“[Kennan] comes to us…as ambassador of a generation nearly gone and a conservatism so responsible, dutiful and so long extinct it may look revolutionary….As ever, Kennan in the present book has fulfilled his responsibility admirably.” ― Chicago Tribune "I have attempted to take the high ground,” writes George F. Kennan in the foreword to this illuminating work, "trying to stick to the broader dimensions of things―the ones that would still be visible and significant in future decades." Against the background of a century of wars, revolution, and uneasy peace, Mr. Kennan advances his thoughts on a broad front: how the individual's quest for power can transform a government into a confusion of ambition, rivalry, and suspicion; how a nation's size can create barriers between the rulers and the ruled; why America must first set its own house in order before it can become a beacon to others. Deeply aware of the pressures under which public officials must act, Mr. Kennan sees a government in Washington that is forced to make decisions on issues of the moment, often without regard for long-term consequences. Neither the legislature, responsive to the interests of a narrow constituency, nor the executive branch, swamped by urgent problems at home and abroad, has the time or inclination to look far beyond the next election. Lost entirely is a vital element in any democracy: deliberation based upon study, review, and judgment. To address problems that defy quick political solutions, Mr. Kennan here boldly lays down a blueprint for a Council of State, a nonpolitical, permanent advisory board that would stand alongside yet apart from government policy makers, with the prestige to be heard "above the cacophony of political ambitions." Rich in historical example, this volume is a brilliant summing up of the experience and thought of the man the Atlantic described in a cover story entitled "The Last Wise Man" as: "diplomat, scholar, writer of rare literary gifts, one of most remarkable Americans of this century."
George Frost Kennan (February 16, 1904 – March 17, 2005) was an American advisor, diplomat, political scientist, and historian, best known as "the father of containment" and as a key figure in the emergence of the Cold War. He later wrote standard histories of the relations between Russia and the Western powers.
In the late 1940s, his writings inspired the Truman Doctrine and the U.S. foreign policy of "containing" the Soviet Union, thrusting him into a lifelong role as a leading authority on the Cold War. His "Long Telegram" from Moscow in 1946, and the subsequent 1947 article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" argued that the Soviet regime was inherently expansionist and that its influence had to be "contained" in areas of vital strategic importance to the United States. These texts quickly emerged as foundational texts of the Cold War, expressing the Truman administration's new anti-Soviet Union policy. Kennan also played a leading role in the development of definitive Cold War programs and institutions, most notably the Marshall Plan.
Shortly after the diploma had been enshrined as official U.S. policy, Kennan began to criticize the policies that he had seemingly helped launch. By mid-1948, he was convinced that the situation in Western Europe had improved to the point where negotiations could be initiated with Moscow. The suggestion did not resonate within the Truman administration, and Kennan's influence was increasingly marginalized—particularly after Dean Acheson was appointed Secretary of State in 1949. As U.S. Cold War strategy assumed a more aggressive and militaristic tone, Kennan bemoaned what he called a misinterpretation of his thinking.
In 1950, Kennan left the Department of State, except for two brief ambassadorial stints in Moscow and Yugoslavia, and became a leading realist critic of U.S. foreign policy. He continued to be a leading thinker in international affairs as a faculty member of the Institute for Advanced Study from 1956 until his death at age 101 in March 2005.
John Lukacs wrote that Kennan was overly ambitious in calling his memoir a "philosophy," but it was a first rate collection of thoughts by a great man just the same. Lukacs compared it to the oracular sayings of Samuel Johnson, and like the picture we get in Boswell's Life, Kennan shares an intimate portrait of several of his cherished and controversial beliefs. He shares his observations of man's spiritual condition and needs, makes a very poignant defense of submitting oneself to the Christian church - the church in some form, at any rate -, and offers compelling reflections on the evolution of domestic and foreign policy through his very long and sage-like life. One chapter he wrote on the growth of America around automobile infrastructure in the last century was immediately dear to me for the beauty of his argument. I did not expect to find such a treasure in Kennan's memoir, and I heartily recommend it. I will soon get my own copy and it will find a place on a shelf for special favorites.
The bulk of Kennan's book is five stars. His analysis is clear, coherent, thoughtful and accurate (at least in my view).
Around the Cragged Hill loses a star only because of its half-hearted policy recommendations, which, if they had occupied more than the last handful of pages, would have dragged the rating down to three or even two stars.
Let's start with the positives. Despite spending much of his career working in the state's bureaucracy, Kennan has no time for the liberal orthodoxy that characterises his former employers. On immigration, the role of the state, the size of the bureaucracy, the fallen nature of man, the futility of our foreign aid programmes, and on and on, Kennan dissents markedly from his state department colleagues. His insights, offered from the inside, are useful correctives, even if one disagrees with them.
The negatives are solely related to his policy prescriptions. He proposes to tackle the failings of the bureaucratic state with - wait for it - another bureaucratic state organisation. The book goes into more detail on this, thankfully not too much, but to my mind it's a rather pointless exercise. I wonder if his age at the time of writing (amazingly around 89 years old) decreased his range of vision.
Having said that, the book is brilliant and worth reading for anyone who takes governance seriously and wishes the state, in all its forms, would take it a little more seriously too.
The book is also worth reading for Kennan's view of man. We are all of us deeply flawed, he acknowledges, and he encourages us to take a much more charitable view of each other - including and perhaps especially those who work in the state and whose ends are not always in our interests. There but for the grace of God, and so on, and Kennan's writing on this subject is some of his best on any subject. A useful reminder to be kind!
This is, as advertised, George Kennan's personal philosophy in the twilight of his years. Kennan, mind, was a major Cold War architect who advocated containment over aggression. To read his book, one feels he has the sensibilities of a lot of median voters before polarization, some views that skew left, some views that skew right. It's hard to know what do with a figure like this. He begins the book by preaching a view of humanity as forever broken and seeking and ends with a proposal to the U.S. government to hire people like him for an impartial Council of Elders there to whisper in the president's ear, operating outside the normal spheres of government. Seneca said there is no book bad enough you can't benefit from it. This, a case in point. At least it instructs, as indirectly as directly, humility in thought.
An odd book in that Kennan made the US successful in the cold war with his policy of containment, and yet when we are at peak security and prosperity after the collapse of the USSR, in 1993, he thinks the US is in dire straits and so proposes a council of experts to rescue us. This is because he believes also that senior USG officials (and business execs) should not really be executives but thinkers and deciders.
I give it 3 stars for the elegance of the prose and for several compelling ideas. Yet this is a book by an old man (late 80s) apparently out of touch with contemporary politics and society. E.g., he asks why there is no policy of evaluating the results of government programs at the time of the Government Programs and Results Act GPRA), which did just that.