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The Great Global Transformation: The United States, China, and the Remaking of the World Economic Order
Global neoliberalism is on its last legs, as a new international economic order takes trade blocs, tariff wars, economic sanctions, and national champions are in; nationalism, anti-immigration movements, and the far-right are on the rise. Liberalism is being rejected by the civic realm, as the status quo of the past fifty years crumbles. What remains in its wake?
Drawing on original research, leading economist Branko Milanovic reveals the seismic shifts that are shaping our world. He details the how the rising economic power of Asia is creating a new global ‘middle class’ – in the greatest reshuffle of incomes since the Industrial Revolution. He explores our why are we becoming increasingly unhappy, when the world is becoming richer and more equal? And he shows us the fight as plutocracy returns, global war threatens, and a new system silently shapes our nations, driving malcontent to breaking point. In National Market Liberalism, Milanovic provides an invaluable guide to the new 21st century.
Drawing on original research, leading economist Branko Milanovic reveals the seismic shifts that are shaping our world. He details the how the rising economic power of Asia is creating a new global ‘middle class’ – in the greatest reshuffle of incomes since the Industrial Revolution. He explores our why are we becoming increasingly unhappy, when the world is becoming richer and more equal? And he shows us the fight as plutocracy returns, global war threatens, and a new system silently shapes our nations, driving malcontent to breaking point. In National Market Liberalism, Milanovic provides an invaluable guide to the new 21st century.
280 pages, Hardcover
Published March 23, 2026
About the author
Branko Milanović
26 books269 followersBranko Milanović (Serbian Cyrillic: Бранко Милановић, IPA: [brǎːŋko mǐlanoʋitɕ; milǎːn-]) is a Serbian-American economist. He is most known for his work on income distribution and inequality. Since January 2014, he is a visiting presidential professor at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York and an affiliated senior scholar at the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). He also teaches at the London School of Economics and the Barcelona Institute for International Studies. In 2019 he has been appointed the honorary Maddison Chair at the University of Groningen.
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Displaying 1 - 15 of 15 reviews
March 14, 2026
Ok, so this blew my mind a little 🤯
First of: Liberal friends, the crisis of the rules-based order is structural, not moral. The order is not collapsing because actors stopped respecting rules but because power distribution changed and the rules reflected the old distribution.
So, "The Great Global Transformation. National Market Liberalism in a Multipolar World (2025) by Branko Milanovic 😻 Already my book of 2026.
Marxist political economy meets geopolitics meets political philosophy to bring about a theory and history of the current state of affairs which at least for me brought together elements and trends I wasn't able to think together in terms of forming a coherent whole historical process.
Big picture:
The book tries to explain the historical shift from global neoliberalism (1980–2016) to a new emerging order Branko calls national market liberalism.
Two structural forces drive this transformation:
1. The rise of Asia, especially China
2. The political backlash against domestic elites enriched by globalization
Global neoliberalism collapsed not because it failed but because it succeeded too well: it enriched Western elites and lifted Asia to global economic parity.
Thus, domestic inequality and global power redistribution are two sides of the same process. The rise of China and the rise of populism stem from the same historical shift.
Five or so few main theses and concepts:
#1 National market liberalism, where markets remain dominant but globalization becomes subordinated to national power politics.
Global neoliberalism kept markets liberal and international. National market liberalism keeps markets liberal but nationalizes globalization.
Neoliberalism minus internationalism produces national market liberalism. The ideological shift is not toward socialism or fascism but toward market economies embedded in nationalist geopolitics.
#2 The counter-revolution
The political backlash against the neoliberal era:
Trump in the US
Xi in China
Putin in Russia
European right-wing populist parties
Despite ideological differences they share a similar objective: limit the power of the globally integrated elite.
• Trump attacking “coastal elites”
• Xi strengthening party control and anti-corruption campaigns
• Putin targeting oligarchic networks and state corruption
These leaders are often seen as unrelated phenomena but represent different national expressions of the same structural reaction.
The conflict is not primarily between democracies and autocracies but between global elites and national political coalitions.
#3 Global class shifts and the middle class 🤯
One of the most powerful sections of the book. Major redistribution of global income over the past 40 years.
Key stats
• China’s share of global output rose from 2% in 1974 to 22% in 2022
• China surpassed the US in PPP GDP in 2015
• average Chinese income growth 8.1% per capita annually (1978–2022)
• the First World share of global output fell from 62% to 44%
Asia’s rise restores the global economic balance that existed before the Industrial Revolution.
Western middle class position
In 1988: US income deciles ranged roughly from the 74th to 100th global percentile
By 2018: Western middle classes occupy much lower positions in the global income distribution
Practical implication
Goods that once felt universally affordable within rich countries become luxury goods again.
The Western middle class is not necessarily getting poorer domestically but losing its relative position globally.
Relative decline, not absolute poverty, drives political anger.
Let this sit and sink in.
#4 Link to the rise of the far right
The populist right becomes the main political vehicle for this backlash.
Base of support
• people excluded from global elite networks
• regions deindustrialized by globalization
• voters resentful of educated cosmopolitan elites
Mechanism
Globalization → elite enrichment → stagnating middle classes → political resentment → populist mobilization
Geopolitical rivalry is partly a domestic political strategy. Anti-China policy is not just foreign policy but a tool to restore domestic legitimacy.
#5 The new global order
The emerging system is multipolar national capitalism. Key features:
• several competing power centers
• different domestic political systems
• declining belief that liberal democracy is the universal model
• economic fragmentation into blocs
Globalization does not disappear but becomes strategic and politicized. The world is not deglobalizing but re-globalizing along geopolitical lines.
The real break with the past is the end of the belief that globalization and liberal democracy inevitably spread together.
# 6 Fascism
Many liberal (and progressive) commentators describe Trumpism as fascism. Milanovic rejects this. Fascism historically combined nationalism with state control over the economy and social mobilization of the masses (I think this overly and superficially focuses on 20th century Euro fascisms and misses other key features).
Trumpism does not abolish markets or capitalism. It remains committed to market liberalism domestically. Instead it replaces global neoliberalism with national market liberalism (tariffs and trade wars, sanctions as economic policy, industrial policy, immigration restrictions, explicit nationalism, etc).
Not sure this is strong enough an argument against the clearly proto fascist elements (eg the role of ICE etc) within Trumpism. Will come back to this. It's not the main point in Branko's book so will let it go for now.
Anyway. What a grand read 😻👯♀️, coming at the very right time as I feel fairly lost, geopolitically speaking.
May 10, 2026
This book by Serbian-American economist Branko Milanovic is the most acute analysis I have read on the vaccuum created by the end of the global neoliberal era and the demise of a unipolar world under a once benign American hegemon.
Milanovic's title 'The Great Global Transformation' echoes that of a similarly epochal book: ‘The Great Transformation', by Hungarian political economist Karl Polanyi, appeared just towards the end of World War II in 1944, the same year that Hayek's 'Road to Serfdom' was published.
Directly contradicting the highly influential Hayek (Thatcher's inspiration), Polanyi's book was prescient in its warning of the destructive nature of the self-regulating market economy, which he saw as a state-imposed transformation that would have devastating social and environmental costs.
Writing 80 years onward, Milanovic looks at the wreckage wrought by neoliberalism and what might come next, a glimpse of which we are already seeing in the second Trump administration's return to 19th century power politics and a multipolar world.
Milanovic cites two factors as bringing to an end the US-led post-Cold War neoliberal era - first, China's 1999 entry to the World Trade Organisation, which challenged Western supremacy, and, second, the 2008 global financial crisis which delegitimised the elites created by globalisation.
In the inevitable backlash, epitomised by Trump and a global trend toward populism and nationalism, we see a new politics - not of leftist revolt or a resurgence of post-war social democracy - but of national market liberalism in a multipolar world.
"The rise of China has created geopolitical tensions because the global neoliberal order is hierarchically structured and cannot easily accept a country as big and potentially powerful as China," Milanovic writes. "This has led to the reversal of globalization."
"But the rise of Asia has also displaced many people in the ‘political West’ from their global income positions, reinforced the gap between the educated well-to-do and the rest of the population within Western countries, and created a state of incipient political unrest."
Traditional media does not really get how big a transformation China on its own has made to the world we lived in during the 1980s and 1990s. For example, China produced just 2% of global output in 1974. By 2022, this had exploded to 22%. As a result, China is now the world's biggest economy, adjusted for exchange rates, and is outpacing the US on just about every measure, including AI and the energy transition.
In the meantime, the Western middle classes, who enjoyed all the benefits of industrialisation for more than a century and a half, are now in rapid relative decline. And this convergence between the old West and the rest is why we are seeing populist parties of the right so ascendant.
Quoting the work of early 20th century economist Joseph Schumpeter (who coined the term 'creative destruction'), Milanovic questions the standard claim in economics that 'free trade' necessarily lowers the possibility of global conflict.
The classical 18th century Adam Smith economic view in which small traders compete in a crowded market has been replaced by a world of monopoly capital. The Googles, Amazons and Apples export capital to China and other former third world countries, while seeking to control cheap labour and resources there. But in doing so they run into conflict with other monopolised national capitalism (like China's state-owned enterprises).
The result is intense imperialist competition, a grab for land and resources (Putin in Ukraine, Xi in Taiwan, Trump in Venezuela), a breakdown of international law and the rising possibility of geopolitical military conflict as we seeing now. Meanwhile, western elites and political leaders have soured on globalisation under pressure from middle class voters who no longer see how they gain from the system.
This explains Trump's Liberation Day tariffs and the 'Make America Great Again' movement. It explains why the US is going it alone and leaving its European allies to themselves to deal with Putin's aggression in Ukraine. And it explains why the populist revolt against 'the elites' has been confined so far to a backlash against globalisation and cosmopolitanism. The super rich, meanwhile, aren't ready to give up their bounty just yet, so are using culture wars and nationalism, built on crude racial resentment, to suck the state dry.
"There were two possible responses to the ‘China challenge’ to the Western middle classes," Milanovic writes. "One was to change the rules of globalisation so that it no longer hollows out Western middle classes; the other was to improve the income position of the middle by taxing more the domestic rich and redistributing income from the top to the middle."
Trump decided on the first option. A trade war with China was the easier road because this kept corporate donors on his team, while tempting the disgruntled MAGA lower middle class who represent his base with the illusory carrot of getting back their old rustbelt jobs "stolen" by China.
The result of all this is that 'liberal democracies' no longer believe in the Rawlsian definition of liberalism. Commitments to social justice, the rule of law, and freedom of expression/identity have been abandoned, as have free trade and open migration. The 'end of history' theory, propounded by theorist Francis Fukyama in 1989, has been shown to be hopelessly naive and simplistic. Instead we see a range of systems such as Hungary's illiberal democracy or China's authoritarian capitalist state as viable alternatives to globalised liberal democracy.. As Milanovic observes, we have entered the period of the struggle for multipolarity.
As to what replaces the old concept of neoliberalism in a unipolar world, Milanovic cites 'national market liberalism' and multipolarity. Trump, Putin and Xi each benefited from the old system but now they use the rebellion against the elites that globalism created to cement their power in their own hemipsheres, while the US and Europe focus on neoliberalism at home.
"Global neoliberal hegemony may be terminally weakened, but the ideological hegemony of neoliberalism, especially in the economic sphere domestically, may be preserved," he writes.
What is gone in the new multipolar world is the formerly unchallenged dominance of the 'Washington Consensus' of free trade, budget austerity, private outsourcing, deregulation and privatisation. In its place are tariff wars, sanctions, trade blocs, governments 'investing' in companies like Intel, immigration curbs, and nationalist and chauvinist culture wars.
What remains of the old order in national market liberalism is low taxation of high incomes and inheritances, tax preferences given to income from capital over income from labour, more deregulation, more limits on state spending and increasing attacks on culture war fronts like multiculturalism, affirmative action, access to safe abortion, and gender fluidity.
It is a deeply cynical, selfish and retrograde development in world history, one that if one reads Milanovic's arguments closely, is likely to end very badly indeed.
Milanovic's title 'The Great Global Transformation' echoes that of a similarly epochal book: ‘The Great Transformation', by Hungarian political economist Karl Polanyi, appeared just towards the end of World War II in 1944, the same year that Hayek's 'Road to Serfdom' was published.
Directly contradicting the highly influential Hayek (Thatcher's inspiration), Polanyi's book was prescient in its warning of the destructive nature of the self-regulating market economy, which he saw as a state-imposed transformation that would have devastating social and environmental costs.
Writing 80 years onward, Milanovic looks at the wreckage wrought by neoliberalism and what might come next, a glimpse of which we are already seeing in the second Trump administration's return to 19th century power politics and a multipolar world.
Milanovic cites two factors as bringing to an end the US-led post-Cold War neoliberal era - first, China's 1999 entry to the World Trade Organisation, which challenged Western supremacy, and, second, the 2008 global financial crisis which delegitimised the elites created by globalisation.
In the inevitable backlash, epitomised by Trump and a global trend toward populism and nationalism, we see a new politics - not of leftist revolt or a resurgence of post-war social democracy - but of national market liberalism in a multipolar world.
"The rise of China has created geopolitical tensions because the global neoliberal order is hierarchically structured and cannot easily accept a country as big and potentially powerful as China," Milanovic writes. "This has led to the reversal of globalization."
"But the rise of Asia has also displaced many people in the ‘political West’ from their global income positions, reinforced the gap between the educated well-to-do and the rest of the population within Western countries, and created a state of incipient political unrest."
Traditional media does not really get how big a transformation China on its own has made to the world we lived in during the 1980s and 1990s. For example, China produced just 2% of global output in 1974. By 2022, this had exploded to 22%. As a result, China is now the world's biggest economy, adjusted for exchange rates, and is outpacing the US on just about every measure, including AI and the energy transition.
In the meantime, the Western middle classes, who enjoyed all the benefits of industrialisation for more than a century and a half, are now in rapid relative decline. And this convergence between the old West and the rest is why we are seeing populist parties of the right so ascendant.
Quoting the work of early 20th century economist Joseph Schumpeter (who coined the term 'creative destruction'), Milanovic questions the standard claim in economics that 'free trade' necessarily lowers the possibility of global conflict.
The classical 18th century Adam Smith economic view in which small traders compete in a crowded market has been replaced by a world of monopoly capital. The Googles, Amazons and Apples export capital to China and other former third world countries, while seeking to control cheap labour and resources there. But in doing so they run into conflict with other monopolised national capitalism (like China's state-owned enterprises).
The result is intense imperialist competition, a grab for land and resources (Putin in Ukraine, Xi in Taiwan, Trump in Venezuela), a breakdown of international law and the rising possibility of geopolitical military conflict as we seeing now. Meanwhile, western elites and political leaders have soured on globalisation under pressure from middle class voters who no longer see how they gain from the system.
This explains Trump's Liberation Day tariffs and the 'Make America Great Again' movement. It explains why the US is going it alone and leaving its European allies to themselves to deal with Putin's aggression in Ukraine. And it explains why the populist revolt against 'the elites' has been confined so far to a backlash against globalisation and cosmopolitanism. The super rich, meanwhile, aren't ready to give up their bounty just yet, so are using culture wars and nationalism, built on crude racial resentment, to suck the state dry.
"There were two possible responses to the ‘China challenge’ to the Western middle classes," Milanovic writes. "One was to change the rules of globalisation so that it no longer hollows out Western middle classes; the other was to improve the income position of the middle by taxing more the domestic rich and redistributing income from the top to the middle."
Trump decided on the first option. A trade war with China was the easier road because this kept corporate donors on his team, while tempting the disgruntled MAGA lower middle class who represent his base with the illusory carrot of getting back their old rustbelt jobs "stolen" by China.
The result of all this is that 'liberal democracies' no longer believe in the Rawlsian definition of liberalism. Commitments to social justice, the rule of law, and freedom of expression/identity have been abandoned, as have free trade and open migration. The 'end of history' theory, propounded by theorist Francis Fukyama in 1989, has been shown to be hopelessly naive and simplistic. Instead we see a range of systems such as Hungary's illiberal democracy or China's authoritarian capitalist state as viable alternatives to globalised liberal democracy.. As Milanovic observes, we have entered the period of the struggle for multipolarity.
As to what replaces the old concept of neoliberalism in a unipolar world, Milanovic cites 'national market liberalism' and multipolarity. Trump, Putin and Xi each benefited from the old system but now they use the rebellion against the elites that globalism created to cement their power in their own hemipsheres, while the US and Europe focus on neoliberalism at home.
"Global neoliberal hegemony may be terminally weakened, but the ideological hegemony of neoliberalism, especially in the economic sphere domestically, may be preserved," he writes.
What is gone in the new multipolar world is the formerly unchallenged dominance of the 'Washington Consensus' of free trade, budget austerity, private outsourcing, deregulation and privatisation. In its place are tariff wars, sanctions, trade blocs, governments 'investing' in companies like Intel, immigration curbs, and nationalist and chauvinist culture wars.
What remains of the old order in national market liberalism is low taxation of high incomes and inheritances, tax preferences given to income from capital over income from labour, more deregulation, more limits on state spending and increasing attacks on culture war fronts like multiculturalism, affirmative action, access to safe abortion, and gender fluidity.
It is a deeply cynical, selfish and retrograde development in world history, one that if one reads Milanovic's arguments closely, is likely to end very badly indeed.
April 1, 2026
überragend
May 18, 2026
Fascinating, meticulously researched argument linking the rise of China and Asia's structural economic impact to malcontent in political West's domestic environments, and the questioning of the power and position of domestic elites who benefited from global neoliberalism (in US, Russia, China).
Milanovic bounds his argument where needed but isn't afraid to address mainstream/thorny questions. The kind of book that will take me awhile to really digest, hopefully not making me too annoying to my friends.
Milanovic coins the term "homoploutia" to refer to the increasing share of richest Americans are both labor-income and capital-income rich – this is a variance from classical capitalism, where people who had assets deriving incomes from capital, seldom worked; today's elite in the US and China are meritocratic/ reliant on credentialism.
He writes that the new US ruling class demonstrates a combination of managerial capitalism (which assumed the state would have a role in ruling class of managerial professionals) with classical capitalism – so where professional-managerial class and top of capitalist class compose the new elite. Those with labor and capital income are not going to align with those who only have labor income, intermingling the interests of capitalists with the interests of the professional managerial class - so, well-paid lawyers, doctors, bankers on salary, software-engineers who invest their savings into private property and make high salaries along with capital gains.
If homoploutia increases further, Milanovic warns there would be an impregnable elite invulnerable to fluctuations of labor market with assets and capital income to fall back on – "gyrations of stock market, fluctuations in profits and interest, can be cushioned thanks to high-paying jobs" – being rich in both factors of production has solved perennial conflict between capital and labor - which he writes would be the one thing that would've surprised Marx most.
There are three characteristics of this new ruling class – sociologically, fusion of 'meritocrats’ with capitalists; economically w/ increasing homoploutia, and ideological side with unquestionable acceptance of the importance and role of private property. In the last chapter, he links horizontal and vertical expansion of capitalism with ideas of private property, greed, and nationalism. Greed is motor driving obsession with property since acquisition is ultimate objective -- not just for its value but to increase the value of an individual. He even calls out taking photos of our lunch and walks in the woods as evidence as these photos have value only once we share it with others to reflect back on our own wealth/status/achieving pleasure/happiness --- so we continue commodifying ourself/time??? My phone eats first so I felt called out here.
Back to his writing on the broader international order, to illustrate the economic miracle/gravity of economic strength of China, he shows how relative to population the economic explosion of growth is a twentieth of Japan's economic boom, which was exponentially higher than the US' industrial revolution. As a natural result of this convergence (along with more generally, populous Asian countries w/political West (which includes Japan, Korea)), the rise of urban incomes in China have resulted in “downplacement” for those on lower deciles in the political West. Though a substantial gap still exists, with US median income 4.6 times higher than Chinese median income, in 1988, the gap was HUGE – 18 to 1. Today, 3 per cent of Chinese – 40 million people, have income greater than the US median.
When you look at market exchange rates (the actual productive capacity to purchase things in the world), US still has greater value of international economic power of GDP produced in the US -so the real GDP output may not be the best measurement - ok, then what could it be? Milanovic writes it may rely on if the dollar remains dominant global reserve currency; but maybe it would be when there are as many affluent Chinese as American. Those numbers stand at 40 mil. vs. 165 mil today. This is in absolute terms because if that point required a catch-up in terms of proportion of population, China would have 3-4x more affluent citizens than the US and would be by that point way "ahead" of the US. -- while using this metric Milanovic also qualifies/interrogates the racing/ "decline" rhetoric, criticizing lack of precision in terms/arguments.
He writes that for the US, either globalization as we knew it or elite power had to go -- “as long as the economic unhappiness of the malcontents – those parts of the electorate who felt left behind by globalization – could be assuaged at four-year intervals without producing political earthquakes, their unhappiness was not a political problem." The two solutions were to either change rules of globalization so it doesn’t hollow out the middle class, or, improve income position of middle by taxing the rich and redistributing gains....
Trump obviously rides the populist wave convinced by the first, and attacking the current order. He writes, according to Gary Gerstle ideology becomes an ‘economic order’ only when it is acquiesced, or accepted by, large parts of the electorate and most important parts of the political establishment.
Trump pulled back the curtain in the U.S. that previously covered the political establishment: "His persona revealed the depth of corruption at the center of politics and at the center of business. These are unpardonable sins. Sins enjoyed in secret are acceptable or overlooked; sins flaunted are not.
...Once his second term is over, those who replace Trump will do their best not to end corruption, because it has become a systemic feature, but to cover it up. But now that the ‘spectators’ have seen the truth it will be difficult to go back and pretend that nothing ever happened.
...Thus, Trump’s legacy will be one of public cynicism towards all policies and politicians. In that too Trump differs from fascism that presented an ostentatious facade of incorruptibility (even if it was truly corrupt within), while Trump, Musk, and their merry band of destroyers of conventions revel in the displays of power, graft and nepotism.” p161 He writes that critics are wrong to call new phenomena fascism – bc it eschews socialistic elements and explicitly rejects them – in that way indistinguishable from neoliberalism even if it shares the nationalistic element.
Also points out Trump politics follows domestic economic components of neoliberalism but not international/social -- part of a wider trend of what he calls national market liberalism - where countries pursue neoliberal policy domestically and more mercantilist policies in trade policy. Trump doesn't care for the unipolar mythology: “America First at least formally puts all countries on the same level. It argues that America will follow its own interests but it does not expect less from others.” - 159
On hegemonic order/unipolarity vs multipolarity, Milanovic points out that even if the political system in China was democratized, absorption of China into a US-hegemonic world order would be impossible given the strength of the country and size/economic weight....arguments that argue for democratization of China's political system as a way to stabilize world order imply that a democratic China wouldn't challenge the world order, which just seems like a lapse in imagination -- The size and gain in economic strength, correcting from artificial low after WW2, would always disrupt the US-primacy based international order. Relatedly, "friend-shoring is Commonwealth Imperial Preferences or Japan’s Co-prosperity Zone that dares not speak its real name.”
Milanovic mentions discusses importance of the Eisenhower moment in 1950 when he accepted the New Deal reforms in opposition to his ideology--analogous to the “Biden” moment of economic policy?
The Great Global Transformation is full of helpful charts and original economic data, sharp critiques of political commentary, and concise summaries of relevant theories on elitism/economic competition/hegemony/IR. He analyzes interaction between economic strength and security - assessing prominent economic theories and saying current relations resemble imperialist competition: strictly domestic developments influence international economic relations in the US and China, creating possibility of conflict. So even with trade increasing peaceful affections etc in Smith's original argument, this rests on a US hegemonic "peace" that relies on perpetual war for perpetual peace...
In the end he leaves us with: “Nationalism grows on the terrain of never-satiated mass plenty and greed; and the desire that plenty – which because of greed always remains a relative plenty (i.e. plenty in comparison to the plenty of others) - may be preserved, for ever. Wars are our way to try to reach for that “for ever” ....
Milanovic bounds his argument where needed but isn't afraid to address mainstream/thorny questions. The kind of book that will take me awhile to really digest, hopefully not making me too annoying to my friends.
Milanovic coins the term "homoploutia" to refer to the increasing share of richest Americans are both labor-income and capital-income rich – this is a variance from classical capitalism, where people who had assets deriving incomes from capital, seldom worked; today's elite in the US and China are meritocratic/ reliant on credentialism.
He writes that the new US ruling class demonstrates a combination of managerial capitalism (which assumed the state would have a role in ruling class of managerial professionals) with classical capitalism – so where professional-managerial class and top of capitalist class compose the new elite. Those with labor and capital income are not going to align with those who only have labor income, intermingling the interests of capitalists with the interests of the professional managerial class - so, well-paid lawyers, doctors, bankers on salary, software-engineers who invest their savings into private property and make high salaries along with capital gains.
If homoploutia increases further, Milanovic warns there would be an impregnable elite invulnerable to fluctuations of labor market with assets and capital income to fall back on – "gyrations of stock market, fluctuations in profits and interest, can be cushioned thanks to high-paying jobs" – being rich in both factors of production has solved perennial conflict between capital and labor - which he writes would be the one thing that would've surprised Marx most.
There are three characteristics of this new ruling class – sociologically, fusion of 'meritocrats’ with capitalists; economically w/ increasing homoploutia, and ideological side with unquestionable acceptance of the importance and role of private property. In the last chapter, he links horizontal and vertical expansion of capitalism with ideas of private property, greed, and nationalism. Greed is motor driving obsession with property since acquisition is ultimate objective -- not just for its value but to increase the value of an individual. He even calls out taking photos of our lunch and walks in the woods as evidence as these photos have value only once we share it with others to reflect back on our own wealth/status/achieving pleasure/happiness --- so we continue commodifying ourself/time??? My phone eats first so I felt called out here.
Back to his writing on the broader international order, to illustrate the economic miracle/gravity of economic strength of China, he shows how relative to population the economic explosion of growth is a twentieth of Japan's economic boom, which was exponentially higher than the US' industrial revolution. As a natural result of this convergence (along with more generally, populous Asian countries w/political West (which includes Japan, Korea)), the rise of urban incomes in China have resulted in “downplacement” for those on lower deciles in the political West. Though a substantial gap still exists, with US median income 4.6 times higher than Chinese median income, in 1988, the gap was HUGE – 18 to 1. Today, 3 per cent of Chinese – 40 million people, have income greater than the US median.
When you look at market exchange rates (the actual productive capacity to purchase things in the world), US still has greater value of international economic power of GDP produced in the US -so the real GDP output may not be the best measurement - ok, then what could it be? Milanovic writes it may rely on if the dollar remains dominant global reserve currency; but maybe it would be when there are as many affluent Chinese as American. Those numbers stand at 40 mil. vs. 165 mil today. This is in absolute terms because if that point required a catch-up in terms of proportion of population, China would have 3-4x more affluent citizens than the US and would be by that point way "ahead" of the US. -- while using this metric Milanovic also qualifies/interrogates the racing/ "decline" rhetoric, criticizing lack of precision in terms/arguments.
He writes that for the US, either globalization as we knew it or elite power had to go -- “as long as the economic unhappiness of the malcontents – those parts of the electorate who felt left behind by globalization – could be assuaged at four-year intervals without producing political earthquakes, their unhappiness was not a political problem." The two solutions were to either change rules of globalization so it doesn’t hollow out the middle class, or, improve income position of middle by taxing the rich and redistributing gains....
Trump obviously rides the populist wave convinced by the first, and attacking the current order. He writes, according to Gary Gerstle ideology becomes an ‘economic order’ only when it is acquiesced, or accepted by, large parts of the electorate and most important parts of the political establishment.
Trump pulled back the curtain in the U.S. that previously covered the political establishment: "His persona revealed the depth of corruption at the center of politics and at the center of business. These are unpardonable sins. Sins enjoyed in secret are acceptable or overlooked; sins flaunted are not.
...Once his second term is over, those who replace Trump will do their best not to end corruption, because it has become a systemic feature, but to cover it up. But now that the ‘spectators’ have seen the truth it will be difficult to go back and pretend that nothing ever happened.
...Thus, Trump’s legacy will be one of public cynicism towards all policies and politicians. In that too Trump differs from fascism that presented an ostentatious facade of incorruptibility (even if it was truly corrupt within), while Trump, Musk, and their merry band of destroyers of conventions revel in the displays of power, graft and nepotism.” p161 He writes that critics are wrong to call new phenomena fascism – bc it eschews socialistic elements and explicitly rejects them – in that way indistinguishable from neoliberalism even if it shares the nationalistic element.
Also points out Trump politics follows domestic economic components of neoliberalism but not international/social -- part of a wider trend of what he calls national market liberalism - where countries pursue neoliberal policy domestically and more mercantilist policies in trade policy. Trump doesn't care for the unipolar mythology: “America First at least formally puts all countries on the same level. It argues that America will follow its own interests but it does not expect less from others.” - 159
On hegemonic order/unipolarity vs multipolarity, Milanovic points out that even if the political system in China was democratized, absorption of China into a US-hegemonic world order would be impossible given the strength of the country and size/economic weight....arguments that argue for democratization of China's political system as a way to stabilize world order imply that a democratic China wouldn't challenge the world order, which just seems like a lapse in imagination -- The size and gain in economic strength, correcting from artificial low after WW2, would always disrupt the US-primacy based international order. Relatedly, "friend-shoring is Commonwealth Imperial Preferences or Japan’s Co-prosperity Zone that dares not speak its real name.”
Milanovic mentions discusses importance of the Eisenhower moment in 1950 when he accepted the New Deal reforms in opposition to his ideology--analogous to the “Biden” moment of economic policy?
The Great Global Transformation is full of helpful charts and original economic data, sharp critiques of political commentary, and concise summaries of relevant theories on elitism/economic competition/hegemony/IR. He analyzes interaction between economic strength and security - assessing prominent economic theories and saying current relations resemble imperialist competition: strictly domestic developments influence international economic relations in the US and China, creating possibility of conflict. So even with trade increasing peaceful affections etc in Smith's original argument, this rests on a US hegemonic "peace" that relies on perpetual war for perpetual peace...
In the end he leaves us with: “Nationalism grows on the terrain of never-satiated mass plenty and greed; and the desire that plenty – which because of greed always remains a relative plenty (i.e. plenty in comparison to the plenty of others) - may be preserved, for ever. Wars are our way to try to reach for that “for ever” ....
May 19, 2026
A thoughtful and assertive book about the fate of national economies in a multipolar world. There is much I disagree with about this book. There is much I examine why I disagree about the given topics. I would say it reaches too far to explain the political with the economic, and reaches too shallowly into ideology to explain the materialism-ideology-structural factors balance behind events. Nonetheless, an interesting book from an author willing to state directly what he believes will happen.
October 13, 2025
*Thanks to NetGalley and the publisher for an advance reader copy of this book in exchange for an honest review.*
The Great Global Transformation details the fall of global neoliberalism with economic sanctions, tariff wars, anti-immigration, nationalism and the far right becoming the new normal. This book explains how the rising power of Asia particularly China is creating a new ‘middle class’ which has displaced the jobs of the ‘middle class’ in America. This book discusses national market liberalism, international trade and the elites focusing on America and China with some really interesting information about the Communist Party of China.
I found this book to be very informative and generally interesting. It did require me to be focused because a lot of this was complex information. This had original research from the author and had graphs and tables to illustrate points. I really enjoyed learning about the situation with America and China especially the information on the CPC. I would recommend this for any people interested in this topic and I actually think this is a good book to read after reading Capitalism and it’s Critics by John Cassidy.
The Great Global Transformation details the fall of global neoliberalism with economic sanctions, tariff wars, anti-immigration, nationalism and the far right becoming the new normal. This book explains how the rising power of Asia particularly China is creating a new ‘middle class’ which has displaced the jobs of the ‘middle class’ in America. This book discusses national market liberalism, international trade and the elites focusing on America and China with some really interesting information about the Communist Party of China.
I found this book to be very informative and generally interesting. It did require me to be focused because a lot of this was complex information. This had original research from the author and had graphs and tables to illustrate points. I really enjoyed learning about the situation with America and China especially the information on the CPC. I would recommend this for any people interested in this topic and I actually think this is a good book to read after reading Capitalism and it’s Critics by John Cassidy.
June 7, 2026
I love reading Milonovic, the great thinker on global inequality, of the Elephant Graph fame. In this book he astutely analysed the recent transformation of the 21st century.
1. The rise of Asia was really the rise of China, because it was just big, and allegedly already surpassed America in GDP in real terms.
2. The Elephant Graph again: the middle class in the West lost out to middle class of China. This made them angry. Convergence of living standards sounded good in theory, but not when you actually became relatively poorer in the process. It thus became ‘China Stole our jobs’ and the result was…
3. National Market Liberalism in the West. Full capitalism inside the country, mercantilist internationally. This tariffs, ban of high tech chips etc. While on the other side…
4. China adopts Statism. The ideology of the party became more important as China tried to fight against the influence of the rich Elite (as happened in America). This he cracked down on Alibaba, over borrowing of developers, even tuition centres. He brought about a series of anti corruption campaign, including no lavish dinners etc. The rich capitalists must follow the State as in ancient Chinese tradition, and not the other way round.
5. The current elites in America are capitalist-workers (like Meta and Musk) So all Marx’s theory would not apply. In China, capitalists with party affiliation are the top.
6. Property became more difficult to enforce when things owned are not physical. This intellectual property enforcement has evolved to be more effective (daily crackdown on illegal show-sharing sites etc). World GDP doubled during the 21sr century; with more things to win, greed grows. Part of greed is to share about your opulent and happy lifestyle, so social media exaggerates greed. Greed then leads to nationalism, so we can fight against ‘others’ who steal our jobs, our technology etc.
7. The world will divide into 2 bloc: America and China. The current hegemonic arrangement has America at the top, the other West at second tier, all the way down to the poor countries. But China cannot fit into this mold. All previous efforts by China and other developing countries to have better representation at the IMF and World Bank had failed, as current seat holders will definitely not give up their seats. So they must form a new group, even if China really becomes democratic.
1. The rise of Asia was really the rise of China, because it was just big, and allegedly already surpassed America in GDP in real terms.
2. The Elephant Graph again: the middle class in the West lost out to middle class of China. This made them angry. Convergence of living standards sounded good in theory, but not when you actually became relatively poorer in the process. It thus became ‘China Stole our jobs’ and the result was…
3. National Market Liberalism in the West. Full capitalism inside the country, mercantilist internationally. This tariffs, ban of high tech chips etc. While on the other side…
4. China adopts Statism. The ideology of the party became more important as China tried to fight against the influence of the rich Elite (as happened in America). This he cracked down on Alibaba, over borrowing of developers, even tuition centres. He brought about a series of anti corruption campaign, including no lavish dinners etc. The rich capitalists must follow the State as in ancient Chinese tradition, and not the other way round.
5. The current elites in America are capitalist-workers (like Meta and Musk) So all Marx’s theory would not apply. In China, capitalists with party affiliation are the top.
6. Property became more difficult to enforce when things owned are not physical. This intellectual property enforcement has evolved to be more effective (daily crackdown on illegal show-sharing sites etc). World GDP doubled during the 21sr century; with more things to win, greed grows. Part of greed is to share about your opulent and happy lifestyle, so social media exaggerates greed. Greed then leads to nationalism, so we can fight against ‘others’ who steal our jobs, our technology etc.
7. The world will divide into 2 bloc: America and China. The current hegemonic arrangement has America at the top, the other West at second tier, all the way down to the poor countries. But China cannot fit into this mold. All previous efforts by China and other developing countries to have better representation at the IMF and World Bank had failed, as current seat holders will definitely not give up their seats. So they must form a new group, even if China really becomes democratic.
April 26, 2026
The Great Global Transformation by Branko Milanovic is an insightful and thought-provoking exploration of the economic and social changes shaping our modern world. Known for his deep understanding of inequality and global economics, Milanovic presents a compelling analysis of how globalization, shifting wealth patterns, and political developments are transforming societies across continents.
What makes this book especially impressive is the author’s ability to explain complex economic ideas in a clear and engaging way. Rather than overwhelming readers with technical language, Milanovic uses real-world examples and historical context to make his arguments accessible and relevant. His writing encourages readers to think critically about the forces influencing income distribution, opportunity, and power in the twenty-first century.
The book stands out for its balanced perspective. Milanovic does not simply celebrate globalization or criticize it; instead, he carefully examines both its benefits and its challenges. He highlights how millions have been lifted out of poverty while also acknowledging the inequalities and tensions that have emerged in many countries.
Another strength of the book is its global outlook. Instead of focusing only on Western economies, Milanovic looks at developments across Asia, Europe, the Americas, and beyond. This broader lens gives readers a richer understanding of how interconnected the world has become.
Overall, The Great Global Transformation is an excellent read for anyone interested in economics, politics, or the future of global society. It is intelligent, timely, and highly informative. Branko Milanovic has written a book that not only explains major world trends but also challenges readers to consider what kind of future they want to build.
What makes this book especially impressive is the author’s ability to explain complex economic ideas in a clear and engaging way. Rather than overwhelming readers with technical language, Milanovic uses real-world examples and historical context to make his arguments accessible and relevant. His writing encourages readers to think critically about the forces influencing income distribution, opportunity, and power in the twenty-first century.
The book stands out for its balanced perspective. Milanovic does not simply celebrate globalization or criticize it; instead, he carefully examines both its benefits and its challenges. He highlights how millions have been lifted out of poverty while also acknowledging the inequalities and tensions that have emerged in many countries.
Another strength of the book is its global outlook. Instead of focusing only on Western economies, Milanovic looks at developments across Asia, Europe, the Americas, and beyond. This broader lens gives readers a richer understanding of how interconnected the world has become.
Overall, The Great Global Transformation is an excellent read for anyone interested in economics, politics, or the future of global society. It is intelligent, timely, and highly informative. Branko Milanovic has written a book that not only explains major world trends but also challenges readers to consider what kind of future they want to build.
December 5, 2025
Readable for a non-economist and extremely thought-provoking. Way beyond the simplistic
February 18, 2026
Good description of the basic facts and trends, reasonable extrapolation and some fine insights and polemics around rise of China. However, the last chapters are a bit over reaching.
March 7, 2026
"Perpetual wars for Perpetual peace"
April 5, 2026
This book is incredible. Explains the rise of far right populism, the geopolitics of the post WWII order and its flaws, and so, so much.
December 29, 2025
Very insightful and more importantly, readable. The observation of the homoploutic elite is interesting, as well as the analysis of the role of China, Trump, and the eponymous move towards national market liberalism and what that means.
Listened to Branko Milanovic’s Downstream interview with Novara before reading which was very interesting.
Listened to Branko Milanovic’s Downstream interview with Novara before reading which was very interesting.
December 10, 2025
This book is so good and important, if I could give 10 stars, I would. The way he explains and makes the connections between events/developments using language that is perfectly chosen. Our world is complex and Branko Milanovic never simplify at a cost of truth but manages to transmit complex connections to non economists. I got very hooked by the explanation of homoploutia.
February 23, 2026
Great analysis with some brilliant parts (the imperialism theories contrasting Montesqieu/Smith and Lenin/Luxemburg/Schumpeter), deep insights (into China) and a good overview on economic stats. Didn't really get the relevance of the Rawls-part though.
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