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Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat
One of the perils for military planners in a high-tech world is to be taken in by the destructiveness of modern weapons and to give in to the currently popular theory that modern war will last for days or weeks rather than months or years—in short, to envision a world where technologies, not people, dominate war.
We can ill afford to dismiss the human element in combat. The stakes are far too great. Colonel Wm. Darryl Henderson, US Army, maintains that we cannot expect tactical situations in future fields of battle to be devoid of the human factor. Most recently, for example, Iraq's war with Iran was potentially a high-tech and swift war. That war is entering its fourth year and has cost, to date, 900,000 lives. Cohesion—mutual beliefs and needs that cause people to act as a collective whole—has so far played a more significant role in the Iran-Iraq war than all the sophisticated weapons on either side.
Does American society produce the type of soldier who would, under stress, suppress his individuality and act for the mutual good of the group? In the post-Vietnam, all-volunteer force environment, the kind of American citizen attracted to military service—the qualities he carries from society and what qualities the military organization is able to impart to him—must be a matter for serious thought and planning. Colonel Henderson's work is a step in that direction.
We can ill afford to dismiss the human element in combat. The stakes are far too great. Colonel Wm. Darryl Henderson, US Army, maintains that we cannot expect tactical situations in future fields of battle to be devoid of the human factor. Most recently, for example, Iraq's war with Iran was potentially a high-tech and swift war. That war is entering its fourth year and has cost, to date, 900,000 lives. Cohesion—mutual beliefs and needs that cause people to act as a collective whole—has so far played a more significant role in the Iran-Iraq war than all the sophisticated weapons on either side.
Does American society produce the type of soldier who would, under stress, suppress his individuality and act for the mutual good of the group? In the post-Vietnam, all-volunteer force environment, the kind of American citizen attracted to military service—the qualities he carries from society and what qualities the military organization is able to impart to him—must be a matter for serious thought and planning. Colonel Henderson's work is a step in that direction.
261 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 2002
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
March 29, 2021
Henderson offers an interesting perspective of the strengths and weaknesses of the United States Army, compared to the Soviet, Israeli, and North Vietnamese armies. While somewhat outdated, much of the information is interesting and still provides important lessons for the leaders of today's army.
June 12, 2016
The study of warfare is often in practice divided between two camps: those who focus on the strategy developed by statesmen and senior generals, and those who concentrate on the technology and numbers. In this book, Darryl Henderson sought to shift attention towards a very different, and often over-looked, aspect of warfare: the cohesion that binds the men of a combat unit together and gives them the moral strength to move forward when under deadly fire. Himself a colonel in the US Army and an experienced combat veteran, Henderson had realised that neither of the predominat schools of analysis offered sufficient explanation for what happened on the battlefield.
The work opens with three chapters, setting out the significance of cohesion, its characteristics, and a methodology for assessing the level of cohesion experienced in small units. Central to this approach is Henderson's determination to demonstrate the fundamental flaw in the argument put forward from some quarters that cohesion cannot be measured and hence is not a subject fit for analysis.
The book then uses the methodology to consider cohesion in four armies: the North Vietnamese Army, the US Army, the Soviet Army and the Israeli Army, with scores assigned for a wide range of factors. The results are almost universally negative for the US Army, with the NVA and the Israelis coming out strongly and the Soviets generally somewhat better than the US.
Central to this assessment is Henderson's contention that the US Army had, at the time of writing in the mid-1980s, effectively converted military service from a calling into just a job. All of the factors that characterise a job tend to mitigate against cohesion, not least his repeated argument that no job is worth dying for.
Looking back over the 30 years since this book was published, it is tempting to suggest that the differences between the military calling and a civilian job may not be quite as wide as Henderson suggested, at least to the extent that more recent management thinking has demonstrated that the 'machine' approach to staff is also highly damaging in a commercial context (much has been made in the literature of the need for low level initiative and motivation).
In addition, it may be possible that Henderson may have been unnecessarily pessimistic about the potential for volunteer armies to develop cohesion. Indeed, it is perhaps surprising that he did not include the British Army in his set of comparisons, as this army has long focused on methods of achieving cohesion in the context of a volunteer force.
Overall, while a little dated (none of the comparator armies would now be leading contenders to be included in an equivalent analysis today), the basic focus on the central importance of cohesion and the methodological analysis remain of considerable validity. As such, the book remains well worth consideration by anyone, military or civilian, seeking a deeper understanding of why soldiers are willing (or not) to expose themselves to the risk of death.
The work opens with three chapters, setting out the significance of cohesion, its characteristics, and a methodology for assessing the level of cohesion experienced in small units. Central to this approach is Henderson's determination to demonstrate the fundamental flaw in the argument put forward from some quarters that cohesion cannot be measured and hence is not a subject fit for analysis.
The book then uses the methodology to consider cohesion in four armies: the North Vietnamese Army, the US Army, the Soviet Army and the Israeli Army, with scores assigned for a wide range of factors. The results are almost universally negative for the US Army, with the NVA and the Israelis coming out strongly and the Soviets generally somewhat better than the US.
Central to this assessment is Henderson's contention that the US Army had, at the time of writing in the mid-1980s, effectively converted military service from a calling into just a job. All of the factors that characterise a job tend to mitigate against cohesion, not least his repeated argument that no job is worth dying for.
Looking back over the 30 years since this book was published, it is tempting to suggest that the differences between the military calling and a civilian job may not be quite as wide as Henderson suggested, at least to the extent that more recent management thinking has demonstrated that the 'machine' approach to staff is also highly damaging in a commercial context (much has been made in the literature of the need for low level initiative and motivation).
In addition, it may be possible that Henderson may have been unnecessarily pessimistic about the potential for volunteer armies to develop cohesion. Indeed, it is perhaps surprising that he did not include the British Army in his set of comparisons, as this army has long focused on methods of achieving cohesion in the context of a volunteer force.
Overall, while a little dated (none of the comparator armies would now be leading contenders to be included in an equivalent analysis today), the basic focus on the central importance of cohesion and the methodological analysis remain of considerable validity. As such, the book remains well worth consideration by anyone, military or civilian, seeking a deeper understanding of why soldiers are willing (or not) to expose themselves to the risk of death.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews