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Modern War Studies
Trial by Fire: The 1972 Easter Offensive, America's Last Vietnam Battle
Provides an account of the last massive engagement of the Vietnam War in which American forces participated
600 pages, Hardcover
First published October 1, 1994
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February 17, 2023
This book is a comprehensive account of the Easter Offensive of 1972. Dale Andradé dives deep into both the military and political aspects of Secretary General Le Duan's attempt to end the Vietnam conflict by delivering one strong blow against South Vietnam.
The Easter Offensive was the biggest engagement of North Vietnamese soldiers and conventional firepower in the war, and had it not been for the large-scale, persistent American aerial intervention, it would have succeeded. Since the Americans did intervene, though, Le Duan's plan was eventually a massive failure, which cost the Communists 100,000 men, 450 tanks, and hundreds of artillery pieces left scattered on the battlefield. It also resulted in the destruction of North Vietnam's air defenses and damaged its economy and military. The author aims to analyze and explain what made the Communist leaders confident that such a venture could be successful and why it was not.
By 1972, Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho had been struggling to negotiate a diplomatic solution to the Vietnam conflict for two years already. Meanwhile, the Vietnamization of the war was progressing steadily – in spring, only 70,000 out of 550,000 American soldiers were still in Vietnam, and most of their responsibilities were now the ARVN's. It was also expected for the number of Americans to drop to 50,000 by July. Although the Communists were known for not halting military activity even during peace talks, their decision to launch an offensive while there still was American presence in Vietnam is questionable. Attacking after the Americans had left seems way smarter. Why did they not wait?
According to the author, it was because of political and military assumptions that had convinced tham that the sooner they attacked, the better. At the time, the Communists were increasingly worried that the American diplomats would succeed in winning North Vietnam's allies over, and then the Soviets and the Chinese would stop sending military aid to North Vietnam. When President Richard Nixon visited Beijing in late February, ending the twenty-five years of no communication between America and China, the leaders of North Vietnam treated the visit as a sign that China would stop supporting them soon and decided to take military action before it became too late. The Communists also hoped that the American people's strong sentiment against the Vietnam conflict and the approaching presidential election would make it difficult for Nixon to respond to their sudden and sweeping attack. That Operation Lam Son 719 – the ARVN's attempt to capture an important logistic center of the Communists in southern Laos – had gone awry a year earlier made them believe that the ARVN was destroyed and victory was within reach.
The Communists' reasoning was not bad, but serious mistakes, misconceptions, and miscalculations doomed the offensive to failure even before it was launched.
The first big mistake was Le Duan's decision to focus on conventional strategies instead of on guerrilla warfare. The elusive guerrillas were the Communists' strength. They and their unconventional tactics frustrated the American soldiers in the jungles and rice paddies time after time. By choosing not to rely on them, Le Duan did America and South Vietnam a huge favor. With the ARVN defending in the battle, American air support destroyed North Vietnam's infantry and armor attacks, battered rear areas, and cut supply lines. The Communists had struggled to build up the men and materiel for the offensive because the Americans kept harassing them in Laos. Maintaining these 200,000 men on the battlefield proved to be even more challenging, and when the Americans began to bomb, the task became barely possible.
Le Duan's second mistake was to try to spark a people's uprising in South Vietnam like the one in 1968. The National Liberation Front had not recovered from Tet, so they could not help organize it, and the population had become fed up with the Communists no less than with the Americans. Nevertheless, Le Duan believed that the people would revolt and hinder the ARVN, leaving North Vietnam's soldiers fewer enemies to deal with. This did not happen.
The greatest military misconception of the Communists was about the effect Lam Son 719 had on the ARVN. They believed that they had completely defeated South Vietnam's soldiers and proved that Vietnamization was a failure. They claimed to have inflicted more than 16,000 casualties on the ARVN, captured hundreds of tanks, and shot down numerous American helicopters. These exaggerated statistics tricked them into thinking that they would easily prevail over the enemy in battle. Le Duan believed that since North Vietnam's soldiers had managed to win against Saigon's best Airborne and Marine units in Laos, they would achieve victory again. However, this was not a correct interpretation of the situation. During Lam Son, the ARVN soldiers had been invading the enemy's unfamiliar territory, and their task had been further complicated by problems with leadership, command, and coordination. Furthermore, as American statistics demonstrated, the ARVN had suffered much fewer casualties that the Communists reported, and they did not think that they had lost.
