It will be observed that the title of this volume is "Mental Evolution in Animals." The reasons which have led me to depart from my intention (as expressed in the Preface of "Animal Intelligence") to devote the present essay to mental evolution in man as well as in animals, are given in the introductory chapter. It may appear that in the following pages a somewhat disproportionate amount of space has been allotted to the treatment of Instinct; but, looking to the confusion which prevails with reference to this important branch of psychology in the writings of our leading authorities, I have deemed it desirable to consider the subject exhaustively.
It is, I think, desirable briefly to explain the circumstances under which I have been enabled to produce so much hitherto unpublished material from the MSS of the late Mr. Darwin, and also to state the extent to which I have availed myself of such of this unpublished material as came into my hands. As I have already explained, in the Preface of "Animal Intelligence," Mr. Darwin himself gave me all his MSS relating to psychological subjects, with the request that I should publish any parts of them that I chose in my works on Mental Evolution. But after his death I felt that the circumstances with reference to this kind offer were changed, and that I should scarcely be justified in appropriating so much material, the value of which had become enhanced. I therefore published at the Linnean Society, and with the consent of Mr. Darwin's family, as much of this material as could be published in a consecutive form ; this is the chapter which was intended for the "Origin of Species," and which, for the sake of reference, I have added as an Appendix to my present work. For the rest, the numerous disjointed para- graphs and notes which I found among the MSS I have woven into the text of this book, feeling on the one hand that they were not so well suited to appear as a string of disconnected passages, and on the other hand that it was desirable to publish them somewhere. I have gone through all the MSS carefully, and have arranged so as to introduce every passage in them of any importance which I find to have been hitherto unpublished. In no case have I found any reason to suppress a passage, so that the quotations which I have given may be collectively regarded as a full supplementary publication of all that Mr. Darwin has written in the domain of psychology. In order to facilitate reference, I have given in the Index, under Mr. Darwin's name, the numbers of all the pages in this work where the quotations in question occur. ---- 18, Cornwall Terrace, ---- Regent's Park, London, N.W., ---- November, 1883.
George John Romanes FRS (20 May 1848 – 23 May 1894) was a Canadian-English evolutionary biologist and physiologist who laid the foundation of what he called comparative psychology, postulating a similarity of cognitive processes and mechanisms between humans and other animals.
He was the youngest of Charles Darwin's academic friends, and his views on evolution are historically important. He invented the term neo-Darwinism, which is still often used today to indicate an updated form of Darwinism. Romanes' early death was a loss to the cause of evolutionary biology in Britain. Within six years Mendel's work was rediscovered, and a whole new agenda opened up for debate.
Romanes worked as a younger associate to Darwin. This book (1884 publishing date) is based in part on his access to Darwin’s vast collection of research notes. The one theme throughout the book is that humans are continuous with animals in many significant respects.
Several of his points and observations stood out. First, variability within a species: Instinctive programs allow for modification of expression. There are local variations within a species and there are individual variations. Second, mind and choice: The origins of mind go way back. Instinctive programs allow for choice based on experiences that are preserved in memory. This is the “fine tuning of instinct.” Third, heritability: The movement of traits through the generations can come from the adaptive advantages derived from choice. While often dismissed as Lamarckian, if an individual(s)' instinctive program allows for choice that has survival benefits, that capacity is passed on to the next generation where it is used for adaptive purposes.
Fourth, hierarchy and continuity of mind: Romanes begins with simple pleasure and pain (good/bad for survival, and appropriate behavior), followed by sensation and reflex actions (primary instincts) and then secondary instincts that “have a mental element” involving perception. With perception, “intelligence” (coordination of ends with means) begins. There are stages of perception (and degrees of memory, “the dim idea of an absent object or experience”) that lead, in time, to man where reason (“intentional adaptation of means to ends” or a “conscious knowledge of relation between means employed and ends attained”) is used to draw meaningful inferences (“inferring unperceived qualities or relations from perceived ones—as when on hearing a growl I immediately infer the presence of a dangerous dog”).
Fifth, Kant’s a priori categories: These have their origins in biology as Romanes writes “the simplest, oldest, and most constant ideas relating to time, space, number, sequence, &c., may be compared, in point of organic integrity, with the oldest and most indissolubly associated muscular movements….” Sixth, emotions: Romanes provides an extensive list of animal emotions. The emotions are both specific (shame, pride, jealousy, fear) and general classes of behavior (parental affect, social feelings, curiosity). These emotion programs coordinate behavior (means) with survival (ends), thereby embedding “rationality” at the core of evolution. It’s not clear how Romanes makes a distinction between emotion and instinctive programs; it could be that these are the same.
Seventh, inborn character: Romanes refers to “strongly marked individual differences of disposition in animals.” The collectivity of emotions and instinct varies within a species, which accounts for an individuality of disposition, temperament and character. If this is the case with animals, isn’t this the case with humans too (do we have a “self”)? Eighth, “trivial and useless instincts”: Romanes refers explicitly to Darwin who made many references to the evolution of “Useless, unintelligent, or non-adaptive habits” that are not formed by natural selection. They survive and were perpetuated, presumably because they are not deleterious to survival. Ninth, group selection: Drawing from Darwin, Romanes states that in many instances, the interests of the individual are subordinated to those of the species. He refers specifically to ants and termites that sacrifice” themselves for the benefit of the community—i.e., the species” with neutered beings serving as “organs” of a larger body. This is interesting as group selection is a “no no” in contemporary evolutionary theory.
Tenth, values and biology: For Romanes, animal behavior begins with pleasure and pain. At the lowest levels of life, organisms react favorably to stimuli that produce pleasure and react negatively to that which provides pain. This places absolute value within our biology: good is survival. Pain threatens survival. But this view of the organism is incomplete. It has organisms as passive recipients of external stimuli. Romanes also states that the organism does seek that which is “good” which suggests a more active view. This is more in line with Schopenhauer’s observation that we are prompted by need (need to seek; need to resist). Seen this way, life starts with need (pain) and behavior ends with pleasure (successful seeking, successful defending). Seeking and defending are the means, in other words, to the end of survival. Survival is the absolute value. Absolute Good resides in our biology.