Fateful Hours: The Collapse of the Weimar Republic

by Volker Ullrich, Jefferson Chase (Translator)

Demokratien sind fragil. Freiheiten, die fest errungen scheinen, können verspielt werden. Wenige historische Ereignisse verdeutlichen dies so eindringlich wie das Scheitern der Weimarer Republik. Volker Ullrich erzählt eines der größten Dramen der Weltgeschichte – anschaulich, spannend und nahe an den handelnden Personen. Chancen blieben ungenutzt, Alternativen wurden verspielt. Nichts war zwangsläufig oder unvermeidbar. Die Schicksalsstunden einer Demokratie, es gab sie von den Anfängen in der Revolution von 1918 bis zu den verhängnisvollen Tagen im Januar 1933. Es kommt auf die konkreten Handlungen einzelner Personen an – damals wie heute. Eine Lektüre, die beklemmende Parallelen zur Gegenwart zeigt.

Die Geburt der Weimarer Republik stand unter einem denkbar ungünstigen Stern. Das deutsche Kaiserreich hatte den Weltkrieg krachend verloren. Der Versailler Vertrag legte dem besiegten Land harte Bedingungen auf. Eine nicht abreißende Kette von Krisen – unterbrochen nur durch eine Phase scheinbarer Stabilisierung Mitte der 20er Jahre – erschütterte die Republik. Doch trotz aller Belastungen – das Experiment der ersten deutschen Demokratie war nicht von allem Anfang an auf ein ruhmloses Ende angelegt. In seinem packenden Buch zeigt der renommierte Historiker und Publizist Volker Ullrich, dass es immer wieder Gelegenheiten gab, die Weichen anders zu stellen, von der Gründungsphase der Republik bis zum Januar 1933. So ist Ullrichs Buch auch eine eindringliche Wir haben es in der Hand, ob die Demokratie siegt oder scheitert.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Germany, Politics, European History, German Literature, World War II

384 pages, Hardcover

First published November 11, 2025

About the author

Volker Ullrich was born in Celle. He studied history, literature, philosophy and education at the University of Hamburg. From 1966 to 1969 he was assistant to the Hamburg’s Egmont Zechlin Chair. He graduated in 1975 after a dissertation on the Hamburg labour movement of the early 20th Century, after which he worked as a Hamburg school teacher. He was, for a time, a lecturer in politics at the Lüneburg University, and in 1988 he became a research fellow at Hamburg’s Foundation for 20th-century Social History. Since 1990 Ullrich has been the head of the political section of the weekly newspaper Die Zeit.
Ullrich has published articles and books on 19th- and 20th-century history. In 1996 he reviewed the thesis postulated in Daniel Goldhagen’s book Hitler's Willing Executioners that provoked fresh debate among historians.
In 1992 he was awarded the Alfred Kerr Prize for literary criticism, and, in 2008, received an honorary doctorate from the University of Jena.

Reviews

[Alain Acevedo]

tengo una sensación de contrariedad tras terminar este libro porque, por una parte, lo he leído rapidísimo y me ha interesado mucho pero, por otra, creo que trata un tema complejo desde una perspectiva tan simple que, en realidad, no me parece que contribuya demasiado arrojar luz sobre un periodo histórico del que, además, se ha escrito tanto

me parece una crónica espectacular, escrita por un veterano periodista para ser devorada por los lectores. creo que cumple su objetivo de explicar cómo los movimientos en la alta política contribuyeron a que Hitler alcanzara el poder y, por ello, contribuye a defender de forma efectiva la tesis del autor que, en sus propias palabras, se puede resumir en que "lo único que la ciencia histórica puede decir con certeza sobre el futuro es que será diferente de como se lo imaginan las personas del presente. todo depende de manera decisiva de cómo actúen determinadas personas en situaciones concretas". y creo que justo esta última frase resume bien mi problema con el libro

creo que entender la historia como una sucesión de acontecimientos políticos protagonizados por grandes personajes que parecen actuar como si se encontraran aislados del contexto social, político y económico en el que operan nos aboca a no entender nada sobre el pasado de las sociedades que habitamos. en este libro, no se menciona ni una sola vez el nombre de mussolini, no se dedica media página a explicar la estructura económica de la alemania de entreguerras, no se habla del día a día de los ciudadanos de la república de weimar, no se hace el mínimo esfuerzo por exponer cómo funcionaban los sindicatos o los medios de comunicación. no hay nada de sociología electoral, nada de filosofía política que ayude a entender por qué spd y kpd siempre estuvieron enfrentados, nada sobre las razones por las cuales el sistema institucional en el que se mueven los personajes que desfilan por estas páginas fue diseñado como fue diseñado. los protagonistas toman decisiones como si flotaran en el éter y sus procesos decisorios no se vieran influidos por tendencias económicas, sociales y políticas que se encontraban presentes también en otros Estados europeos de la década de 1920 y donde las cosas no sucedieron tal y como lo hicieron en alemania

creo que el libro es víctima de una concepción simplista del devenir histórico que funciona desde el punto de vista cognitivo como lo hace la creencia en grandes conspiraciones globales que ayudan a explicar el mundo: un pequeño grupo de personas tiene el destino de la humanidad en sus manos y de sus decisiones depende qué va a ser de nosotros. creo que la realidad es mucho más compleja que esto y, si bien existieron en weimar y en la actualidad individuos en el sector industrial o el mundo político con gran poder personal, es imprescindible prestar atención al contexto en el que tomaban sus decisiones para entender por qué las cosas sucedieron como sucedieron

hay otros libros muy centrados en los movimientos de la alta política que sí me gustan y creo que aportan al debate historiográfico sobre los acontecimientos que tratan (se me ocurre kristina spohr en después del muro-sobre el fin de la guerra fría- o serhii plokhy en el último imperio -sobre la disolución de la unión soviética). debido a todos los aspectos que menciono que creo que deja sin tratar, no me termina de quedar claro qué aporta este al estudio de la caída de la república de weimar que no se conociera ya, porque tampoco consulta ninguna fuente novedosa ni ofrece una interpretación que no se lleve repitiendo unas cuantas décadas

me lo he pasado bien leyéndolo pero me deja sabor de boca raro porque creo que ha sido más por haber pasado por él buscándole puntos débiles que por haberme retado o enseñado cosas que no supiera. en fin, no está mal pero creo que hay libros sobre este periodo que ayudan bastante más a entender que este

[Maxi · Rating 5 out of 5]

Ganz hervorragendes Buch, das zwar sachlich aber dennoch spannend die Zeit der Weimarer Republik hin zum Dritten Reich skizziert und dabei keine Akteure außer Acht lässt. Es ist weniger nur eine Erklärung zur Entstehung des Dritten Reiches, sondern zeichnet vielmehr ein wirklich umfassendes Bild der politischen Entwicklungen in der Weimarer Republik. Wirklich lesenswert.

[Marks54 · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a history of the events leading to the fall of the Weimar Republic and the rise of Adolf Hitler and the Third Reich. It is written by Volker Ulrich, an exceptional historian and the author of a two volume Hitler biography.

Why this book and why now? If one follows current events and has read some history, it is not difficult to run into news accounts and attempts at explanation of a drift among traditional democracies towards greater authoritarian rule. The US in the second Trump administration features prominently in these, although there have been developments in Eastern and Western Europe. An obvious question is what history has to offer in potential explanations for these developments. The European totalitarians of the 1920s and 1930s are clear targets of attention and of these none is more prominent than Hitler. So it should not be surprising that a distinguished scholar and the Nazi era would produce a book raises questions about whether the Nazi dictatorship was a necessary development or whether it could have been averted, or at least developed differently, had event proceeded in different ways. Ullrich convincingly shows that the rise of Hitler to power - and all that followed from that - was by no means assured and it was possible that the Weimar Republic’s collapse was not necessary but could have been forestalled have events gone different ways.

But wait a second! What is one to make of this analysis? The history is well known - this is one of the most studied periods of modern history and many of the facts seem clear. The key to evaluating this effort is not the facts themselves but the “what if?” Judgments that go with them. How to evaluate analysis based on hypotheticals like these?

The problem for me is that these hypotheticals - these little changes in events that might have changed the more macro outcomes - did not happen. Not only that - but the chains of different events that might have shifted outcomes also did not happen. This is not just my claim but it is built into the arguments being offered by assumption.

So what? What is the problem with arguing from “What if”? If the few events that I was focusing on did happen to change, it is very likely (at least to me) that other events would have also changed. Social reality is highly interconnected (networked?). How many other events would change and which ones? Who knows? If I don’t know which events would changes along with the events I was focusing on, how to I know what the overall result of my “do over “ would be?

In behavioral decision research this is sometimes referred to as the “simulation heuristic”. The typical example for this involves missing some scheduled event. Suppose I am trying to catch a 9am flight. Getting ready for travel and driving to the airport are complex and time-consuming. So I get delayed and end up arriving at the airport at 11am. Once I get there, however, I find out that my plane had been delayed and only finally took off at 10:45am -just before I arrived. Once I realized that, it would not take much prompting for me to start calculating how things might have been different if I had only left a little earlier, taken a different route, driven faster, and the like. All of this has nothing to do with my missed plane and is more plausibly understood as a mind game that I play to make sense out of my frustration at missing the plane. The problem is that I am very capable of ginning up hypotheticals but am unable to have any of them compete for attention with what actually happened. It sure sounds good, but how does my mental invention get beyond the hypothetical?

That is the same problem I have with “what if” history. For the “Fateful Hours”, Ullrich has done a fine job at explaining the implications of a series of decisions points in the Weimar Republic spanning the entire length of the republic. That is the reason for my rating. This made for much better explanation but still does not get around the facts that Hitler came to power in January 1933.

Besides, whatever the links between Weimar contingencies and Hitler, I am much less clear of the implications for this analysis as it applies to the second Trump administration. That analysis will depend on events that have yet to happen and logics that are as yet unclear.

I still recommend the book.

[Gabriela]

Lo terminé en la estación de tren esperando al amigo que me lo dejó y se me olvidó devolvérselo

[Yannic · Rating 2 out of 5]

Das Vorwort scheint reine Verkaufsstrategie zu sein. Die durchaus spannende Frage, warum die Weimarer Republik scheitert, wird nicht beantwortet. Chronologisch und mit vielen Daten und noch mehr Namen wird die Geschichte der Weimarer Republik abgespult. Da ist nichts Neues oder Interessantes dabei.

[Claudio Riquelme · Rating 5 out of 5]

Muy aclarador sobre el período, fácil de leer. Se aprende como una democracia se puede perder con consecuencias muy graves y transformarse en tragedia ( segunda guerra mundial)
El 60% corresponde al relato y el 40% final es de las notas bibliográficas, por que parece muy bien documentado.

[Gilvir Gill · Rating 5 out of 5]

oh man I'm not really sure where to start with this. I don't read a lot of translated history so I think there was some stylistic things where as someone who doesn't speak German like I can't tell if the bluntness is as intense in the original (it probably is at least as) or like if there's some tone thing lost in translation (there probably is), but I still think the translated writing was still great to read and I think the author and translator do a great job like bringing us back to the happenings of the time and I always appreciate a historical account that heavily relies on primary sources in the form of letters/correspondences or what papers at the time were publishing.

okay anyway actual content: holy fuck what an important read especially in today's day and age. I think comparing the current state of America and a lot of the west to Germany in the 1920s is a relatively common occurrence, and I think a lot of people tend to focus on a broad notion of the fragility of democracy, or on the Nazi party itself and the elements of the current regime that mostly map onto it (e.g. the obvious comparison of the President to the Chancellor, people who compare Miller to Goebbels etc.) and one of the historical lessons and my big takeaways from this is that it isn't the Nazis that destroyed the Weimar Republic, at least not on their own. In fair and free-ish elections and even with the advantages of aristocratic/oligarchic funding and a few years of control over the education system that they shouldn't have had and the economic concerns etc., nevermind never winning an outright majority in the Reichstag, they werent even close to putting together a governing coalition through the parliamentary confidence system. Instead, the main reason that the Nazis were able to come to power and destroy the Weimar Republic from within has to do with the hubris of right-center party leaders that would rather empower the largest demagogues the world has seen up to that point, rather than surrender any power to a milquetoast social democratic party that was midkey very pro-establishment in many ways (mmmm sounds familiar), not even being prepared to just accept confidence and supply with few strings attached. I appreciate the care this book gives to laying out how people like Hindenburg and his final few presidentially-appointed Reich Chancellors, the DNVP, the business leaders in Germany, all of whom thought they could control or manage the Nazi party in an effort to pass pro-business and pro-austerity legislation (while also idiotically rejecting the Keynsianism experiment in its early forms), were also very, very, responsible for the collapse of the Weimar system. And I wish American business leaders and and "mainstream" politicians would pay more attention to that

a most important quote from the book (written by Arthur Rosenburg and translated by Chase I think?)l:

"in 1930, the bourgeois republic in Germany perished because its fate was entrusted to the bourgeoise, and because the working class was no longer strong enough to save it."


I think this is my most important and most recommended history read of this year with the exception of the power broker

[Kendall Kaut · Rating 5 out of 5]

The central questions of Weimar befuddle us today:

1) Was collapse inevitable?

2) What does the collapse say about our own era and the fragility of democracies?

Volker Ullrich deeply dives from 1918 to 1933 with a litany of newspapers, diaries and other documents to capture the zeitgeist of the era.

Ullrich’s detailed descriptions remind us that so many steps—even up until the fateful decision by Hindenburg to give the chancellory to Hitler—could have stopped the Nazis from gaining power.

Even with that ultimate conclusion that Hitler and the Nazi’s rise was anything but inevitable, Ullrich details all the flaws in Weimar. The center simply had too difficult of a time holding when the communists believed they’d control the dissolution of the state, and when conservative elements believed after-Weimar would also be post-Nazi.

If there’s any critique of the book—and this is less a critique and more an alternative reading—it’s that the German public bears much more responsibility for its own choices in who it elected and how it reacted to the anti-democratic forces of its era. Hyperinflation doesn’t have to mean fascism. Unemployment doesn’t have to mean communism or antisemitism. Ullrich never excuses the voters, but they deserve more scorn for reacting to calamities in the worst way a citizenry has ever faced catastrophe in the modern era. Even if there were plenty of steps to stop the Nazis in 1932 and 1933, the German public kept giving the Nazis a plurality in that era.

A well-traveled and quick read on an event so baffling that the journey still boggles rationality. One of my favorite reads of the year.

[Andreas Kühnel · Rating 3 out of 5]

An und für sich mag ich Ullrichs Schreibstil und die Art und Weise, wie er oft trockene geschichtliche Inhalte in einem beinahe romanhaftem Stil vermittelt. Das gelingt ihm in diesem Buch ebenfalls sehr überzeugend. Andererseits widmet er sich hier auch einem sehr gut erforschten Thema, sodass der Erkenntnis-Mehrwert, kennt man sich hier aus, eher bescheiden ausfällt. Was mich am meisten stört, ist die Tatsache, dass Ullrich im Vorwort verkündet, die Gründe für das Scheitern der Weimarer Republik mit der heutigen politischen Lage zu vergleichen, was er jedoch am Schluss gerade mal in einen einzigen Absatz verpackt. Schade, hier lässt er m.E. sehr viel Ungenutzt. Deshalb die zwei Sterne Abzug. Ansonsten aber ist das Buch, gerade wenn man sich noch nicht so sehr in dieser Zeitepoche auskennt, ein sehr empfehlenswertes.

[Bailey · Rating 5 out of 5]

I wish more people would read this to see the parallels between then and now. Terrifying.

[Maduck831 · Rating 4 out of 5]

Preface
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History is always open. The only thing a historian can say for certain about the future is that it will turn out differently than people at any given time imagine.
Chapter 1: A Magical Beginning: The 1918–19 Revolution
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For Hampe, as well as for more than a few members of the conservative bourgeoisie who had been loyal to the kaiser, November 9, 1918, had been the “most miserable day” of his life. 36
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A main reason the MSPD extended a hand to the army command was the realization that the orderly demobilization of eight million soldiers was hardly possible without the military leadership cooperating.
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Kessler agreed. “Final day of this terrible year,” he noted. “ 1918 is likely to forever remain the most terrible year in German history.”
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The path was thus cleared for what became known as the Weimar Coalition.
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The fact that a former saddle maker, who had enjoyed only a vocational education, now held the highest office in the land was the clearest possible demonstration of a new beginning for Germany.
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Conversely, it was precisely this fact that stuck in the craw of those Wilhelmine social elites who had previously ruled the country. 106
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This command effectively amounted to a license to kill, and, freed from any restrictions, Noske’s paramilitaries used it to justify full-blown massacres in the German capital.
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In particular, his enemies blamed him for publishing documents from the archives of the Bavarian Foreign Ministry proving decisively that the leadership of the German Reich had triggered the First World War. 115
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In the months and years to come, Munich would become a reactionary, counterrevolutionary hotbed. It was no coincidence that Adolf Hitler, at the time an unknown former private in the First World War, launched his career in the Bavarian capital.
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As Ernst Troeltsch wrote in retrospect, this marked the end of “the dreamland of the armistice period, in which, in ignorance of the conditions and real consequences of the impending peace, everyone could imagine the future in whatever fantastic, pessimistic, or heroic way they wanted.”
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When the actual terms of the draft Treaty of Versailles emerged, it was like a slap in the face for Germany’s government, political parties, and populace.
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There is no doubt that the Treaty of Versailles was a peace dictated by the victors to the vanquished. But at least in comparison to what a victorious imperial Germany would likely have forced upon its adversaries, it was not overly harsh.
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The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which the Reich had imposed on revolutionary Russia in March 1918, was a clear indication of what the Allies could have expected had they lost the war.
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On February 28, during the first reading of the draft, MSPD spokesman Richard Fischer warned: “We must reckon with the fact that one day someone from another party, perhaps a reactionary, coup-loving one, will occupy this position. We must take precautions against such eventualities.” 138
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Most fatefully, it would turn out, the draft constitution’s Article 48 granted him emergency powers, authorizing him to take the “necessary measures” if “public security and order” were “seriously disturbed or endangered.”
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The combination of rule by emergency decree, the fact that the president was directly elected, the long term of the office, and the right to dissolve the Reichstag gave the Reich president massive influence, although he was supposed to exercise it only during crises to protect the constitutional order.
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At the same time, we shouldn’t neglect the revolution’s achievements and accomplishments. It cemented the change from monarchy to republic and established the first democratically constituted state in German history. “This extraordinary event in the history of democracy gives the November Revolution historical status,” writes historian Alexander Gallus. 147
Chapter 2: Marching on Berlin: The Kapp–Lüttwitz Putsch
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In fact, faced with economic hardship and bleak career prospects, most German students turned their backs on the republic. It was one of the most serious flaws of Weimar democracy.
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Skepticism also prevailed among industrialists, although they, too, refused to take a public stand against Kapp.
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Despite the undecided situation, the Kapp regime might have triumphed, were it not for the determined resistance of the working class.
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developed into a “bulwark” of the Weimar Republic, in stark contrast to Bavaria, which became a reactionary, anti-democratic stronghold under the rule of lawyer Gustav von Kahr and his successors.
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The pitched battles were extremely vicious. Over a thousand Red Army soldiers were killed, most of them after being captured.
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Instead of strengthening the Weimar Republic, the successful defense against the Kapp–Lüttwitz Putsch made the middle classes more right wing while pushing the working class further to the left. The
Chapter 3: “The Enemy Is on the Right”: The Murder of Walther Rathenau
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threats. Rathenau’s attempt to reach an agreement on the issue of reparations with the victors of the First World War was tar-brushed as a “policy of fulfillment”—that is, a traitorous submission to the demands of Germany’s enemies.
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Political murder was the order of the day in the early Weimar Republic, and time and again the trail of the perpetrators led to the same circles: radical right-wing nationalist groups and paramilitary Freikorps associations, whose members hadn’t reintegrated into postwar civilian life.
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Not coincidentally, this clandestine organization had its headquarters in Munich. After the suppression of the Bavarian Soviet Republic in May 1919, the southern German metropolis had become a center of reactionary counterrevolution and an Eldorado for right-wing opponents of democracy.
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“You shouldn’t worry about my survival. If a life not wasted is to end, it will not be arbitrary, but because it has come to a conclusion. I am grateful for every hour I have been granted to affect the world, and it’s not worth asking which sentence, which brushstroke of my work will be the last.” 14
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After 1933, the Nazis reinterpreted the two men’s deaths as a tale of heroism, erecting a memorial stone to the pair of “martyrs of the movement,” as they were now known. Saaleck Castle would become a place of pilgrimage for the radical Right for years. 41
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Thus, while radical right-wing organizations were banned in Prussia, they were permitted to operate largely unhindered in Bavaria. Only a year later, Hitler and Ludendorff were to stage a coup in Munich.
Chapter 4: Madhouse: The Occupation of the Ruhr Valley and Hyperinflation
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Between 1920 and 1922, unlike the major industrialized countries of the West, Germany experienced an economic boom with low unemployment. In turn, this made it possible to finance war debts and additional social benefits.
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The Ruhr industrialist Hugo Stinnes was particularly unscrupulous in this regard, buying up everything that could be purchased: businesses, estates, ships, hotels, newspapers. The result was a huge economic empire, the likes of which had never been seen in Germany.
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In March 1923, Stinnes made it onto the cover of Time magazine and was dubbed the “New Emperor of Germany.” 18
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In May 1923, he bought shares for the first time and quickly became obsessed. “Dreams of making a killing fill every brain and every hour,” he wrote in his diary. “The age has gone astray to the point of excess.” 26
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“Memories of German Inflation,” written in exile in California in 1942, Thomas Mann also saw the events of 1923 as a prelude to what was to come: “There is a straight path from the madness of German inflation to the madness of the Third Reich.”
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1923 left people feeling that everything was fundamentally shaky, there was no security anymore, and nothing could be relied on.
Chapter 5: The Turn to the Right: Ebert’s Death and Hindenburg’s Election
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“That’s good—now we’ve finally finished him off,” he told confidants. Indeed, Ludendorff descended into political insignificance with breathtaking speed. 23
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conscious worker
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the radio for the first time. “Friday evening . . . we were able to listen on the radio to Grandpa Hindenburg’s speech in Hanover and Marx’s in Nuremberg,” reported Betty Scholem in her letter to her son Gershom. “This technical fact in itself was far more interesting than the candidates’ canned phrases.” 46
Chapter 6: A Dark Day: The Collapse of the Final Grand Coalition
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Leaders of heavy industry also began to ponder how to force the Social Democrats from power and install a government that would be independent of parliament. 27
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The split in the labor movement would prove disastrous for the further history of the Weimar Republic, because it undermined workers’ ability to mount a common defense against the fascists and the German extreme Right in alliance with National Socialism.
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Brüning failed to say a word about the plans to end the coalition and install a “Hindenburg cabinet” with himself at its head.
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“You can’t influence the direction of the carriage if you’re running alongside it,” he told his personal adviser Herbert Weichmann.
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The breakup of the grand coalition on March 27, 1930, was undoubtedly a major turning point in the history of the Weimar Republic. It marked the last time a government would be based on a parliamentary majority.
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As the economic crisis worsened, the right wing, heavily influenced by big business, gained the upper hand and sought to end cooperation with the SPD and to join the extraparliamentary Right.
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The day after Müller’s resignation, Hindenburg charged Brüning with forming a government that, “in view of the parliamentary difficulties,” was not to be “based on coalition commitments.”
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The Reichstag elections of September 14, 1930, would turn out to be a spectacular success for the Nazis, who were able to increase their share of the vote from 2.6 to 18.3 percent and their number of seats from 12 to 107. That made them the second-strongest party after the Social Democrats.
Chapter 7: The Thuringia Model: Wilhelm Frick’s Fascist Cultural Revolution
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the traditional hotel on the market square, which rolled
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young Baldur von Schirach,
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Hitler personally attended Günther’s inaugural lecture, on November 15, 1930, which was entitled “The Causes of the Racial Decline of the German People Since the Migration of Peoples.”
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And Frick was in fact rewarded with the post of Reich minister of the interior—one of the most powerful positions in the land—in the “cabinet of national concentration” formed on January 30, 1933, under Germany’s new chancellor, Hitler.
Chapter 8: The Beginning of the End: Brüning’s Fall
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Despair and anger spread, accompanied by a loss of trust in democratic institutions and parties. That boosted the already widespread resentment against the “system” and all those who were part of it.
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Young unemployed formed gangs, and crime skyrocketed. In addition to poverty and loss of social status, many unemployed felt degraded and useless. Mass unemployment brought insecurity even to those who were still employed, since they too could lose their jobs at any time and fall down the social ladder.
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The trauma of the 1923 hyperinflation, ingrained in the nation’s collective memory, still made itself felt.
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In doing so, he failed to turn the tide and instead exacerbated the economic crisis and contributed to the radicalization of large segments of the population.
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But attempts to ridicule the Nazi leader could not combat the phenomenon of Hitler and his undeniable charisma. They did nothing whatsoever to dispel his followers’ willingness to worship him as a national savior.
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Within a short time, the Reichsbank lost a large part of its gold and foreign-currency reserves. Germany was on the verge of insolvency.
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Ultimately, as far as reparations were concerned, Brüning’s rigid austerity policy was beginning to pay off. But the cost was tremendous.
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The assumption was that he, Schleicher, would be able to contain Hitler’s ambitions and limit the destructive dynamism of his movement. That would prove to be a serious miscalculation.
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On Hitler’s behalf, Göring hastened to assure Hindenburg that the Nazis would “only act legally and only pursue their goals by legal means.” 64
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In a meeting with the Reich chancellor on January 5, 1932, Hindenburg “agreed in principle” while making it known how difficult it was for him to decide “to make himself available to the fatherland again.” 71 A two-thirds majority in parliament was required to extend his term of office, and Brüning could obtain one only with the support of the National Socialists.
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A few days later, in a detailed memorandum, he justified that refusal by citing constitutional concerns that, though not unfounded, sounded strange coming from the mouth of a man who had made no secret of his intent, once in power, to abolish the constitution as quickly as possible. 74 Hugenberg also rejected Brüning’s plan.
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Hitler still had one obstacle. To run for the office of president, he needed German citizenship—something Thuringian Minister of the Interior and National Education Wilhelm Frick had tried and failed to procure for him in the summer of 1930. The right-wing government of the Braunschweig intervened on Hitler’s behalf, appointing the Nazi leader a government councillor at its legation in Berlin on February 26.
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The political landscape had shifted to such an extraordinary extent that the Social Democrats now felt compelled to endorse a dyed-in-the-wool monarchist as the only alternative to Hitler.
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As in 1925, Hindenburg did not campaign. Only once, in a March 10 radio speech, did he address the public. In it,
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Hindenburg couldn’t stand the fact that he owed his election not to like-minded allies on the right but to the tactical discipline of the Social Democrats and the Catholic Center. “What an ass I am for having allowed myself to be elected a second time,” he told confidants a few weeks after the election. 100
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Nonetheless, we should not overlook that the erosion of parliamentary democracy—the increase in power of the Reich president and the Reichswehr leadership at the expense of parliament, which was dramatically disempowered—had already begun when Brüning took office.
Chapter 9: The Hour of the Barons: Papen’s Prussian Coup D’État
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The new interior minister, Baron Wilhelm von Gayl, described this task as “liberating Adolf Hitler’s young movement, the circles of which are growing ever wider, from the shackles imposed under Brüning and Severing in order to harness the nationalist force alive within it to rebuild the nation.”
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The “democratic bulwark” was razed without a fight, and that demoralized the supporters of the Weimar Republic—and encouraged their adversaries.
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With their bloodless coup d’état, the old Prussian elite regained a hold on the levers of power. “On 20 July 1932, the day of the putsch,” historian Christopher Clark has written, “the old Prussia destroyed the new.”
Chapter 10: The Finish Line: The Transfer of Power to Hitler
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Although the Nazis were still the strongest party in parliament, they were seen to be on the decline.
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“The barons have won again. For how long?” 37 Hitler had “lost another battle,” commented Hellmut von Gerlach in Die Weltbühne, while warning: “We would be guilty of a mistake of our own, if we thought he was finished. His crown may be losing one point after another, but he still poses a very great danger to the republic.” 38
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“It is the peripeteia of the drama.” Since then, there was less danger of Hitler and Schleicher reaching a compromise “because a party in decline has an infinitely smaller chance of seizing total power by ousting its government partners than one in the ascendance.”
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Harold Laski, the British political scientist

[David C Ward · Rating 3 out of 5]

I’ve liked Ullrich’s studies of Germany, especially his bio of Hitler. This examination of the political machinations of Hitler’s seizure of power is less compelling because the narrative is well known, indeed it’s been covered by Ulrich himself. Still a useful cautionary tale, especially these days.

[Richard Derus · Rating 5 out of 5]

Real Rating: 4.75* of five

The Publisher Says: From the New York Times best-selling historian, the riveting story of the Weimar Republic—a fledgling democracy beset by chaos and extremism—and its dissolution into the Third Reich.

Democracies are fragile. Freedoms that seem secure can be lost. Few historical events illustrate this as vividly as the failure of the Weimar Republic. Germany’s first democracy endured for fourteen tumultuous years and culminated with the horrific rise of the Third Reich. As one commentator wrote in July 1933: Hitler had “won the game with little effort. . . . All he had to do was huff and puff—and the edifice of German politics collapsed like a house of cards.” But this tragedy was not inevitable.

In Fateful Hours, award-winning historian Volker Ullrich chronicles the captivating story of the Republic, capturing a nation and its people teetering on the abyss. Born from the ashes of the First World War, the fledgling democracy was saddled with debt and political instability from its beginning. In its early years, a relentless chain of crises—hyperinflation, foreign invasion, and upheaval from the right and left—shook the republic, only letting up during a brief period of stability in the 1920s. Social and cultural norms were upended. Political murder was the order of the day. Yet despite all the challenges, the Weimar Republic was not destined for its ignoble end.

Drawing on letters, memoirs, newspaper articles, and other sources, Ullrich charts the many failed alternatives and missed opportunities that contributed to German democracy’s collapse. In an immersive style that takes us to the heart of political power, Ullrich argues that, right up until January 1933, history was open. There was no shortage of opportunities to stop the slide into fascism. Just as in the present, it is up to us whether democracy lives or dies.

I RECEIVED A DRC FROM THE PUBLISHER VIA EDELWEISS+. THANK YOU.

My Review: This is a complicated subject...how a democracy dies...and, as a result, a complex read. There were a lot of moving parts to the death of the Weimar Republic. It was not inevitable, a foregone conclusion; the economic disasters wrought by the vengeful Treaty of Versailles were even surmountable, as proved by Hjalmar Scacht; given the authority to control hyperinflation, he did so by staying outside the control of the politicians. The personalities, in other words, of the players in the government were largely to blame for that very government's demise.

A hearty share of the blame for the fall was on the Communist Party's plate. Their strong base of disaffected workers and sailors, reeling economically from the kaiser's stupid management of the economy in the war,was frittered away in insistence on Purity and perfect adherence to untested (and, it would turn out, unwise) Soviet policies. This resulted in an uncompromising, self-destructive inflexibility. Doom in politics is always inflexibility. Their rigidity and refusal to support a more center-left candidate led to Paul von Hindenburg, an old-line reactionary, being elected president in 1925.

Quite simply, the destruction of the Weimar Republic was inevitable then. Right-wing ultranationalist parties had a friend in high office, one who refused to countenance the suppression of their terrorism.
Army veterans and the moneyed classes weren't innocent in the fall of the republic. Anger and hatred at the vicious Treaty of Versailles' immiseration of millions of ordinary Germans made a fertile breeding ground for paramilitaries, for well-funded but ineptly led coups against the government, and for the ultimate rise of Hitler and his National Socialist party. (You clocked that last word, right? The post-WWII US rebranded them as "Nazis" because can't have anything remotely resembling socialism getting attention.) The greedy classes were delighted to fund Hitler, in no small part because Hjalmar Schacht...the one banker who succeeded in reducing war reparations payments...was a hero among them and he said to. Sadly, all those "wise heads, leadership material" men wildly miscalculated their influence over Adolf and Co. They were never more than opportunistically interested in Hitler's plans. Rearming Germany was, to them, a way to make immense profits; the war that followed was suicidal on economic terms.

Democracy is fragile. It is always under attack from within by authoritarians, because they can make more money and get their sick fantasy high-control rocks off. The Nazi book-burnings are branded, in the US at least, as burnings of Jewish and dangerous books.

Jewish, for sure; the "dangerous" books, the ones that were "polluting German youth," were Magnus Hirschfeld's works in the Institute for Sexual Science. Weird how you were never taught that, isn't it. And isn't it just so coincidental that the current scum in power are ramping up the rhetoric against sexual and ethnic minorities. Book burning, before some annoying little twidgee says a word, looks a lot worse to people than banning, so they have learned some lessons...but the effect is the same.

A timely read. Not comfortable, not easy, but very very much a book for these times.

And the future, if we can claw one out of "Their" hands.

[Frank Stein · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a peculiar kind of old-fashioned history. Almost all the drama takes place in the chambers of the Weimar Parliment. The only characters are politicians who are introduced with little more than their names and their titles, without any sense of personality. The main actions are elections and negotiations about parlimentary cabinets. Yet this book finally gave me an understanding of the political machinations that led to the fall of Weimar and the rise of Hitler.

It was clear something was wrong early with the republic, because there was an almost unending series of assasinations and attempted coups. The Social Democratic Party, led by President Frederich Ebert, fought back two separate leftist uprisings around the end of 1918, a more general workers strike in March of 1919, and the Kapp-Luttwitz right-wing solidiers putsch the following year. Kurt Eisner, head of Bavaria, was assasinated in 1919, as was Matthias Erzberger, the SPD finance member, in 1922, followed by foreign minister Walter Rathenau in 1923, when the Reich also suffered the hyperinflation and Hitler's beer-hall putsch (technically headed by the putative hero of the First World War, Erich Ludendorf, who had already participated in the 1920 Kapp putsch.) Others like Philip Schneideman, the SPD man who delcared the republic, barely escaped assasination. In almost all these cases the assasins and putschists got out without punishment or with a slap on the wrist. The right-wing ministry of Bavaria protected Ludendorf and got Hitler out with barely a year spent in prison.

The background for these radical efforts efforts was increasing public disgust with the parlimentary system. The number of parties, especially the SPD and the Kommunist Partei Deutscland on the left, the "Center" and BVP catholic parties, the German People's Party (DVP) in the middle, and the DNVP and the Nazis on the right, made majorities difficult. After well-regarded DVP member and future foreign minister Gustav Streseman was kneecapped as chancellor by the SPD, ending the first "grand coalition," as series of minority governments ruled Germany. The 1928 election added more confusion by having almost a seventh of votes go to tiny parties and the Comintern take the line line that communist parties' main enemies were "social fascists" on the left. A "cabinet of personalties" headed by SPD chief Herman Muller was put in charge, but based purely on individual basis instead of their party, which was a step away from parlimentary democracy. Still, this second "grand coalition" lasted until 1930, when Reich President, and arch-conservative, Paul von Hindenberg, declared that they had not done enough on the budget and pushed a presidential cabinet headed by Center party conservative Heinrich Brunning, who would rely on the president's "Article 48" emergency powers to govern. This was a big step towards pure presidential power. In 1932 Brunning lost Hindenberg's favor, who was increasingly influenced by his East Prussian junker neighbors, and the president appointed aristocrat Franz von Papen and then soldier Kurt von Schleicher. The threat of Hitler's party winning had held off more elections, but when the final election of 1932 did come the NSDAP surged to 38%, only to lose five percentage points in the next election, which many declared to be the end of the Nazi movement. It was only a last minute deal between Von Papen (trying to sabotage his enemy and successor, Schleicher) and Hitler, and a push on Hindenberg from his son Oskar and other right-wing allies, that allowed Hitler to rule. Everyone thought Hitler's was just one of the interminable short-term governments of Weimer, since the Nazi's only had the chancellorship and the Interior ministry. It would last 12 devestating years.

Obviously this is a complicated story with lots of turns, but I've heard pieces of it for ages. Having it all assembled in one place is helpful, and also terrifying. The number of minor changes that would have saved the world from Hitler appears astounding in retrospect. At every move one can't believe the short-sightedness of the parties and people who allowed it to happen.

[Book Club of One · Rating 4 out of 5]

Volker Ullrich, A German Historian who has published several works centered on Hitler and World War II, here looks back to Hitler's rise to power in Fateful Hours: The Collapse of the Weimar Republic delineating the road map to Hitler's rise showing the complexities of history and the many moments where events could have taken a different path and outcome.

While the argument is not new, the level of detail and focus specifically on Hitler's rise for this political history make for a streamlined and focused narrative. As a quote attributed to British Historian A. J. P. Taylor gets to the heart of this book: "Nothing is inevitable until it happens, and everything is inevitable once it has happened."*

The narrative moves chronologically from the closing days of World War I to early 1933, with each of the chapters focused on a specific time period. Alongside the political play by plays, Ullrich also makes use of extensive periodical coverage and the diaries or journals of contemporary witnesses, such as German philologist and diarist Victor Klemperer. In general though, Ullrich is not concerned with the wider cultural, artistic or sexual movements beyond some general commentary.

While people can keep abreast of the news, events can often move at speed and surprise even the most knowledgeable. There will always be those seeking their own aggrandizement or benefit, twisting events or occurrences for their own benefit.

The collapse of the Wiemar Democracy is only one historical event that one can explore to see a democracy collapse in to an authoritarian state. With the preface and coda Ullrich notes this while also emphasizing that we our contemporary societies are under threat to democracy, and the authoritarian playbook frequently begins with small scale acts such as banning books, changing the norms of accepted behaviors and focus on xenophobia. Peace and democracy are fragile and require maintenance and support.

Recommended to readers of history, politics or those who draw lessons from the past to shape our future.

*Taylor, Alan John Percivale, and Chris Wrigley. From the Boer War to the Cold War: essays on twentieth-century Europe.London: Viking Penguin, 1995. Pg. 187.

I received a free digital version of this book via NetGalley thanks to the publisher.

[Mike A · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a partial history of the Weimar Republic, primarily focused on moments and time periods of significant turmoil or upheaval, with additional considerations of counterfactuals/hypothetical 'what-ifs' (which by themselves can help us both understand the era better and appreciate the complexities faced by individuals that lived through it).

The author pays more attention to details around events, people, etc rather than broader systematic trends as used by Evans in the monumental The Coming of the Third Reich. There is also more a focus on the Republic itself, rather than the eventual Nazi domination (indeed the narration essentially ends in Jan 1933).

It is however a very useful book, because in the precise descriptions of the events and machinations around key moments of the Republic, arguments can arise as to which specific social factors and political forces were primarily responsible, and in which way, for the eventual catastrophe that followed. These are indeed arguments with significant ramifications, that go on all the way to our present time, especially considering the profound antidemocratic changes of the last 5-10 years.

I wish some additional attention were paid to periods of relative calm, such as the 1924-1928 era, as continuity is as important as change in understanding a society and its time. However, that's a minor qualm.

[Juancho Vizcaino · Rating 5 out of 5]

“ El triunfo de Hitler no fue de ningún modo un “accidente” de la historia alemana, como se afirmó durante mucho tiempo, pero tampoco fue el resultado inevitable o forzoso de la crisis estatal de Weimar. Incluso a finales de enero de 1933 existían todavía dos opciones para mantenerlo alejado del poder: Hindenburg podía o bien haber mantenido a Schleicher en funciones en su cargo si el Parlamento emitía contra él un voto de censura, o bien haberle ofrecido al canciller, lo que ya había concedido en principio a Papen, es decir, disolver el parlamento y posponer las nuevas elecciones más allá del plazo constitucional de sesenta días. Esta solución habría desembocado en una dictadura militar apenas disimulada, pero las probabilidades de ganar de este modo un poco de tiempo hasta que la situación económica hubiera mejorado visiblemente no eran malas.
Que en tales circunstancias Hitler osara movilizar a la SA para dar un contragolpe y envolverla en un enfrentamiento con las fuerzas armadas parece algo muy dudoso. La postura de Hindenburg fue decisiva. Se había dejado convencer por Papen y otros consejeros de que un gabinete de concentración nacional, en el que Hitler pudiera ser al mismo tiempo “rodeado” y “domesticado” gracias a la mayor presencia de ministros conservadores, constituía la menos arriesgada de las alternativas. No pasaría mucho tiempo hasta que se advirtiera que esta suposición había sido una peligrosa ilusión”

[Peter Rooijmans · Rating 4 out of 5]

All in all, a sobering narrative about the fragility of an democracy:
After the abdication by the Kaiser in 1918 the German republic was born, based on a parliamentary system.
However many monarchist and anti-democratic sentiments endured. The republic was supported at all times by the social-democrat party SDP, but the War repair payments imposed on Germany and the crash in 1929 fed into a growing dissatisfaction about the Government. From the mid-twenties this was exploited by monarchist and anti-democratic forces, to undermine the republic. These conservative rightwing groups thought that with help of the nazi party they could turn back the clock. Therefore they supported Hitler’s candidature to become Chancellor, disregarding all claims the nazi’s had already made about the nature of their aims. With the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor the Weimar Republic came to an end.

[Josh Reitz · Rating 4 out of 5]

There were portions of the book I found difficult to read for two reasons. One was due to my not being familiar with German politics, and the second was that the author came off too academic in portions.

However, it was a great read and brought lots of insight into the past and current climate.

My hope, that more people would, at the very least, read the chapter titled "The Thuringia Model". The control over civil servants and police, along with the school and theater systems, gave Hitler loyal party members extraordinary power. Key people were put into positions where they could access personnel files to target undesirables. The constant campaigning around "fraud" and "foreign people that are undermining the moral fortitude of the German people" all as a method to further rile up sympathizers.

The whole model was simply a test for how this work large scale.

[Philip Kuhn · Rating 5 out of 5]

It's a very good book overall on the subject. It's all about the fall of the German Weimar republic. I love Ullrich and his books. His biggest contribution, if that is the right word, is the main reason for the fall of the republic and the birth of the Third Reich. He says it was not accident. It was a deliberate conspiracy of Army generals and conservative right wing forces. Especially big businesses and Prussian land owners. Of which President Hindenburg was one of them. But the Nazis were on the decline and Von Papen saved them. Hitler would never have been appointed Chancellor by Hindenburg if it wasn't for Papen's behind the scenes dealing. To say that the consequences were tragic is an understatement.
Good book if you want to learn more about the subject.

PHIL Kuhn

[Julia Braxton · Rating 4 out of 5]

Informative. Terrifying. Reassuring in some ways but a true bellwether of potentially catastrophic events to come in others. The beginning and end were most intriguing as the middle got muddled (for me) with so many different names and political games. That being said, no American in 2026 can read this without seeing direct parallels between the lead up to how Hitler took power in January 1933 and what is currently taking place with Trump 2.0. The slow erosion of constitutional norms. The gradual capitulation with “little to no effort” and mere “huffing and puffing”. History may not repeat (the US isn’t coming out of a world war, saddled with infinite debt, and our inflation is a fraction of Germany’s; our democracy is much older, etc), but it sure as f*** rhymes.

[David · Rating 4 out of 5]

Ullrich does a nice job of documenting the rise and fall of the Weimar Republic. He somehow makes sense of the chaos as multiple political parties try to gain control over the years. Communists, royalists, nationalists and everyone in between seems to have formed a party. The government struggled with war reparations, unemployment, the impact of the Depression. Through all of this the Nazi’s began to gain strength. Sadly, a united opposition would have crushed the Nazis but the opposition could not come together. Strains of antisemitism were always present - Jews were blamed for starting then losing WWI. The Nazi’s capitalized on that and no one seemed to be bothered by it.

[Carole Edwards · Rating 5 out of 5]

Fateful Hours: The Collapse of the Weimar Republic by Volker Ullrich is a powerful, deeply researched history of Germany’s first democracy and how it unraveled in the years after World War I. Ullrich examines the political turmoil, economic crises, and fragmented parties that weakened the Weimar Republic, showing how, despite numerous chances to avert disaster, democratic institutions failed and paved the way for Hitler’s rise. The book paints the collapse not as inevitable but as the result of human choices and missed opportunities, offering a sobering reminder of how fragile democracy can be.

[Xaver Dettling · Rating 5 out of 5]

Eine grandiose und konzise Darstellung der politischen Geschichte der Weimarer Republik. Zentrale Schlüsselereignisse, wie die Ausrufung der parl. Demokratie, die Einflussnahme der extremen Rechten und deren zahlreichen Attentate auf politische Exponentinnen und Exponenten, wirtschaftliche Aufschwünge und Schwierigkeiten, die Machtergreifung Hitlers sind nur einige Beispiele für eine fundierte Verflechtung der Geschichte der Weimarer Republik, welches ein breites Panorama in die politisch sehr wacklige und brüchige Zeit gibt.

[Mario Mirabelli · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is an excellent book but is missing the most important part. Disappointing. Over 290 pages of thorough research on the thirteen years of "democracy" after WW I in Germany ending with Hitler coming to power. The missing piece is what happens when Hitler becomes vice chancellor but has two other equal and supposedly powerful counterbalancing partners in government as well as Chancellor Hidenburg. Within barely a month, Hitler had outmaneuvered everyone and several months later was the in charge.

[Sebastian Parot Becker · Rating 2 out of 5]

Extremelly biased. Focused on political games but mentions very little about economics and other important contextual circumstances. After two decades of left wing policies that created hyperinflation, unemployment and economic stagnation, the authorities decided, instead of change course and apply what works (capitalism which, by the way they did after WWII very succesfully), double down and apply more centralized, big government, high taxes, lots of subsidies (not right wing at all) in the version of National Socialism, another kind of collectivism which, of course, doesn’t work either.

[alicia · Rating 4 out of 5]

Really interesting take on the Weimar period leading up to its collapse and the rise of Nazism. It was just unfortunate that there were too many eerily similar comparisons to the current state of some countries with the rise of far right populism. The author sends this warning in a very calm and collected way that also isn't trying to make it political but more about the future of democracy. The writing style is also really easy to read and digest so it doesn't feel like a heavy history text at all.

[Uwe · Rating 5 out of 5]

Gewohnte Qualität eines erfahrenen Autors.
Spannend zu lesen, reich an Erkenntnissen.
Eine wichtige Lektüre, um die Situation der Deutschen in der Welt zu verstehen und wie es zu den folgenden Katastrophen kam.
Absolut empfehlenswert.

Der Satz zum Bezug auf die aktuelle politische Situation sei ihm (oder dem Verlag) verziehen, auch wenn er grober Unfug ist. Dafür das Buch zu verdanken, halte ich für sehr übertrieben.

[Jose Luis · Rating 4 out of 5]

excelente libro acerca de lo q ocurrió en alemania desde el fin del a1era guerra hasta la asunción de Hitler como canciller. mucho mas politico q social explica en detalle como los distintos partidos politicos los distintos dirigentes desde la derecha hasta la izquierda fueron cometiendo errores q facilitaron y mucho la llegada de Hitler. El último error fue la subestimacion de hitler

[James · Rating 4 out of 5]

A well written book on the decay and slide into the nightmare of the Nazi rule. Reading as history, understanding it as current events. The failure of institutions, political compromise based on false assumptions of true political strength. As we watch the erosion of democracy across the world, the book is not only timely, but offering lessons that one would be wise to learn.