Contrary to North Vietnam's expectations, most of the ARVN units performed well during the Easter Offensive. They were on their own territory, defending it, and they had American advice and air support. They made the best of these advantages and succeeded in turning the battle in their favor.
However, the author observes, the political mistakes of North Vietnam's leaders played the most important part in the defeat. They underestimated how far the American government was willing to go to ensure that the eventual peace agreement would be acceptable to it. The Communists were taken off-guard by the speed at which the Americans managed to mobilize and use air power on such a massive scale. They had not realized on time that ending the war was less important for Nixon than protecting America's reputation as an ally. He was ready to raze North Vietnam to the ground, and he almost did so with Operation Linebacker, an all-out bombing campaign in the North. As the ARVN prevailed over its enemy and Linebacker was put into action, Le Duan was forced to acknowledge that getting the Americans out of Vietnam, not liberating the South, was the top priority. Peace talks began again.
TRIAL BY FIRE is a brilliantly written account of the Easter Offensive. Andradé has organized a large amount of information into a well-structured and interesting narrative. I appreciated the ease with which he changes perspectives to show all sides and aspects of the offensive. This book is exceptionally informative.
The Easter Offensive was the biggest engagement of North Vietnamese soldiers and conventional firepower in the war, and had it not been for the large-scale, persistent American aerial intervention, it would have succeeded. Since the Americans did intervene, though, Le Duan's plan was eventually a massive failure, which cost the Communists 100,000 men, 450 tanks, and hundreds of artillery pieces left scattered on the battlefield. It also resulted in the destruction of North Vietnam's air defenses and damaged its economy and military. The author aims to analyze and explain what made the Communist leaders confident that such a venture could be successful and why it was not.
By 1972, Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho had been struggling to negotiate a diplomatic solution to the Vietnam conflict for two years already. Meanwhile, the Vietnamization of the war was progressing steadily – in spring, only 70,000 out of 550,000 American soldiers were still in Vietnam, and most of their responsibilities were now the ARVN's. It was also expected for the number of Americans to drop to 50,000 by July. Although the Communists were known for not halting military activity even during peace talks, their decision to launch an offensive while there still was American presence in Vietnam is questionable. Attacking after the Americans had left seems way smarter. Why did they not wait?
According to the author, it was because of political and military assumptions that had convinced tham that the sooner they attacked, the better. At the time, the Communists were increasingly worried that the American diplomats would succeed in winning North Vietnam's allies over, and then the Soviets and the Chinese would stop sending military aid to North Vietnam. When President Richard Nixon visited Beijing in late February, ending the twenty-five years of no communication between America and China, the leaders of North Vietnam treated the visit as a sign that China would stop supporting them soon and decided to take military action before it became too late. The Communists also hoped that the American people's strong sentiment against the Vietnam conflict and the approaching presidential election would make it difficult for Nixon to respond to their sudden and sweeping attack. That Operation Lam Son 719 – the ARVN's attempt to capture an important logistic center of the Communists in southern Laos – had gone awry a year earlier made them believe that the ARVN was destroyed and victory was within reach.
The Communists' reasoning was not bad, but serious mistakes, misconceptions, and miscalculations doomed the offensive to failure even before it was launched.
The first big mistake was Le Duan's decision to focus on conventional strategies instead of on guerrilla warfare. The elusive guerrillas were the Communists' strength. They and their unconventional tactics frustrated the American soldiers in the jungles and rice paddies time after time. By choosing not to rely on them, Le Duan did America and South Vietnam a huge favor. With the ARVN defending in the battle, American air support destroyed North Vietnam's infantry and armor attacks, battered rear areas, and cut supply lines. The Communists had struggled to build up the men and materiel for the offensive because the Americans kept harassing them in Laos. Maintaining these 200,000 men on the battlefield proved to be even more challenging, and when the Americans began to bomb, the task became barely possible.
Le Duan's second mistake was to try to spark a people's uprising in South Vietnam like the one in 1968. The National Liberation Front had not recovered from Tet, so they could not help organize it, and the population had become fed up with the Communists no less than with the Americans. Nevertheless, Le Duan believed that the people would revolt and hinder the ARVN, leaving North Vietnam's soldiers fewer enemies to deal with. This did not happen.
The greatest military misconception of the Communists was about the effect Lam Son 719 had on the ARVN. They believed that they had completely defeated South Vietnam's soldiers and proved that Vietnamization was a failure. They claimed to have inflicted more than 16,000 casualties on the ARVN, captured hundreds of tanks, and shot down numerous American helicopters. These exaggerated statistics tricked them into thinking that they would easily prevail over the enemy in battle. Le Duan believed that since North Vietnam's soldiers had managed to win against Saigon's best Airborne and Marine units in Laos, they would achieve victory again. However, this was not a correct interpretation of the situation. During Lam Son, the ARVN soldiers had been invading the enemy's unfamiliar territory, and their task had been further complicated by problems with leadership, command, and coordination. Furthermore, as American statistics demonstrated, the ARVN had suffered much fewer casualties that the Communists reported, and they did not think that they had lost.
Contrary to North Vietnam's expectations, most of the ARVN units performed well during the Easter Offensive. They were on their own territory, defending it, and they had American advice and air support. They made the best of these advantages and succeeded in turning the battle in their favor.
However, the author observes, the political mistakes of North Vietnam's leaders played the most important part in the defeat. They underestimated how far the American government was willing to go to ensure that the eventual peace agreement would be acceptable to it. The Communists were taken off-guard by the speed at which the Americans managed to mobilize and use air power on such a massive scale. They had not realized on time that ending the war was less important for Nixon than protecting America's reputation as an ally. He was ready to raze North Vietnam to the ground, and he almost did so with Operation Linebacker, an all-out bombing campaign in the North. As the ARVN prevailed over its enemy and Linebacker was put into action, Le Duan was forced to acknowledge that getting the Americans out of Vietnam, not liberating the South, was the top priority. Peace talks began again.
TRIAL BY FIRE is a brilliantly written account of the Easter Offensive. Andradé has organized a large amount of information into a well-structured and interesting narrative. I appreciated the ease with which he changes perspectives to show all sides and aspects of the offensive. This book is exceptionally informative.
October 8, 2013
Trial by Fire: The 1972 Easter Offensive, America's Last Vietnam Battle by Dale Andradé is an excellent account of the 1972 Easter Offensive in Vietnam during the final stages of the American troop withdrawals.
This is a story of courage, stupidity, cowardice and of major and minor fire-fights and battles. The courage of those American advisers and the South Vietnamese troops they assisted during this brutal offensive is awe inspiring. Not to forget their enemies who took massive punishment from US airpower but carried on the fight!
This is a well-researched and written piece of military history which I think has been forgotten due to the fact that it was at the tail end of an unpopular war. The author has done a great job to remind us that the war didn't finish when our troops got home, that people continued to fight and die long after.
Well worth the time to read with over 500 pages of text, however the author could have provided some better maps.
This is a story of courage, stupidity, cowardice and of major and minor fire-fights and battles. The courage of those American advisers and the South Vietnamese troops they assisted during this brutal offensive is awe inspiring. Not to forget their enemies who took massive punishment from US airpower but carried on the fight!
This is a well-researched and written piece of military history which I think has been forgotten due to the fact that it was at the tail end of an unpopular war. The author has done a great job to remind us that the war didn't finish when our troops got home, that people continued to fight and die long after.
Well worth the time to read with over 500 pages of text, however the author could have provided some better maps.
December 25, 2023
A well-researched and very readable narrative history of the Vietnam War’s biggest battle.
