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Operation Biting: The 1942 Parachute Assault to Capture Hitler’s Radar
- GenresWar
384 pages, Paperback
Published October 9, 2025
10 people are currently reading
26 people want to read
About the author
Max Hastings
112 books1,724 followersSir Max Hugh Macdonald Hastings, FRSL, FRHistS is a British journalist, editor, historian and author. His parents were Macdonald Hastings, a journalist and war correspondent, and Anne Scott-James, sometime editor of Harper's Bazaar.
Hastings was educated at Charterhouse School and University College, Oxford, which he left after a year.After leaving Oxford University, Max Hastings became a foreign correspondent, and reported from more than sixty countries and eleven wars for BBC TV and the London Evening Standard.
Among his bestselling books Bomber Command won the Somerset Maugham Prize, and both Overlord and The Battle for the Falklands won the Yorkshire Post Book of the Year Prize.
After ten years as editor and then editor-in-chief of The Daily Telegraph, he became editor of the Evening Standard in 1996. He has won many awards for his journalism, including Journalist of The Year and What the Papers Say Reporter of the Year for his work in the South Atlantic in 1982, and Editor of the Year in 1988.
He stood down as editor of the Evening Standard in 2001 and was knighted in 2002. His monumental work of military history, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany 1944-1945 was published in 2005.
He is also a Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature.
Sir Max Hastings honoured with the $100,000 2012 Pritzker Military Library Literature Award for Lifetime Achievement in Military Writing.
Hastings was educated at Charterhouse School and University College, Oxford, which he left after a year.After leaving Oxford University, Max Hastings became a foreign correspondent, and reported from more than sixty countries and eleven wars for BBC TV and the London Evening Standard.
Among his bestselling books Bomber Command won the Somerset Maugham Prize, and both Overlord and The Battle for the Falklands won the Yorkshire Post Book of the Year Prize.
After ten years as editor and then editor-in-chief of The Daily Telegraph, he became editor of the Evening Standard in 1996. He has won many awards for his journalism, including Journalist of The Year and What the Papers Say Reporter of the Year for his work in the South Atlantic in 1982, and Editor of the Year in 1988.
He stood down as editor of the Evening Standard in 2001 and was knighted in 2002. His monumental work of military history, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany 1944-1945 was published in 2005.
He is also a Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature.
Sir Max Hastings honoured with the $100,000 2012 Pritzker Military Library Literature Award for Lifetime Achievement in Military Writing.
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
November 24, 2025
Another 3.5 from me! A thoroughly detailed account of WW2’s formidable Operation Biting and the extraordinary men who executed it. Just lacked the enthralling narrative of a PRK (Patrick Radden Keefe)
January 23, 2026
A fascinating and detailed review of British Forces’ first successful parachute and Combined Operations action to capture radar equipment from Bruneval in Normandy in early 1942.
As a kid I first learnt of this raid through a Victor comic re-telling and as with all such stories at the time everything was described as a triumph for the plucky Brits.
The reality, of course, is far more sobering. The raid was certainly almost 100% successful in achieving its outcome and casualties were pretty low, but obviously not zero (they never can be). However, despite the undeniably huge, almost unimaginable, bravery and determination of the men on the ground the mission was blessed with incredible good fortune almost all the way through and just one or two different pieces of luck could have made the difference between the success it was and the disaster it could have been (e.g. later raids at Dieppe and St Nazaire).
The thoroughly researched detail is absolutely fascinating giving the background of the need for the British Army to be seen to do something right after 2.5 years of setbacks and surrenders across the globe which meant that officers (although presumably only very junior ones) often went unsaluted by the other services. There was an arrogant assumption in the top ranks that only Britain had developed effective radar, when in fact the Germans were probably ahead at the start of WW2, but as the offensive force they saw less need to quickly develop and roll it out. Fortunately key people in the intelligence and technical services area were less blinkered and could see the need to understand better how the Nazi system worked. The planning was blessed with an incredible amount of accurate detail provided by the French Resistance at a time when coastal security was comparatively lax and when many such reports turned out to be very inaccurate. Training for the operation was hampered by poor and freezing weather, lack of really skilled naval personnel and a ridiculous amount of time wasted travelling to different locations which, in hindsight, would have been much better spent practicing shooting skills and more realistic scenarios. Co-operation in providing scarce materials, including aircraft, was only grudgingly given and at the risk of security leaks. The fall of snow was both a blessing and a curse. Landing on it meant far fewer injuries than might otherwise be expected, but also meant the combatants stood out very clearly when trying to clear their line of retreat to the beach. Several “sticks” of troops and equipment were dropped a couple of miles short of the planned drop zone and had great difficulty joining up with the others - although this turned out to be hugely fortunate in two respects. Firstly, they could advance from the rear on the one section of the German defenders who actually put up a fight and who otherwise, with just 9 men, would have completely prevented the paras from getting to the beach to be picked up. Secondly, the German commanders were thoroughly confused as to the actual objective of the raid and set up defensive lines in places the British had absolutely no intention of attacking.
Later the Nazis seemed to learn more from this raid than the British did, beefing up coastal security considerably, stopping any access to the area by civilians and demolishing obvious landmarks. The British persisted with drop zones too far from the objective and decided night drops were too risky. Consequently, later at Arnhem the Germans had plenty of time to organise their defences and to deploy armoured and motorised forces against lightly armed foot soldiers. The British did at least move their own research centre away from the coast, recognising it too could be vulnerable to a smash and grab raid.
The book is also revealing as to how people in positions of power seemed to get there through total over confidence, unjustified arrogance, ignoring the rules that apply to others and using their wealth and contacts, despite their otherwise almost complete lack of suitability, training or aptitude for the role. Sadly, this seems to be a trait that continues across the world today.
The one very annoying aspect of reading this book was trying to keep track of where all the key groups were on the ground. There are maps, but not in obvious locations once that page has been moved on from. Putting them all in one location at the front or back of the book, along with the key aerial photographs would have made it much easier to follow. This is the only reason this isn’t a 5 star review as it was very annoying. However, this does at least emphasise how much more difficult it was for the troops dropped in the wrong location to figure out where they were and what direction they should be heading in. Sadly the planning and training failed to sufficiently cover what would happen when, as was almost inevitable given anti-aircraft defences and the need for the planes to take evasive action, some troops were dropped off target. Far too much faith was placed in the idea of the plan working out perfectly, when experience dictates that all such plans inevitably start to fall apart once they meet reality on the ground.
A sure sign of how interesting and engaging this book is, is the fact I’ve been quoting anecdotes from it to my wife for the last 24 hours (whether she wanted to hear them or not).
As a kid I first learnt of this raid through a Victor comic re-telling and as with all such stories at the time everything was described as a triumph for the plucky Brits.
The reality, of course, is far more sobering. The raid was certainly almost 100% successful in achieving its outcome and casualties were pretty low, but obviously not zero (they never can be). However, despite the undeniably huge, almost unimaginable, bravery and determination of the men on the ground the mission was blessed with incredible good fortune almost all the way through and just one or two different pieces of luck could have made the difference between the success it was and the disaster it could have been (e.g. later raids at Dieppe and St Nazaire).
The thoroughly researched detail is absolutely fascinating giving the background of the need for the British Army to be seen to do something right after 2.5 years of setbacks and surrenders across the globe which meant that officers (although presumably only very junior ones) often went unsaluted by the other services. There was an arrogant assumption in the top ranks that only Britain had developed effective radar, when in fact the Germans were probably ahead at the start of WW2, but as the offensive force they saw less need to quickly develop and roll it out. Fortunately key people in the intelligence and technical services area were less blinkered and could see the need to understand better how the Nazi system worked. The planning was blessed with an incredible amount of accurate detail provided by the French Resistance at a time when coastal security was comparatively lax and when many such reports turned out to be very inaccurate. Training for the operation was hampered by poor and freezing weather, lack of really skilled naval personnel and a ridiculous amount of time wasted travelling to different locations which, in hindsight, would have been much better spent practicing shooting skills and more realistic scenarios. Co-operation in providing scarce materials, including aircraft, was only grudgingly given and at the risk of security leaks. The fall of snow was both a blessing and a curse. Landing on it meant far fewer injuries than might otherwise be expected, but also meant the combatants stood out very clearly when trying to clear their line of retreat to the beach. Several “sticks” of troops and equipment were dropped a couple of miles short of the planned drop zone and had great difficulty joining up with the others - although this turned out to be hugely fortunate in two respects. Firstly, they could advance from the rear on the one section of the German defenders who actually put up a fight and who otherwise, with just 9 men, would have completely prevented the paras from getting to the beach to be picked up. Secondly, the German commanders were thoroughly confused as to the actual objective of the raid and set up defensive lines in places the British had absolutely no intention of attacking.
Later the Nazis seemed to learn more from this raid than the British did, beefing up coastal security considerably, stopping any access to the area by civilians and demolishing obvious landmarks. The British persisted with drop zones too far from the objective and decided night drops were too risky. Consequently, later at Arnhem the Germans had plenty of time to organise their defences and to deploy armoured and motorised forces against lightly armed foot soldiers. The British did at least move their own research centre away from the coast, recognising it too could be vulnerable to a smash and grab raid.
The book is also revealing as to how people in positions of power seemed to get there through total over confidence, unjustified arrogance, ignoring the rules that apply to others and using their wealth and contacts, despite their otherwise almost complete lack of suitability, training or aptitude for the role. Sadly, this seems to be a trait that continues across the world today.
The one very annoying aspect of reading this book was trying to keep track of where all the key groups were on the ground. There are maps, but not in obvious locations once that page has been moved on from. Putting them all in one location at the front or back of the book, along with the key aerial photographs would have made it much easier to follow. This is the only reason this isn’t a 5 star review as it was very annoying. However, this does at least emphasise how much more difficult it was for the troops dropped in the wrong location to figure out where they were and what direction they should be heading in. Sadly the planning and training failed to sufficiently cover what would happen when, as was almost inevitable given anti-aircraft defences and the need for the planes to take evasive action, some troops were dropped off target. Far too much faith was placed in the idea of the plan working out perfectly, when experience dictates that all such plans inevitably start to fall apart once they meet reality on the ground.
A sure sign of how interesting and engaging this book is, is the fact I’ve been quoting anecdotes from it to my wife for the last 24 hours (whether she wanted to hear them or not).
January 5, 2026
An interesting and assume well researched book. Debatable that it quite reads like a thriller as shown on the sleeve as quoted by the Mail, but enjoyed as shows the interesting nature of pressures to succeed and how luck / fortune can make the difference between success and failure
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews