Perché i Paesi falliscono: Il grande ciclo dell'economia

by Ray Dalio, Riccardo Spagnolo (Translator)

Il debito pubblico dei grandi Paesi può minacciare il nostro benessere collettivo? Ci sono limiti alla crescita del debito? Un grande Paese con un’importante valuta di riserva come gli Stati Uniti può davvero andare in rovina? E come si presenterebbe questo scenario? Ecco alcune domande che stanno alla base del grido di allarme per l’economia globale contenuto in questo volume.

Politici, responsabili delle politiche governative e investitori discutono da decenni su questi interrogativi, senza trovare delle risposte esaustive. Ray Dalio, uno dei più grandi investitori del nostro tempo, che ha previsto la crisi finanziaria mondiale del 2008 e la crisi del debito europeo del 2010-2012, condivide per la prima volta la sua dettagliata spiegazione di quello che definisce il “Big Debt Cycle”. Comprendere questo ciclo è fondamentale per aiutare politici, investitori e il pubblico in generale a capire dove ci troviamo e in che direzione ci stiamo muovendo. Il modello di Dalio indica soluzioni sorprendentemente semplici per gestire i problemi legati al debito che Stati Uniti, Europa, Giappone e Cina stanno affrontando oggi.

'Perché i Paesi falliscono' mostra come questi problemi siano collegati ad altre forze – politiche interne degli Stati, relazioni geopolitiche, cambiamenti naturali (come siccità, inondazioni e pandemie) e tecnologici (soprattutto l’AI) – che insieme stanno causando ciò che Dalio definisce “sconvolgimenti del grande ciclo nell’ordine mondiale”. Leggendo questo libro, comprenderete meglio che cosa sta succedendo e come reagire di conseguenza.

Genres: Economics, Finance, Nonfiction, Business, History, Politics, Money

418 pages, Kindle Edition

First published June 3, 2025

About the author

Raymond Dalio (born August 8, 1949) is an American investor, hedge fund manager, and philanthropist. Dalio is the founder of investment firm Bridgewater Associates, one of the world's largest hedge funds.

Reviews

[Sebastian Gebski · Rating 5 out of 5]

It's kinda incredible (if you ask me), but Ray Dalio has managed to wite yet another book on the very same topic (big & small cycles in local/global economies) and it's ... a-must-read again. Bah.

No, but seriously, get it - it's a no-brainer buy. Many good points, many good observations - quite hard to follow as an audiobook (without graphs and illustrations), and even in the Kindle form I occasionally had to stop and process some shortcuts he made. TBH not all chapters are for every audience, but the ones that are supposed to be generally understandable for everyone already bring a powerful message - hope is not a strategy, we should learn from the past, the post-WW2 period is over, multilateral liberalism is over and we're (unfortunately) back to the rules of direct, brutal strength. For the latest 2 generations (at least) - it's a shock. The faster the wake-up comes, the better.

OK, but back to the book:
- it covers the general theory of cycles (already introduced earlier by Dalio)
- its detailed justification/clarification
- examples from the past (for various countries)
- a summary and even a brief hints on solutions

I've started listening to audiobook (in my Everand subscription), but the book is so good that Ive bought e-book as well & I already know I'll be coming back to it regularly. Good stuff.

[Nigel · Rating 5 out of 5]

Demagogues and sophistry are going to ruin the world
You added a status update

Usually demagogues from the left share support on the people who are in poverty, and on the lower spectrum, where they demagogues on the right will share support on people who are middle class to hold their power
All through out history
You added a status update

Who controls the autocracy and if they do radical enough policies to control the oligarchs in there country and how far and how serious
will such governments
take and how much dictatorial they will be, power controls but absolute control
Autocracy from democracy is
How nationalist they'll be.


Dark sky’s in southern Alberta and over Canada prairies😞

Top it off we have climate deniers who completely ignore the last decade Canada 🇨🇦 has been in a state of emergency 🚨 fire 🔥 status…. And that this year we got 25% of our ground water 💦 this year…. I don’t know how it could get any worst, expanding to the global over population areas that only have 25% of there ground water 💦 with looking at the crisis that is going and transpiring on hard money and on Fiat money.

Might just be the dark haze of smoke developing over the prairies but I think we’re in hell…. Crops are going to be stunted either from lack of ground water 💧 or the smoke haze and the cattle can’t be on the farm cause they rely on the small water sheds on the farm that are well fed that are near empty….

Call me a nihilistic person 🧍‍♂️ but this year is looking forward to winter…. And it’s not even summer yet…

https://www.nowdix.ca/2025/06/off-fac...