This book is a straightforward military history, focused heavily on small-unit actions, and most of the book deals with the fighting on the ground. The air campaign over North Vietnam and the mining of Haiphong is dealt with in only a few chapters. Andradé does a good job explaining North Vietnamese, South Vietnamese, and American goals, strategy, and tactics (apparently the newer 2001 edition has more details on the North Vietnamese side; I read the original edition). His coverage of Giap is critical, and Andradé finds little evidence that he was a battlefield genius, though he did contribute to the success of great feats in logistics. Andradé also describes how the offensive’s failure would mark the end of Giap’s career. There is little coverage of Nixon and Kissinger until the book gets to Linebacker.
Andradé also does a good job explaining the importance of American air support in the south, and highlights the crucial role played by US advisers who, while they never commanded ARVN troops, could call in massive aerial, artillery and naval assets. “Simply put, without them the South Vietnamese would probably have lost on every front,” he concludes. Andradé also covers the role played by the Laotian and Cambodian allies of both sides. Much of the book focuses on the experience of US advisers and ARVN officers, NCOs, and soldiers, and the weaknesses of South Vietnamese forces despite years’ worth of substantial American investment. The coverage of strategy and intelligence is good. Andradé also ably covers such topics as Soviet support for the communists, the brutal reigns of North Vietnam’s occupation regimes, the experience of South Korean troops, and the details of aerial resupply.
The narrative is detailed and shrewd. The coverage of the horrible conditions endured by North Vietnamese soldiers is pretty solid. The maps could have been better, though. At one point Andradé refers to the Skyspot system as using “lasers” (I thought it was a radar system?) There’s also a few typos. The accounts of individual soldiers sometimes read a bit awkwardly since Andradé inserts them between sections on strategy.
A comprehensive and well-written work.
This book is a straightforward military history, focused heavily on small-unit actions, and most of the book deals with the fighting on the ground. The air campaign over North Vietnam and the mining of Haiphong is dealt with in only a few chapters. Andradé does a good job explaining North Vietnamese, South Vietnamese, and American goals, strategy, and tactics (apparently the newer 2001 edition has more details on the North Vietnamese side; I read the original edition). His coverage of Giap is critical, and Andradé finds little evidence that he was a battlefield genius, though he did contribute to the success of great feats in logistics. Andradé also describes how the offensive’s failure would mark the end of Giap’s career. There is little coverage of Nixon and Kissinger until the book gets to Linebacker.
Andradé also does a good job explaining the importance of American air support in the south, and highlights the crucial role played by US advisers who, while they never commanded ARVN troops, could call in massive aerial, artillery and naval assets. “Simply put, without them the South Vietnamese would probably have lost on every front,” he concludes. Andradé also covers the role played by the Laotian and Cambodian allies of both sides. Much of the book focuses on the experience of US advisers and ARVN officers, NCOs, and soldiers, and the weaknesses of South Vietnamese forces despite years’ worth of substantial American investment. The coverage of strategy and intelligence is good. Andradé also ably covers such topics as Soviet support for the communists, the brutal reigns of North Vietnam’s occupation regimes, the experience of South Korean troops, and the details of aerial resupply.
The narrative is detailed and shrewd. The coverage of the horrible conditions endured by North Vietnamese soldiers is pretty solid. The maps could have been better, though. At one point Andradé refers to the Skyspot system as using “lasers” (I thought it was a radar system?) There’s also a few typos. The accounts of individual soldiers sometimes read a bit awkwardly since Andradé inserts them between sections on strategy.
A comprehensive and well-written work.
May 21, 2024
1972 - the US was deep into the process of withdrawal from Vietnam. Nixon was fulfilling his promise to "Vietnamese-ize" the conflict between North and South. Desultory peace talks were ongoing in Paris .
Bang! A massive three-pronged invasion of the South was launched by the NVA, including tanks and surface-to-air missiles. Desperate fighting ensued in the north (Quang Tri), the Central Highlands (Kontum), and the south (An Loc). American advisers to the ARVN called down enormous quantities of American airpower to help stave off the waves of attacks and relentless artillery fire. Additionally, Nixon resumed the bombing of North Vietnam with far greater ferocity and far fewer target restrictions than had Johnson. Eventually, the North called off its offensive and agreed to a negotiated settlement (which they later broke in 1975 leading to the total collapse of the South).
I was still in high school when all this happened and remember the news reports. I also remember the storm of controversy back in the US over the resumption of bombing when America was still torn between wanting a victory to lay against the 50,000+ American servicemen KIA versus just wanting to be done with Vietnam as our intervention had clearly failed to create a stable, worthy government.
So, 51 years later, I got interested again in this period to deepen my surface level memories and knowledge. Trial by Fire seemed like the best book length account of this climatic year of the Vietnam War.
On the plus side, Andradé goes deep into the three battles with some especially vivid writing. He's done a lot of primary source research. Yet, there was a quality to the book that was unsatisfying to me.
To start with, the maps were horrible. Place names referenced in the text should appear on the maps. This was only true for the largest towns (e.g. Quang Tri, Hue, etc.). Firebases were oft-mentioned but were never shown on the maps. The maps were gray with gray letters on gray backgrounds. The type was smaller than the minutest details on a pill bottle. No sense of 3D terrain was supplied. The supply routes in Cambodia and Laos were 100% omitted.
More fundamentally, most of the account comes from the reports from the US advisers to each of the ARVN units. These advisers braved multi-week sieges under intense artillery and mortar fire. They had to often deal with fatalistic ARVN commanders. So, where the advisers were present, the writing is captivating. Where they weren't, the writing bogs down into colorless operational history of one ARVN unit after another defending or attacking some hamlet (never shown on the maps). Fortunately for the reader, the big battles - Quang Tri, Kontum, and An Loc all had American advisers present
There is very little written from first hand ARVN sources. There is a bit from NVA sources (mostly, diaries/accounts from captured/killed soldiers. There are some first hand accounts from US helicopter, FAC, resupply, and fighter-bomber pilots. Nothing from B-52 pilots (who, along with the bomb payloads) played a huge role in stopping the NVA). There is scant mention except for intelligence reporting of what was going on a MACV HQ in Saigon and virtually nothing from the US Pacific command or the Pentagon.
You get a mixed picture of the ARVN without any analysis (again, except on tactics) - some commanders were brave and knew how to lead, others were feckless. Some ARVN soldiers fought tenaciously, others easily broke or surrendered. There's no analysis of the NVA leadership or soldiers (though, again, there is on tactics)- for the most part the reader just assumes they were brave, motivated, and mission-oriented despite thousands being killed by round-the-clock B-52 Arc Light strikes.
Logistics just seemed to happen.
The story is told in five parts - Quang Tri, Kontum, An Loc, Delta, and bombing campaign against the north. The first three parts dominate the book. Yet all of these things were happening more or less at the same time. This makes for a geographically coherent narrative but doesn't really convey the zeitgeist that must have existed throughout the south as well as back in the US.
It is one thing if a book is just about one battle (see Huế 1968: A Turning Point of the American War in Vietnam ) as the author can get away with skirting macro issues and events. But the NVA Easter Offensive was a whole North-to-South war fought at a level more intense than ever before. As a reader, this didn't quite come through. In fact, if you didn't know in the advance that Nixon had launched a huge bombing campaign in the North, the reader wouldn't learn of this until the final 5% of the text.
So, I gave this only 3 stars when I really wanted to go to 4 stars. You get three fairly good operational histories of three battles/sieges with lots of first hand American accounts but I had hoped that after 20 years (when the book was written), more could have been included from the political, ARVN, and NVA side.
Bang! A massive three-pronged invasion of the South was launched by the NVA, including tanks and surface-to-air missiles. Desperate fighting ensued in the north (Quang Tri), the Central Highlands (Kontum), and the south (An Loc). American advisers to the ARVN called down enormous quantities of American airpower to help stave off the waves of attacks and relentless artillery fire. Additionally, Nixon resumed the bombing of North Vietnam with far greater ferocity and far fewer target restrictions than had Johnson. Eventually, the North called off its offensive and agreed to a negotiated settlement (which they later broke in 1975 leading to the total collapse of the South).
I was still in high school when all this happened and remember the news reports. I also remember the storm of controversy back in the US over the resumption of bombing when America was still torn between wanting a victory to lay against the 50,000+ American servicemen KIA versus just wanting to be done with Vietnam as our intervention had clearly failed to create a stable, worthy government.
So, 51 years later, I got interested again in this period to deepen my surface level memories and knowledge. Trial by Fire seemed like the best book length account of this climatic year of the Vietnam War.
On the plus side, Andradé goes deep into the three battles with some especially vivid writing. He's done a lot of primary source research. Yet, there was a quality to the book that was unsatisfying to me.
To start with, the maps were horrible. Place names referenced in the text should appear on the maps. This was only true for the largest towns (e.g. Quang Tri, Hue, etc.). Firebases were oft-mentioned but were never shown on the maps. The maps were gray with gray letters on gray backgrounds. The type was smaller than the minutest details on a pill bottle. No sense of 3D terrain was supplied. The supply routes in Cambodia and Laos were 100% omitted.
More fundamentally, most of the account comes from the reports from the US advisers to each of the ARVN units. These advisers braved multi-week sieges under intense artillery and mortar fire. They had to often deal with fatalistic ARVN commanders. So, where the advisers were present, the writing is captivating. Where they weren't, the writing bogs down into colorless operational history of one ARVN unit after another defending or attacking some hamlet (never shown on the maps). Fortunately for the reader, the big battles - Quang Tri, Kontum, and An Loc all had American advisers present
There is very little written from first hand ARVN sources. There is a bit from NVA sources (mostly, diaries/accounts from captured/killed soldiers. There are some first hand accounts from US helicopter, FAC, resupply, and fighter-bomber pilots. Nothing from B-52 pilots (who, along with the bomb payloads) played a huge role in stopping the NVA). There is scant mention except for intelligence reporting of what was going on a MACV HQ in Saigon and virtually nothing from the US Pacific command or the Pentagon.
You get a mixed picture of the ARVN without any analysis (again, except on tactics) - some commanders were brave and knew how to lead, others were feckless. Some ARVN soldiers fought tenaciously, others easily broke or surrendered. There's no analysis of the NVA leadership or soldiers (though, again, there is on tactics)- for the most part the reader just assumes they were brave, motivated, and mission-oriented despite thousands being killed by round-the-clock B-52 Arc Light strikes.
Logistics just seemed to happen.
The story is told in five parts - Quang Tri, Kontum, An Loc, Delta, and bombing campaign against the north. The first three parts dominate the book. Yet all of these things were happening more or less at the same time. This makes for a geographically coherent narrative but doesn't really convey the zeitgeist that must have existed throughout the south as well as back in the US.
It is one thing if a book is just about one battle (see Huế 1968: A Turning Point of the American War in Vietnam ) as the author can get away with skirting macro issues and events. But the NVA Easter Offensive was a whole North-to-South war fought at a level more intense than ever before. As a reader, this didn't quite come through. In fact, if you didn't know in the advance that Nixon had launched a huge bombing campaign in the North, the reader wouldn't learn of this until the final 5% of the text.
So, I gave this only 3 stars when I really wanted to go to 4 stars. You get three fairly good operational histories of three battles/sieges with lots of first hand American accounts but I had hoped that after 20 years (when the book was written), more could have been included from the political, ARVN, and NVA side.
July 10, 2022
At times a bit dry, but a thorough accounting of the North Vietnamese 1972 Easter Offensive against South Vietnam. I highly recommend it for those who don't understand much about that period of the war, or who wish to put the exploits of John Paul Vann or "Ripley at the Bridge" into their larger historical contexts.
July 31, 2008
I've read this book twice as a companion to Whitcomb's "Rescue of Bat 21". I would thoroughly recommend reading the two books at the same time to see a more well-rounded account of the circumstances surrounding the rescue of Lt. Col. Hableton
July 28, 2014
To be honest I had to abandon this book. Too 'shallow', too many 'stereotype war movie clichés' in it. Like referring to ARVN M-41 tanks as 'monsters', stating that an US advisor ' . . . . hated to leave his post, but had to . . ' with NVA's in the wire about to overrun the firebase etc. etc.
April 27, 2014
Excellent examination of the 1972 Hanoi Easter Offensive.
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews