Balibar presents this small book as it were simply an introductory exegesis of Marx’s work. In fact, it offers a very original interpretation of Marx’s philosophy. Balibar’s writing is so admirably clear that the complexity of the book’s interpretive argument almost catches the reader off guard. For Balibar, Marx is a thinker frequently switching back and forth from anti-philosophy to philosophy and in so doing arriving at a meta-critique of philosophy that changed the western tradition forever. This project, Balibar argues, ultimately results in a philosophical model of the materiality of time.
At the end of the book, Balibar identifies three main paths one can take to understand the flow of Marx’s thought. The first is a critique of the western tradition that oscillates between a flat out rejection of the tradition in the Thesis on Feurerbach to a more nuanced balance between theory and action in The German Ideology, in which philosophy is, perhaps unintentionally, reimbraced.
Marx was at his most anti-philosophical, perhaps predictably, upon immediately turning away from philosophical academia. The Thesis on Feuerbach proclaims that philosophy is a pointless attempt to describe the world as if it were a static thing. Marx makes the (dangerously philosophical) point that the world is ever-changing, so the attempt to describe reality is a pointless celebration of individualistic interpretations of the world. The point, of course, is to change the world and this can only be done through political praxis. This is, Balibar contends, Marx, the former scholar of pre-Socratic Greek thought, forbidding himself from ever “regressing” to the practice of philosophy.
Was the Marx of the Thesis, then, proclaiming that there could only be The Revolution- monolithic and uninterpretable- and silence? (Balibar’s phrasing seems designed to invite comparisons between this early work by Marx and Wittgenstein’s equally anti-philosophical Tractatus.) Whether or not the young Marx was thinking this way, Balibar contends, he fortunately soon changed his mind. In Marx’s subsequent writings, reality is not shaped by a Revolutionary Transformation, but rather a constant multitude of little transformations, all transforming each other.
Balibar makes the striking claim that Marx was not at any point in his career a materialist in the sense that the term has been used in the history of western philosophy. The tradition known as “materialism” simply claims that meaning is inspired by matter. This is, of course, an interpretation of the world. Materialism, as historically understood, was just another form of dreamy, foppish idealism.
The term “materialism” was, nonetheless, the term Marx chose, perhaps clumsily, for his inversion of idealism. If “old materialism” had been a disguised idealism, then perhaps post-Kantian idealism disguised another impulse. For Kant and his disciples, universal categories have two sides; representation and subjectivity. Indeed, for Kant, representation, a type of interpretation, is constituted by subjectivity. In other words, stressed Marx, for post-Kantian thought, the world is actively constituted by subjectivity(ies) that can then recreate that world. This is, Balibar contends, in no way a carrying on of the tradition known as materialism, but the germ of a whole new concept of philosophy.
In Balibar’s narrative, the next evolution in Marx’s thought came as a response to a criticism by rival radical Max Stirner. Stirner critiqued the “proletarian revolution” that Marx dreamed of as just another abstract universal, such as humanism or Christ, that would ultimately oppress the creative power of the individual. Deeply offended, Marx responded with “The German Ideology”. As vehemently as he had renounced philosophy in the Thesis, Balibar contends, Marx was already reverting to it with this new work. Indeed, at the heart of this work was a turn back to the ancient Greeks who distinguished “praxis”, the attempts of the master class to be the most perfect citizens and individual they could be, from “poiesis”, the attempts by slaves, the working class of the ancient world, to perfect the creation of items of utility. Praxis was made possible by “theoria” the detached contemplation that led the thinker to the Ideal.
It is at this point in Marx’s thinking that the first “path” through Marx’s thought identified by Balibar spins off into the second, a path that begins with a critique of of the classical, meaning bestowing subject of western thought and proceeds to two competing theories of the constitution of subjectivity. Marx argues, according to Balibar, that in the post-Kantian thought-world praxis and poiesis had been subtly merged together. Subjectivity perfects its own representation through social action or practice. To put it in terminology that is more immediately recognizable as Marxist, history is the process by which humanity produces its own means of existence which in turn transforms humanity and nature itself. What the ancient Greeks defined as theoria, individualistic, detached contemplation, Marx reimagined as the collective production of consciousness in a given society, or that society’s ideology. Ideology is produced by society, but itself also produces the ideas through which members of a society collectively understand a reality. Social change didn’t thwart the creative ambitions of the individual, as Stirner proposed, but rather the individual was a byproduct of social change and the current dominant ideology.
The fact remained for Marx, however, that successive social regimes, from the slave societies of the ancient world to the nascent European capitalism of his time, had maintained the distinction between praxis and poesis- intellectual and physical labor. Marx’s notion that under communism there would be no such division of labor is often dismissed as one of his most utopian fantasies. But, Balibar insists, the annihilation of the distinction between physical and intellectual labor is central to Marx’s thinking. This division, in Marx’s mind, divided all people from themselves, both the oppressed workers and the reified capitalists of his time.
In the proletariat, Marx saw a social group so utterly deprived of all status and essence that they might be able to potentially absorb all essence. For Marx, writes Balibar, the proletariat was not really a class at all. It had been too disenfranchised by capitalism to have any class-interest of its own, and therefore any consciousness shaped by that narrow interest. These were humans so devoid of values that they might, ironically, be the first people in history of realizing genuinely universal values, not class interests but mass interests.