Although I go back on after a fawn is born on my lawn…
It’s complicated facebook and me that’s for sure. 👍

https://www.nowdix.ca/2025/06/a-fawn-...

[Sanford Chee]

All-in interview w/ Ray Dalio Jan 2025
https://podcasts.apple.com/sg/podcast...
https://youtu.be/1_rvVTuGRNE?si=r4WTt...

Bloomberg 9 Feb 2025
https://youtu.be/s5kQkpnwtCE?si=KJeuk...

Ray Dalio with David Rubenstein: How Countries Go Broke Jul 2025
https://youtu.be/eGtGKk0E_qk?si=5pRrz...

Defending the Value of Money -Ray Dalio 23 Jul 2025
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/defend...

'US sliding towards 1930s-style autocracy, warns Ray Dalio' -FT 2 Sep 2025
https://www.ft.com/content/b86bd33b-b...
FT Interview: Ray Dalio 2 Sep 2025
https://www.ft.com/content/d130beb3-b...

'It All Has Happened Before for the Same Reasons' -Ray Dalio 17 Sep 2025
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/all-ha...

Ray Dalio & Ng Kok Song @Future China Global Forum 2025
https://youtu.be/SN4G3LfERcQ?si=mYlkA...

All-in Podcast 3 Mar 2026 US system is in jeopardy
https://youtu.be/u-vMNzHgSHI?si=q3EBN...

Ray Dalio Principles
https://www.principles.com/
https://economicprinciples.org/

How Countries Go Broke: Introduction & Chapter One
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/how-co...
5 big forces affecting cycles of peace & prosperity vs conflict & depression: (1) Big debt cycle; (2) internal politics & social harmony; (3) geopolitics; (4) big acts of nature eg droughts, floods, earthquakes, pandemics etc; (5) technology

1 Mar 2024 bubble indicator
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/we-sto...

Popping of the bubble occurs due to a combination of (1) a tightening of money and (2) the prior rate of debt growth being unsustainable.

Chapt 2: The Mechanics in Words and Concepts
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/how-co...
When bond yields are low relative to inflation, bonds will be sold and inflation assets will be bought, and vice versa.
"From what I can see, we are likely entering the very turbulent stage in the overall Big Cycle driven by the interactions of these five big forces, and the resulting changes in the world order will be big...By “long-term (big) debt cycle,” I mean the cycle of building up debt assets and debt liabilities over long periods of time (i.e., successive short-term debt cycles) to amounts that eventually become unmanageable. This leads to a combination of big debt restructurings and big debt monetizations that produce a period of big market and economic turbulence." -Ray Dalio
Big debt crises come about when the amounts of debt assets and debt liabilities become too large relative to the amount of money in existence and/or the amounts of goods and services in existence.
The greater the size of the debt assets and debt liabilities relative to the real incomes being produced, the more difficult the balancing act is, so the greater the likelihood of a debt-caused downturn in the markets and economy.
A sure sign of moving toward a debt crisis is when there is a large and rising amount of borrowing that is being used to pay for the debt service.

Chpt 3: The Mechanics in Numbers and Equations
1/ Debts relative to income (Debt/GDP)
https://tradingeconomics.com/united-s...
[(Future exp ex-int - future income) + current debt*(1+i/r)] / [current income*(1+g)]
2/ Debt service relative to income (interest expense/government revenue >useful vs Debt/GDP)
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/61172
3/ Nominal interest rates relative to a) inflation rates and b) nominal income growth rates (i.e., inflation plus real growth)
4/ Debts and debt service relative to savings (e.g., reserves)
=>countries with very high debt levels, very large deficits, low savings, and very high and very fast rising interest rates have a very high risk of a debt default or debt devaluation crisis.

Chapter Four & Chapter Five - Part 2: The Archetypical Sequence Leading to Central Governments and Central Banks Going Broke
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/how-co...

Chapter 8 to Chapter 11 - Part 3
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/how-co...

'My Trip to Washington to Get in Sync with Republican and Democratic Leaders on the Budget and Debt Situation' -Ray Dalio 27 Jun 2025
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/my-tri...

Ray Dalio: When countries have too much debt, lowering interest rates and devaluing the currency that the debt is denominated in is the preferred path government policy makers are most likely to take, so it pays to bet on it happening.
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/most-i...

[Russell Chee · Rating 2 out of 5]

There is little here that is original from the perspective of an investor, macroeconomist, or politician. Dalio writes about pretty basic things with the kind of verbal flourishes that imply he is the only person who understands these dynamics. This is by no means a bad introduction to fiscal and monetary dynamics, and investing through these macro cycles, but it is a far cry from the intellectual tome it strives to be.

[John Lutz · Rating 5 out of 5]

I’ve been a fan of Ray’s since I’ve started investing and familiarizing myself with market trends, but I’ve never taken the time to read his work as an author - so as a first “Dalio book” for me my review is a bit biased as I’m reading a lot of these ‘principles’ alongside their definitions for the first time. (I can see how some may have found parts of it repetitive if they’ve read his previous books, but I enjoyed the context as someone who hasn’t)

Dalio releasing this book in March of 2025 would come to a shock to someone who read it that didn’t know the date it was published. The analysis on the federal reserve’s independence (alongside its importance), state of the government debt, and overall world order is shockingly appropriate.

I found the historical debt cycle review of China (yet also a bit anecdotal) and Japan more than worthy of inclusion. China’s resilience economically matches up with what I learned from my reading of “Chip Wars” earlier last year. While Japan’s debt problem is as topical as ever as I’m writing this review in January of 2026.

Provided with Ray’s reasoning for his “3% 3-part solution” I have to agree with him. I think cutting spending, tax increases, and a small yet meaningful interest rate cut makes sense especially given the current /good/ economic conditions to do it in. That being said, his remarks about the current political affairs ongoing in the US paint a larger picture of why he points out in the book with detailed data (rightfully so) with how unprecedentedly divided the US is on both spectrums that a bipartisan agreement would be an almost unthinkable task (but one can hope).

That being said, I appreciated his take on the issue and the historical patterns he pointed out to solidify the understanding of why he was led to his solution, and predictions of the future - which I thought wrapped the book up quite well.

I also appreciated his thoughtful instructions on how to read the book (different per chapter!). As someone who’s been reading “market jargon” for a few years I can only imagine how intimidating some of this information would be if I wasn’t as familiar with the topics at hand.

This is a great book.

[Blake · Rating 1 out of 5]

This books pretty full of shit.

Dahlio makes big claims about the “big debt cycle” but has no evidence to back it up throughout the book.

His fundamentals on economics are mostly good, but also through an investors lens.

Towards the end of the book, his core premise reveals part of the issue, which is he has a presupposition that with the ability to capture all knowledge the future can be predicted. It’s a pretty obviously faulty premise.

The graphs in the book are mainly ascientific and serve mainly to try to illustrate his points.

The history overview are a bit odd and tangential though not necessarily wrong.

His political section is already dated (idk why you would write current events) and overly naive.

Anyone interested in this book would be better off reading other economists, historians, and political writers.

[David K. Glidden · Rating 3 out of 5]

Nearly a century ago by now, my father taught graduate students business cycle theory, while he was finishing his degree in agricultural economics. As he became invested in agricultural statistics over his long career, he learned that all generalities are false, no matter how well they appear backed up by statistics.

Dalio’s monetarist theory of economic cycles consequently reminds me of medieval geocentrics who could calculate the motions of stars and planets with considerable accuracy, even though their planet was certainly not the center of the universe.

Dalio is a Platonist, not an Aristotelian. A Hedgehog who sees one big thing, and not a Fox who sees many things. His writing is pretentious, arrogant, supercilious, because he has made a lot of money as a hedge fund monetarist, and in his success he wrongly sees monetarism as the Key to Understanding Economics.

Dalio‘s Top Down, almost autocratic approach to economics naturally takes the perspective of the Lords and Masters of the Universe —the Robber Barons who have taken most of the global wealth, often by trickery and legal chicanery, the movers of global markets. Theirs is indeed a Platonic Universe where only the aristoi ( the best people) really matter.

Aristotelian Economics, by contrast, works from the bottom up, focusing not on gaining the most money, but on distributing the greatest economic good for the most people, starting with the poorest of the poor. And so these economists focus on microcosms, on the moral imperative of fairness, rather than the greedy lust of covetedness. A human potentialities model of economics, as Sen & Nussbaum describe it.

Yes, we the people today are at the mercy of politically influential monetarists. But what if economists took as their Original Position the standards of living of those most in need?

Dalio ends his book with a love letter to Trump and his ilk, those artful dodgers who brought about the Crash of 2008, escaping unscathed while poorer folks lost homes and livelihoods.

[Subramanya Shindagikar · Rating 3 out of 5]

Picked up this one as I belong to the group of Ray which believes current economic world order centered around US is unsustainable. However, editors of the book sadly have done an awful job. Content of the book is worth 100 pages which has been dragged to 400. He often mentions he won’t go into certain topics because it will be a digression - such digressions would have been a lot better than repeating exactly the same statements over and over.

Having said that, his concept of economic cycles resonates very well and perspective of looking at multiple events with a common lens and theme of cycles is refreshing. The book keeps you waiting till the end to see if economic indicators which he says he uses to predict the stage of cycle are explained - it never comes, just the final conclusions with graphs plotted with probability are shown without any method. Disappointing to see that from Ray Dalio who sets out on this book declaring that he wants to teach the world all the knowledge he gained over decades. None of the concepts in the book are complicated, unnecessarily readers told to skip to next if they are non professionals all throughout the book. Better thing would have been to explain the basics if author thinks whatever he is saying is complex, instead of repetitive statements all over.

Easy to notice is the presumption book carries - the Fed or in general, Central Banks are all powerful entity. In reality, Central Banks have very narrow tools which they can exercise even when they are operating independently. They can get the things wrong, but to get it very right and overturning the bad economy it takes wonders if they do. Ray Dalio has projected the Fed as God-like.
Interest rates in the book have been shown as some kind of knob which central banks can easily rotate and “set”, that’s not how the reasonably free markets operate!

4* for the giving the perspective on macro cycles and big picture, 2* for the book structure and presumptions.

[Ty · Rating 3 out of 5]

always interesting to read dalio’s perspective on things. his previous book, changing world order, has greatly shaped how i view the world and so far its been a solid compass to make sense of and navigate what’s going on in the world. to me, this book felt like a mix between an update on the core points of changing world order a few years down the line, as well as a deep dive on the mechanics and current state of sovereign debt, particularly that of the US.

i feel like this book is structured less cohesively and the ideas are expressed less lucidly than in changing world order. it doesn’t explain every term or concept and often leaves reasoning steps in arguments implicit, which, combined with the fact that this book often quite technical, makes this book less accessible to lay people (read: macroeconomics enthusiasts who are by no means professionals) like myself.

still, for anyone interested in macroeconomics and broadly subscribes to dalio’s views on the cyclicality of economies, countries, and geopolitics, i do recommend this as a follow up to changing world order.

[Caden Crum · Rating 4 out of 5]

Look, I know everyone is not as well versed in Dalio’s literature as me. For many, this is the first book they’ve read. Because of that, I can excuse the first 100 pages of this book being largely repetitive and arguably verbatim of what was included in his last book, The Changing World Order. However, after page 100, this man starts to cook. It gets a bit technical, even for a finance major, but he does a great job of describing the problem we and the rest of the world face in terms of debt and I love his visually appealing the graphs were. His solution of working down the debt-to-GDP ratio to 3% by cutting spending 4%, hiking taxes 4%, and slashing interest rates by 1% is a bit idealistic and probably over-simplified, but it would work great as a fallback plan if Congress cannot find a more palatable solution. Solid read

[J Bomb · Rating 4 out of 5]

7 out of 10

Enjoyed Dalio’s thesis more than I thought I would. It really got me thinking (and more worried than before) about the level of indebtedness in the west, and Dalio connected the debt theme with internal politics (populism, economic nationalism) and external politics (war, tariffs, might makes right) in a way that felt coherent and even prescient even though he only wrote it a year ago.

Loses some points because the writing style is tragic. I hated the constant signposting and hated the bold text for those who only wanted to skim. I felt these choices rewarded the disinterested person and punished those who read every page. Will probably seek out some of Dalios thoughts online in shorter form but won’t reach for another book.

[Katherine Baldock · Rating 3 out of 5]

Get a fucking editor, if I have to read “early March 2025” one more time I’m going to freak.

[Book Dragon · Rating 5 out of 5]

Ray Dalio, the founder of Bridgewater Associates, has extensively studied and written about the cyclical nature of economies, particularly focusing on how debt cycles drive the rise and fall of nations. His recent book, "How Countries Go Broke: The Big Cycle," distills decades of research into a comprehensive framework for understanding national bankruptcy. This technical review will delve into Dalio's core concepts, emphasizing the mechanisms by which countries accumulate unsustainable debt and the inevitable consequences.

Dalio's Core Framework: The Big Debt Cycle and the Overall Big Cycle

Dalio posits that the economic machine operates through identifiable cause-effect relationships that repeat in cycles. The most critical of these is the Big Debt Cycle, which typically spans 75-100 years. This cycle is not isolated; it interacts with other major cycles, including the political cycle within countries and the geopolitical cycle between countries, all contributing to what Dalio calls the Overall Big Cycle that dictates the rise and decline of empires.
Stages of the Big Debt Cycle and How Countries Go Broke:
Dalio outlines a predictable progression for the Big Debt Cycle, which, if mishandled, leads to a country's financial demise:

1) Early Stage: Low Debt, High Productivity, and Sound Money:
*Characteristics: After a major restructuring (often following a war or depression), debt levels are low, and there's a strong focus on productivity, sound money, and wealth accumulation. The leading power's currency often gains reserve status due to its stability and economic strength.
* Mechanism: People are cautious and prioritize saving and productive investment. Borrowing is for productive purposes, leading to real economic growth.

2)Growth Stage: Credit Expansion and Leveraging:
* Characteristics: As confidence grows, people increasingly borrow, believing in continued prosperity. Credit expands faster than incomes, leading to asset price appreciation and a sense of wealth. New financial instruments and intermediaries emerge.
* Mechanism: Central banks typically keep interest rates low to stimulate growth, encouraging more borrowing. This "leveraging up" fuels economic activity but also creates a growing debt burden.

3)Bubble Phase: Unsustainable Debt Growth and Speculation:
* Characteristics: Debt growth becomes excessive and unsustainable, used increasingly for speculative investments rather than productive ones. Asset prices become detached from their underlying earnings. This is often accompanied by a widening wealth gap.
* Mechanism: The illusion of prosperity encourages more borrowing and risk-taking. People extrapolate past returns into the future, ignoring the accumulating debt. The central bank faces a dilemma: raise rates to curb inflation and the bubble (risking a downturn), or keep rates low and let the bubble inflate further.

4) Peak and Tightening: Central Bank Action or Inability to Service Debt:
* Characteristics: The bubble bursts. This can be triggered by the central bank raising interest rates to curb inflation, or by the market's realization that existing debt cannot be serviced.
* Mechanism: Higher interest rates make debt repayment more difficult, leading to defaults. For countries, this can manifest as difficulty in selling government bonds or a flight of capital.

5) Deleveraging: The Painful Adjustment:
* Characteristics: This is the phase where debt levels decline relative to incomes. Dalio identifies four key levers for deleveraging, which are often used in combination:
* Austerity (Cutting Spending): Governments, businesses, and individuals reduce spending. While necessary, this can be deflationary and lead to further income contraction, paradoxically increasing the debt burden initially.
* Debt Reduction/Restructuring: Debts are written down, defaulted on, or restructured (e.g., lower interest rates, longer repayment periods). This can be painful for creditors (e.g., banks, bondholders).
* Wealth Redistribution (from "Haves" to "Have-Nots"): Governments may increase taxes on the wealthy or implement policies that redistribute wealth to stimulate demand. This can lead to social and political unrest.
* Monetization of Debt (Printing Money/Quantitative Easing): Central banks print money to buy government debt and other financial assets. This is often the most palatable option for policymakers but carries the risk of inflation and currency devaluation, especially if confidence in the currency is lost.
* Mechanism: The goal of deleveraging is to bring debt and income back into a sustainable relationship. The "beautiful deleveraging" is achieved through a balanced mix of these four levers, allowing debt to decline relative to income without causing excessive deflation or inflation. A "ugly deleveraging" occurs when the wrong mix of policies is applied, leading to depression, hyperinflation, or social disorder.

6)Debt Crisis and Potential Bankruptcy:
* Characteristics: If the deleveraging process is poorly managed, or if debt levels are simply too immense, a country can face a full-blown debt crisis, potentially leading to national bankruptcy. This is particularly true for countries that borrow in a foreign currency or those whose currency loses its reserve status.
* Mechanism: The inability to roll over debt, a collapse in bond prices, soaring interest rates, and hyperinflation (if money printing becomes excessive) can all signal national bankruptcy. The ultimate consequence for a country with a reserve currency that prints its own money is often a devaluation of its currency and a loss of its reserve status.

How the Overall Big Cycle Interacts:

Dalio emphasizes that economic cycles are intertwined with political and geopolitical forces:
* Internal Political Cycle: Economic hardship during deleveraging often leads to populism, political polarization, and social unrest, as the "haves" and "have-nots" clash over wealth distribution.
* External Geopolitical Cycle: The rise and fall of empires are closely linked to their economic strength. A nation's ability to service its debt, its economic competitiveness, its share of world trade, and the strength of its currency as a reserve currency are all crucial indicators of its power. Declining economic power due to excessive debt can weaken a nation's military and its influence on the global stage, potentially leading to conflicts and a shift in the world order.

Technical Nuances and Dalio's Key Insights:

* Money vs. Credit: Dalio meticulously distinguishes between money (what you settle transactions with) and credit (a promise to deliver money). The vast majority of "money" in an economy is credit, and it's the expansion and contraction of this credit that drives economic cycles.
* The Role of Central Banks: Central banks play a pivotal role in managing debt cycles through interest rate policy and quantitative easing. Their ability to print money is a powerful tool, but it has limits, especially for non-reserve currency countries or when confidence in the currency erodes.
* Reserve Currency Status: Dalio highlights the immense advantage of having a reserve currency (like the USD). It allows a country to print money to pay its debts without immediate, severe inflationary consequences, as much of that newly printed money is absorbed by global demand for the reserve currency. However, even this has limits, and excessive printing can eventually undermine confidence and lead to a loss of reserve status.
* Productivity as the Long-Term Driver: While debt cycles cause short-term fluctuations, Dalio stresses that long-term prosperity is ultimately driven by productivity growth. Countries that fail to improve productivity will eventually become uncompetitive, regardless of their debt management strategies.

Conclusion:

Ray Dalio's "How Countries Go Broke" provides a powerful and historically informed technical framework for understanding the mechanics of national debt crises. By emphasizing the cyclical nature of credit, the interplay of economic, political, and geopolitical forces, and the limited tools available to policymakers, Dalio offers a stark warning about the consequences of unchecked debt accumulation. His work is a crucial guide for policymakers and investors seeking to navigate the complex and often perilous landscape of global finance, providing a lens through which to anticipate and potentially mitigate the inevitable challenges of the "Big Debt Cycle."

[Jack Smith · Rating 3 out of 5]

Some really interesting ideas, unfortunately it feels like a fantastic 150 page book has been bloated to 400 pages, very repetitive at points

[Nick Veronica · Rating 4 out of 5]

Really like this read and seems really relevant to current geopolitical conditions. Can't say I understand every mechanic he discusses in full, but the historical context regarding predictive behavior of the large debt cycle & characteristics of nations and global conflicts that start to occur during stage 5 of the large debt cycle provided meaningful context to certain things we are seeing today I found enlightening.

Some people paint Ray Dalio as a "Doomsayer" but I didn't feel that way at all. I felt his argument wasn't that America was going to collapse and here comes WW3, but more that monetary order we have been accustomed too with the U.S. Dollar serving as the world reserve currency is potentially coming to an end or a reset. What that looks like isn't totally predictable and could range greatly from small cold war like conflicts (being the most likely in this situation) that don't necessarily impact your everyday citizen, all the way to full on war between major countries where internal strife seems to grow larger within classes alongside the adoption of more nationalistic policies, attitudes, and behaviors. This book was finished at the end of the last presidential election and is interesting to compare his broad view predictions to what has actually occurred.

[Nick · Rating 5 out of 5]

The author masterfully frames the developments in economics and politics (including geopolitics) in terms of debt/money cycles. The style of writing is accessible to both casual and “involved” readers. I particularly enjoyed the mathematical analyses behind the cycles described. However, I was surprised to see some takes on issues from US internal politics to China-related international affairs. This is likely to be due to the author’s different optic to my own, largely affected by age, wealth, nationality, and experience. Overall, i gave the book 5 stars because it gives a holistic, and fair overview, of its propositions in historical context. Furthermore, I quite liked the unique approach to seeing how markets operate.

[Kyle Fitzy Shanklin · Rating 4 out of 5]

An important yet dense look at a very pertinent subject. This was my first foray into Dalio, and while some insights were interesting, I wasn’t expecting to be picking up a textbook. I grasped the concept of big and small credit cycles pretty quickly, but the book kept drilling deeper and deeper. I eventually switched to the audiobook just to get through it, because well… it’s a lot. I switched back to reading and the final few chapters saved it for me. Seeing how Dalio would tackle an impending credit crisis and reading his predictions for the future made it worth finishing. 3.5 stars, rounded up to 4.

[James · Rating 2 out of 5]

Long and very repetitive.

There is a lot of financial details and specifics which is great if you are in the finance field and want a really in-depth view of countries and their debt cycles. With that being said it is still so repetitive.

In each chapter or section there are points/perspectives being made that get over-repeated too much. Great, interesting but delivered in an extremely dull way. Way too much filler in the book.

Seems like this book was partly a cash grab to jump on the recent economic instability in the US financial market.

The book should have been 1/3 the length that it is.

[Malinda · Rating 4 out of 5]

So this had big concepts explained pretty well and I grasp now how countries go broke. I know a few indicators, what the cycles look like, and the history examples were helpful. I appreciated how the author would say that this section may get too detailed for some so if you skipped to go to a certain chapter.

[Chris Reifel · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a good book for gaining a better understanding of why we are are in a critical place with respect to our National Debt. The Author does a nice job of detailing the Economics of the Big Cycles and provides the reader with numerous opportunities for deep dives throughout the book.

[Manish · Rating 4 out of 5]

Deeply technical book, with formulae and graphs

[Eugene Tararaka · Rating 4 out of 5]

IMHO, not as great as other Dalio books but it's still a good investment of time.

[Jacqui Busch · Rating 4 out of 5]

I simultaneously think capitalism is stupid, and that USA should undertake what he suggests at the end of the book. If we do an even amount of cutting and taxing (and hopefully the Fed does their part too) and then adjust the particulars from there, then at least we'll hopefully still have a country in 10 years (assuming no other country nukes us while DJT is acting up). I am decidedly of the 60% of the country who is on the dole (specifically, I'm on disability), and the cuts to things like Medicaid will really, really hurt, but I would be comforted by knowing that the rich are doing their part to rein in the deficit, too. And if we don't do something soon, we will run out of money to fund entitlements altogether, which would be far more painful overall.

[Elan Garfias]

Definitely one of the more honest books by a capitalist about how power works and what money really is. This one is pretty technical and I've found his interviews to be a bit more accessible but he doesn't try to put any sort of ideological veneer over his treatment of debt traps and inflationary cycles which is extremely refreshing.

[Jennifer Bryant]

This book is about an interesting topic, and I think the ideas within are structurally sound.
However, the writing is repetitive and unengaging, which is a serious problem given that the topic is complicated.
As I said to my girlfriend, "It's like having a bad professor."

[Michael V · Rating 4 out of 5]

Ray argues that small, careful changes over long periods builds up momentum without too much stress in a single category. I would gladly reach across the aisle to consider some of his data-driven solutions.

Unfortunately, I'm not in the room at all. Good luck everyone!

[Borja Alvarez · Rating 4 out of 5]

Muy buen libro, he podido entender las dinámicas de los ciclos de deuda y cómo afectan a los países. Ray Dalio además expone casos particulares de países, y también conecta con la dimensión geopolítica.

Muy interesante

[Vyu]

The author made an AI of himself I hate it here

[Nilesh Jasani · Rating 3 out of 5]

How Countries Go Broke: The Big Cycle presents itself less as a narrative exploration and more as a dense economist’s report, heavy with data and driven by the formidable reputation of the famous investor behind it. The text tackles one of the most defining issues of the modern era: the excessive accumulation of debt, particularly government borrowing across the world's largest economies. The writing style is dry, methodical, and utilitarian, clearly targeting a data-hungry, financial-world readership that is likely already conversant with the nuances of sovereign credit and macroeconomic levers. For the uninitiated, the book’s stark conclusions regarding the trajectory of empires and currencies might hold a certain morbid appeal. The author’s track record of market success brings credibility that a university professor writing on the same topic with similar examples would never have. However, lay readers may feel adrift in the granular details as the book prioritizes a rigorous framework over accessibility. In some ways, this is a high-level briefing document for those who view the world through spreadsheets and yield curves.

For this reviewer, the book serves primarily as a springboard to examine the prevailing consensus on public sector debt. It is a subject where the alarming reality has been visible for over a decade. Public sector debt in most developed countries has reached record levels that, by any traditional metric, are worryingly unsustainable. One does not need a deep historical compendium to understand the basic arithmetic: a debt series cannot rise indefinitely faster than the income supporting it without eventually triggering a painful reversal. A desk analyst can recite any number of historical defaults or currency crises to flag the risk, but the points of unsustainability are better articulated through simple logic rather than historical analogy. The vicious cycle of ever-rising interest burdens is obvious. As debt piles up, the cost of servicing that debt consumes a larger share of the budget, necessitating further borrowing just to keep the lights on, which in turn raises the risk premium and the interest rate, accelerating the spiral. This mechanical inevitability is clear to anyone willing to look at the issue without the rose-tinted glasses of modern monetary theory. A system may fudge and buy time, but one can easily show how this cannot continue forever, and the more one kicks the can down the road, the worse it will be for the future generations that run out of trickery.

However, the more critical discussion—and one that is often glossed over in purely economic analyses—centers on the political realities of reversal. The book, like many others in this genre, offers solutions and prescriptions for fiscal sanity. Yet, these solutions are, for all intents and purposes, politically infeasible. To believe that policymakers will proactively implement the austerity measures necessary to reverse these debt trends is to fundamentally misunderstand the incentives of power. A reversal requires inflicting significant pain: social (through reduced services), economic (through higher taxes or reduced spending), and, most importantly, political (for leaders attempting to enforce these measures). There is no incentive for a sitting government to volunteer for a recession or a decline in living standards to secure a stable balance sheet for a successor ten years down the line. This reviewer would love to be proven wrong by a brave Volker-like personality who is able to implement the strictest of measures while being able to retain the job long enough, but it is abundantly clear that proactive reversals—so often desired by theoreticians, commentators, and those not currently holding office—are simply not in sight. The political capital required to tell a population that the party is over does not exist in modern political economies.

If we accept that a managed, proactive solution is a fantasy, the central question shifts from "how do we fix this?" to "what causes the uncontrollable unravelling?" This is where the reliance on historical cycles, a core tenet of the book, becomes problematic. While the author and many contemporaries attempt to draw robust lessons from history to predict the timing and nature of this unravelling, the reality is that history is worse than a poor guide. The past offers almost no reliable pattern for the type of pain that will emerge, regardless of the terminology used to describe these "cycles." The book posits an 80-year "Big Cycle," suggesting a rhythmic rise and fall of powers and credit systems. But one must ask: why 80 years? Why not a 250-year cycle, or a 10,000-year cycle? The specificity of the duration implies a precision that simply does not exist in the chaotic data of human civilization.

To proclaim the existence of an 80-year cycle with any statistical validity—even granting a generous 25-year leeway for error—one would need a dataset containing at least 20 to 30 distinct data points. In the context of modern financial systems, we barely have 160 years of reliable data, covering perhaps two of these alleged cycles. Furthermore, these 160 years have been characterized by such profound secular changes that they render cyclical comparisons largely moot. The world of the gold standard, the world of Bretton Woods, and the world of globalized fiat currency are effectively different planets. Drawing a straight line of "cyclicality" through the Industrial Revolution, the advent of nuclear weapons, the internet age, and the rise of artificial intelligence ignores that secular forces of change are far more dominant than any underlying cyclical rhythm. The variables have changed so drastically that the equation cannot be solved with the old constants.

The limitations of these historical models are nowhere more evident than in the case of Japan. For over three decades, Japan has been the poster child for unsustainable debt levels. By every model present in the 1990s, the Japanese sovereign debt market should have collapsed, the yen should have evaporated, or hyperinflation should have taken hold. Yet, despite the constant hand-wringing and the "widow-maker" trade of shorting Japanese government bonds (JGBs), the unsustainable levels have not reversed. The collapse has not arrived. If one argues that Japan is paying the price through stagnant growth, one can easily counter with the example of the United States. In the US, debt continues to rise unabated to eye-watering levels, yet economic growth remains robust, defying the correlation that high debt must equal low growth. Conversely, numerous nations with relatively low debt levels remain trapped in economic and bond market funks, unable to generate growth despite their balance sheets that worry their bondholders but would appear nothing but liveable by the standards of what some other economies with higher debt levels are allowed to live easily with.

The failure of these predictions points to a fundamental issue in macroeconomic modeling: the problem of overfitting. One can add a countless number of parameters to explain why Japan has stagnated and not exploded or why the US thrives: the status of the reserve currency, the domestic ownership of debt, the confidence in the legal system, the specific financial architecture, or mere happenstance. However, the number of historical episodes available to explain is far smaller than the number of parameters one can model. In other words, with the benefit of hindsight, almost everything that has happened appears to be exactly how it should have been. The "why" is always clear after the fact. But ex-ante, looking forward, whatever one forecasts based on these models has as much chance of being right as any other forecast based on the same data. The "Big Cycle" is a narrative imposed on chaos, not a roadmap found within it. The author can rightfully claim the returns he has generated from his models, but this does not mean his models can forecast the timing or the path of the reversal.

This does not make the debt problem any less valid. The mathematics of leverage is unforgiving. When the bubble finally bursts, everyone who warned about it, including the author of this book, will appear prophetic. They will be lauded for their foresight, and their models will be cited as proof of the inevitable. But this is a survivor bias of predictions. The more honest and important admission should be that no amount of historical analysis can actually help us navigate the immediate future. History cannot tell us what to do over the next two quarters, the next two years, or even the next two political cycles. The triggers for the unraveling will likely be novel, specific to the technological and geopolitical realities of the moment, and entirely invisible to a model calibrated on the rise and fall of the Bretton Woods, 1997 Asian crisis, or any other collapse of any other time or place.

Ultimately, How Countries Go Broke serves as a significant, albeit dense, contribution to the library of financial warnings. It correctly identifies the tectonic stresses in the global economy, even if its predictive utility is hampered by the very historical framework it champions. For sure, the book is a valid testament to the author’s worldview and offers a coherent, if debatable, theory of everything for the long term.

[Melissa]

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