With so much secondary literature available on Saint Augustine, it can be difficult to know where to start, let alone to identify which aspects of the saint’s immense body of work are most pertinent to one’s research or spiritual aims. With On Augustine, Rowan Williams, former Archbishop of Canterbury, has made that task much easier, at least for those with some prior familiarity with Augustine’s most famous texts. On Augustine collects eleven essays and a sermon which address the Bishop of Hippo’s reflections on time and self-awareness, biblical hermeneutics, creation, evil, politics, love, and the Trinity. Published over twenty-five years, some of the essays, like “Sapientia: Wisdom and the Trinitarian Relations,” have considerably influenced recent scholarship and debate, whereas others are aimed at a more popular audience. While Williams does not cover the entirety of Augustine’s written corpus—an impossible task for any one volume anyway—and quite deliberately eschews some of the saint’s most well-known (and controversial) themes (neither sex, the Donatists, nor the damnation of unbaptized infants features here), he does probe elements in Augustine’s work he believes interpreters have misunderstood or misinterpreted. That is to say, in most of these essays, Williams seeks to defend Augustine from readers less scrupulous than the former archbishop, and he does so with characteristic patience, charity, and intellectual acumen.
While the scope of Williams’s inquiries is vast, one central theme inflects all the essays: we are finite, time-bound creatures, and the sooner we realize and appreciate this fact about ourselves, the better off we will be. With respect to time and consciousness, Williams writes that we are “inescapably unfinished, consistently in search . . . never just ‘there’” (3). We can come to know ourselves only once we accept our dependence on God, and we can only draw closer to God in and across time. “The question of who or what exactly I am, the nature of self or soul,” Williams writes, “is to be understood in relation to the story of Christ’s acceptance of the weakness of mortality” (12). The Confessions attests to this temporalized spiritual process, and thus Williams explains how, rather than some Neoplatonist ascent toward mystical union with the divine, incarnation is “the path we must follow,” an “embrace of our creatureliness” (142). The incarnation, Williams demonstrates with reference to On the Trinity, testifies to God’s embrace of our limited material and temporal condition, by which God incorporates humanity into the divine life. “Death-directed experience in humanity is embraced by the incarnate Word” (146), he explains, and in this radical act of love Christ unites divine and human voices as one; thus even the very human, very pained “Psalms [become] the words of Jesus, the Word who speaks in all scripture” (27). On the same token, when we recite the Psalms we appropriate Christ’s life, “and from this act of appropriation, the church as a whole is revealed as the community where humanity is allowed full scope to say what it is, in terms of its failure and pain, so that it may fully become what it is created to be, the multiple echo of the Word’s response to the Father” (30). As noted, this theme of limited, temporalized human finitude manifests in all the essays: one could comment on many more similar strands Williams sensitively interlinks.
One of the most helpful essays in the collection is also the last, Williams’s patient explanation of the nuances of uti and frui—use and enjoyment—a central distinction in On Christian Doctrine, which, Williams contends, Hannah Arendt fundamentally misinterprets in her famous doctoral thesis. Her interpretation has, in turned, influenced commentators such as Werner Jeanrond and Martha Nussbaum, thus Williams finds it imperative to clarify this consequential confusion. Briefly, Augustine writes in On Christian Doctrine that while we are called to love God and to love other persons, we can only “enjoy” God, whereas “no human person can be loved in and for himself or herself” (191). We can, to be sure, love other people, yet we “use” them such that they are a “means to a more final satisfaction”—i.e. God (43). This use and enjoyment distinction is “superimposed” on another critical distinction in On Christian Doctrine, namely the difference between res and signum: God alone is purely res—“he alone is what he is, confined by no function,” determined by no other entity (ibid). Each human subject, alternatively, is both res and signum, both “a true subsistent reality” and a signum which points to and opens up on to God (196).
Williams observes that these are tricky concepts that invite anachronistic notions of instrumentality and, prima facie, offend our Kantian sensibilities. Yet Augustine’s point is a sophisticated one and, Williams insists, helpful once we discard the idea that he thinks we are permitted to instrumentalize others in an effort to draw closer to God. Instead, his concern is that “we should not pretend that any human other is God: that is to say, we should not treat them as if relation with them could secure our eternal bliss” (196). In fact, if we erroneously believe that another person can provide such fulfillment, we do instrumentalize them insofar as they become a means to ensure our satisfaction, the end of our desire. “Our temptation is constantly to project on to . . . persons around us expectations they are unable to fulfill, and so to shrink both them and ourselves. . . . We enslave ourselves to objects of desire that pretend to a finality . . . they cannot have” (200). Thus, to “enjoy” another person is not only deceptive for she who seeks illusory fulfillment, it also reduces the other person’s metaphysical complexity and overlooks their role as signum—i.e. their capacity “to prompt and nourish the awareness in other subjects of the infinity of love that is God” (201). The upshot, Williams demonstrates, is that when we love another person, we participate in God’s love, which alone constitutes the human subject. To love another person entails an intimate connectedness between God and the object of love wherein Christ’s love is active. In short, to love another person is to love Christ, and to love Christ, the Head of the Church, is to love his Body here on earth. The two are inseparable.
Despite its virtues, it is unclear to me whether this collection of essays is meant for a popular or academic audience. Academic journals first published many of the essays here, Williams frequently cites the work of other academics with some sense that we should know who they are, and most of the Latin is left untranslated. Moreover—and this is perhaps what tips the scales for me—Williams paraphrases considerable portions of texts like Confessions, City of God, and On the Trinity in the assumption—or so his tone insinuates—that the reader has some familiarity with these texts. I have read Confessions twice and written a thesis on Book XIX of City of God, yet I often found it difficult to trace where, exactly, Williams was in a text, even when he provides specific citations. In fact, one may do well to read these essays with Confessions or On the Trinity at hand, such is the rate at which Williams alludes to particular sections. In the end, it therefore seems that this collection is intended—or at least most enjoyed by—an academic audience familiar with the major themes of Christian doctrine. It may also be difficult to appreciate fully for readers who do not share some of Williams’s orthodox Christian assumptions—about the Incarnation, for example.
Williams is an artful expositor whose multi-decade study of one of the Western church’s most influential saints yields rich dividends. If Williams overlooks those aspect of Augustine which seriously offend our twenty-first century moral sensibilities, to which he alludes in the sermon that concludes the book, this is only because so many other commentators have already covered this territory, often uncharitably. Based on such interpretations, Augustine has morphed into a caricature for many modern readers—anti-feminist par excellence, foremost sexual pedant in Christian history—and such one-sided, erroneous portraitures fail to do justice to the saint’s complexity as a thinker and as a teacher. Williams, on the contrary, offers an extremely charitable, albeit not uncritical, appraisal. He both clarifies muddled points of dispute and emancipates some of Augustine’s most profound ideas from fallacious scholarly accretions. One walks away from this text with a more complicated, less stylized appreciation for a thinker who still has much to say to modern readers.