The Social Order of the Underworld: How Prison Gangs Govern the American Penal System

by David Skarbek

When most people think of prison gangs, they think of chaotic bands of violent, racist thugs. Few people think of gangs as sophisticated organizations (often with elaborate written constitutions) that regulate the prison black market, adjudicate conflicts, and strategically balance the competing demands of inmates, gang members, and correctional officers. Yet as David Skarbek argues, gangs form to create order among outlaws, producing alternative governance institutions to facilitate illegal activity. He uses economics to explore the secret world of the convict culture, inmate hierarchy, and prison gang politics, and to explain why prison gangs form, how formal institutions affect them, and why they have a powerful influence over crime even beyond prison walls. The ramifications of his findings extend far beyond the seemingly irrational and often tragic society of captives. They also illuminate how social and political order can emerge in conditions where the traditional institutions of governance do not exist.

Genres: Nonfiction, Economics, Sociology, Politics, Crime, Psychology, Anthropology

224 pages, Kindle Edition

First published January 1, 2014

About the author

I am Professor of Political Science and Political Economy at Brown University.

My research examines how extralegal governance institutions form, operate, and evolve, and in particular, how people define and enforce property rights and engage in trade in the absence of strong, effective governments. My first book, The Social Order of the Underworld, applies this interest to understanding the consequences of America's unique experiment with mass incarceration. In short, I ask, who makes law for the outlaws?

I received a Ph.D. in Economics at George Mason University, after which I taught in the Department of Political Science at Duke University. My academic articles have been published in numerous journals, including the American Political Science Review, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Journal of Criminal Justice, and Public Choice.

I enjoy giving talks about political and economic issues across the United States and around the world. I've recently given academic seminars and public talks in Wales, Belgium, Italy, England, and in the United States, including at Stanford University, the National Bureau of Economic Research, and UC Berkeley.

Reviews

[Patrick Peterson · Rating 5 out of 5]

2014 - Aug. - What an amazing book. I was a bit dubious, going in, that I would really be able to appreciate this book's topic, but was very happily surprised.

The first 10 pages or so are an incredible description of what the book is all about and why it is important. Breathtaking in it's fresh, clear and realistic approach to explaining the rise of prison gangs, and what to do about them.

The book destroys the pernicious myth that prison gangs are the cause of more crime and harms to prisoners. The case is patiently, poignantly and persuasively made that the reverse is more the case - gangs alleviate more crime and insecurity for prisoners than they cause.

Facts, both anecdotal and as systematic as the data available allows are analyzed from a fresh economic perspective, as free of stifling jargon as possible and made crystal clear in it's implications. A theory of governance is used that acts like a clarifying lens to make comprehensible what is really going on in the prisons, street gangs and political system. After several iterations of the author's use of the theory to explain how prison gangs came to be, how they operate, what their upsides and downsides are, I believe any reasonable reader will agree that the author has not only made his case, but will think something like "Oh, geez, why did we not think of that before?"

The author uses a wonderful device to hook the reader and keep him/her intrigued and emotionally connected throughout the book - stories of real prisoners which are as poignant, relevant and gripping as can be.

Read the first page and a half to see what I mean. I bet you will then read the rest of the book to find out what prison gangs are really all about and what realistic things can be done to make the system vastly better, for taxpayers, prisoners and society.

That should be all you need to get into this wonderful book, but if you still want more, let me know and I can give you more details of specific things that really intrigued and/or impressed me.

I later read his follow-up book: The Puzzle of Prison Order and liked that too. Great complement to this book.

[Cori · Rating 4 out of 5]

Months ago, I finished this book and have since been meaning to post the review. And selfishly, I'm including numerous quotes and learning points as this is all info I can use in lectures, so this review will be my reference point if I need a direct quote. And the book is stinkin' expensive to buy. So there's that. I apologize now for the lengthy review. Hence the huge delay in posting a review.

This book examines the extralegal governance institutions that criminals create. The author contends that without the governances created by gangs, the prisons would be in a constant state of riots and chaos.

One might tend to suspect that a group of rebels-- muggers, rapists, forgers-- confined together would exist in a perpetual state of anarchy. Far from the case; the inmate society is surprisingly orderly and organized.

Proof he offers of this is that the convict code sprang up in all prisons across the world organically, and for many decades, governed the order of the prison system.

Sociosexual life (a particular view of homosexuality), race, ways of interacting with officers, ways of viewing snitches... these are the same across borders with little to no deviation. Also consistent is a social hierarchy based on the crime career that got someone incarcerated in the first place. Some crimes bolster an inmate's reputation and status while others make their prison time very difficult indeed.

Child molesters and informants rank low in the inmate hierarchy, and these inmates often face a presumptive threat of assault... though murderers typically rank high in the inmate social order, the nature of their crime can undermine that status...inmates view killers poorly if they victimized women...it would be dangerous to put a guy like Manson into the main population, because in the eyes of the other inmates he didn't commit first class crimes. He was convicted of killing a pregnant woman, and that sort of thing doesn't allow him to rank very high in the prison social structure. It's like being a child molester. Guys like that are going to do hard time wherever they are."

So if the Convict Code is so prevalent and universally understoof, why did gangs come into play rather than individuals following the code?

Before the mid-1970s, the convict code had provided governance relatively effectively...however, the convict code began to break down once large demographic changes occurred within the prison system. Inmates still voice respect for the code today, but it cannot provide the governance that they require...like many mafia groups, prison gangs originated to provide protection... what makes mafia groups unique is not that they engage in crime in an organized and sophisticated fashion but that they govern crime.

In other words, gangs developed to enforce the Convict Code.

The public believes, based on television shows and movies, that blood-thirsty, sadistic killers form gangs to cause chaos. Sensational stories sell...only 15%-20% are hard core participants who have a vested interest in the organization and leadership. Most gang members are not dedicated to crime. Joining a gang is a way for them to do their time more easily. A study of the Aryan brotherhood in Arizona found that a member's criminal record, use of controlled substances, age, childhood delinquency, and violent incidents in prison are not statistically significantly different from those of non-gang members.

The point they make through this is that violent people do not gravitate towards gangs in order to commit more violence. The motivation is protection and people will follow the directives of the gang in order to enjoy continued protection.

Bert Useem and Anne Piehl have found that in the United States, from the 1970s to the early 2000s, the rate of riots became less frequent, the homicide and assault rate among inmates declined dramatically, and escapes were less common. This was the time frame that gangs cropped up.


The book goes on to explain that the Sicilian mafia arose in the 19th century to fill a need when bandits preyed on landowners and the government would not supply a solution. Similarly, the Russian mafia was a result of a property rights enforcement need when the Soviet Union collapsed, and was supplied by an over-abundance of now unemployed Russian soldiers and secret police. The Yakuza and Chinese mafia arose to fill property right needs, commercial disputes, and cartelization of industries...the illicit nature of the businessforces them to seek alternatives. In the United States, the mafia came to power in the freewheeling alcohol markets of the Prohibition Era. Similarly, gangs emerged in prisons to fill a void in governance. Essentially, the criminals needed law enforcement.

The Ruiz vs. Estelle lawsuit also helped push prisons towards a gang run system. Prison wardens used to have "building tenders," an informal inmate assistant to resolve disputes who informed officers about what was occuring among inmates. After the ruling, officials could no longer count on the tenders and a vacuum emerged that was filled by prison gangs.

Something interesting that jumped out at me was the quote below.

The third function of governance institutions is to help people act collectively. Goods like national defense are difficult to produce privately because everyone enjoys their benefits once they exist. The same threat that deters a hostile country from bombing my neighbor's house protects mine too, even if I haven't paid for it. Recognizing this ability to free ride, many people won't contribute to the production of a public good. As a result, even though each individual acts rationally, the public good may not be provided at all.
Hmmm...sounds like a pretty solid argument against socialism. Anyways, moving on.

Some other points of interest along the way:
Certain words are serious triggers to inmates in most prison systems: punk, bitch, rapo, cho mo (child molester), and lame (a naïve or stupid inmate) are automatic fighting words. A slash across the cheek indicates that someone is no good and ostracizing them or a temporary beating is not sufficient enough to establish their place in the hierarchy. Informal groups called "tips" or "cliques" help resolve disputes. A "car" just means "group."

Gangs will typically have a contract that is written down, with by-laws, that members must abide by.

Studies have shown that many of the things we think would improve a prison system do not make a noticeable difference: violent characteristics of the inmates, high inmate-to-staff ratio, architecture, and repressive corrections tactics. One penologist theorizes the prison leadership is one of the main things that will positively impact the prison. If prisoners don't need protection, they won't turn to gangs.

Gangs don't tend to exist in women's prisons or gay and transgender housing.

Prison typically do not house inmates of different color and gang affiliation in the same cell. And gang leaders communicate housing needs to officers.

Gangs are responsible for all their members to uphold business standards so they can continue to enjoy profit off illicit sales. If a gang member sells bad drugs, or buys drugs and doesn't pay, the entire gang steps up to resolve the issue so they aren't ostracized in future business dealings. This often includes beating/stabbing/otherwise punishing the delinquent member and/or paying back the debt. An inmate may not know if another inmate is trustworthy, but they know a gang's reputation. Their brand reputation is on the line, if you will.

California has three security levels for gangs. Security Threat Group I includes Aryan Brotherhood, Black Guerilla Family, Mexican Mafia, Nazi Low Riders, Northern Structure, Nuestra Familia, and Texas Syndicate. Security Threat Group II includes inmates associated with other groups and street gangs that are lower in gang hierarchy like members of the Crips, Bloods, Norteños, Sureños, White Supremacists, 2-5's, and Northern Riders. Many others at this level exist as well. Security Threat Group III are those with no street gang affiliation who align with broader racial and ethnic groups.

For example, a Hispanic from Northern California with no street gang ties would affiliate with Norteño inmates and follow their gang rules, even though he is not a gang member. Full gang membership is not required, but all inmates must affiliate with some inmate group, most commonly one's race...

"Shot callers" run the gangs and make demands of the inmates who affiliate with them... a white inmate at Pelican Bay State Prison described the obligatory nature of segregation, explaining, "to talk to a black would cause problems with my own race...I grew up totally colorblind so it's a big adjustment, you know, but that's just how it is." People with no history of racism, who may actually hold no racist beliefs, must live in a segregated world. One inmate reports that many people who appear to hate others are just adopting the rules and behaviors necessary for survival.

When violence breaks out, they are required to fight and protect those of their own race. Otherwise, they are allowed to buy and sell drugs to other races, etc.

Affiliation is typically seen as a positive thing by inmates and officers alike.  Up until 2005, inmate reception forms even explicitly asked inmates to report which gang they affiliated with. 

According to the Johnson v. California Supreme Court ruling, inmates held in double cells at prison reception centers had pretty close to 0% chance of being housed with someone of a different race. This makes it more likely that an inmate will affiliate with his racial group.

A shot caller is typically someone who has been incarcerated, incarcerated, often in the housing area, for a relatively long time, knows the facility and common problems to arise, and has the skills needed to resolve disputes.

If someone starts trouble, the shot caller can punish him or make him apologize. A white inmate who served eight years for robbery and assault explained how the gang worked to keep white inmates in line. "I knew this guy that ran his mouth a lot, made lots of problems, called people names and stuff. He called these Mexican guys a bunch of greasy wetbacks. He's a loose cannon, he's going to cause trouble you know what I mean, we work hard to keep that race shit calm and here's this prick causing trouble, no one wants that so we had to check him. We took him down a pegg or two, it came right from the top, that asshole needs a lesson."

A black inmate described his initial surprise at the gang policing of interracial violence. After he disrespected a white inmate, "the next thing I know I'm told to make it right with him. I have to man up and take care of my shit. At first I thought, you gotta be kidding me. No way I'm going to tell this guy that I'm sorry. Then they told me that I have no choice. That's the rule, you do what you're told. They made a very good argument about how I need to fall in line. OK, so I made things right."

...another inmate described how each group monitors and punishes its own members: "We need to keep the boys in line. If one of our guys is a hot head or something and is always shooting off his mouth it can get everyone into trouble. We don't want a lockdown, we don't want a riot so I've had to beat down on my own guys to control the bigger picture. If one of my guys is messing up then we either offer him up to the other guy or we take him down ourselves."

Cell fights are common and set up to avoid corporal punishment. It's easier to hide a fight from the guards if it is pre-arranged to happen in a private cell.

Inmates can figure out why another inmate is there quite easily. They ask to see their official paperwork or ask for someone on the outside to find out. If someone refuses to show their papers it's not a good look.

An inmate explained, "There are so many rules about who goes first in line for meals and who gets the TV first. If you follow all these rules, you end up doing easy time."

If someone doesn't follow the rules, they can end up on the Green Light list. A Green Light list records the names of inmates who should be assaulted. One gang member explained, "It's not uncommon for the whole jail to know about greenlight lists. When you get to jail, you get a list of rules and a greenlight list."...A former Mexican Mafia member described how the gang turned on him: "I find that I'm on the list. That's a death sentence. My heart broke. I'm going to be honest with you. I'm like 'you gotta be shitting me.' A spotless career and I'm on the list?"

The Mexican Mafia is one of the most feared, violent prison gangs in America. So much so, that they collect taxes on street gangs as taxes to benefit their prison gang. The benefit behind this is that the street gangs have the backing and protection of the Mexican Mafia. As a matter of fact, the number 13 is often added to the end of a gang's handle if they pay tribute to the Mexican Mafia (M being the 13th letter of the alphabet). One Southern California gang proudly refused the Mexican Mafia taxation demands and start calling itself The Green Light Gang. The result was that many of them were murdered in subsequent years. They have since become compliant. The Mexican Mafia was actually responsible for a decrease in drive-by shootings, though it was not out of any sense of good will. Drive by shootings attract police presence and political attention, cracking down on drug dealings, therefore profit margin. (Also, personal musing here, why shoot a baby when you can kill it via a drug OD when it's older and make a profit off it.) That's actually an important distinction. Homicides didn't decrease. The method just changed and became more targeted so passers-by in the streets weren't caught in the cross-fire.

More inmates mean more crime. Soft crime committers become hard crime committers when they leave prison. Going to prison weakens family/community ties which tether people to better behavior.

One of the aspects of this book I liked the most is that author proposed potential and viable solutions.
1) Gangs exist for protection. Remove the need for protection, and the prison removes the need for gangs.
2) Data needs to be more available. Very little data and studies have been collected, let aline made available regarding the correction system or different programs and initiatives that have been successful/unsuccessful (e.g. the prison in our county has a dog training program where a shelter dog is paired with an inmate and they put it through obedience training. The outcomes are incredible.).
3) Be more thoughtful as to what people are incarcerated for.
4) Increase the number of police officers on the street to proactively prevent prison time from happening in the first place. Hire more police.
5) Give an incentive based reward system to the wardens who run prisons.

The author has significant amounts of references to support each of his potential solutions. In light of the "Defund the Police" movement that has gained so much popularity lately, the data on number 4 is both fascinating and frightening for the areas where this has actually come to fruition. Good luck to ya'll. I shan't be visiting your fair neighborhoods.

Bert Useem and Anne Piehl have found that in the United States, from the 1970s to the early 2000s, the rate of riots became less frequent, the homicide and assault rate among inmates declined dramatically, and escapes were less common.

I would rate this book an R for swearing, references to rape and drugs and alcohol, descriptions of violence, racial slurs, and many other adult themes.

Original review posted 12/9/24.

Knox and Robinson 2004 and Knox 2006

[Pete · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Social Order of the Underworld: How Prison Gangs Govern the American Penal System (2014) by David Skarbek is a fascinating look into when, how and why prison gangs have formed in the US and how they operate. The book concentrates on the Californian Prison System.

Prior to the 1950s the Californian Prison system housed a fairly small number of inmates and Skarbek says there were no gangs, instead prison inmates had a code that they obeyed that was fairly simple but allowed inmates to remain fairly safe.

As the population of inmates grew rapidly prison became more dangerous as new inmates didn’t know the code and inmates had little in common with each other. In order to provide protection gangs arose and then began to provide services for inmates including drugs and payment systems and a method of enforcing agreements. The gangs formed along ethnic lines and geographic lines. Skarbek argues not because of racial attitudes but simply because race is something that allows easy identification. These gangs create their own rules and even write their own constitutions. They recruit people who they believe will serve the organisation well.

The gangs allow people to do deals by ensuring that people are more trustworthy because they will enforce contracts. For instance if a white inmate gets drugs from a latino inmate and then refuses to pay the white gangs will actually force the inmate to pay or physically harm him to keep order. Skarbek points out that prison gangs actually reduce riots and some kinds of violence as the gangs want things to be orderly so that they can make money from their illicit activities. Prison lockdowns due to riots hurt gang profits.

The many downsides of gangs, their own kinds of violence and the corruption they lead to are not ignored. The remarkable pressure that they manage to bring to bear on crime outside prisons is explained convincingly.

The book provides a really interesting glimpse into how the underworld organises itself. It’s really interesting to read about how human self-organisation arises in incredibly inhospitable environments.

[Amber · Rating 5 out of 5]

Absolutely incredible book - Skarbek looks at why prison gangs exist using a governance standpoint. I had never thought of this framework before and he's really made me think about these social systems and the imposition of order. Very cool.

[UChicagoLaw]

What to read if you want to know why prison gangs have written constitutions and why they result in lower rates of prison violence? I started teaching criminal procedure last year, and as a result, I became interested in how our hypertrophic carceral system influences society. David Skarbek’s The Social Order of the Underworld: How Prison Gangs Govern the American Penal System is a revelatory account of the etiology, flourishing, and demise of prison gangs. Skarbek works in a rational choice tradition, but also brings to bear a rich tapestry of first-hand accounts. He shows that prison gangs are an inevitable (and, yes, rational, even efficient) response to mass incarceration and the new demographics of prisons. The result is a compelling portrait of the inadvertent consequences of mass incarceration that can usefully be read alongside Alice Goffman’s more noticed (and also excellent) On the Run: Fugitive Life in an American City. —Aziz Huq

[b bb bbbb bbbbbbbb · Rating 3 out of 5]

An investigation into the nature and purpose of prison gangs through the lens of an economist.

I don't always agree with the technical tools and economic explanations used, but they do lead to conclusions that are interesting and appear to be reasonable. Namely that prison gangs arose to fill a security and power vacuum which the prisons and prison staff were/are unable or unwilling to provide themselves. Due in part to overcrowding, corruption, changes in sentencing practices and a variety of other factors.

The gangs also serve to stabilize and coordinate the in-prison economy of drugs, weapons, information, etc- at a cost. The gangs maintain order and their authority through a monopoly on violence.

Fairly well put together and easy to read. Though certainly not written from a radical, prison abolitionist stance, the author does seem to arrive at positions which point vaguely in that direction.

[Crystal Gearhart · Rating 2 out of 5]

This is not an ethnography. It is hard to say what it is. It is not really suitable for anybody who works in corrections, because the information presented is common knowledge. It is not really appropriate for those interested in corrections, because it oversimplifies gangs in prison. I was fine with the book until the end when the author started to offer suggestions for improvements to the corrections system, such as a prison voucher system, so inmates can choose their facility, which he believes will make prisons work harder to make their inmates want to stay at their facility.

[Raja · Rating 3 out of 5]

Some really interesting data points, but the book illustrates the problem with relying on self-interested sources (in this case, prison officials and COs) to discern the workings of otherwise opaque institutions. Especially on the crucial question of how prevalent gang activity is in certain systems, for which the author only has the opinions of prison officials, and they are quite interested in making the gang problem seem as large as possible to justify their budgetary needs.

[Joshua Sorkin · Rating 4 out of 5]

I'm taking off a star for Skarbek's wooden writing style. Other than that, this is an impressively well-researched, highly coherent analysis of a subculture that by its very nature has a strong incentive to hide its existence from anthropological inquiry.

I daresay it has revolutionized the way I conceptualize organized crime in prison: rather than continuing to see it as dysfunctional aberration of a healthy market economy, helmed by psychotic ultraviolence addicts, I'm inclined to favor Skarbek's theory that it is a natural step in social evolution when the typical consumer demands of a severely confined population collide with an lack of legitimate governance to protect the welfare of market actors.

An interesting take on racism on page 101: "inmates who don't know each other can't identify as easily whether someone is a Marxist or a Christian, or as quickly, as determining whether the inmate is white or black...an inmate cannot change his race, so racial segregation limits...taking advantage of groups or falsely claiming membership in a group. Gangs do not form to promote racism; race facilitates gang governance."

The problem described here seems to be: in a heavily transient population, I need to know whether I can trust you even if we aren't personally acquainted, so you need to display something you can't fake to verify your membership in a group whom I respect; if you forge an identity signifier, you can take advantage of that identity group's social capital, and your negative actions will degrade its reputation, so there's a strong motivation to choose symbols that resist counterfeiting. Skin color is inherent in a human body and largely unalterable, so it is something I can reliably use to assess your identity and allegiance.

In all, the book is an intriguing look at a brutal, clandestine world. Skarbek breathes dignity and rationality into the residents of an extremely dehumanizing system without apologizing for their atrocities, and that's an admirable literary tightrope to walk.

[Frank Godinez · Rating 3 out of 5]

I read this book for a Sociology of Crime class. Definitely a good insight into how gangs provide extralegal forms of governance when people are not able to use legal forms because they are not efficient or they are into illicit activities.

I really liked the game theory lense applied to the ways prisoners make choices about whether to join a gang or how to coordinate a new political environment. Research on history of prisons in the U.S is on point as well.

[Court C. · Rating 5 out of 5]

To start off, I had to read this for a class and going into it I was NOT excited but as I started reading I found myself getting hooked. This book focuses on real life stories and data focusing on gangs within the prison system. The author also goes into details about how inside gang life impact outside life within the community, as well as how people involved in gangs in prison go about life leaving prison when it comes to how connected they still are to the gang they were once devoted members to.

I am usually not the biggest fan of non-fiction or "real life" books, I am a romance girly, but I LOVED this book and found myself hooked on every page. I am also not an annotation girly, I found myself running out of highlighters left and right.

I highly recommend this book for anyone who wants to try and learn about inside prison life and anyone who is looking to become more involved in non-fiction books.

[Hank · Rating 3 out of 5]

Really didn’t like the language used around prisoners and the generalization of “untrustworthiness” for “committing a crime” I need to read more books on this subject tho so for introduction purposes I guess 3???

[Collin · Rating 5 out of 5]

Alternative titles for this book: “Anarchy Doesn’t Exist” or “Why Hobbes (and Lock) Were Wrong”

[Kevin · Rating 4 out of 5]

In a succinct and well-written book, Skarbek presents the order which prisoners derive from gangs both within and without prison and some policy prescriptions.

[Alasdair Reads · Rating 5 out of 5]

You seldom get a book which is so admirably clear in its thesis, explains why competing explanations are lacking (in a more conventionally academic book we would have had to dredge through chapters of the author engaging with nonsense in detail, in this book this is dispensed with in a few paragraphs pointing out how deficient these theories are) and then goes on to show systematically how his explanation is much more convincing and action guiding. Because of the visceral subject matter and stories the author can rely on this never ceases to be anything but a fascinating read, even though he (commendably) makes his basic points up front and then the rest of the book is mostly repeatedly showing how these points relate to different aspects of prison life and culture. The author never glamorises the subject but never demonises it either. Thus he can credit prison gangs for dramatically reducing the level of violence in American prisons, while also highlighting the misery and evil they fuel inside and outside of prisons. I would have liked the last chapter to be even more ambitious and have explicitly suggested lessons from the study not only for prisons but for other areas of informal governance.

[Jerrod · Rating 4 out of 5]

Skarbek provides an engaging overview of the US (mostly California) prison system and provides a compelling way of understanding the emergence of prison gangs. He uses the analytical tools of economics, drawing on signaling theory, constitutional political economy, and industrial organization, to provide a narrative in which prison gangs emerge to provide protection when norms based on decentralized enforcement no longer provided adequate means of governing social interactions within the prison system. This book is a great example using the economic way of thinking (i.e. rational choice theory) to understand something that has been seen as falling outside the realm of the study of rational actors. We learn that we should not see prisoners as non-rational actors who only have a preference for racism and violence. Skarbek shows that profit can provide the incentive necessary to curtail violent behavior and set up organizations to provide governance for impersonal exchange. We also see that monopoly power is incredibly important to the reduction of violence. Skarbek documents these aspects (and more) of prison gangs during a period when the increase in prison gangs' power coincided with a reduction in violence among prisoners. The argument that, under current conditions, gangs make prisoners' experiences better and safer than the relevant alternatives (which do not include everyone acting peacefully of their own accord) is provocative and well supported.

Beyond just understanding prison gangs and the environmental factors that led to their emergence, Skarbek does an excellent job of describing the process of how impersonal exchange emerges after norms governing personal exchange break down. He accomplishes this better than many other authors who have attempted it, including Leeson, North, and Greif. A key question in this literature is "where the shadow of state-produced violence does not loom large, can impersonal exchange emerge, and if so, how is it sustained?" Skarbek shows that impersonal exchange can arise without state enforcement of rules and that this is accomplished when the benefits of creating organizations to provide governance outweigh their costs.

Thing I disliked most about the book: authors like Skarbek, along with Leeson, like to distinguish between governance and government when arguing that anarchy is not so bad. What they fail to admit is the organizations that undergird impersonal exchange where there is no formal "government" are essentially just miniature state-like entities that enforce the rules via violence (just like a formal government would do).

Thing I liked most about the book: everything else... the economic theory is presented so well, and the stories of prison gangs are interspersed at the proper points to illustrate the economic concepts.

I recommend this to everyone.

[Tom · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is a lot of fun. It mixes a bunch of different types of evidence (court transcripts, interviews, administrative data) to answer the question: why was there a large rise in the prevalence of prison gangs in the US over the past 30 years? Skarbek's answer is fundamentally: because the 'convict code', an informal set of rules previous in place, was no longer tenable when the prison population became younger, much larger, and more violent. Gangs set up to enforce order, primarily to facilitate the market for drugs.

Skarbek employs game theory (of the informal type, rather than the Nash/Rubenstein/Harsyani type) to understand why prison gangs operate in the way they do (for example, why are gangs almost always divided along racial lines, and why do gangs punishing others within their own gang for harming people from other gangs?)

The argument generally seemed to me to be pretty plausible. The one thing I felt it was lacking was substantive econometric analysis. Even a simple regression of the proportion of prisoners who are in gangs on the number of prisoners, or average age of prisoners, is missing. The book seems to indicate that this is due to lack of available data. Fair enough: you can't blame Skarbek for that. But, while the other types of evidence appealed to are very useful and are deployed in a convincing manner, there must necessarily be a lot of game theoretic story telling to join up prisoners' testimonies with a model of the gang market. Although of course metrics is rarely decisive, it does allow us to look at these relationships atheoretically, in reduced form. If there is such a relationship, then the game theory can explain why. But without that metrics work it is much harder to judge whether the theory is right, or just a nice story.

Overall, the book is highly readable, very informative, and probably largely accessible to non-economists.

[Liberté · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book is incredibly well thought out and researched. Not only does it provide a lens into understanding prison gangs as a form of governance, it would also serve as a useful introduction into many economic concepts including rational choice theory and the role of institutions. Skarbek also balances the role that gangs play in prisons (the benefits) with the violence which they perpetrate (the costs), while recognizing the potential opportunity costs of not having prison gangs, such as even more violence. A must-read for anyone interested in governance or why prison gags operate so successfully across America.

[Carlos · Rating 3 out of 5]

An economist's analysis of how prison gangs govern the American penal system, though mostly focused in California and Texas.

I was expecting something with more anecdotes and detailed stories, maybe even some gangs' histories, to illustrate how this all works. Instead, it read more like a very detailed, albeit dry, explainer.

The conclusions though are rock solid, and it's hard political science. Any PolSci. types who want to read about how governance can be applied in a Hobbesian setting: here you go.

[Synapse]

The Invisible Hook: The Hidden Economics of Pirates конечно, круче, но и тут можно узнать, что экономика изучает не только кривые спроса и предложения, но и более веселые и жизненные штуки. "However they do participate in a number of productive and contractual activities, such as selling drugs, protection, prostitution, and sodomy for sale."

[Holly Donnelly · Rating 3 out of 5]

An interesting mix of social science research and anecdotes.

[Andrew · Rating 4 out of 5]

a good introduction to the history and nature of prison gangs ... now i need to read more in-depth about the political shifts that led to our current state of mass incarceration

[Molly · Rating 2 out of 5]

Interesting material. Uninteresting presentation.

[Stephen Witt · Rating 5 out of 5]

The subtitle is inaccurate: this is an examination of how prison gangs rule the streets.

[Paul · Rating 4 out of 5]

Super interesting. Political science at its best.

[alzabo · Rating 3 out of 5]

an interesting examination of the institutions behind prison gang organization

[Stanton Baker · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good, it was all about California. Interesting perspective on the issue.