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History of the Second World War: United Kingdom Civil Series
Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War
This book is perhaps the most little read and yet at the same time the most important official history you will read about WW2. If you really want to understand the nature of second world war an understanding of how management of merchant shipping and the control of port clearance is essential.
In most areas of the war FDR relegated management to his military commanders. The only aspect of the war which he maintained direct control of was the 'War Shipping Administration, such was its importance to Allied strategy.
The 'Germany First' strategy was not a choice, but something forced upon the US Army. Eisehnower pointed out in a very influential paper that a campaign in the Pacific would take 4 times as many ships as a campaign Europe and that it was the shortage of shipping load that determined strategy.
Many of the highly complex tables and appedencies have been removed from this edition to make it readable on smaller, A5 size readers
In most areas of the war FDR relegated management to his military commanders. The only aspect of the war which he maintained direct control of was the 'War Shipping Administration, such was its importance to Allied strategy.
The 'Germany First' strategy was not a choice, but something forced upon the US Army. Eisehnower pointed out in a very influential paper that a campaign in the Pacific would take 4 times as many ships as a campaign Europe and that it was the shortage of shipping load that determined strategy.
Many of the highly complex tables and appedencies have been removed from this edition to make it readable on smaller, A5 size readers
- GenresHistory
596 pages, Kindle Edition
First published July 9, 2014
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December 19, 2025
I read this so you don't have to.
tl;dr;
The British in World War II had immense shipping problems. They solved them.
Full Review
I was put onto this book by the extolling of James Holland on his popular We Have Ways of Making You Talk podcast. It was a work I had never heard of, and the author, was the only woman to have written an official history. Normally, Holland's recommendations are great. Here, not so much.
I had thought I was going to get an incisive account of the merchant shipping contribution to the war from the early days of 1939 to the dark days after the Fall of France and happy U Boat hunting periods to the eventual victory. But no.
This book is unlike any history I have ever read.
First of all, the author eschewed ever mentioning anyone by name, including Churchill, Roosevelt, Allanbrooke, Dill, and more (except by coincidence in a footnote). As such, it is 100% devoid of any human interest. There were titanic contests of will between the Brits and Americans over shipping allocations yet these are referred to only obliquely and without any human drama. The various heads of the shipping ministries and boards are never named.
Second of all, the drama of the Battle of the Atlantic is only mentioned as to its effect in tons of shipping sunk. This book is not a page turner except insofar as you'll never get to the next page unless you skim the highlights of the current page.
Third, the writing style is "wordy" and veers on the bureaucratese. I've randomly chosen one of the shorter paragraphs to give you a flavor. Many paragraphs ran to full pages (again, without anyone's name ever mentioned).
Thus during the greater part of the first two years of war a large though diminishing freedom was left to serving seaman to seek, and to former seamen to remain in, safe, civilian jobs, which were growing progressively more plentiful and more remunerative. Indeed, the freedom was greater than appears, for after the fall of France the arrangements broke down by which it had been intended to keep track of the serving seamen of military age; so that in practice it was perfectly possible for even men in this category to take jobs ashore; and meanwhile the sea, who had been an inconstant mistress during the slumps of peace, was becoming an increasingly cruel one in war. The temptation to desert was very great.
-- Chapter VII Crews; page 163
Fourthly, for reasons of scope, the author excludes any discussion of the tanker fleet and fuel demands.
You do learn some things when reading this book. I'll mention a few to whet the appetite of the dedicated Second World War enthusiast
* Nitrates, coal, grain and the Middle East. In 1941-3, the Egyptian front needed coal shipped in to run the railroads to supply the troops and civilians; South Africa needed Egyptian nitrates to fertilize her fields that in turn grew grains to supply to the Gulf countries and territories. If any one of these were not shipped in sufficient quantity, downstream consequences ensued.
* Ocean liners - although few in number, they were exceptionally valuable in terms of carrying capacity, especially for troops.
* Once France fell, the port of London became unavailable and all cargo had to be offloaded in western UK ports. There was not enough space to unload, not enough space to warehouse, and not even enough rail capacity to transport to where the goods were needed.
* The Brits had more experience in managing a global supply chain and the Americans generally distrusted the Brits' experience. British planners calculated needs in tons, American planners calculated needs in "sailings". Trying to get a combined Allied shipping plan vexed many. Americans felt that the British civilian economy could get by with less; Brits felt that American theatre commanders, especially in the Pacific were wasteful (as in fact they were with cargo ships queued up for weeks to unload - essentially wasted tonnage).
* The Indian famine was predictable yet so many factors led it to occur regardless. Blaming exclusively Churchill for the famine is far too simplistic. See Chapter XVI.
Why did I rate this 3 stars?
* 1 star for readability
* 5 stars for an impressive collection of charts, tables, appendices. Were one a logistics game designer, the raw material here is a godsend. I suppose this book had to be written as part of the official record.
So, I took the middle of the two.
Dozens and dozens of charts and tables. If you want to know the change in bauxite tonnage of US-controlled shipping between March and October 1942 , see Appendix XLVII. Some photos.
Recommended only for the most grognard SWW historians.
tl;dr;
The British in World War II had immense shipping problems. They solved them.
Full Review
I was put onto this book by the extolling of James Holland on his popular We Have Ways of Making You Talk podcast. It was a work I had never heard of, and the author, was the only woman to have written an official history. Normally, Holland's recommendations are great. Here, not so much.
I had thought I was going to get an incisive account of the merchant shipping contribution to the war from the early days of 1939 to the dark days after the Fall of France and happy U Boat hunting periods to the eventual victory. But no.
This book is unlike any history I have ever read.
First of all, the author eschewed ever mentioning anyone by name, including Churchill, Roosevelt, Allanbrooke, Dill, and more (except by coincidence in a footnote). As such, it is 100% devoid of any human interest. There were titanic contests of will between the Brits and Americans over shipping allocations yet these are referred to only obliquely and without any human drama. The various heads of the shipping ministries and boards are never named.
Second of all, the drama of the Battle of the Atlantic is only mentioned as to its effect in tons of shipping sunk. This book is not a page turner except insofar as you'll never get to the next page unless you skim the highlights of the current page.
Third, the writing style is "wordy" and veers on the bureaucratese. I've randomly chosen one of the shorter paragraphs to give you a flavor. Many paragraphs ran to full pages (again, without anyone's name ever mentioned).
Thus during the greater part of the first two years of war a large though diminishing freedom was left to serving seaman to seek, and to former seamen to remain in, safe, civilian jobs, which were growing progressively more plentiful and more remunerative. Indeed, the freedom was greater than appears, for after the fall of France the arrangements broke down by which it had been intended to keep track of the serving seamen of military age; so that in practice it was perfectly possible for even men in this category to take jobs ashore; and meanwhile the sea, who had been an inconstant mistress during the slumps of peace, was becoming an increasingly cruel one in war. The temptation to desert was very great.
-- Chapter VII Crews; page 163
Fourthly, for reasons of scope, the author excludes any discussion of the tanker fleet and fuel demands.
You do learn some things when reading this book. I'll mention a few to whet the appetite of the dedicated Second World War enthusiast
* Nitrates, coal, grain and the Middle East. In 1941-3, the Egyptian front needed coal shipped in to run the railroads to supply the troops and civilians; South Africa needed Egyptian nitrates to fertilize her fields that in turn grew grains to supply to the Gulf countries and territories. If any one of these were not shipped in sufficient quantity, downstream consequences ensued.
* Ocean liners - although few in number, they were exceptionally valuable in terms of carrying capacity, especially for troops.
* Once France fell, the port of London became unavailable and all cargo had to be offloaded in western UK ports. There was not enough space to unload, not enough space to warehouse, and not even enough rail capacity to transport to where the goods were needed.
* The Brits had more experience in managing a global supply chain and the Americans generally distrusted the Brits' experience. British planners calculated needs in tons, American planners calculated needs in "sailings". Trying to get a combined Allied shipping plan vexed many. Americans felt that the British civilian economy could get by with less; Brits felt that American theatre commanders, especially in the Pacific were wasteful (as in fact they were with cargo ships queued up for weeks to unload - essentially wasted tonnage).
* The Indian famine was predictable yet so many factors led it to occur regardless. Blaming exclusively Churchill for the famine is far too simplistic. See Chapter XVI.
Why did I rate this 3 stars?
* 1 star for readability
* 5 stars for an impressive collection of charts, tables, appendices. Were one a logistics game designer, the raw material here is a godsend. I suppose this book had to be written as part of the official record.
So, I took the middle of the two.
Dozens and dozens of charts and tables. If you want to know the change in bauxite tonnage of US-controlled shipping between March and October 1942 , see Appendix XLVII. Some photos.
Recommended only for the most grognard SWW historians.
Displaying 1 of 1 review