanigans, backstabbing, loyal and unselfish work you describe remind me of my own experience in corporate America. Is criticism deserved? Sure. Were there significant achievements that saved American lives? Absolutely! What I'm getting at is, hindsight is 20:20. Where possible let's give some credit, allow the benefit of the doubt and criticize when it's warranted. We've all made mistakes in the "heat of the battle" as did the main players in your book. After my rant, maybe 4 stars is too much. In spite of all this I did enjoy the read. Perhaps ironic that I finished this on Pearl Harbor Day. Can you explain to me the difference between the attack on Pearl Harbor and the attack on the World Trade Center?
October 20, 2008
Dick Cheney established the core of US policy regarding terrorism. If there is even a one percent possibility of an event happening, we must presume that it is a certainty and act accordingly. Thus has our foreign policy become driven purely by fear and suspicion, a marked separation from a history of basing our actions on knowledge and fact.
The president is interested in action only, almost never on analysis. Thus, instead of pushing his agencies to get the best understanding of the hows and whys of events, he looks solely at actions to be done, regardless of whether they are ultimately useful or not.
Suskind speaks much about people he refers to as the “Invisibles.” The people who are out of the public eye, the men and women who perform intelligence and operations services for our country, folks who try to find the reality of what is going on out there and bring that to our rulers. And he shows how these committed professionals are being driven from national service by an administration that sees all government agencies as tools for their personal political gain.
Regarding recent revelations in the NY Times, LA times and Wall Street journal about the secret acquisition of financial intelligence by the government, it is very clear that revelation of this program is of absolutely no impact on current intelligence gathering capabilities. The information gathered through that program has completely dried up as the very adaptable al Qaeda operatives have long since shifted to means that are not trackable.
Suskind has gained access to much of the inner workings of not only the White House, but of the CIA and other agencies. It is clear that he has spoken at length with Tenet and McLaughlin (Tenet’s successor). And we know from his last work that he has corroboration from Paul O’Neill. There is much detail here, sometimes dizzyingly so.
Among items of interest:
Abu Zubaydah was an early capture. But he was not a significant one. In fact, he was characterized by insiders as the equivalent of a Wal-Mart greeter. He was also mentally unstable. (p 111) the United States would torture a mentally disturbed man and then leap, screaming, at every word he uttered.”
(p 214) The “different way” of Cheney’s doctrine was an audacious challenge to international legalities. Where once a discernible act of aggression against America or its national interest was the threshold for a U.S. military response, now even proof of threat is too constraining a standard.
Bush was kept out of the information loop as a matter or strategy:
(p 174) The thinking of several former Nixon administration officials, including Cheney, was not that the break-in and similar actions were the problem. The problem was that the President should have been “protected from” knowledge of such activities.
A president, in this model, can even say, in a general way, that he’d be happy if something were to occur—and have his subordinates execute such wishes—and still retain what, during the Reagan administration, was termed “plausible deniability.” That was what Ronald Reagan essentially did by telling advisers that he wouldn’t mind if they found a way to get around congressional bans on aid to the anti-communist rebels in Nicaragua, but then, when later questioned in a videotaped deposition, saying that he hadn’t “any inkling” of what they actually did.
For some presidents, like the first President Bush, this didn’t work. He demanded to know everything pertinent in making decisions, so he wouldn’t make mistakes. Presidents generally don’t like being surprised, or ending up on a “need to know” basis. The idea of being in-explicitly briefed to water down accountability, or of using oft-reviled inefficiencies of government “Process” to counteract the heightened transparency of the media age, is repugnant to them.
With this new George W. Bush presidency, however, Cheney was able to shape his protective strategy in a particularly proactive way. Keeping certain knowledge from Bush—much of it shrouded, as well, by classification—meant that the President, whose each word circles the globe, could advance serious strategies by saying whatever was needed.
Whether Cheney’s innovations were tailored to match Bush’s inclinations, or vice versa, is almost immaterial. It was a firm fit. Under this strategic model, reading the entire NIE [National Intelligence Estimate, which contained much that cautioned against concluding that WMD were extant in Iraq] would be problematic for Bush: it could hem in the President’s rhetoric, a key weapon in the march to war. He would know too much
A revealing tale of Bush as a young man regarding his view that the way to make people do what you want is to go after them relentlessly:
(p 215) At Harvard Business School, Bush, according to interviews with a dozen classmates, was short on academic skill, but long on bravado and cornball charisma. He distinguished himself in intramural sports and became de facto captain of his class’s winning basketball team, which played against a winning team from the class below, the class of 1976. The game was tight. The other team’s captain, Gary Engle—a mirror image of Bush, athletic, same size, headlong, crafty, mild attention deficit disorder—went up for a shot. Bush slugged him—an elbow to the mouth, knocking him to the parquet. “What the hell are you doing?” Engle remembers saying. “What, do you want to get into a fistfight and both of us end up in the fucking emergency room?” Bush just smiled.
Moments later, at the opposite end of the court, Engle went up high for a rebound and felt someone chop his legs out from under him. Bush again. Engle jumped up and threw the ball in Bush’s face. The two went at it until two teams of future business leaders leapt on their captains, pulling them apart. Engle, angry and vexed by what had happened, began wondering why the hell Bush would have done what he did. He lost his composure, and his team lost its leader.
A few years later, Engle, who was fast making a fortune in Florida real estate, bumped into Jeb Bush. It was 1980 and the young Bush was working with Armando Cordina, a Miami businessman who was the chairman of George H. W. Bush’s Florida campaign for the Republican presidential nomination. Engle, a Republican contributor, had thought from time to time about his game against George. Nothing like that had happened to him before or since. This was his chance to get a little insight about it. He told the story. Jeb kind of laughed, Engle recalled. “In Texas, they call guys like George ‘a hard case.’ It wasn’t easy being his brother either. He truly enjoys getting people to knuckle under.”
An interesting source of information might be publications by one of the Al-Qaeda
operatives, Yusef al-Ayeri. He was (p235) behind a web site, al-Nida, that U.S. investigators had long felt carried some of the most specialized analysis and coded directives about al Qaeda’s motives and plans. He was also the anonymous author of two extraordinary pieces of writing—short books, really, that had recently moved through cyberspace, about Al Qaeda’s underlying strategies. The Future if Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula After the Fall of Baghdad, written as the United States prepared its attack, said that an American invasion of Iraq would be the best possible outcome for al Qaeda, stoking extremism throughout the Persian gulf and south Asia, and achieving precisely the radicalizing quagmire that bin Laden hoped would occur in Afghanistan. A second book, Crusaders’ War, outlined a tactical model for fighting the American forces in Iraq, including “assassination and poisoning the enemy’s food and drink,” remotely triggered explosives, suicide bombings, and lightning strike ambushes. It was the playbook.
(P 302) Inside the analytical shops at CIA and NSC, the Madrid bombings and swift
follow-up investigation flowed neatly into another growing consensus—a conclusion that was the last thing anyone in the White House wanted publicized: al Qaeda might not, at this point, actually want to attack America.
Following text points out that it was al Qaeda strategy to isolate the US from its allies (see the Madrid Bombing) and thereby increase its burden by forcing the withdrawal of those allies. (p 304) “What we understood inside CIA is that al Qaeda just doesn’t act out of bloodlust, or pathological rage. Though their tactics are horrific, they’re not homicidal maniacs. They do what they do to carry forward specific strategic goals,” said a senior CIA official involved in highest-level debates over bin Laden and Zawahiri…”Clearly, they had the capability to attack us in about a hundred different ways. They didn’t. The question was, why?”
(p 334) …at CIA headquarters, [after the installation of Porter Goss] the five o’clock meetings [daily updates on anti-terror actions and intelligence] were becoming
irregular.
Goss’s people, called “the Gosslings,” were running loyalty tests. Goss made it clear to top brass what he would alter right in an all-agency memo: that the CIA is there to support the policies of the administration. Period.
(P 337) [In late October, 2004, bin Laden had released one of his occasional statements] At the five o’clock meeting, once various reports on latest threats were delivered, John McLaughlin opened the issue with the consensus view: “Bin Laden certainly did a nice favor today for the President.” [It was clear to these people that it served bin Laden well to have George W. Bush in the White House for another four years.]
(p 339) Each moment that passes in which they survive to speak the dream of jihad, and we live with fearful regard and cramped liberties, is a moment of victory on their ledger. Those moments will add up.
The president is interested in action only, almost never on analysis. Thus, instead of pushing his agencies to get the best understanding of the hows and whys of events, he looks solely at actions to be done, regardless of whether they are ultimately useful or not.
Suskind speaks much about people he refers to as the “Invisibles.” The people who are out of the public eye, the men and women who perform intelligence and operations services for our country, folks who try to find the reality of what is going on out there and bring that to our rulers. And he shows how these committed professionals are being driven from national service by an administration that sees all government agencies as tools for their personal political gain.
Regarding recent revelations in the NY Times, LA times and Wall Street journal about the secret acquisition of financial intelligence by the government, it is very clear that revelation of this program is of absolutely no impact on current intelligence gathering capabilities. The information gathered through that program has completely dried up as the very adaptable al Qaeda operatives have long since shifted to means that are not trackable.
Suskind has gained access to much of the inner workings of not only the White House, but of the CIA and other agencies. It is clear that he has spoken at length with Tenet and McLaughlin (Tenet’s successor). And we know from his last work that he has corroboration from Paul O’Neill. There is much detail here, sometimes dizzyingly so.
Among items of interest:
Abu Zubaydah was an early capture. But he was not a significant one. In fact, he was characterized by insiders as the equivalent of a Wal-Mart greeter. He was also mentally unstable. (p 111) the United States would torture a mentally disturbed man and then leap, screaming, at every word he uttered.”
(p 214) The “different way” of Cheney’s doctrine was an audacious challenge to international legalities. Where once a discernible act of aggression against America or its national interest was the threshold for a U.S. military response, now even proof of threat is too constraining a standard.
Bush was kept out of the information loop as a matter or strategy:
(p 174) The thinking of several former Nixon administration officials, including Cheney, was not that the break-in and similar actions were the problem. The problem was that the President should have been “protected from” knowledge of such activities.
A president, in this model, can even say, in a general way, that he’d be happy if something were to occur—and have his subordinates execute such wishes—and still retain what, during the Reagan administration, was termed “plausible deniability.” That was what Ronald Reagan essentially did by telling advisers that he wouldn’t mind if they found a way to get around congressional bans on aid to the anti-communist rebels in Nicaragua, but then, when later questioned in a videotaped deposition, saying that he hadn’t “any inkling” of what they actually did.
For some presidents, like the first President Bush, this didn’t work. He demanded to know everything pertinent in making decisions, so he wouldn’t make mistakes. Presidents generally don’t like being surprised, or ending up on a “need to know” basis. The idea of being in-explicitly briefed to water down accountability, or of using oft-reviled inefficiencies of government “Process” to counteract the heightened transparency of the media age, is repugnant to them.
With this new George W. Bush presidency, however, Cheney was able to shape his protective strategy in a particularly proactive way. Keeping certain knowledge from Bush—much of it shrouded, as well, by classification—meant that the President, whose each word circles the globe, could advance serious strategies by saying whatever was needed.
Whether Cheney’s innovations were tailored to match Bush’s inclinations, or vice versa, is almost immaterial. It was a firm fit. Under this strategic model, reading the entire NIE [National Intelligence Estimate, which contained much that cautioned against concluding that WMD were extant in Iraq] would be problematic for Bush: it could hem in the President’s rhetoric, a key weapon in the march to war. He would know too much
A revealing tale of Bush as a young man regarding his view that the way to make people do what you want is to go after them relentlessly:
(p 215) At Harvard Business School, Bush, according to interviews with a dozen classmates, was short on academic skill, but long on bravado and cornball charisma. He distinguished himself in intramural sports and became de facto captain of his class’s winning basketball team, which played against a winning team from the class below, the class of 1976. The game was tight. The other team’s captain, Gary Engle—a mirror image of Bush, athletic, same size, headlong, crafty, mild attention deficit disorder—went up for a shot. Bush slugged him—an elbow to the mouth, knocking him to the parquet. “What the hell are you doing?” Engle remembers saying. “What, do you want to get into a fistfight and both of us end up in the fucking emergency room?” Bush just smiled.
Moments later, at the opposite end of the court, Engle went up high for a rebound and felt someone chop his legs out from under him. Bush again. Engle jumped up and threw the ball in Bush’s face. The two went at it until two teams of future business leaders leapt on their captains, pulling them apart. Engle, angry and vexed by what had happened, began wondering why the hell Bush would have done what he did. He lost his composure, and his team lost its leader.
A few years later, Engle, who was fast making a fortune in Florida real estate, bumped into Jeb Bush. It was 1980 and the young Bush was working with Armando Cordina, a Miami businessman who was the chairman of George H. W. Bush’s Florida campaign for the Republican presidential nomination. Engle, a Republican contributor, had thought from time to time about his game against George. Nothing like that had happened to him before or since. This was his chance to get a little insight about it. He told the story. Jeb kind of laughed, Engle recalled. “In Texas, they call guys like George ‘a hard case.’ It wasn’t easy being his brother either. He truly enjoys getting people to knuckle under.”
An interesting source of information might be publications by one of the Al-Qaeda
operatives, Yusef al-Ayeri. He was (p235) behind a web site, al-Nida, that U.S. investigators had long felt carried some of the most specialized analysis and coded directives about al Qaeda’s motives and plans. He was also the anonymous author of two extraordinary pieces of writing—short books, really, that had recently moved through cyberspace, about Al Qaeda’s underlying strategies. The Future if Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula After the Fall of Baghdad, written as the United States prepared its attack, said that an American invasion of Iraq would be the best possible outcome for al Qaeda, stoking extremism throughout the Persian gulf and south Asia, and achieving precisely the radicalizing quagmire that bin Laden hoped would occur in Afghanistan. A second book, Crusaders’ War, outlined a tactical model for fighting the American forces in Iraq, including “assassination and poisoning the enemy’s food and drink,” remotely triggered explosives, suicide bombings, and lightning strike ambushes. It was the playbook.
(P 302) Inside the analytical shops at CIA and NSC, the Madrid bombings and swift
follow-up investigation flowed neatly into another growing consensus—a conclusion that was the last thing anyone in the White House wanted publicized: al Qaeda might not, at this point, actually want to attack America.
Following text points out that it was al Qaeda strategy to isolate the US from its allies (see the Madrid Bombing) and thereby increase its burden by forcing the withdrawal of those allies. (p 304) “What we understood inside CIA is that al Qaeda just doesn’t act out of bloodlust, or pathological rage. Though their tactics are horrific, they’re not homicidal maniacs. They do what they do to carry forward specific strategic goals,” said a senior CIA official involved in highest-level debates over bin Laden and Zawahiri…”Clearly, they had the capability to attack us in about a hundred different ways. They didn’t. The question was, why?”
(p 334) …at CIA headquarters, [after the installation of Porter Goss] the five o’clock meetings [daily updates on anti-terror actions and intelligence] were becoming
irregular.
Goss’s people, called “the Gosslings,” were running loyalty tests. Goss made it clear to top brass what he would alter right in an all-agency memo: that the CIA is there to support the policies of the administration. Period.
(P 337) [In late October, 2004, bin Laden had released one of his occasional statements] At the five o’clock meeting, once various reports on latest threats were delivered, John McLaughlin opened the issue with the consensus view: “Bin Laden certainly did a nice favor today for the President.” [It was clear to these people that it served bin Laden well to have George W. Bush in the White House for another four years.]
(p 339) Each moment that passes in which they survive to speak the dream of jihad, and we live with fearful regard and cramped liberties, is a moment of victory on their ledger. Those moments will add up.
January 22, 2013
I listened to the audio version.
I have read enough about the events taking place after 9/11/2001 to have a grasp of the general way Bush handled this attack. This book fills in a lot of gaps and makes me even more horrified than I was before.
Bush's character and operational behavior is well-known. He is a man of "action", not contemplation. He doesn't read; instead he likes to dive in, take some sort of action. And that is what happened after 9/11. He wanted to DO something and he did.
The "one percent doctrine" was a strategy developed by Cheney, the vice-president (for those who read this many years from now!). Simply put, it states that if there is a one-percent chance that an activity has taken place (or is taking place), then we proceed as if it is a certainty. Thus if there was a one-percent chance that Saddam Hussein was developing nuclear weapons we proceed as if we are certain that he is.
The book offers convincing evidence that Bush and Cheney were looking for ways to invade Iraq well before 9/11. They would have gone there regardless, in other words. Many of us figured this out.
Caught in this situation, where evidence held little value or interest, was the CIA and in particular George Tenet. Tenet's personality is friendly, supportive, helpful. It was apparently fairly easy to run roughshod over his concerns. During the aftermath of the attack, the CIA became a tool for the president and vice-president to use to support what they wanted to do. Rather than an advisor, offering advice based on evidence.
Suskind doesn't exactly stand back in this portrayal. He lets his own feelings come through. It may be this approach that would make some others wonder if he is embroidering any. It seems clear that one source is George Tenet, in part because there is much in here that Tenet may have been the only one to know. I do hope that the printed editions of this book contained references at the end; the audio version did not.
Suskind provides an almost novelistic approach here, filling in facial expressions and gestures, rather a different type of nonfiction. It makes it easy to listen to and understand. I recommend it as one of several one should read to understand how we got here.
I have read enough about the events taking place after 9/11/2001 to have a grasp of the general way Bush handled this attack. This book fills in a lot of gaps and makes me even more horrified than I was before.
Bush's character and operational behavior is well-known. He is a man of "action", not contemplation. He doesn't read; instead he likes to dive in, take some sort of action. And that is what happened after 9/11. He wanted to DO something and he did.
The "one percent doctrine" was a strategy developed by Cheney, the vice-president (for those who read this many years from now!). Simply put, it states that if there is a one-percent chance that an activity has taken place (or is taking place), then we proceed as if it is a certainty. Thus if there was a one-percent chance that Saddam Hussein was developing nuclear weapons we proceed as if we are certain that he is.
The book offers convincing evidence that Bush and Cheney were looking for ways to invade Iraq well before 9/11. They would have gone there regardless, in other words. Many of us figured this out.
Caught in this situation, where evidence held little value or interest, was the CIA and in particular George Tenet. Tenet's personality is friendly, supportive, helpful. It was apparently fairly easy to run roughshod over his concerns. During the aftermath of the attack, the CIA became a tool for the president and vice-president to use to support what they wanted to do. Rather than an advisor, offering advice based on evidence.
Suskind doesn't exactly stand back in this portrayal. He lets his own feelings come through. It may be this approach that would make some others wonder if he is embroidering any. It seems clear that one source is George Tenet, in part because there is much in here that Tenet may have been the only one to know. I do hope that the printed editions of this book contained references at the end; the audio version did not.
Suskind provides an almost novelistic approach here, filling in facial expressions and gestures, rather a different type of nonfiction. It makes it easy to listen to and understand. I recommend it as one of several one should read to understand how we got here.
September 9, 2007
A terrifying political thriller. In Suskind's new novel, a dim-witted religious convert stumbles into the presidency of the most powerful country in the world. What's truly terrifying, though, is the collection of buffoons he brings with him into office. Soon after taking office, their country suffers a devastating terrorist attack.
The response to this attack is predictably and tragicomically inappropriate, if not nonsensical. It revolves around an obscure and largely powerless tinpot dictator, whom our president and several members of his foreign policy team are obsessed with deposing him for no discernable reason. The antics of this crew are counterbalanced with accounts of the activities of a number of minor characters, career CIA and FBI officers trying to make sense of how to do their job when their bosses want to do their job for them, and do it very poorly.
This dark comedy is a hilarious and chilling tale, and a bracing read. My only complaint is that at times, Suskind takes things a bit too far and strains the boundaries of parody. The title refers to a foreign policy doctrine articulated by the vice president that is simply too demonstrably lunatic even for this bunch--if applied consistently, it would require the US government to launch dozens of interventions are wars every year. What gives this book it's bite is the lingering fear that people like this actually could be in power someday, but flourishes like this threaten to break that spell. Still, I give a strong recommendation to this original, hilarious, and tragic political thriller.
The response to this attack is predictably and tragicomically inappropriate, if not nonsensical. It revolves around an obscure and largely powerless tinpot dictator, whom our president and several members of his foreign policy team are obsessed with deposing him for no discernable reason. The antics of this crew are counterbalanced with accounts of the activities of a number of minor characters, career CIA and FBI officers trying to make sense of how to do their job when their bosses want to do their job for them, and do it very poorly.
This dark comedy is a hilarious and chilling tale, and a bracing read. My only complaint is that at times, Suskind takes things a bit too far and strains the boundaries of parody. The title refers to a foreign policy doctrine articulated by the vice president that is simply too demonstrably lunatic even for this bunch--if applied consistently, it would require the US government to launch dozens of interventions are wars every year. What gives this book it's bite is the lingering fear that people like this actually could be in power someday, but flourishes like this threaten to break that spell. Still, I give a strong recommendation to this original, hilarious, and tragic political thriller.
January 22, 2011
لن أتحدث هنا عن الكتاب، والذي يؤكد بشكل أو بآخر أفكاري حول عصر بوش الصغير.. والذي ينطبق عليه القول: تأتيك الرفسة القوية من الحمار الضعيف، رغم أنه جمهوري (أي فيل وليس حمار).
بداية أعترف أن الديموقراطية الأمريكية فاشلة، وهذا يؤكده وصول بوش الأحمق إلى سدة الحكم (وقد أثببت دراسات العالم الفرنسي أروو صعوبة الديمقراطية من الناحية الرياضية).. وضعف هذا الرئيس برر قوة الرجل الثاني ديك تشيني، والآنسة رايس.. وهو ما جعل التشيني يقترح ويطبق نظرية الواحد بالمائة.. ولكن هنا تبرز المشكلة.. فأمريكا تطالبنا أن نكون معها بنسبة 100% لأفكارها ولو كانت نسبة 1% من الدقة.
فاجأني الكتاب بحجم الرؤساء والمسؤولين والأمراء والملوك و... و... الذين تعاونوا مع المخابرات الأمريكية من الدول العربية والإسلامية.. فأنا لم أتوقع ذلك.
العالم العربي تعامل مع عصر بوش بغباء.. فيبدو أن كلا المعسكرين المقاوم والمعتدل لم يسمعا بالحكمتين المنطبقتين على عصر بوش الصغير:
إياك ومصاحبة الأحمق، فإنه يريد أن ينفعك.. فيضرك
لا تجادل الأحمق حتى لا يخطئ الناس بينكما
توجد بعض الثغرات في الترجمة.. وبعض التحريفات.. منها ما أضحكني مثل: وشربوا شراب بندر (الأمير بندر) المفضل.. والحقيقة أنني لا أعرف ما هو شرابه المفضل!
يبدو أن المترجم (أو دار النشر.. لست أدري) لا يحبذ ذكر الخمر في كتابه علماً أنه ذكر بالكتب المقدسة.
أرجو أن يعلم المترجمون أن عملهم أمانة.. ولا ينبغي أن يسقطوا أفكارهم الخاصة على كتبهم المترجمة
بداية أعترف أن الديموقراطية الأمريكية فاشلة، وهذا يؤكده وصول بوش الأحمق إلى سدة الحكم (وقد أثببت دراسات العالم الفرنسي أروو صعوبة الديمقراطية من الناحية الرياضية).. وضعف هذا الرئيس برر قوة الرجل الثاني ديك تشيني، والآنسة رايس.. وهو ما جعل التشيني يقترح ويطبق نظرية الواحد بالمائة.. ولكن هنا تبرز المشكلة.. فأمريكا تطالبنا أن نكون معها بنسبة 100% لأفكارها ولو كانت نسبة 1% من الدقة.
فاجأني الكتاب بحجم الرؤساء والمسؤولين والأمراء والملوك و... و... الذين تعاونوا مع المخابرات الأمريكية من الدول العربية والإسلامية.. فأنا لم أتوقع ذلك.
العالم العربي تعامل مع عصر بوش بغباء.. فيبدو أن كلا المعسكرين المقاوم والمعتدل لم يسمعا بالحكمتين المنطبقتين على عصر بوش الصغير:
إياك ومصاحبة الأحمق، فإنه يريد أن ينفعك.. فيضرك
لا تجادل الأحمق حتى لا يخطئ الناس بينكما
توجد بعض الثغرات في الترجمة.. وبعض التحريفات.. منها ما أضحكني مثل: وشربوا شراب بندر (الأمير بندر) المفضل.. والحقيقة أنني لا أعرف ما هو شرابه المفضل!
يبدو أن المترجم (أو دار النشر.. لست أدري) لا يحبذ ذكر الخمر في كتابه علماً أنه ذكر بالكتب المقدسة.
أرجو أن يعلم المترجمون أن عملهم أمانة.. ولا ينبغي أن يسقطوا أفكارهم الخاصة على كتبهم المترجمة
March 24, 2013
An intriguing book that casts deep questions about the Bush administration. Mr. Suskind claims that Bush has swept aside logic and evidence in favour of intuition. He has also emasculated the CIA to prevent it from offering advice. It is changing into an organization that supports administrative policy. It leaves one wondering how former presidents tried the same thing with similar government organizations – the Pentagon and the military for example. What is most frightening is how much the Bush administration prevents and ridicules any evidence that contradicts its’ own agenda. It fabricated ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’ to justify the Iraq war. During the 2004 presidential debates Bush could not bring himself to acknowledge any errors that his administration had made. All-in-all this book paints a picture of a government that is closing itself off from any contradictory view-points. To paraphrase “You are with us or you are against us”.
In his book Mr. Suskind states that since 9/11 Bush has had to deal more and more with dictatorship countries like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. It would seem he has picked up some of those qualities at the expense of traditional American democratic values.
In his book Mr. Suskind states that since 9/11 Bush has had to deal more and more with dictatorship countries like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. It would seem he has picked up some of those qualities at the expense of traditional American democratic values.
October 31, 2008
Insightful and definitely worth the time. I often found Susskind's colorful interjections irritating and gratuitous in a book so heavily based on analysis. At one point, for example, someone call "his lead FBI agent in Dubai..., a city whose longing, mercantile soul belongs to no country save that of desire." Huh? That kind of stuff just belong here, Ron.
On analytic points though, Suskind does a good job of showing how the one percent doctrine came so heavily to define the Bush Administration's approach after 9/11, and how that led to catastrophe. Particularly convincing was his discussion of the dynamic between Tenet and Bush...making a largely inscrutable element of the story - Tenet - very human and understandable.
My biggest issue with the books is that Suskind doesn't really answer the question "why Iraq?" It might well have satisfied the doctrine that a one percent chance of an attack was enough for the US to act, but that fact still doesn't explain why was such a monomaniacal fixation for so many of the people working for the Bush administration.
On analytic points though, Suskind does a good job of showing how the one percent doctrine came so heavily to define the Bush Administration's approach after 9/11, and how that led to catastrophe. Particularly convincing was his discussion of the dynamic between Tenet and Bush...making a largely inscrutable element of the story - Tenet - very human and understandable.
My biggest issue with the books is that Suskind doesn't really answer the question "why Iraq?" It might well have satisfied the doctrine that a one percent chance of an attack was enough for the US to act, but that fact still doesn't explain why was such a monomaniacal fixation for so many of the people working for the Bush administration.
March 13, 2009
The best clear explanation for why we're in the mess we are in. Tells the story clearly with a feeling of sympathy for decision makers with out absolving them of responsibility.
August 31, 2019
Dense and fascinating, but a little scattered
What I mean by "scattered" is that the book could use a sharper focus. Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Ron Suskind waded through mountains of documents and transcripts and notes from interviews and then published this as quickly as he could. He wanted to include all the important details he uncovered while they were topical, but he didn't really have the time to properly meld them into the narrative. The result is the book is a little less readable and engaging than it might have been.
Nonetheless, this is a fascinating account of how the Bush administration operates.
The "One Percent Doctrine" that forms the centerpiece and focal point is from Vice President Dick Cheney. Here's an example of how Cheney articulated it: "If there's a one percent chance that Pakistani scientists are helping Al Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our response." Cheney added, "It's not about our analysis, or finding a preponderance of evidence... It's about our response." (p. 62)
Looked at carefully this doctrine is really just a rationale for the Bush administration to do what it wants to do. The key point is the "one percent." If "it's not about...a preponderance of evidence," how do we know that there's a one percent chance? How do we know that it's not one tenth of one percent or one thousandth of one percent or a googleplex of one percent? We don't. And that is exactly the point of the Cheney Doctrine. As Suskind puts it, "A key feature of the Cheney Doctrine was to quietly liberate action from such accepted standards of proof... Suspicion...became the threshold for action." (p. 163)
Looked at in terms of our invasion of Iraq, the utility of the Cheney Doctrine to the Bush administration becomes clear. Was there a one percent chance that Saddam Hussein was developing weapons of mass destruction? Psychologically, since WMD are so scary, the answer was yes. But as far as evidence goes, the answer was no. Suskind writes: "...Cheney's doctrine was an audacious challenge to international legalities. Where once a discernible act of aggression against America or its national interest was the threshold for a US military response, now even proof of a threat is too constraining a standard." (p. 214)
I just wish the Cheney Doctrine had been applied to such things as global warming or stem cell research. Is there a one percent chance that the US will fall woefully behind the rest of the world in developing disease prevention and cure because we will not fund stem cell research? Is there a one percent chance that global warming is caused by human activities? In terms of the invasion of Iraq, perhaps Cheney and Bush ought to have asked, is there a one percent chance that invading Iraq will increase jihadist recruitment and will turn world opinion so against the US that we will lose effectiveness in our ability to fight terrorism?
It could also be said that by the logic of the one percent doctrine we really ought to have invaded North Korea and Iran.
Although Ron Suskind's assault on the Bush administration is not frontal, make no mistake about it, this book is yet another indictment. Much of the barrage comes from the experience of professionals in the intelligence community, most particularly from the experience of George Tenet who was director of the CIA until Bush allowed him to resign in June of 2004. The main thrust of Suskind's intent is to show that the Cheney Doctrine allowed the Bush administration to accept "as a guiding principle...that suspicion was an adequate threshold for preventative action" and thereby justify the invasion of Iraq.
Along the way, Suskind shows how the Bush administration also justified torture of detainees, how it lied to the American people and the world about the "evidence" for WMD in Iraq, how it made a phony connection between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda, and how in general secrecy and mendacity became hallmarks of the Bush administration.
There is a lot of insider knowledge in this book that could only have been gotten from people in the know whom Suskind does not identify. (Too bad.) He remarks in an "Author's Note" toward the end of the book that he'd like to mention their names and offer public thanks, but--to a one--I think they'd rather I not." (p. 350) Clearly this is the strength of this book, the sort of horse's mouth type of veracity that comes only from actually talking to those "deep inside."
One point that I found particularly interesting is the evidence here that Al Qaeda was responsible for the anthrax mailings that killed several people shortly after 9/11. (See pages 70-72 and 251-252.) We have not been made aware of this apparently because the Bush administration considers such knowledge too scary for consumption by the general public.
I also appreciated Suskind's statement that the neocons in the White House, led by Wolfowitz and Feith, thought that Saddam Hussein "was an easy mark...a demonstration model to show the new resolve of the United States and its postmodern rules of international behavior" (p. 214)--that is, to show that preemptive strikes were now policy, and aggressive wars might be in the offing from here on out. Actually this is the main reason for invading Iraq, that is, to flex new muscle and show the world that we will actually use our military strength.
One final observation from Suskind: "Cheney's nickname inside CIA was 'Edgar.' As in Bergen. The President would, by implication, be in the Charlie McCarthy role [that is, in the role of the puppet]. This isn't fair, but it is at least half true." (p. 213)
--Dennis Littrell, author of “The World Is Not as We Think It Is”
What I mean by "scattered" is that the book could use a sharper focus. Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Ron Suskind waded through mountains of documents and transcripts and notes from interviews and then published this as quickly as he could. He wanted to include all the important details he uncovered while they were topical, but he didn't really have the time to properly meld them into the narrative. The result is the book is a little less readable and engaging than it might have been.
Nonetheless, this is a fascinating account of how the Bush administration operates.
The "One Percent Doctrine" that forms the centerpiece and focal point is from Vice President Dick Cheney. Here's an example of how Cheney articulated it: "If there's a one percent chance that Pakistani scientists are helping Al Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our response." Cheney added, "It's not about our analysis, or finding a preponderance of evidence... It's about our response." (p. 62)
Looked at carefully this doctrine is really just a rationale for the Bush administration to do what it wants to do. The key point is the "one percent." If "it's not about...a preponderance of evidence," how do we know that there's a one percent chance? How do we know that it's not one tenth of one percent or one thousandth of one percent or a googleplex of one percent? We don't. And that is exactly the point of the Cheney Doctrine. As Suskind puts it, "A key feature of the Cheney Doctrine was to quietly liberate action from such accepted standards of proof... Suspicion...became the threshold for action." (p. 163)
Looked at in terms of our invasion of Iraq, the utility of the Cheney Doctrine to the Bush administration becomes clear. Was there a one percent chance that Saddam Hussein was developing weapons of mass destruction? Psychologically, since WMD are so scary, the answer was yes. But as far as evidence goes, the answer was no. Suskind writes: "...Cheney's doctrine was an audacious challenge to international legalities. Where once a discernible act of aggression against America or its national interest was the threshold for a US military response, now even proof of a threat is too constraining a standard." (p. 214)
I just wish the Cheney Doctrine had been applied to such things as global warming or stem cell research. Is there a one percent chance that the US will fall woefully behind the rest of the world in developing disease prevention and cure because we will not fund stem cell research? Is there a one percent chance that global warming is caused by human activities? In terms of the invasion of Iraq, perhaps Cheney and Bush ought to have asked, is there a one percent chance that invading Iraq will increase jihadist recruitment and will turn world opinion so against the US that we will lose effectiveness in our ability to fight terrorism?
It could also be said that by the logic of the one percent doctrine we really ought to have invaded North Korea and Iran.
Although Ron Suskind's assault on the Bush administration is not frontal, make no mistake about it, this book is yet another indictment. Much of the barrage comes from the experience of professionals in the intelligence community, most particularly from the experience of George Tenet who was director of the CIA until Bush allowed him to resign in June of 2004. The main thrust of Suskind's intent is to show that the Cheney Doctrine allowed the Bush administration to accept "as a guiding principle...that suspicion was an adequate threshold for preventative action" and thereby justify the invasion of Iraq.
Along the way, Suskind shows how the Bush administration also justified torture of detainees, how it lied to the American people and the world about the "evidence" for WMD in Iraq, how it made a phony connection between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda, and how in general secrecy and mendacity became hallmarks of the Bush administration.
There is a lot of insider knowledge in this book that could only have been gotten from people in the know whom Suskind does not identify. (Too bad.) He remarks in an "Author's Note" toward the end of the book that he'd like to mention their names and offer public thanks, but--to a one--I think they'd rather I not." (p. 350) Clearly this is the strength of this book, the sort of horse's mouth type of veracity that comes only from actually talking to those "deep inside."
One point that I found particularly interesting is the evidence here that Al Qaeda was responsible for the anthrax mailings that killed several people shortly after 9/11. (See pages 70-72 and 251-252.) We have not been made aware of this apparently because the Bush administration considers such knowledge too scary for consumption by the general public.
I also appreciated Suskind's statement that the neocons in the White House, led by Wolfowitz and Feith, thought that Saddam Hussein "was an easy mark...a demonstration model to show the new resolve of the United States and its postmodern rules of international behavior" (p. 214)--that is, to show that preemptive strikes were now policy, and aggressive wars might be in the offing from here on out. Actually this is the main reason for invading Iraq, that is, to flex new muscle and show the world that we will actually use our military strength.
One final observation from Suskind: "Cheney's nickname inside CIA was 'Edgar.' As in Bergen. The President would, by implication, be in the Charlie McCarthy role [that is, in the role of the puppet]. This isn't fair, but it is at least half true." (p. 213)
--Dennis Littrell, author of “The World Is Not as We Think It Is”
March 27, 2016
This journalistic account delves into the work of "the invisibles:" the people behind the scenes in the FBI and the CIA who are the main operators and executors of our response to 9/11. It also covers the inner workings of the Bush administration regarding the War on Terror (GWOT), but because Suskind's sources are mainly retired and active invisibles, the focus is on their actions. He's deeply sympathetic to these people in their bureaucratic struggles with the Bush Cabinet. CIA director Tenet, for instance, comes across as more sympathetic here than in most accounts. Suskind portrays Tenet as a hard worker, a solid organizer, and a pretty good diplomat who managed to exact significant cooperation from allies like . He casts aspersions on the Bush administration, especially Cheney, for cherry-picking and manipulating the intelligence on WMD, pressuring the CIA to say what he wanted to hear, and ultimately blaming Tenet (slam dunk, anyone) for intelligence failures that really should have been pinned on Cheney himself.
The book is pretty scattered, and anyone looking for in-depth coverage of any particular issue will probably be disappointed. It's almost as if Suskind just put down every story he had access to. Nevertheless, the stories themselves are very interesting. They provide some very cool insights into the workings of the Bush administration and these federal agencies. As long as you are willing to put up with a staccato rhythm, you can still get a lot out of this book.
In terms of explaining the Iraq War, Suskind offers inside information but not much of a systematic argument. He focuses heavily on the neocon shaping of Bush and the nation's view of the threat environment post-9/11. The most important argument in the book is the idea of the 1% doctrine, a Cheney idea. It basically means that if the odds of a terrorist attack or plot (especially with WMD) is even 1% likely to be true, we have to treat it as true and act accordingly. This extremely low risk acceptance post 9/11 is certainly one piece of the puzzle of explaining the Iraq War and other policies like the abuse of detainees, although it's not enough by itself to explain the 2003 invasion. One percent is probably an exaggeration, but there's no doubt that Cheney and others were probably hyper sensitive to threats after 9/11. It probably seemed to Cheney et al that they were playing it safe by treating ambiguous, even unlikely threats as certainties. Nevertheless, as scholars like Robert Jervis have pointed out, the actions that one takes if one sees conflict or a threat as inevitable can be just as disastrous as overlooking or downplaying a threat. I think the Bush administration's record speaks to the validity of this point.
In sum, this is an interesting, readable, albeit somewhat scattershot account that I'd recommend to most people who are interested in the Bush administration and the GWOT. For people who aren't really into this stuff, I'd recommend reading something like James Mann's Rise of the Vulcans or Packer's the Assassin's Gate instead.
The book is pretty scattered, and anyone looking for in-depth coverage of any particular issue will probably be disappointed. It's almost as if Suskind just put down every story he had access to. Nevertheless, the stories themselves are very interesting. They provide some very cool insights into the workings of the Bush administration and these federal agencies. As long as you are willing to put up with a staccato rhythm, you can still get a lot out of this book.
In terms of explaining the Iraq War, Suskind offers inside information but not much of a systematic argument. He focuses heavily on the neocon shaping of Bush and the nation's view of the threat environment post-9/11. The most important argument in the book is the idea of the 1% doctrine, a Cheney idea. It basically means that if the odds of a terrorist attack or plot (especially with WMD) is even 1% likely to be true, we have to treat it as true and act accordingly. This extremely low risk acceptance post 9/11 is certainly one piece of the puzzle of explaining the Iraq War and other policies like the abuse of detainees, although it's not enough by itself to explain the 2003 invasion. One percent is probably an exaggeration, but there's no doubt that Cheney and others were probably hyper sensitive to threats after 9/11. It probably seemed to Cheney et al that they were playing it safe by treating ambiguous, even unlikely threats as certainties. Nevertheless, as scholars like Robert Jervis have pointed out, the actions that one takes if one sees conflict or a threat as inevitable can be just as disastrous as overlooking or downplaying a threat. I think the Bush administration's record speaks to the validity of this point.
In sum, this is an interesting, readable, albeit somewhat scattershot account that I'd recommend to most people who are interested in the Bush administration and the GWOT. For people who aren't really into this stuff, I'd recommend reading something like James Mann's Rise of the Vulcans or Packer's the Assassin's Gate instead.
May 21, 2014
Having read more than a handful of books on the Bush administration, the War on Terror, etc., I may have been a little late in getting to this one. And though some of the information contained here is now old news, there is enough new information to provide value.
First the premise of this book, (based on its title), suggests, (okay - states), that the Bush administration's anti-terrorism policy since 9/11 has been based on a negative, i.e. rather than proving a threat before reacting, the US Intelligence community found itself having to "prove" that there wasn't a threat before acting and thus pre-empting any future attacks on American soil or even American interests worldwide. Judging the wisdom and morality of such a policy is something we are witnessing daily in the press and will be up to each of us individually. What this book focuses on is the challenge of implementing, and at its core, the practicality of pursuing such a policy - if in fact it is a policy or a strategy.
Because of this focus, (and sources), this book is intelligence community-centric and thus CIA- and George Tenent-centric, which provides a different perspective from the other books I have read on this topic. This doesn't mean the book is pro-CIA but it is sympathetic and I think rightfully so. (The tracking of "suspect" financial info is fascinating.) The conditions the men and women of that organization have been working under since 9/11 are mind-boggling. Also the quandary the FBI now finds itself in, preventing terrorist crimes as opposed to catching criminals, is highlighted as well as more examples of inter-agency communication problems.
Although not a great read - the last 60-80 pages are rushed and somewhat jumbled and some may find the writing style glib, (think of Bob Woodward with a few extra cups of coffee in his system), this is still a good book with some valuable insight. The description of President Bush's relationships with both VP Cheney and George Tenent are food for thought as well as this eerie quote from Donald Rumsfeld - "Every CIA success is a DoD failure.".
First the premise of this book, (based on its title), suggests, (okay - states), that the Bush administration's anti-terrorism policy since 9/11 has been based on a negative, i.e. rather than proving a threat before reacting, the US Intelligence community found itself having to "prove" that there wasn't a threat before acting and thus pre-empting any future attacks on American soil or even American interests worldwide. Judging the wisdom and morality of such a policy is something we are witnessing daily in the press and will be up to each of us individually. What this book focuses on is the challenge of implementing, and at its core, the practicality of pursuing such a policy - if in fact it is a policy or a strategy.
Because of this focus, (and sources), this book is intelligence community-centric and thus CIA- and George Tenent-centric, which provides a different perspective from the other books I have read on this topic. This doesn't mean the book is pro-CIA but it is sympathetic and I think rightfully so. (The tracking of "suspect" financial info is fascinating.) The conditions the men and women of that organization have been working under since 9/11 are mind-boggling. Also the quandary the FBI now finds itself in, preventing terrorist crimes as opposed to catching criminals, is highlighted as well as more examples of inter-agency communication problems.
Although not a great read - the last 60-80 pages are rushed and somewhat jumbled and some may find the writing style glib, (think of Bob Woodward with a few extra cups of coffee in his system), this is still a good book with some valuable insight. The description of President Bush's relationships with both VP Cheney and George Tenent are food for thought as well as this eerie quote from Donald Rumsfeld - "Every CIA success is a DoD failure.".
November 28, 2016
This book is on the bestsellers list. It's a great look into the methods that the U.S. used to snag terrorists and get information from them to catch more. You may remember various terror alerts throughout the years, like the one issued for the New York subway system. This book gives you the behind-the-scenes of why those alerts were issued and what information they were based on.
The "one percent doctrine" was crafted by Dick Cheney. Essentially, if there's a 1% chance that something will happen then the White House treats it as an absolute certainty. This has led the U.S. on many wild goose chases, and a 1% chance that maybe someone in Iraq met with someone in Al Qaeda helped lead us into our Iraq war.
This book is definitely to be watched with The Dark Side. That show gives you names and faces of the CIA operatives in this book who have since left the agency disgruntled. It also shows you how Cheney and others really beat the drum of Iraq long before 9/11. I also recommend reading it with Bush at War by Bob Woodward. Suskind leaves out much of the details of war in Afghanistan since Woodward had already covered them so well.
The "one percent doctrine" was crafted by Dick Cheney. Essentially, if there's a 1% chance that something will happen then the White House treats it as an absolute certainty. This has led the U.S. on many wild goose chases, and a 1% chance that maybe someone in Iraq met with someone in Al Qaeda helped lead us into our Iraq war.
This book is definitely to be watched with The Dark Side. That show gives you names and faces of the CIA operatives in this book who have since left the agency disgruntled. It also shows you how Cheney and others really beat the drum of Iraq long before 9/11. I also recommend reading it with Bush at War by Bob Woodward. Suskind leaves out much of the details of war in Afghanistan since Woodward had already covered them so well.
October 6, 2012
A detailed and extensive look at the frantic, desperate "war on terror" after 911. The extent of the inaccuracy of our intelligence gathering, and the lengths we went to attain it--the introduction of rendition, spending incredible resources on what should have been obviously sketchy intelligence tortured out of prisoners willing to say anything--is more than disturbing.
Cheney's "one percent doctrine--the idea that if there's even a one percent chance that intelligence is correct, we should act on it--was responsible for a war, compromising our civil liberties beyond anything we've seen before, and an increase in unilateral presidential powers that changed the entire country for the worse. After all, how can you truly determine what a "one percent risk" means? There's no way to quantify it, so that one percent is essentially whatever Cheney, The FBI and the CIA say it is. Cheney may have had more influence and power over the presidency than anyone else in history outside of Henry Kissinger. And we're still paying for it.
Cheney's "one percent doctrine--the idea that if there's even a one percent chance that intelligence is correct, we should act on it--was responsible for a war, compromising our civil liberties beyond anything we've seen before, and an increase in unilateral presidential powers that changed the entire country for the worse. After all, how can you truly determine what a "one percent risk" means? There's no way to quantify it, so that one percent is essentially whatever Cheney, The FBI and the CIA say it is. Cheney may have had more influence and power over the presidency than anyone else in history outside of Henry Kissinger. And we're still paying for it.
May 21, 2008
Wonder why our government ignored it's own intelligence analysis about weapons of mass destruction in our rush to war in Iraq? This brilliantly reported book lays out in clear, convincing detail the complete transition of the Bush administration to one that relied less on evidential analysis to one of pure, gut reaction and instinct. The "one percent doctrine" was simply this: if there was a one percent chance of the U.S. being attacked, the proper response was to act immediately, regardless of what the intelligence or evidence showed. This simplistic approach to a post-9/11 world provided a framework that ultimately led to the hasty, poorly thought-out invasion of Iraq, the use of torture, the disregard for human and civil rights, and an arrogance that has destabilized our country far more than pre-9/11 days. A sobering work about the foolishness, and yes, crimes of the Bush administration.
October 29, 2007
Ron Suskind's work is consistently informative and engrossing. He made the Secretary of the Treasury a fascinating character in The Price of Loyalty. In The One Percent doctrine he continues his expose of the Bush administration, this time with a scathing look at how the US government goes about waging a war on terrorism. Much of the book puts sources and proof to things we've already heard about on CNN or read about in the New York Times. What's stunning about Suskind's work - and his skill as a writer - is the way he puts forth the information in an easy-to-read yet fascinating text that clearly exposes what countless newspaper articles have so far failed to expose: that the system of US foreign policy is broken.
NC
NC
April 29, 2007
Really awesome book. The author has dozens of sources within the Bush administration, FBI, and CIA, and chronicles the "War on Terror" from its inception to the building of a case for war with Iraq. Really interesting information on what the CIA, NSA, and FBI actually do to fight terrorism, and how they came to do. Also exposes the sham Iraq war intelligence for what it was and how it was politically motivated from start to finish. Written like a novel, its a great look at the (flawed) leadership style of the president and the lives of the people who actually fight the war on terror and receive no acknowledgement.
February 20, 2008
Brilliant. One of the best I've ever read. When the CIA isn't being pressed to produce intelligence on erroneous foregone conclusions (WMD in Iraq) or play political football (with 16 words in a State of the Union address), they're doing some amazing things across the world. With remarkable details, Suskind describes sting operations, finance tracking webs, and heads-of-state collaboration between countries and agencies. He convincingly heralds George Tenet on the latter; I'm interested now to read his memoir, just published last year.
August 11, 2010
Had to read this because it was referred to in another book. I'm glad to see it was a national bestseller. Hope everybody who bought it, read it. Well done! The Bush administration put us in a hole that will take generations to climb out of. Did they not think the story would come out - ever? Well, they got away with it while they needed to - and the way they did it needs to be exposed. They were lucky the public was satisfied with being in the dark, and so busy with their lives they didn't care, or couldn't take the time to pay attention to what was going on in our names.
February 8, 2013
This book tells the inside story of the war on Terrorists. I found it both shocking and spell-binding. Suskind makes a compelling case that former CIA director,George Tenet, is a genuine hero and not the villain, usually portrayed. The powerful influence of Vice-President Cheney on Bush white house policies is essentially the theme of the book. President Bush distains advice from anyone other than his inside circle. Numerous experts quit in disgust.
I recommend that you read this book. Ralph Hermansen
I recommend that you read this book. Ralph Hermansen
June 29, 2014
I've always known that George W. Bush was likely our most stupid president, but seeing it writ large like this is still shocking. To read, even this many years later, how little interest he took in running the country, how easily swayed he was by the people around him and how poor his judgment was is astonishing. But more horrifying, and so timely now, is the parade of charlatans around him who led the country into an unnecessary war, who financially broke the country, and who are trying to take us back there. A must read.
April 2, 2020
This book is not so much an eye opener, as for most of the world it was always clear that the 11th September attacks were just used as a pretext to prosecute a war against Iraq that was never justified by the events. However it was a clear vindication of all that many many people were saying, based on testimony from some very well placed sources. As such this was a good piece of journalism in book form.
From the opening pages it was clear that Suskind was going to take no prisoners. He tells us that Bush was never much of a reader (despite the efforts to project an image that he was), and that he based his decisions on gut reactions based on face to face meetings.
The genius of Suskind is that he writes in a way that shows he is not just twisting a knife in the dying corpse of a discredited administration. In fact he makes a good case for Bush's strengths in his use of gut feeling - something that served him well over the years. Yes, the author is fairly clear that Cheney was really pulling the strings in the US administration (with the help of Rumsfeld et al.), but we see Bush fighting to assert his own authority, and his strengths and weaknesses laid bare.
The result is, of course, a fairly damning indictment on men who followed an obsession against the evidence, leading America into what we can all now see to be the biggest American foreign policy disaster ever. Nevertheless it is written in a way that is not anti American. It is well informed, compassionate and articulately written.
My biggest problem with the book though was the slightly piecemeal way it is laid out. The timeline jumps forward and back a little. As this is essentially a narrative history based on primary sources, I would have liked it to be laid out in a slightly more logical and chronological order. But that is not a reason not to read this book. In fact this book or something like it should be used in all future courses on American history!
From the opening pages it was clear that Suskind was going to take no prisoners. He tells us that Bush was never much of a reader (despite the efforts to project an image that he was), and that he based his decisions on gut reactions based on face to face meetings.
The genius of Suskind is that he writes in a way that shows he is not just twisting a knife in the dying corpse of a discredited administration. In fact he makes a good case for Bush's strengths in his use of gut feeling - something that served him well over the years. Yes, the author is fairly clear that Cheney was really pulling the strings in the US administration (with the help of Rumsfeld et al.), but we see Bush fighting to assert his own authority, and his strengths and weaknesses laid bare.
The result is, of course, a fairly damning indictment on men who followed an obsession against the evidence, leading America into what we can all now see to be the biggest American foreign policy disaster ever. Nevertheless it is written in a way that is not anti American. It is well informed, compassionate and articulately written.
My biggest problem with the book though was the slightly piecemeal way it is laid out. The timeline jumps forward and back a little. As this is essentially a narrative history based on primary sources, I would have liked it to be laid out in a slightly more logical and chronological order. But that is not a reason not to read this book. In fact this book or something like it should be used in all future courses on American history!
September 11, 2021
In this detailed polemic against the Bush-Cheney administration's response to al Qaeda's September 11th attacks against the United States, Ron Suskind meticulously points out the differences between fact and political bluster that led to our invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America's Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11 describes how dedicated public servants were placed in impossible positions of needing to supply nonexistent evidence of a connection between suspects and threats. According to Suskind, this was then used on multiple occasions to justify actions that did little but serve as a recruitment tool for jihadists in the Middle East.
I closed this book with a disappointing belief that the leaders we Americans entrusted with extraordinary powers then used them to advance personal vendettas, and twenty years later, left us with little confidence in the federal government. This distrust is revealed in the divided politics we see today on the news and the lack of common values which brought our nation together. I grieve for the integrity and common defense lost in the decades we had available to reignite the beacon of American democracy.
I closed this book with a disappointing belief that the leaders we Americans entrusted with extraordinary powers then used them to advance personal vendettas, and twenty years later, left us with little confidence in the federal government. This distrust is revealed in the divided politics we see today on the news and the lack of common values which brought our nation together. I grieve for the integrity and common defense lost in the decades we had available to reignite the beacon of American democracy.
September 6, 2019
I thought this book offered a pretty insightful (although by now a little dated) look into the War on Terror after 9/11. Specifically, the title refers to Dick Cheney's (Darth Vader's) evil notion that if there's even a 1% chance that an organization has the ability to attack the United States, we need to act as if that attack were a certainty. In effect, this policy gave the government carte blanche to do whatever it wanted to (imprison indefinitely without trial, kidnap, torture, etc) to whomever it wanted to, just on the suspicion of a terrorist attack. Now imagine applying this idea in the real world - if there's a 1% chance you have cancer, we're going to give you chemotherapy. If there's a 1% chance your plane will crash, we'll ground your flight, and on and on. That's how utterly STUPID Dick Cheney's position was, yet it became the de facto basis of a lot of the United States' foreign policy after 9/11. This policy also had the effect of doing away with the need for any analysis or fact checking, since if there was even a 1% chance it was right, treat it like it was right! So Cheney, with one slight-of-hand statement, shifted the emphasis from analysis and acting on the basis of facts, to acting on the smallest sliver of suspicion. And then you wonder why our foreign policy is so screwed-up .......
December 9, 2023
The quality of the reporting is really high - Suskind is clearly connected. Having read a lot about this topic, I found this book to be refreshing in that it told some stories and mentioned some characters I hadn’t previously read much about. It also raises some interesting questions, many of which hold up as being thought-provoking almost 20 years after this was published.
But the writing style is quite jarring. It often feels like you’re being lectured at. And I’m not sure this book is “about” anything in particular rather than just being a collection of events told mostly in chronological order. As a magazine piece it would’ve worked quite well, but there was no clear hook to this book for me. Also I’m anti repeatedly plugging other books you’ve written within the text of a different book. Don’t do that.
But the writing style is quite jarring. It often feels like you’re being lectured at. And I’m not sure this book is “about” anything in particular rather than just being a collection of events told mostly in chronological order. As a magazine piece it would’ve worked quite well, but there was no clear hook to this book for me. Also I’m anti repeatedly plugging other books you’ve written within the text of a different book. Don’t do that.
November 25, 2025
A primary source narration of post-9/11 foreign policy-making by the George W. Bush administration. Suskind portrays Bush as being disinterested in the process of making policy and asserts that he delegated strategic thinking and operational details to VP Dick Cheney. It was Cheney who developed the titular “one percent doctrine,” that no more than a one percent certitude is needed to target a terrorist suspect. Cheney’s concern was a “low-probability, high-impact” event. Suskind argues that Bush pressured his intelligence staff to find (conjure) evidence to support his War on Terror goals. This pressure from politicians was an acute problem for the intelligence community, even resulting in the suicide of a high-ranking FBI official. Suskind argues that a U.S. invasion of Iraq was inevitable considering the neo-con influence in the Bush administration, even without 9/11.
October 30, 2019
Inside look at the beginning of the new age. Desperate times call for desperate measures, or so it is said; in this case, extreme times call for extreme measures. What happens when the players write to the rules to the game of finding and not fighting enemies? Ideology grabs hold of the pen. A must read for anyone interested in understanding those crucial days after 9/11. We lived history in HD. This book captures the effort of the invisibles, those who toil to maintain the measure of peace we are mostly afforded, and records the actions, or lack thereof, of the neocons who unleashed the doctrine that brought us the nightmares of Iraq, Syria and likely more to come. Fully completely compelling.
December 15, 2019
I thought that this book would have been a better read. I find it not as compelling as other books on the 9/11 saga.
I think the author spends too much time on the same theme. We know Bush and his team. We now further understand the inner workings of the relationships, however, the book does not go deep enough in highlighting the flaws. For example, the clear excuse to invade Iraq only for Blackwater to take control of great swathes of the country. We should try to understand the economic decisions in this invasion, however, the author seems to have missed out on some important data on this issue.
Books like the Looming Tower and Black Flags are a bit more intense and give flavour to the politics in play.
I think the author spends too much time on the same theme. We know Bush and his team. We now further understand the inner workings of the relationships, however, the book does not go deep enough in highlighting the flaws. For example, the clear excuse to invade Iraq only for Blackwater to take control of great swathes of the country. We should try to understand the economic decisions in this invasion, however, the author seems to have missed out on some important data on this issue.
Books like the Looming Tower and Black Flags are a bit more intense and give flavour to the politics in play.
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