The failed revolutions of 1848 greatly shook and disappointed Marx. He felt that the proletariat had allowed itself to be led astray and had abandoned their historic goal… for now. In the 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Marx was forced to admit that the economic realities of the working class created class unity but also competition between workers for resources. He had to rethink his notions about the proletariat being a “universal class” because they were not really a class at all. As a result, he also had to reexamine his theory of ideology.
Marx set about trying in his philosophical work to redefine social objectivity. At least since Kant, western philosophy has not accepted any theories of objectivity that did not also offer a theory of subjectivity. Marx therefore had to redefine one to redefine the other. For both Kant and Hegel, the subjective constitution of the world remains central, even if the latter complicated things a bit with his notion of the historical evolution of subjective consciousness. In Marx’s later writings, by contrast, it is fetishism that constitutes the social world. Reality was constituted by relations of exchange. With this, Balibar writes, the last vestiges of the transcendental subject were purged from Marx’s thought. If the ideologically defined subject was a byproduct of society, rather than the other way around, this subject was still born of ideas. Rather, according to Marx’s new theory of fetishism, the subject was simply the result of the objects of production and the norms of behavior that went into using them.
By the time he wrote Capital, Volume 1, the center of the social world for Marx was not humanity at all, but the commodity, the eternally exchangeable object. Subjectivity was founded in relation to this object and was itself exchangeable. Ideology had been a theory of the constitution of the state’s power, in which the separation of mental and physical labor alienated humanity from itself in the name of a grand, fake idea such as God, Right or Nation. Fetishism, by contrast, was a theory of subjection to the market in which productive human activity was alienated from itself via its subordination to the reproduction of exchange value. Everything and everyone becomes an exchangeable, and thus replaceable, commodity.
Marx’s competing theories of ideology and fetishism had at least one important factor in common. In both theories the state seeks to extract itself from time. If there was change and historical evolution, the capitalist state assures us, it took place in the past and is now at an end. Fukiyama was utterly unoriginal in declaring the end of history. Bourgeois theorists of capitalism have always done so, since the most nascent days of capitalism. It is Marx’s breaking with such thought that will eventually inform Balibar’s thesis that Marx’s ultimate project was, intentionally or not, to provide a model for the materiality of time. This also brings us to Balibar’s third great path through Marx: one that starts from a radical theory of causality and proceeds to a dialectic of temporality in which historical forces create a multitude of times.
Capital was, Balibar reminds us, written in the aftermath of both the revolutionary disappointments of 1848 and the Paris Commune of 1871. The book is, Balibar believes, more of a critique of notions of progress than a work of positivist progressivism. Indeed, if there is an idea that Capital embraces, rather than critiques, it is not progress but process as a logical (in that it concerns the irreconcilability of contradiction) and political (in that it bases it’s analysis on the real conditions of the labor struggle) concept.
The fact that the proletariat was able to collectively resist commodification on any level fascinated Marx. As labor power is continuously transformed into a commodity, a capitalist collective subject to capitalist time, the process of such transformation leaves a residue, an unintended remainder: it creates a proletarian collective subject to proletarian time. In his late thought, instead of proposing a temporal totality, such as “progress”, Marx thought reality could only be understood by studying problems of forces acting on each other in the present. And this present is itself constantly transforming in ways determined not by consciousness but by the process of production.
Capitalism being necessarily transformative, it is necessarily true that society will evolve in the future and revolutionary practice will evolve along with it. Perhaps a socialist practice will develop in the future that is far more potent than were those that Marx lived to see. The only constant that Balibar’s Marx saw in historical time was that it was always non-contemporaneous with itself. Rather, it was always transforming and in doing so creating new means for its own transformation. The future always presents a multiplicity of paths of development because within any one epoch there are always a multiplicity of times at work, as capitalist time engenders proletarian time and so forth. But the path that will be historically taken is contingent and provisional on contingency.
To support his interpretation of Marx’s late thought as more concerned with process than mechanical progress, Balibar points to a letter Marx wrote late in life to the then leaders of the nascent Russian socialist movement. These leaders then believed that the traditional communal farming communities that characterized Russian society would have to be abolished along with all vestiges of feudalism so that capitalism could wholly take hold in Russia before any move towards socialism could begin. Marx rejected this notion, and specifically wrote to the Russians that historical development as he had outlined it in his work was a tendency, not an absolute law. Indeed, Marx advised his Russian followers to embrace the peasants’ collective communities and that perhaps in the strange case of Russia, aspects of feudal life could lead to a more natural transition to socialism and ultimately communism.
After the fall of the Paris Commune, old Marx understood once and for all that he would not live to see a successful proletarian revolution. His work would never be complete, his thought would be one that would never reach an absolute conclusion. In the Critique of the Gotha Program, Marx famously made his distinction between socialism and communism. Balibar understands socialism, the transitional stage between capitalism and communism, not as a type of state, as it has historically been understood, Rather, for Balibar, socialism designates the temporal space between (Marx’s? Our?) present and a future in which revolutionary politics, seemingly a lost cause in the years after the Commune (much like our own time) could return.
This work of Balibar’s was written in the early 1990s, when the fall of the Soviet Union was still a recent development and the joyous cries of capitalist triumphalism were everywhere and deafening. Like in the years after the fall of the Paris Commune, revolutionary victory, or even progressive reform, felt very far away, even historically impossible. Writing this book was I think a way for Balibar to imagine even that historical time as a socialist one- that is one between a terrible present and a potential future where thoughts of revolution could again be uttered.