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Tradecraft, Tactics, and Dirty Tricks: Russian Intelligence and Putin's Secret War
Step into the covert world of Russian espionage with this revealing insider's account of how the Russian Intelligence Services (RIS) operate across the globe. Drawing on years of CIA field experience, Sean M. Wiswesser exposes the tactics, tradecraft, and mindset of the RIS—making this a must-read for anyone fascinated by spies, sabotage, and the high-stakes intelligence war between Russia and the West.
Unmask the shadowy world of Russian espionage with this riveting exploration of the Russian Intelligence Services (RIS) and their global clandestine operations. With decades of experience as a CIA operations officer, author Sean M. Wiswesser takes readers deep into the heart of Maskirovka—the Russian art of denial, deception, and manipulation. Using historical examples and firsthand accounts, this book reveals the tactics employed by the three main services of Russia's intelligence the SVR, GRU, and FSB. Learn about the RIS' use of double agents, surveillance, and "street work," honeytraps, sabotage, active measures, assassinations, the RIS roles in the Russo-Ukraine War, and much more.
Wiswesser's unparalleled expertise comes from years of sitting across from Russian intelligence officers, operating overseas, and using their own methods against them. As a member of the CIA's expert cadre in the Directorate of Operations, he worked closely with the U.S. intelligence community and foreign allies, gaining a unique perspective on the RIS' global reach. Now, he shares that knowledge in a candid, plain-speaking style designed to inform and galvanize readers from all walks of life.
This book is more than an exposé—it's a toolkit for understanding and countering the RIS' manipulative tactics. Wiswesser breaks down ten key elements of their tradecraft, offering invaluable insights to intelligence professionals, academics, business leaders, NGO workers, and private citizens alike. With a deep grounding in Russian language, culture, and intelligence traditions, he provides readers with the context they need to grasp the RIS' methods and motivations.
Written for the general reader, this compelling account combines expert analysis with real-world stories, making it both accessible and deeply informative. Whether you're a practitioner in the field or simply curious about the world of espionage, the author's narrative will open your eyes to the global threat posed by Russian intelligence and equip you with the knowledge to recognize and resist their tactics. Prepare to be captivated, informed, and empowered.
Unmask the shadowy world of Russian espionage with this riveting exploration of the Russian Intelligence Services (RIS) and their global clandestine operations. With decades of experience as a CIA operations officer, author Sean M. Wiswesser takes readers deep into the heart of Maskirovka—the Russian art of denial, deception, and manipulation. Using historical examples and firsthand accounts, this book reveals the tactics employed by the three main services of Russia's intelligence the SVR, GRU, and FSB. Learn about the RIS' use of double agents, surveillance, and "street work," honeytraps, sabotage, active measures, assassinations, the RIS roles in the Russo-Ukraine War, and much more.
Wiswesser's unparalleled expertise comes from years of sitting across from Russian intelligence officers, operating overseas, and using their own methods against them. As a member of the CIA's expert cadre in the Directorate of Operations, he worked closely with the U.S. intelligence community and foreign allies, gaining a unique perspective on the RIS' global reach. Now, he shares that knowledge in a candid, plain-speaking style designed to inform and galvanize readers from all walks of life.
This book is more than an exposé—it's a toolkit for understanding and countering the RIS' manipulative tactics. Wiswesser breaks down ten key elements of their tradecraft, offering invaluable insights to intelligence professionals, academics, business leaders, NGO workers, and private citizens alike. With a deep grounding in Russian language, culture, and intelligence traditions, he provides readers with the context they need to grasp the RIS' methods and motivations.
Written for the general reader, this compelling account combines expert analysis with real-world stories, making it both accessible and deeply informative. Whether you're a practitioner in the field or simply curious about the world of espionage, the author's narrative will open your eyes to the global threat posed by Russian intelligence and equip you with the knowledge to recognize and resist their tactics. Prepare to be captivated, informed, and empowered.
277 pages, Kindle Edition
First published April 21, 2026
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Displaying 1 - 28 of 28 reviews
May 22, 2026
(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
Эта книга будет чуть лучше «Russia's Hybrid Warfare Offensive Against the West», однако, по сути, это всё та же мешанина из любопытных фактов, новостных историй по типу убийства Литвиненко и покушения на Скрепалей. Другими словами, эта книга не предлагает главного – глубокого исследования работы российских спецслужб. Более точно: книга просто суммирует всю ту информацию, что есть в открытом доступе, не предлагая при этом никакого собственного анализа. Это означает, что если читатель уже знаком с базовой или основной информацией о российских спецслужбах, он или она не найдут в этой книге ничего нового и интересного для себя. Я даже выскажу мысль, что читать книги об отдельных кейсах, как например книга «A Very Expensive Poison: The Assassination of Alexander Litvinenko and Putin's War with the West», в которой детально описывается, как российские спецслужбы убивали Литвиненко, намного интересней, чем читать такую вот книгу, которая является, как я отметил выше, сборником разной информации.
Да, в книге проскальзывают интересные моменты, но все они очень поверхностные и по сути самоочевидные или взяты из книг, написанных в эпоху существования Советского Союза, как например нижеследующее умозаключение автора.
The FSB employs various scenarios to position their agents or cooptees— reporting sources either paid or coerced—with proximity to foreigners. The initial approach often appears innocuous, such as a contact made at a conference or business meeting. However, certain recurring patterns emerge in FSB operations. A common tactic involves exploiting fear of extortion by the “Russian mafia” to manipulate foreign businesspeople into working for or reporting to the FSB. This may also involve the use of “swallows”—prostitutes hired by the service to entrap foreigners.
Another frequent approach takes place within Russian universities and research institutes. Every department interacting with foreigners in these institutions typically includes FSB agents who report back to the DKRO, the main counterintelligence arm of the FSB, or other UFSB regional handlers. Their primary task is to assess international students, identifying those who might be recruitable and to determine whether they are future government employees, current officials, or suspected intelligence officers.
<…>
All Russian scientific institutes as well as government institutions, whatever the size, will have at least one security officer, called an “OB” or offitser bezopasnosti in Russian. The OB is in charge of monitoring foreign contacts and reporting such instances to the FSB
Одна из глав посвящена очень узкой теме – коммуникации между шпионами. Автор детально разбирает, как осуществляется такая коммуникация между агентами ГРУ/СВР. Как мне кажется, эта информация слишком специфическая и мне, как обычному читателю, было всё это не интересно читать.
3. Dead Drop Loaded: If it is a Residency-to-Agent exchange, the SVR or GRU officer conducts their MP to ensure they are free of surveillance. The Russian intelligence officer then “loads” the Residency’s package of materials (money, instructions, technical gear, etc.) at the dead drop (tainik) site. RIS officers are trained to use trash bags or other insulators to double-wrap their packages of money or materials.
Проблема неконкретности текста, т.е. поверхности сказанного особо заметно и поэтому мне постоянно хотелось, чтобы автор был в том или ином вопросе более конкретен и не ограничивался лишь общими рассуждениями из серии «шпионы занимаются шпионажем», ведь это и так понятно даже не специалисту и для этого вовсе не нужно читать специализированные книги, такие как эта, к примеру.
In today’s SVR, Directorate NTR (formerly Directorate T) is responsible for collecting scientific and technological intelligence and targeting government and private/commercial science institutes and centers of learning abroad. Line X officers are the embassy-based representatives of SVR Directorate NTR, and they are responsible for collecting science and technology intelligence abroad.
<…>
The GRU Military-Technical Commission and other GRU officers deploy undercover abroad to assist. They are placed in organizations like Rostech and Rosoboronexport. Both are Russian arms exporters that operate globally, but they are also always on the watch to acquire, steal, or purchase foreign military technology.
В книге есть интересный момент, когда автор высказывает собственное мнение о том, почему путинская Россия демонстративно убивает своих оппонентов. В принципе, эта идея довольно здравая, частично пересекающаяся с моей идеей о причинах вторжения Путина в Украину в феврале 2022 года.
Many former intelligence veterans and other commentators have pointed out that it is certainly plausible that Putin does want all the world to know it was his decision and his guys that carried out these attempts against Litvinenko successfully, against Skripal and Navalny unsuccessfully, and finally against Navalny in prison to put an end to unfinished business and kill him.
<…>
The question is, why not do a better job of hiding the RIS hand or trying to conceal it at all?
<…>
As Ben Macintyre points out, Putin can’t afford to be seen as anything but brutal.
<…>
But the idea remains the same: a theatrical, symbolic act of state-sponsored homicide to send a warning to other would-be opponents, cow the Russian populace, and stun the world with its brazen brutality, all suffused with just enough mystery for a shrugging Kremlin denial.”
Тем не менее, ближе к концу, книга меня неприятно поразила своей стереотипностью, клише. Такое чувство, что автор знаком с русскими исключительно по анекдотам.
One of my strangest recollections of this was sitting down to eat with a RIO during a clandestine meeting, and I could tell he was agitated. This was early in my operational experience with Russians (I don’t want to specify the timeframe or location to protect him), so I was puzzled what made him so nervous. I offered him more food. He wasn’t satisfied. I asked him if the temperature was OK in the room, but he was still not happy. Finally, I offered him the minibar to see if he wanted some vodka. That hit the spot, as he quickly answered me, “Well, as the saying goes, we can’t have soup without vodka, can we?”
<…>
This is a critical point in dealing with Russians, and RIOs in particular: drinking alcohol (usually vodka, but not exclusively) is a part of their culture, and for IOs, it is embedded into their very fiber.
Такое чувство, что если русский не пьёт водку на завтрак, на обед и на ужин, значит это не настоящий русский, так же как если у американца нет ковбойских ботинок, и он/она не умеет ездить на лошади и стрелять из кольта «от бедра», значит он ненастоящий американец. Понятно. Вот как после таких заявлений можно всерьёз относиться к этой книге и к этому автору?
While current and longtime minister Sergey Lavrov appears to be trusted by Putin to some degree, as witnessed by his sheer longevity in office, there has been reporting to suggest he is not trusted completely by the president. According to some reporting on the Ukrainian invasion in February 2022, Lavrov did not know of the attack until possibly the final days or even hours before the attack.
Ещё одно очень странное заявление. Почему автор настолько уверен, что Лавров ничего не знал о готовящемся вторжении? Мне вот кажется, что он всё знал, ибо очень давно работает с Путиным и является крайне лояльным к нему человеком.
В общем, странная получилась книга, неоднозначная и очень поверхностная. Как такового анализа в книге нет.
This book is slightly better than "Russia's Hybrid Warfare Offensive Against the West", but, in essence, it is still the same hodgepodge of curious facts and news stories, such as the Litvinenko murder and the Skripal poisoning. In other words, this book fails to deliver the main thing—an in-depth investigation into the workings of Russian intelligence agencies. More accurately: the book simply compiles all the information available in the public domain, without offering any analysis of its own. This means that if the reader is already familiar with the basic or fundamental information about Russian intelligence agencies, he or she will find nothing new or interesting in this book. I would even go so far as to suggest that reading books about specific cases—such as *A Very Expensive Poison: The Assassination of Alexander Litvinenko and Putin’s War with the West,” which describes in detail how the Russian intelligence services killed Litvinenko, is far more interesting than reading a book like this one, which, as I noted above, is a collection of various pieces of information.
Yes, there are some interesting points in the book, but they are all very superficial and, in essence, self-evident or taken from books written during the Soviet era, such as the following conclusion by the author.
The FSB employs various scenarios to position their agents or cooptees— reporting sources either paid or coerced—with proximity to foreigners. The initial approach often appears innocuous, such as a contact made at a conference or business meeting. However, certain recurring patterns emerge in FSB operations. A common tactic involves exploiting fear of extortion by the “Russian mafia” to manipulate foreign businesspeople into working for or reporting to the FSB. This may also involve the use of “swallows”—prostitutes hired by the service to entrap foreigners.
Another frequent approach takes place within Russian universities and research institutes. Every department interacting with foreigners in these institutions typically includes FSB agents who report back to the DKRO, the main counterintelligence arm of the FSB, or other UFSB regional handlers. Their primary task is to assess international students, identifying those who might be recruitable and to determine whether they are future government employees, current officials, or suspected intelligence officers.
<…>
All Russian scientific institutes as well as government institutions, whatever the size, will have at least one security officer, called an “OB” or offitser bezopasnosti in Russian. The OB is in charge of monitoring foreign contacts and reporting such instances to the FSB
One of the chapters is devoted to a very narrow topic—communication between spies. The author examines in detail how such communication takes place between GRU/SVR agents. In my opinion, this information is too specialized, and as an ordinary reader, I found it all rather uninteresting to read.
3. Dead Drop Loaded: If it is a Residency-to-Agent exchange, the SVR or GRU officer conducts their MP to ensure they are free of surveillance. The Russian intelligence officer then “loads” the Residency’s package of materials (money, instructions, technical gear, etc.) at the dead drop (tainik) site. RIS officers are trained to use trash bags or other insulators to double-wrap their packages of money or materials.
The problem with the text’s vagueness—that is, its superficiality—is particularly noticeable, and so I constantly found myself wishing the author would be more specific on various issues and not limit himself to generalizations along the lines of “spies engage in espionage,” since that is obvious even to a non-specialist and doesn’t require reading specialized books like this one, for example.
In today’s SVR, Directorate NTR (formerly Directorate T) is responsible for collecting scientific and technological intelligence and targeting government and private/commercial science institutes and centers of learning abroad. Line X officers are the embassy-based representatives of SVR Directorate NTR, and they are responsible for collecting science and technology intelligence abroad.
<…>
The GRU Military-Technical Commission and other GRU officers deploy undercover abroad to assist. They are placed in organizations like Rostech and Rosoboronexport. Both are Russian arms exporters that operate globally, but they are also always on the watch to acquire, steal, or purchase foreign military technology.
There is an interesting point in the book where the author shares his own view on why Putin’s Russia so blatantly kills its opponents. In principle, this idea is quite sound and partly overlaps with my own view on the reasons behind Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
Many former intelligence veterans and other commentators have pointed out that it is certainly plausible that Putin does want all the world to know it was his decision and his guys that carried out these attempts against Litvinenko successfully, against Skripal and Navalny unsuccessfully, and finally against Navalny in prison to put an end to unfinished business and kill him.
<…>
The question is, why not do a better job of hiding the RIS hand or trying to conceal it at all?
<…>
As Ben Macintyre points out, Putin can’t afford to be seen as anything but brutal.
<…>
But the idea remains the same: a theatrical, symbolic act of state-sponsored homicide to send a warning to other would-be opponents, cow the Russian populace, and stun the world with its brazen brutality, all suffused with just enough mystery for a shrugging Kremlin denial.”
However, toward the end, the book struck me as unpleasantly full of stereotypes and clichés. It feels as though the author knows Russians only through jokes.
One of my strangest recollections of this was sitting down to eat with a RIO during a clandestine meeting, and I could tell he was agitated. This was early in my operational experience with Russians (I don’t want to specify the timeframe or location to protect him), so I was puzzled what made him so nervous. I offered him more food. He wasn’t satisfied. I asked him if the temperature was OK in the room, but he was still not happy. Finally, I offered him the minibar to see if he wanted some vodka. That hit the spot, as he quickly answered me, “Well, as the saying goes, we can’t have soup without vodka, can we?”
<…>
This is a critical point in dealing with Russians, and RIOs in particular: drinking alcohol (usually vodka, but not exclusively) is a part of their culture, and for IOs, it is embedded into their very fiber.
It feels like if a Russian doesn’t drink vodka for breakfast, lunch, and dinner, then he or she isn’t a real Russian—just as if an American doesn’t own cowboy boots, can’t ride a horse, and can’t draw a Colt “from the hip,” then he or she isn’t a real American. I see. How can anyone take this book and this author seriously after statements like that?
While current and longtime minister Sergey Lavrov appears to be trusted by Putin to some degree, as witnessed by his sheer longevity in office, there has been reporting to suggest he is not trusted completely by the president. According to some reporting on the Ukrainian invasion in February 2022, Lavrov did not know of the attack until possibly the final days or even hours before the attack.
Another very strange claim. Why is the author so certain that Lavrov knew nothing about the impending invasion? It seems to me that he knew everything, since he has been working with Putin for a very long time and is extremely loyal to him.
All in all, it’s a strange book—ambiguous and very superficial. There is no real analysis in the book.
Эта книга будет чуть лучше «Russia's Hybrid Warfare Offensive Against the West», однако, по сути, это всё та же мешанина из любопытных фактов, новостных историй по типу убийства Литвиненко и покушения на Скрепалей. Другими словами, эта книга не предлагает главного – глубокого исследования работы российских спецслужб. Более точно: книга просто суммирует всю ту информацию, что есть в открытом доступе, не предлагая при этом никакого собственного анализа. Это означает, что если читатель уже знаком с базовой или основной информацией о российских спецслужбах, он или она не найдут в этой книге ничего нового и интересного для себя. Я даже выскажу мысль, что читать книги об отдельных кейсах, как например книга «A Very Expensive Poison: The Assassination of Alexander Litvinenko and Putin's War with the West», в которой детально описывается, как российские спецслужбы убивали Литвиненко, намного интересней, чем читать такую вот книгу, которая является, как я отметил выше, сборником разной информации.
Да, в книге проскальзывают интересные моменты, но все они очень поверхностные и по сути самоочевидные или взяты из книг, написанных в эпоху существования Советского Союза, как например нижеследующее умозаключение автора.
The FSB employs various scenarios to position their agents or cooptees— reporting sources either paid or coerced—with proximity to foreigners. The initial approach often appears innocuous, such as a contact made at a conference or business meeting. However, certain recurring patterns emerge in FSB operations. A common tactic involves exploiting fear of extortion by the “Russian mafia” to manipulate foreign businesspeople into working for or reporting to the FSB. This may also involve the use of “swallows”—prostitutes hired by the service to entrap foreigners.
Another frequent approach takes place within Russian universities and research institutes. Every department interacting with foreigners in these institutions typically includes FSB agents who report back to the DKRO, the main counterintelligence arm of the FSB, or other UFSB regional handlers. Their primary task is to assess international students, identifying those who might be recruitable and to determine whether they are future government employees, current officials, or suspected intelligence officers.
<…>
All Russian scientific institutes as well as government institutions, whatever the size, will have at least one security officer, called an “OB” or offitser bezopasnosti in Russian. The OB is in charge of monitoring foreign contacts and reporting such instances to the FSB
Одна из глав посвящена очень узкой теме – коммуникации между шпионами. Автор детально разбирает, как осуществляется такая коммуникация между агентами ГРУ/СВР. Как мне кажется, эта информация слишком специфическая и мне, как обычному читателю, было всё это не интересно читать.
3. Dead Drop Loaded: If it is a Residency-to-Agent exchange, the SVR or GRU officer conducts their MP to ensure they are free of surveillance. The Russian intelligence officer then “loads” the Residency’s package of materials (money, instructions, technical gear, etc.) at the dead drop (tainik) site. RIS officers are trained to use trash bags or other insulators to double-wrap their packages of money or materials.
Проблема неконкретности текста, т.е. поверхности сказанного особо заметно и поэтому мне постоянно хотелось, чтобы автор был в том или ином вопросе более конкретен и не ограничивался лишь общими рассуждениями из серии «шпионы занимаются шпионажем», ведь это и так понятно даже не специалисту и для этого вовсе не нужно читать специализированные книги, такие как эта, к примеру.
In today’s SVR, Directorate NTR (formerly Directorate T) is responsible for collecting scientific and technological intelligence and targeting government and private/commercial science institutes and centers of learning abroad. Line X officers are the embassy-based representatives of SVR Directorate NTR, and they are responsible for collecting science and technology intelligence abroad.
<…>
The GRU Military-Technical Commission and other GRU officers deploy undercover abroad to assist. They are placed in organizations like Rostech and Rosoboronexport. Both are Russian arms exporters that operate globally, but they are also always on the watch to acquire, steal, or purchase foreign military technology.
В книге есть интересный момент, когда автор высказывает собственное мнение о том, почему путинская Россия демонстративно убивает своих оппонентов. В принципе, эта идея довольно здравая, частично пересекающаяся с моей идеей о причинах вторжения Путина в Украину в феврале 2022 года.
Many former intelligence veterans and other commentators have pointed out that it is certainly plausible that Putin does want all the world to know it was his decision and his guys that carried out these attempts against Litvinenko successfully, against Skripal and Navalny unsuccessfully, and finally against Navalny in prison to put an end to unfinished business and kill him.
<…>
The question is, why not do a better job of hiding the RIS hand or trying to conceal it at all?
<…>
As Ben Macintyre points out, Putin can’t afford to be seen as anything but brutal.
<…>
But the idea remains the same: a theatrical, symbolic act of state-sponsored homicide to send a warning to other would-be opponents, cow the Russian populace, and stun the world with its brazen brutality, all suffused with just enough mystery for a shrugging Kremlin denial.”
Тем не менее, ближе к концу, книга меня неприятно поразила своей стереотипностью, клише. Такое чувство, что автор знаком с русскими исключительно по анекдотам.
One of my strangest recollections of this was sitting down to eat with a RIO during a clandestine meeting, and I could tell he was agitated. This was early in my operational experience with Russians (I don’t want to specify the timeframe or location to protect him), so I was puzzled what made him so nervous. I offered him more food. He wasn’t satisfied. I asked him if the temperature was OK in the room, but he was still not happy. Finally, I offered him the minibar to see if he wanted some vodka. That hit the spot, as he quickly answered me, “Well, as the saying goes, we can’t have soup without vodka, can we?”
<…>
This is a critical point in dealing with Russians, and RIOs in particular: drinking alcohol (usually vodka, but not exclusively) is a part of their culture, and for IOs, it is embedded into their very fiber.
Такое чувство, что если русский не пьёт водку на завтрак, на обед и на ужин, значит это не настоящий русский, так же как если у американца нет ковбойских ботинок, и он/она не умеет ездить на лошади и стрелять из кольта «от бедра», значит он ненастоящий американец. Понятно. Вот как после таких заявлений можно всерьёз относиться к этой книге и к этому автору?
While current and longtime minister Sergey Lavrov appears to be trusted by Putin to some degree, as witnessed by his sheer longevity in office, there has been reporting to suggest he is not trusted completely by the president. According to some reporting on the Ukrainian invasion in February 2022, Lavrov did not know of the attack until possibly the final days or even hours before the attack.
Ещё одно очень странное заявление. Почему автор настолько уверен, что Лавров ничего не знал о готовящемся вторжении? Мне вот кажется, что он всё знал, ибо очень давно работает с Путиным и является крайне лояльным к нему человеком.
В общем, странная получилась книга, неоднозначная и очень поверхностная. Как такового анализа в книге нет.
This book is slightly better than "Russia's Hybrid Warfare Offensive Against the West", but, in essence, it is still the same hodgepodge of curious facts and news stories, such as the Litvinenko murder and the Skripal poisoning. In other words, this book fails to deliver the main thing—an in-depth investigation into the workings of Russian intelligence agencies. More accurately: the book simply compiles all the information available in the public domain, without offering any analysis of its own. This means that if the reader is already familiar with the basic or fundamental information about Russian intelligence agencies, he or she will find nothing new or interesting in this book. I would even go so far as to suggest that reading books about specific cases—such as *A Very Expensive Poison: The Assassination of Alexander Litvinenko and Putin’s War with the West,” which describes in detail how the Russian intelligence services killed Litvinenko, is far more interesting than reading a book like this one, which, as I noted above, is a collection of various pieces of information.
Yes, there are some interesting points in the book, but they are all very superficial and, in essence, self-evident or taken from books written during the Soviet era, such as the following conclusion by the author.
The FSB employs various scenarios to position their agents or cooptees— reporting sources either paid or coerced—with proximity to foreigners. The initial approach often appears innocuous, such as a contact made at a conference or business meeting. However, certain recurring patterns emerge in FSB operations. A common tactic involves exploiting fear of extortion by the “Russian mafia” to manipulate foreign businesspeople into working for or reporting to the FSB. This may also involve the use of “swallows”—prostitutes hired by the service to entrap foreigners.
Another frequent approach takes place within Russian universities and research institutes. Every department interacting with foreigners in these institutions typically includes FSB agents who report back to the DKRO, the main counterintelligence arm of the FSB, or other UFSB regional handlers. Their primary task is to assess international students, identifying those who might be recruitable and to determine whether they are future government employees, current officials, or suspected intelligence officers.
<…>
All Russian scientific institutes as well as government institutions, whatever the size, will have at least one security officer, called an “OB” or offitser bezopasnosti in Russian. The OB is in charge of monitoring foreign contacts and reporting such instances to the FSB
One of the chapters is devoted to a very narrow topic—communication between spies. The author examines in detail how such communication takes place between GRU/SVR agents. In my opinion, this information is too specialized, and as an ordinary reader, I found it all rather uninteresting to read.
3. Dead Drop Loaded: If it is a Residency-to-Agent exchange, the SVR or GRU officer conducts their MP to ensure they are free of surveillance. The Russian intelligence officer then “loads” the Residency’s package of materials (money, instructions, technical gear, etc.) at the dead drop (tainik) site. RIS officers are trained to use trash bags or other insulators to double-wrap their packages of money or materials.
The problem with the text’s vagueness—that is, its superficiality—is particularly noticeable, and so I constantly found myself wishing the author would be more specific on various issues and not limit himself to generalizations along the lines of “spies engage in espionage,” since that is obvious even to a non-specialist and doesn’t require reading specialized books like this one, for example.
In today’s SVR, Directorate NTR (formerly Directorate T) is responsible for collecting scientific and technological intelligence and targeting government and private/commercial science institutes and centers of learning abroad. Line X officers are the embassy-based representatives of SVR Directorate NTR, and they are responsible for collecting science and technology intelligence abroad.
<…>
The GRU Military-Technical Commission and other GRU officers deploy undercover abroad to assist. They are placed in organizations like Rostech and Rosoboronexport. Both are Russian arms exporters that operate globally, but they are also always on the watch to acquire, steal, or purchase foreign military technology.
There is an interesting point in the book where the author shares his own view on why Putin’s Russia so blatantly kills its opponents. In principle, this idea is quite sound and partly overlaps with my own view on the reasons behind Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
Many former intelligence veterans and other commentators have pointed out that it is certainly plausible that Putin does want all the world to know it was his decision and his guys that carried out these attempts against Litvinenko successfully, against Skripal and Navalny unsuccessfully, and finally against Navalny in prison to put an end to unfinished business and kill him.
<…>
The question is, why not do a better job of hiding the RIS hand or trying to conceal it at all?
<…>
As Ben Macintyre points out, Putin can’t afford to be seen as anything but brutal.
<…>
But the idea remains the same: a theatrical, symbolic act of state-sponsored homicide to send a warning to other would-be opponents, cow the Russian populace, and stun the world with its brazen brutality, all suffused with just enough mystery for a shrugging Kremlin denial.”
However, toward the end, the book struck me as unpleasantly full of stereotypes and clichés. It feels as though the author knows Russians only through jokes.
One of my strangest recollections of this was sitting down to eat with a RIO during a clandestine meeting, and I could tell he was agitated. This was early in my operational experience with Russians (I don’t want to specify the timeframe or location to protect him), so I was puzzled what made him so nervous. I offered him more food. He wasn’t satisfied. I asked him if the temperature was OK in the room, but he was still not happy. Finally, I offered him the minibar to see if he wanted some vodka. That hit the spot, as he quickly answered me, “Well, as the saying goes, we can’t have soup without vodka, can we?”
<…>
This is a critical point in dealing with Russians, and RIOs in particular: drinking alcohol (usually vodka, but not exclusively) is a part of their culture, and for IOs, it is embedded into their very fiber.
It feels like if a Russian doesn’t drink vodka for breakfast, lunch, and dinner, then he or she isn’t a real Russian—just as if an American doesn’t own cowboy boots, can’t ride a horse, and can’t draw a Colt “from the hip,” then he or she isn’t a real American. I see. How can anyone take this book and this author seriously after statements like that?
While current and longtime minister Sergey Lavrov appears to be trusted by Putin to some degree, as witnessed by his sheer longevity in office, there has been reporting to suggest he is not trusted completely by the president. According to some reporting on the Ukrainian invasion in February 2022, Lavrov did not know of the attack until possibly the final days or even hours before the attack.
Another very strange claim. Why is the author so certain that Lavrov knew nothing about the impending invasion? It seems to me that he knew everything, since he has been working with Putin for a very long time and is extremely loyal to him.
All in all, it’s a strange book—ambiguous and very superficial. There is no real analysis in the book.
June 24, 2026
This has been a great book so far. As someone who is just starting to dive deeper into the world of intelligence and U.S.-Russia competition, I’ve found it to be a comprehensive and accessible look at how Russia approaches intelligence. The book does a strong job of making the topic understandable and removing some of the initial mystery surrounding Russian intelligence operations.
I also appreciated how the author shows that Russian intelligence can be dangerous and effective, while also being reckless and flawed at times. It was especially interesting to see how the book connects Cold War-era tactics and intelligence practices to the modern Russia-Ukraine conflict.
Overall, this is a really good read for anyone interested in intelligence, Russian strategy, or U.S.-Russia competition.
I also appreciated how the author shows that Russian intelligence can be dangerous and effective, while also being reckless and flawed at times. It was especially interesting to see how the book connects Cold War-era tactics and intelligence practices to the modern Russia-Ukraine conflict.
Overall, this is a really good read for anyone interested in intelligence, Russian strategy, or U.S.-Russia competition.
August 4, 2026
A fascinating and highly readable look into Russian intelligence tradecraft. What makes Tradecraft, Tactics, and Dirty Tricks stand out is that Sean Wiswesser writes from real operational experience rather than simply analyzing espionage from the outside.
The book does a particularly good job explaining the mindset behind Russian intelligence; deception, manipulation, recruitment, surveillance, and active measures without turning the subject into either an academic textbook or a spy thriller. The connections to modern Russia and the war in Ukraine make it super relevant.
If you're interested in intelligence, Russia, espionage, or how states actually operate in the shadows, this is an excellent read. Accessible, informative, and full of details that change the way you think about intelligence work.
The book does a particularly good job explaining the mindset behind Russian intelligence; deception, manipulation, recruitment, surveillance, and active measures without turning the subject into either an academic textbook or a spy thriller. The connections to modern Russia and the war in Ukraine make it super relevant.
If you're interested in intelligence, Russia, espionage, or how states actually operate in the shadows, this is an excellent read. Accessible, informative, and full of details that change the way you think about intelligence work.
July 8, 2026
Thank you for a concise primer on the RIS, Mr. Wiswesser. As an easily-distracted reader, the combination of facts, personal anecdotes, and touches of humor made this such an easy read. I enjoyed how the chapters built up to the conclusion exploring the three-day “Special Military Operation” that spiraled out of control. Having the context to understand this active conflict (as of this review) made the information learned that much more significant.
Also… why did the epilogue make me emotional?
Also… why did the epilogue make me emotional?
July 11, 2026
Very technical analysis of Russian Intelligence Services history and current day work, but still somewhat accessible to a reader with no background in the Intelligence Community!
Editing with access to better reception to include the following:
I especially love how Sean breaks down and explains the similarities and differences the various agencies that make up the RIS, you can tell by the way he writes that he most certainly is an authority on the subject.
Editing with access to better reception to include the following:
I especially love how Sean breaks down and explains the similarities and differences the various agencies that make up the RIS, you can tell by the way he writes that he most certainly is an authority on the subject.
June 27, 2026
Sean Wiswesser’s book on Putin’s secret war against the West is an important and even essential read. He lays out the stunning information war Russia has expanded in recent years in an overt attempt to undermine our democracy. Wiswesser helps us understand so we can fight back! David S.
August 10, 2026
Exceptionally good book because it provides an excellent introduction into the subject matter by an expert who has a 30 years career in the intelligence community. It’s also not sugarcoating. It’s a very sobering book at the same time. It’s very balanced. This book should be mandatory in all schools.
August 1, 2026
A must read for practitioners and a great read for the lay person to understand how the Russian intelligence services operate
June 29, 2026
A very interesting book and unique because the author does not only describe tradecraft and dirty tricks of espionage but also add anecdotes and refers to actual Russian terminology. It is full of insight and makes it easier to understand Russian Intelligence Services and their legacy./Peter
July 3, 2026
On July 1, 2026, Wiswesser was a guest of Jonathan Fink
of Silicon Curtain. His discussion of Russian intelligence in Ukraine prompted me to buy the book.
His TLDR account of the war – his final, meatiest chapter – is as follows
• Russia has always celebrated secrecy, deception and spying. Putin’s fictional heroes in childhood were spies.
• Tsars and communist dictators all depended on their spy agencies for their power. Putin rose to power through Russia’s biggest spy organization, the FSB (Federal Security Service). In his presidency that service had more influence than other government organs.
• The FSB successfully orchestrated the invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the “little green men” takeover of Crimea in 2014. It strengthened their credibility with Putin, who had already favored them.
• General Gerasimov – still the head of the Russian Army – aligned himself with the spies by authoring and promoting a plan of “contactless war,” conducted using spy organization tactics such as disinformation and dirty tricks. The Army was reorganized accordingly, more heavily dependent on the GRU, or military intelligence., less on force of arms.
• The approach worked well enough in 2014. Russia was able to take over Crimea and the Donbas. They successfully bribed and cajoled Ukrainian officials into supporting or at least not opposing the Russian invasion.
• The tactics continued during the 2014-2022 lull, with the intelligence agencies constantly bombarding Ukraine with propaganda and provocations that did not rise to the level of acts of war. The intelligence organs retained and gained credibility.
• In 2022, the intelligence agencies projected that they could overwhelm all of Ukraine more or less the same way they had overrun Georgia, Crimea and the Donbas. However-
• Ukraine had changed. The ongoing strife in Donbas had made the citizenry wary. There was little sympathy for Russia among the Ukrainian people. Despite being heavily infiltrated by spies, the Ukrainian government resisted the attack.
• The atrocities in the beginning of the war solidified Ukrainian opposition to the Russians. What was supposed to be a “contactless war” became very much of a real war. The intelligence agencies were slow to get out of the way. The military was unprepared for a long slog.
This the one-page version does not come close to doing justice to Wiswesser’s Chapter ten, which covers in about twenty pages material that in turn deserves a full library of books yet to be written. My hope as a reviewer is that it prompts you to buy the book.
Wiswesser’s own story is interesting. He studied Russian in college and made it his project to get good enough to pass for a native. In two decades in Ukraine, I have met only a couple of Ukrainians whose English made me wonder if they were truly Ukrainian. I am in awe of Wiswesser’s accomplishment.
His appreciation of Russian culture is sincere. They are warm, especially when stoked by enough spirits. They generally despise, or at least have no respect for their government. This goes way back. Read Zinoviev’s Homo Sovieticus from Soviet times and the Marquis de Custine’s Letters from Russia two centuries ago.
The chapters are:
1. Sluzhbi – services: the main Russian intelligence services
2. Obucheniy i Podgotovka/ RIS (Russian Intelligence Service) Training and Personnel
3. Nelegali/Illegals: The Pride of Russian Intelligence
4. Naruzhka/Surveillance
5. Tainiki/RIS Street Tradecraft: Dead Drops, Agent Signals, and other Sticks and Bricks
6. Dirty Tricks: Double agents, Useful Idiots, and Swallows
7. Operativnaya Teknika/Operational Technology
8. RIS Special Operations, Sabotage and Wet Work
9. Aktivniye Meropriyatiye/ Active Measures
10. A Case Study: the RIS in the Ukraine War
Here are a few notes on the chapters.
1. The main services are the SVR – foreign intelligence service, FSB – internal, like the FBI and CIA combined, and GRU, military intelligence. They are separate, competing, and very well staffed. Hundreds of thousands of people. They are known not to be constrained by law or conventions and to act more ruthlessly than their counterparts in the west.
2. Training and personnel. Corruption reigns from top to bottom. Most people are on the take. Promotion and favorable assignments are based on personal connections. People have little respect for their superiors or organizations.
3. “Illegals” are agents working under false identities. The classic spy. They may be trained to be spies: foreign language, culture, counterfeit credentials and the whole thing. They are the most celebrated of spies. Wiswesser writes that many of them turn out not to be worth the investment. They are lazy, content to let Mother Russia support their lives in the much more comfortable west without producing much. They have characteristic Russian weaknesses: bragging, drinking, sloth and corruption, that render many ineffective.
4. Russia, like every other nation, watches its citizens. “The walls have ears.” Informers are vastly more numerous in repressive countries. On the other hand, the west has a strong advantage in technology.
5. Aldrich Ames, Walker and Hanssen, Americans successfully recruited as Russian spies used the classic spy tradecraft, described here in some detail.
6. The Russians use swallows, or honeypots, as sexual bait to get compromising material on Americans. Kompromat. The kind of stuff that Epstein got on Bill Gates. Americans don’t use it so much. First, it is immoral. But also, it doesn’t work. Russians expect one another to steal, have mistresses and such. Useful idiots used to be people who believed in communism. Not very many today believe in Russia. There is no mention of the Russophiles supporting Russia’s current war – Col. Macgregor, Gonzalo Lira and others. Do they believe, or are they on Moscow’s payroll?
7. All spies need communications technology. This discussion describes the ingenious tricks used before the Internet went worldwide. It has changed now that everything is encrypted.
8. Russia uses assassination and other such devices. Once again, harder to do now that everybody leaves a digital trail via surveillance cameras, cell phone locations, bank transactions and so on. The cases discussed, such as Skripal and Navalny, are few and dated.
9. The Russians actively interfere in elections. It has been painfully obvious in the recent elections in Georgia, Moldova, Hungary, Slovakia and elsewhere. Their meddling worked in Ukraine in 2008, but has become less effective since. Wiswesser says that Russia will often have agents advocating both sides, in an attempt to discredit democratic systems in general. Your reviewer is a victim. I believe that there was extensive fraud via mail-in ballots and such in US presidential elections, noticeable since “hanging chad” in 2000.
Wiswesser seems willing to believe that democracy is alive and well in modern Europe and that the Russians’ meddling in supporting Brexit and nationalist organizations such as UKIP, Rally Nationale and AfD is the source of Europe’s problems. Others would claim that Europe has developed its own unassailable nomenclatura in the form of the long-dominant political parties and the EU bureaucracy.
10 The Ukrainian War, as reported above.
Wiswesser believes that American democracy is basically sound and worth defending. He believes in the integrity of the intelligence services, especially his own CIA. He recounts his pleasure working with many cadres of loyal and highly effective agents.
There is no doubt a lot of truth to his account, but also accounts that take a different view as described in Deadly deceits, Legacy of ashes, and No place to hide. He is no doubt right that, whatever its faults, the United States’ system is better than that of the Russians. All of the west needs to defend itself against the Russians, starting with their intelligence apparatus.
In conclusion, this book gives this American, living in Kyiv through four and a half years of war, the best account he has read about why Russia started this mess, and why it is turning out so badly for them.
of Silicon Curtain. His discussion of Russian intelligence in Ukraine prompted me to buy the book.
His TLDR account of the war – his final, meatiest chapter – is as follows
• Russia has always celebrated secrecy, deception and spying. Putin’s fictional heroes in childhood were spies.
• Tsars and communist dictators all depended on their spy agencies for their power. Putin rose to power through Russia’s biggest spy organization, the FSB (Federal Security Service). In his presidency that service had more influence than other government organs.
• The FSB successfully orchestrated the invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the “little green men” takeover of Crimea in 2014. It strengthened their credibility with Putin, who had already favored them.
• General Gerasimov – still the head of the Russian Army – aligned himself with the spies by authoring and promoting a plan of “contactless war,” conducted using spy organization tactics such as disinformation and dirty tricks. The Army was reorganized accordingly, more heavily dependent on the GRU, or military intelligence., less on force of arms.
• The approach worked well enough in 2014. Russia was able to take over Crimea and the Donbas. They successfully bribed and cajoled Ukrainian officials into supporting or at least not opposing the Russian invasion.
• The tactics continued during the 2014-2022 lull, with the intelligence agencies constantly bombarding Ukraine with propaganda and provocations that did not rise to the level of acts of war. The intelligence organs retained and gained credibility.
• In 2022, the intelligence agencies projected that they could overwhelm all of Ukraine more or less the same way they had overrun Georgia, Crimea and the Donbas. However-
• Ukraine had changed. The ongoing strife in Donbas had made the citizenry wary. There was little sympathy for Russia among the Ukrainian people. Despite being heavily infiltrated by spies, the Ukrainian government resisted the attack.
• The atrocities in the beginning of the war solidified Ukrainian opposition to the Russians. What was supposed to be a “contactless war” became very much of a real war. The intelligence agencies were slow to get out of the way. The military was unprepared for a long slog.
This the one-page version does not come close to doing justice to Wiswesser’s Chapter ten, which covers in about twenty pages material that in turn deserves a full library of books yet to be written. My hope as a reviewer is that it prompts you to buy the book.
Wiswesser’s own story is interesting. He studied Russian in college and made it his project to get good enough to pass for a native. In two decades in Ukraine, I have met only a couple of Ukrainians whose English made me wonder if they were truly Ukrainian. I am in awe of Wiswesser’s accomplishment.
His appreciation of Russian culture is sincere. They are warm, especially when stoked by enough spirits. They generally despise, or at least have no respect for their government. This goes way back. Read Zinoviev’s Homo Sovieticus from Soviet times and the Marquis de Custine’s Letters from Russia two centuries ago.
The chapters are:
1. Sluzhbi – services: the main Russian intelligence services
2. Obucheniy i Podgotovka/ RIS (Russian Intelligence Service) Training and Personnel
3. Nelegali/Illegals: The Pride of Russian Intelligence
4. Naruzhka/Surveillance
5. Tainiki/RIS Street Tradecraft: Dead Drops, Agent Signals, and other Sticks and Bricks
6. Dirty Tricks: Double agents, Useful Idiots, and Swallows
7. Operativnaya Teknika/Operational Technology
8. RIS Special Operations, Sabotage and Wet Work
9. Aktivniye Meropriyatiye/ Active Measures
10. A Case Study: the RIS in the Ukraine War
Here are a few notes on the chapters.
1. The main services are the SVR – foreign intelligence service, FSB – internal, like the FBI and CIA combined, and GRU, military intelligence. They are separate, competing, and very well staffed. Hundreds of thousands of people. They are known not to be constrained by law or conventions and to act more ruthlessly than their counterparts in the west.
2. Training and personnel. Corruption reigns from top to bottom. Most people are on the take. Promotion and favorable assignments are based on personal connections. People have little respect for their superiors or organizations.
3. “Illegals” are agents working under false identities. The classic spy. They may be trained to be spies: foreign language, culture, counterfeit credentials and the whole thing. They are the most celebrated of spies. Wiswesser writes that many of them turn out not to be worth the investment. They are lazy, content to let Mother Russia support their lives in the much more comfortable west without producing much. They have characteristic Russian weaknesses: bragging, drinking, sloth and corruption, that render many ineffective.
4. Russia, like every other nation, watches its citizens. “The walls have ears.” Informers are vastly more numerous in repressive countries. On the other hand, the west has a strong advantage in technology.
5. Aldrich Ames, Walker and Hanssen, Americans successfully recruited as Russian spies used the classic spy tradecraft, described here in some detail.
6. The Russians use swallows, or honeypots, as sexual bait to get compromising material on Americans. Kompromat. The kind of stuff that Epstein got on Bill Gates. Americans don’t use it so much. First, it is immoral. But also, it doesn’t work. Russians expect one another to steal, have mistresses and such. Useful idiots used to be people who believed in communism. Not very many today believe in Russia. There is no mention of the Russophiles supporting Russia’s current war – Col. Macgregor, Gonzalo Lira and others. Do they believe, or are they on Moscow’s payroll?
7. All spies need communications technology. This discussion describes the ingenious tricks used before the Internet went worldwide. It has changed now that everything is encrypted.
8. Russia uses assassination and other such devices. Once again, harder to do now that everybody leaves a digital trail via surveillance cameras, cell phone locations, bank transactions and so on. The cases discussed, such as Skripal and Navalny, are few and dated.
9. The Russians actively interfere in elections. It has been painfully obvious in the recent elections in Georgia, Moldova, Hungary, Slovakia and elsewhere. Their meddling worked in Ukraine in 2008, but has become less effective since. Wiswesser says that Russia will often have agents advocating both sides, in an attempt to discredit democratic systems in general. Your reviewer is a victim. I believe that there was extensive fraud via mail-in ballots and such in US presidential elections, noticeable since “hanging chad” in 2000.
Wiswesser seems willing to believe that democracy is alive and well in modern Europe and that the Russians’ meddling in supporting Brexit and nationalist organizations such as UKIP, Rally Nationale and AfD is the source of Europe’s problems. Others would claim that Europe has developed its own unassailable nomenclatura in the form of the long-dominant political parties and the EU bureaucracy.
10 The Ukrainian War, as reported above.
Wiswesser believes that American democracy is basically sound and worth defending. He believes in the integrity of the intelligence services, especially his own CIA. He recounts his pleasure working with many cadres of loyal and highly effective agents.
There is no doubt a lot of truth to his account, but also accounts that take a different view as described in Deadly deceits, Legacy of ashes, and No place to hide. He is no doubt right that, whatever its faults, the United States’ system is better than that of the Russians. All of the west needs to defend itself against the Russians, starting with their intelligence apparatus.
In conclusion, this book gives this American, living in Kyiv through four and a half years of war, the best account he has read about why Russia started this mess, and why it is turning out so badly for them.
July 6, 2026
The problem with talking about Russia is much the same as the problem with talking about emerging technologies: few people truly understand the subject, yet many are eager to use it to advance their own agendas: making money, settling professional scores, or promoting a particular worldview.
If you've ever tried to learn Russian, you've probably encountered someone who thinks the language unlocks entirely new dimensions of human understanding. It's now too common to hear respected academics or commentators begin a sentence with something like, "What Russia understands about soft power, hard power, military conflict, or the international order is..." before simply projecting their own beliefs onto an entire country. To the average Russian, these sweeping claims must sound baffling, as they learn in real-time they possess some inherited cultural memory that dictates how they think.
This is what makes Sean M. Wiswesser's new book (and the podcast appearances that recently brought him wider attention) so refreshing. He avoids both extremes. Russia is neither portrayed as a mysterious, spirit-state plotting out of frozen forests, manipulating world events through esoteric psychological insight. Nor is it dismissed as a nation of incompetent, drunken buffoons incapable of functioning, let alone conducting sophisticated intelligence operations.
Instead, Wiswesser writes as a genuine specialist: someone with deep respect for Russia and the Russian people, while remaining clear-eyed about the fact that the Russian state is fundamentally hostile to democracy and the Western liberal order. Although he only touches on it briefly, the book itself also becomes an argument for the importance of specialization in international affairs.
Throughout, small anecdotes illustrate why local knowledge matters. For example, a seemingly mundane story about wanting a job at a meat-packing plant only makes sense once you understand how deeply corruption and theft permeate everyday life. Likewise, Wiswesser's confident use of Russian terminology helps convey concepts that don't translate neatly into English. The overall impression is that he wrote the book with a sense of Nietzschean urgency, trying to compress as much knowledge as possible into as concise volume as he can.
In that respect, he succeeds. The book covers the structure of the Russian state, but unlike the dry, institution-focused accounts common in academic texts, Wiswesser makes a genuine effort to show what it actually feels like to live within the system and why it functions as it does. The institutions become understandable not simply as bureaucratic structures, but as lived experiences shaped by incentives, corruption, and informal norms. One memorable example is his story of a young Russian intelligence recruit who failed to receive top marks because his instructor had been bribed with vodka. As a consolation, the recruit was given some of the vodka himself to ease the disappointment. I found his day-in-the-life of a RIO official extremely fun to read, and again does much to dispel the idea of Russian incompetence/malevolence. Anyone that has spent anytime inside a large, trundling bureaucracy (public or private sector) will appreciate and sympathise with members of the RIO.
While writing my dissertation on Russo-Sino-American relations, I often wished a book like this had existed. It's concise, practical, and informed by the kind of insight that only comes from years of close engagement with Russia. More importantly, it feels lived-in. Rather than simply describing institutions and policies, it helps the reader understand the social and psychological pressures that shape the people operating within them, while also offering a primer on the MO of the Russian intelligence service and it's unique place in Russian society (especially under Putin).
If you've ever tried to learn Russian, you've probably encountered someone who thinks the language unlocks entirely new dimensions of human understanding. It's now too common to hear respected academics or commentators begin a sentence with something like, "What Russia understands about soft power, hard power, military conflict, or the international order is..." before simply projecting their own beliefs onto an entire country. To the average Russian, these sweeping claims must sound baffling, as they learn in real-time they possess some inherited cultural memory that dictates how they think.
This is what makes Sean M. Wiswesser's new book (and the podcast appearances that recently brought him wider attention) so refreshing. He avoids both extremes. Russia is neither portrayed as a mysterious, spirit-state plotting out of frozen forests, manipulating world events through esoteric psychological insight. Nor is it dismissed as a nation of incompetent, drunken buffoons incapable of functioning, let alone conducting sophisticated intelligence operations.
Instead, Wiswesser writes as a genuine specialist: someone with deep respect for Russia and the Russian people, while remaining clear-eyed about the fact that the Russian state is fundamentally hostile to democracy and the Western liberal order. Although he only touches on it briefly, the book itself also becomes an argument for the importance of specialization in international affairs.
Throughout, small anecdotes illustrate why local knowledge matters. For example, a seemingly mundane story about wanting a job at a meat-packing plant only makes sense once you understand how deeply corruption and theft permeate everyday life. Likewise, Wiswesser's confident use of Russian terminology helps convey concepts that don't translate neatly into English. The overall impression is that he wrote the book with a sense of Nietzschean urgency, trying to compress as much knowledge as possible into as concise volume as he can.
In that respect, he succeeds. The book covers the structure of the Russian state, but unlike the dry, institution-focused accounts common in academic texts, Wiswesser makes a genuine effort to show what it actually feels like to live within the system and why it functions as it does. The institutions become understandable not simply as bureaucratic structures, but as lived experiences shaped by incentives, corruption, and informal norms. One memorable example is his story of a young Russian intelligence recruit who failed to receive top marks because his instructor had been bribed with vodka. As a consolation, the recruit was given some of the vodka himself to ease the disappointment. I found his day-in-the-life of a RIO official extremely fun to read, and again does much to dispel the idea of Russian incompetence/malevolence. Anyone that has spent anytime inside a large, trundling bureaucracy (public or private sector) will appreciate and sympathise with members of the RIO.
While writing my dissertation on Russo-Sino-American relations, I often wished a book like this had existed. It's concise, practical, and informed by the kind of insight that only comes from years of close engagement with Russia. More importantly, it feels lived-in. Rather than simply describing institutions and policies, it helps the reader understand the social and psychological pressures that shape the people operating within them, while also offering a primer on the MO of the Russian intelligence service and it's unique place in Russian society (especially under Putin).
July 21, 2026
Tradecraft, Tactics, and Dirty Tricks by Sean Wiswesser, former senior operations officer with the CIA, leverages his expertise and years in U.S. Intelligence to share an insightful examination of Russia's intelligence apparatus, including espionage, influence, cyber campaigns, and covert action. Wiswesser seamlessly integrates his operational background with doctrinal analysis of adversarial tradecraft, most notably examining ten aspects of Russian intelligence tradecraft, ranging from traditional espionage operations to the elusive hybrid tactics associated with contemporary warfare. The book notably provides readers with a comprehensive understanding of how Russian intelligence services employ these methods to manipulate the perceptions and decision-making of allied policymakers, while simultaneously offering valuable insights for current and future intelligence professionals, students, and analysts.
August 14, 2026
Churchill said "The further backward you look, the further forward you can see." Without question, this book does just that and more. It's essential reading for any student pursuing studies in security, foreign policy, national security law, history, or intelligence, career professionals at any level working in both the public & private sector across all agencies and industries, and especially anyone seeking to educate themselves and understand the RIS from a perspective that is extremely rare to access. And for those who think this information doesn't apply to you: it does. This is not a text you read once; this is a text one should read again, reference often, and recommend to others. Knowledge & awareness are a powerful defense tool and this book gives everyone, everywhere access to understanding the what, how, and why of the RIS by learning the past (and present) to better protect the "now and later."
July 10, 2026
Tradecraft, Tactics, and Dirty Tricks provides an excellent, deeply detailed inner look into the complex world of Russian intelligence services. Wiswesser does a fantastic job breaking down how these operations function in the real world rather than how they are romanticized in fiction.
What makes this book a must-read, however, is that it extends far beyond just one nation. While Russia is the main focus, reading this book allows you to gain a macro-level, general understanding of how every major intelligence agency operates. The reality is that global espionage tactics are incredibly similar across borders; agencies constantly learn from one another by imitation, adapting the same core playbook to their own strategic needs.
Whether you are a seasoned national security enthusiast or just looking for a fascinating primer on global spycraft, this is highly recommended!
What makes this book a must-read, however, is that it extends far beyond just one nation. While Russia is the main focus, reading this book allows you to gain a macro-level, general understanding of how every major intelligence agency operates. The reality is that global espionage tactics are incredibly similar across borders; agencies constantly learn from one another by imitation, adapting the same core playbook to their own strategic needs.
Whether you are a seasoned national security enthusiast or just looking for a fascinating primer on global spycraft, this is highly recommended!
June 27, 2026
THE DEFINITIVE BOOK ON RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE:
Sean distills decades of hard-target intelligence collection into an easily understandable book. He goes well beyond the usual ‘No shit, there I was…’ war stories and delivers practical knowledge that regular citizens can actually use.
This book is relevant for everyone from tech startup founders and international business travelers to social media sleuths, investigative journalists , expats, and newly elected politicians. It’s also required reading if you consider yourself a student of history, a follower of international affairs, an espionage enthusiast, a Russophile, a military strategist, or someone who just wants a damn good read👍🏼🙏🏼!
Sean distills decades of hard-target intelligence collection into an easily understandable book. He goes well beyond the usual ‘No shit, there I was…’ war stories and delivers practical knowledge that regular citizens can actually use.
This book is relevant for everyone from tech startup founders and international business travelers to social media sleuths, investigative journalists , expats, and newly elected politicians. It’s also required reading if you consider yourself a student of history, a follower of international affairs, an espionage enthusiast, a Russophile, a military strategist, or someone who just wants a damn good read👍🏼🙏🏼!
August 24, 2026
I found this factual account of Russia's intelligence services (RIS) in the modern world, by a former CIA operative, hard to get into at first. The opening chapters contain what is essentially a catalogue of the RIS's structure and modus operandi. This is coloured with some short examples of, first instance, spies' activities in the USA and the ways in which American counter-intelligence monitored and exposed them. However, it is not until the closing chapters, containing accounts of RIS involvement in Ukraine and the author's interactions with Russian agents, that we get a real sense of the services' impact at both the state and personal level.
May 23, 2026
Tradecraft, Tactics, and Dirty Tricks delivers an engaging and highly informative exploration of Russian intelligence operations and modern espionage. Drawing on decades of CIA experience, Sean M. Wiswesser examines the methods, mindset, and global reach of the SVR, GRU, and FSB, offering readers valuable insight into deception, surveillance, sabotage, and hybrid warfare. Combining firsthand expertise with accessible analysis, the book provides a timely look at the evolving landscape of international intelligence and geopolitical conflict.
July 1, 2026
Whether you're a fan of espionage thrillers, you're a history buff or you actually pay attention to NatSec/ global issues, this book is for you. Sean pulls back the curtain and escorts you into & through the real world of intelligence. Tradecraft, Tactics and Dirty Tricks will give you an insightful course on the Russian Intelligence services so you can better understand what is really going on in today's Cold War between Russia, NATO & America in particular. Here's a great chance to add some HD color to those Tom Clancy & Vince Flynn novels.
July 10, 2026
Rare chance to read such a real, relevant and comprehensive guide into Russian intelligence world. Written by true subject matter expert, in a way that not only discloses much of the unknown (to the public) details of Moscow's intel modus operandi, but also reveal how seasoned Western analysts and operations staff interpret entangled relations and interests inside dark underground of "siloviki" realm. Highly recommended.
June 26, 2026
This is a great read. Sean Wiswesser does a masterful job of mixing high-level academic research and knowledge with expert-level operational experience to paint an authoritative and comprehensive picture of the Russian Intelligence Services. His analysis of Putin’s actions and motivations is also first rate.
June 25, 2026
Tradecraft, Tactics, and Dirty Tricks is an engaging look inside the world of Russian intelligence and the methods the Kremlin uses to advance its interests. The book does a great job explaining influence operations in a way that is accessible without sacrificing depth. It's an excellent read for anyone interested in intelligence or modern national security.
June 26, 2026
Absolutely fantastic, a must read. This is an insightful account of methods and tradecraft used by the Russian Intelligence Services (RIS), based on many years of experience by the author. The book is an honest and grounded contribution to intelligence literature, a must read for security and business professionals, academics and those in the wider intelligence enterprise.
July 15, 2026
A phenomenal effort and contribution to this field of work. Hope others will read and see why,
Also look at the Editorial Reviews too on Amazon, they speak for themselves:…Spy Historian H. Keith Melton, Tom Clancy novelist MP Woodward, 2 Dep. Directors CIA, Army War College and many more endorsements!
Also look at the Editorial Reviews too on Amazon, they speak for themselves:…Spy Historian H. Keith Melton, Tom Clancy novelist MP Woodward, 2 Dep. Directors CIA, Army War College and many more endorsements!
July 31, 2026
A good overview, but I was a bit disappointed by the lack of detail. It almost became a list of references for further reading, and a table of contents for things to read up on.
I got the book because the author was great in an interview in a podcast, and I don't regret reading it, but yeah, not quite the book I expected.
I got the book because the author was great in an interview in a podcast, and I don't regret reading it, but yeah, not quite the book I expected.
June 25, 2026
An incredible read. Such an important piece for anyone interested in international affairs, the intelligence community, politics, or just passionate about their country.
Beautifully and meticulously written. I HIGHLY recommend this book!!
Beautifully and meticulously written. I HIGHLY recommend this book!!
August 31, 2026
This is a sweeping overview of Russian Intelligence Services. Doesn't go into too much detail and I think the author made it very apparent he was cautious not to do so. There are a lot of references to other materials, and an extensive bibliography in the back for further reading.
June 26, 2026
The author did a really hard job to make it interesting for a wide audience to learn about a dangerous enemy and treat it seriously. Highly relevant.
July 15, 2026
An impressive work, and fast read packed with great spy stories, worth your tjme!!
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