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Osprey Campaign #195
Syracuse 415–413 BC: Destruction of the Athenian Imperial Fleet
Osprey's study of one of the most important battles of the Peloponnesian War (431 - 404 BC). In 415 BC Athens launched a large expeditionary force, its goal the rich, grain-producing island of Sicily. This was in response to a call for help in a minor war from an old ally but the true objectives were the powerful city of Syracuse, suspected of supporting Athens' Peloponnesian enemies, and imperial expansion. The Athenians won an inconclusive victory over the Syracusans late in the year and renewed their attack in the spring of 414. After a period of energetic siege warfare and a series of large-scale battles on land and sea, the Syracusans gained the upper hand and the expedition ended in total disaster with grave consequences for the future of Athens.
Nic Fields explores the background of this foolhardy venture in which Athens took on a nation that was militarily and financially strong and over 700 miles distant. Then, following the narrative of Thucydides, the chronicler of the Peloponnesian War, he describes and explains the long and violent campaign that pitted the two largest democracies of the Greek world against each other.
Nic Fields explores the background of this foolhardy venture in which Athens took on a nation that was militarily and financially strong and over 700 miles distant. Then, following the narrative of Thucydides, the chronicler of the Peloponnesian War, he describes and explains the long and violent campaign that pitted the two largest democracies of the Greek world against each other.
96 pages, Paperback
First published May 8, 2008
43 people want to read
About the author
Nic Fields
88 books22 followersDr Nic Fields started his career as a biochemist before joining the Royal Marines. Having left the Navy, he went back to University and completed a BA and PhD in Ancient History at the University of Newcastle. He was Assistant Director at the British School of Archaeology, Athens, and is now a lecturer in Ancient History and Archaeology at the University of Edinburgh.
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
April 20, 2025
Beginning in 431 BCE, a group of Greek city states led by Sparta fought to end the growing hegemony of Athens in the Greek world. Known today as the Peloponnesian War, it was a conflict characterized for over fifteen years by strategic deadlock. In the face of invasion by the Spartan forces, the Athenians retreated behind their city's walls, thus blunting their enemy's superiority on land. When Athens pursued a more offensive strategy, however, the Spartan-led coalition known as the Peloponnesian League was able to thwart their efforts. With neither side able to counter the other's strengths, the war dragged on indecisively.
In 415, Athens sought to break this stalemate by launching an attack on the Greek colony of Syracuse on the island of Sicily. Ostensibly an effort to support their allies on the island, it was in reality an ambitious and thinly-veiled attempt to conquer the island, which would have deprived the Peloponnesians of a vital source of grain and given Athens the resources needed to force an end to the war. The expedition did indeed prove the turning point in the war, as their defeat in the two-year-long campaign drained the Athenian treasury and cost them the bulk of their fleet. Nic Fields summarizes it in this concise account, showing how Athens's hopes came to ruin, and how their loss determined the outcome of the war.
As a contribution to Osprey Publishing's "Campaign" series, Fields's book follows a set formula in which he identifies the opposing commanders, describes their forces, and explains their plans before going into the campaign itself. This helps to clarify the scope of the fighting, as he shows how the Greeks fought for dominance rather than destruction. On the battlefield this took the form of heavily-armed infantry known as hoplites, who fought in tightly-packed formations until one side broke. Warfare at sea was similar to land, with the goal being to immobilize and capture enemy ships rather than to destroy them. As a result, ultimate victory would depend on attrition in battle rather than a decisive clash in which one army or fleet would annihilate the other.
By gambling their forces on the Sicilian expedition Athens provided their opponents with an opportunity to do just that. What began as a limited naval operation turned into a massive investment of money and forces. Yet these forces were irresolutely led, as the foremost advocate for the invasion, the ostentatious aristocrat Alcibiades, was recalled soon after arriving on the island. With the death of the experienced soldier Lamachos in 414, command was in the hands of Nikitas, who suffered the fatal flaw of not believing that the expedition could succeed. While the Athenians fought well, their failure to pursue their siege of Syracuse aggressively allowed the Syracusans the upper hand, allowing their forces to win a series of battles that debilitated the overextended Athens to eventual defeat.
Defeat meant the loss of dozens of ships and thousands of experienced soldiers and crew. Though the war continued for nearly a decade longer, the Athenians were never able to recover from this setback, and eventually accepted a peace that meant an end to their empire. Fields demonstrates this effectively by situating the campaign within the overall war, with his description of the Athenian forces showing how their loss was so devastating politically as well as militarily. It's an effective if unspectacular introduction to the campaign, one that situates it within the overall history of the war and, in doing so, highlights the irony of the Athenians' failure. Because in the end, the expedition did indeed succeed in deciding the war, just not in the way the Athenians expected.
In 415, Athens sought to break this stalemate by launching an attack on the Greek colony of Syracuse on the island of Sicily. Ostensibly an effort to support their allies on the island, it was in reality an ambitious and thinly-veiled attempt to conquer the island, which would have deprived the Peloponnesians of a vital source of grain and given Athens the resources needed to force an end to the war. The expedition did indeed prove the turning point in the war, as their defeat in the two-year-long campaign drained the Athenian treasury and cost them the bulk of their fleet. Nic Fields summarizes it in this concise account, showing how Athens's hopes came to ruin, and how their loss determined the outcome of the war.
As a contribution to Osprey Publishing's "Campaign" series, Fields's book follows a set formula in which he identifies the opposing commanders, describes their forces, and explains their plans before going into the campaign itself. This helps to clarify the scope of the fighting, as he shows how the Greeks fought for dominance rather than destruction. On the battlefield this took the form of heavily-armed infantry known as hoplites, who fought in tightly-packed formations until one side broke. Warfare at sea was similar to land, with the goal being to immobilize and capture enemy ships rather than to destroy them. As a result, ultimate victory would depend on attrition in battle rather than a decisive clash in which one army or fleet would annihilate the other.
By gambling their forces on the Sicilian expedition Athens provided their opponents with an opportunity to do just that. What began as a limited naval operation turned into a massive investment of money and forces. Yet these forces were irresolutely led, as the foremost advocate for the invasion, the ostentatious aristocrat Alcibiades, was recalled soon after arriving on the island. With the death of the experienced soldier Lamachos in 414, command was in the hands of Nikitas, who suffered the fatal flaw of not believing that the expedition could succeed. While the Athenians fought well, their failure to pursue their siege of Syracuse aggressively allowed the Syracusans the upper hand, allowing their forces to win a series of battles that debilitated the overextended Athens to eventual defeat.
Defeat meant the loss of dozens of ships and thousands of experienced soldiers and crew. Though the war continued for nearly a decade longer, the Athenians were never able to recover from this setback, and eventually accepted a peace that meant an end to their empire. Fields demonstrates this effectively by situating the campaign within the overall war, with his description of the Athenian forces showing how their loss was so devastating politically as well as militarily. It's an effective if unspectacular introduction to the campaign, one that situates it within the overall history of the war and, in doing so, highlights the irony of the Athenians' failure. Because in the end, the expedition did indeed succeed in deciding the war, just not in the way the Athenians expected.
August 16, 2022
Another great book by Nic Fields, lots of pictures of the places he writes about, maps and a precise and chrologically ordered story.
November 5, 2021
A decent overview of the Athenian disaster at Syracuse. For those unfamiliar with the period, there are brief descriptions of the means and modes of hoplite and trireme warfare along with short biographies on the major commanders of both sides.
The photos included were not very helpful, some of them rather dark black-and-whites of the modern setting with cars and light poles in the background. They added nothing to the understanding of the battlefield. The one map of the Epipolae, the raised plateau where the fate of the siege was truly determined, is presented in the final pages of the work. The map itself is good, but it would have made far more sense to move it forward.
However, the painted illustrations are quite good.
If you've read Thucydides and Xenophon, you can probably pass on this.
The photos included were not very helpful, some of them rather dark black-and-whites of the modern setting with cars and light poles in the background. They added nothing to the understanding of the battlefield. The one map of the Epipolae, the raised plateau where the fate of the siege was truly determined, is presented in the final pages of the work. The map itself is good, but it would have made far more sense to move it forward.
However, the painted illustrations are quite good.
If you've read Thucydides and Xenophon, you can probably pass on this.
April 19, 2018
I really enjoyed the narrative here though I wish that Osprey standardised their anglicisation of Hellenic names from title to title. This book, however, provided fresh perspective on an angle of the Peloponnesian War and was quite informative throughout with plentiful quotes and commentary from primary sources.
The illustrations were superb though I don't think much of the majority of the photographs which were quite dark and maybe not the easiest to follow. Similarly, I wasn't impressed that the provided maps did not illustrate the final fall in the Great Harbour in as much detail as they could have, given it was the (effective) ending of the Athenian power.
The illustrations were superb though I don't think much of the majority of the photographs which were quite dark and maybe not the easiest to follow. Similarly, I wasn't impressed that the provided maps did not illustrate the final fall in the Great Harbour in as much detail as they could have, given it was the (effective) ending of the Athenian power.
January 15, 2018
A very successful Osprey book, guided by the strong narratives of Thucydides and Xenophon gives a very good overview of the strategic and tactical situations, with the kind of personality-led analysis that often feels unique to Greek and Roman history due to all the available opinionated sources.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews