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A desigualdade é consequência da concentração do capital? É transmitida de geração a geração ou deriva das diferenças salariais, que por sua vez resultariam do jogo de oferta e demanda do mercado de trabalho? É possível reduzir a desigualdade de oportunidades com investimento em educação? O sistema tributário moderno é capaz de promover a redistribuição de renda ou é preciso uma grande reforma?
A economia da desigualdade demonstra que o antagonismo esquerda/direita do debate político não discorda necessariamente em suas noções de justiça social, mas sim nos mecanismos econômicos que produzem a desigualdade e em como minorá-la. Em edição atualizada, incluindo gráficos e tabelas, o livro é mais uma valiosa aula de Piketty sobre a natureza da distribuição de renda e o cenário econômico mundial.
“Piketty transformou nosso discurso econômico; jamais voltaremos a falar sobre renda e desigualdade da mesma maneira.”Paul Krugman (Prêmio Nobel de Economia), The New York Times
“Como corrigir a desigualdade? O livro de Thomas Piketty chega na hora certa para enriquecer o debate.”Le Monde
“Piketty escreve com a elegância com que a atriz Gwyneth Paltrow se veste. O capital no século XXI é um monumento de pesquisa e elegância.”Elio Gaspari, Folha de S.Paulo e O Globo
“Concordo com as principais conclusões de Piketty. Espero que seu trabalho estimule mais pessoas competentes a estudar a desigualdade de riqueza e de renda. Quanto mais entendermos das causas e curas, melhor.”Bill Gates, The Gates Notes
145 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 1997
The concentration of wealth and capital income did not return to the astronomical level achieved on the eve of World War I, however. The most likely explanation involves the fiscal revolution of the twentieth century. The impact of the progressive income tax (created in France in 1914) and the progressive estate tax (created in 1901) on the accumulation and reconstitution of large fortunes seems to have prevented a return to nineteenth-century rentier society. If contemporary societies have become societies of managers—that is, societies in which the top of the income distribution is dominated by the “working rich” (people who live mainly on their labor income rather than on income derived from capital accumulated in the past), it is primarily a consequence of particular historical circumstances and institutions.
In the United States, for example, there has been a substantial withdrawal of less-skilled individuals from the labor market (and from the group of people classified in official statistics as “actively seeking work”) since the 1970s. This is entirely due to the collapse of low-wage employment opportunities (Juhn et al., 1991; Topel, 1993). Many people of working age have thus found themselves excluded from the labor market, yet they are not counted in unemployment statistics. One striking manifestation of this can be seen in the impressive increase of the prison population. In 1995, 1.5 million individuals were incarcerated in US prisons, compared with 500,000 in 1980; it is estimated that 2.4 million will be incarcerated in 2000 (Freeman, 1996). This aspect of underemployment, entirely neglected in official unemployment statistics, is not a minor matter, since these 1.5 million prisoners represented 1.5 percent of the US working age population in 1995.
Although the wage share tended to increase in the 1970s, it was the profit share that increased in the 1980s and 1990s, in some cases substantially. These variations were widest in France, where the wage share was 66.4 percent in 1970, rising to 71.8 percent in 1981, then falling after 1982 to 62.4 percent in 1990 and 60.3 percent in 1995. How can we explain the fact that more than 5 percent of national income was redistributed from capital to labor between 1970 and 1982, while 10 percent went from labor to capital between 1983 and 1995?
It so happens that the first period coincides with a period of substantial wage increases inaugurated by the Grenelle Accords of 1968. Wages continued to improve in the 1970s owing to the influence of social movements and substantial increases in the minimum wage. The last major increment to the minimum wage occurred in 1981.
[F]iscal redistribution measures adopted by the Socialist government after it came to power in France in 1981, which were denounced at the time by the right as the height of “fiscal bludgeoning” and which consisted essentially of a wealth tax and a surtax on top income brackets, brought in less than 10 billion francs in 1981 (Nizet, 1990, pp. 402, 433), or 0.3 percent of national income. In theory, a government can achieve any level of redistribution it wants via taxes and transfers, but in practice, no transfer of comparable magnitude has been accomplished in so few years. Inevitably, therefore, workers think of and experience redistribution primarily in terms of social struggle and wage increases rather than fiscal reform and transfer payments.