The Improbable War explains why conflict between the USA and China cannot be ruled out. In 1914 war between the Great Powers was considered unlikely, yet it happened. We learn only from history, and popular though the First World War analogy is, the lessons we draw from its outbreak are usually mistaken. Among these errors is the tendency to over-estimate human rationality.All major conflicts of the past 300 years have been about the norms and rules of the international system. In China and the US the world confronts two 'exceptional' powers whose values differ markedly, with China bidding to challenge the current order. The 'Thucydidean Trap' - when a conservative status quo power confronts a rising new one - may also play its part in precipitating hostilities. To avoid stumbling into an avoidable war both Beijing and Washington need a coherent strategy, which neither of them has.History also reveals that war evolves continually. The next global conflict is likely to be played out in cyberspace and outer space and like all previous wars it will have devastating consequences. Such a war between the United States and China may seem improbable, but it is all too possible, which is why we need to discuss it now.
I've been reading a lot of Christopher Coker lately. In recent months a study of war through a critical appraisal of the world's most famous fictional characters followed by his brief book on the inevitability of war. Here Coker, who's sometimes called a philosopher of war, writes about the logic of it and how nations give in to it even while recognizing war's irrationality.
Coker, who's a professor of international relations at the London School of Economics, thinks the world's about to enter the most dangerous phase of great power competition since the end of the Cold War. His reflections of the nature of war in our time leads him to focus on what is probably the most dangerous situation of our time, the possibility of a conflict between China and the U. S. Equally a student of history and one who believes we can learn from the past, he thinks the most convincing historical analogy is the time leading up to the First World War. He approaches the problem as a series of questions, such as how logical the 2 adversaries are in their grand strategies, what roles do honor and reputation play, and whether or not they're capable of absorbing the lessons of the past. The dangers are manifest, and Coker spends considerable time discussing various elements of American and Chinese character which may drive the onset of war, ideas which I'd not been aware of before. He thinks, for instance, that China is in the same emotional space as Germany in 1914 in that the Communist Party's narrative of the past locks China into a time of past humiliations at the hands of the great powers, and that the resentment fuels an inability to move out of the darker past to make their way into a peaceful future. In the U. S., our energetic history and westward expansion, the nature of our bi-party political system, and the whole huge commercial enterprise which is America itself creates a society in which confrontation is "the American default mode, its unique cultural style." These are only 2 of the fascinating perspectives in a book about the nature of war which discusses it in terms of national mythic narratives, dignity, and Aristotle's ends and means rather than the aircraft carriers or cruise missile strengths of the adversaries.
I find Coker to be fascinating reading because he gives you so much to think about. He asks questions without making predictions or providing answers. Instead, he presents his material by telling stories which the reader can explore. There's lots to chew on here.
There are two questions that tend to dominate contemporary geopolitics. To what extent does the? current situation resemble that of 1914? And to what extent are China and the US destined to go to war with each other? Those are the questions that this book addresses.
There are those who see the current situation as largely analogous to that of 1914. We have two large nations squaring up against each other. Each is suspicious of each other. Each has a relatively large military capability. Each is a commercial rival to each other. Each is antipathetic towards each other at a civilisational level. To argue further, there are those who point to the cost of war, and the degree to which both party is dependent upon each other as a factor arguing against war, in exactly the way that liberals argued the case in 1914. Is it the case that the impossibility of war makes it so?
By examining the way in which Europe drifted into war in 1914, the author makes a good case for the current situation is different to 1914. In 1914, the parties involved wanted war, and that's what they got. In 2014 - when this book was written - both parties sought to avoid war. Of course, that was before Xi Jinping rose to his current status and before President Tump was elected. The facts on the ground have now changed. It could be argued that Trump is on his way out, to which it could be countered that Biden is a China hawk as well. If we follow the logic of the book, then we may well be moving towards a point where both sides would be comfortable with the idea of war.
Is that a realistic possibility? And if it is, does that necessarily mean that we shall see a hot war? It is easy to see a situation where conflict between the US and China gest out of hand. Both sides misinterpret each other, both sides send mixed signals to each other, and both sides will not back down because to do that would involve losing too much face. In that sense, war could be a realistic possibility. However, both sides are armed with nuclear weapons, and mutual deterrence has worked so far in its history. Perhaps direct action could be masked by proxy wars? Perhaps conflict could be maintained as hybrid - commercial, financial, and cyber actions - rather than out and out conflict? Who knows? In this respect, we are in unfamiliar territory, which suggests that the current situation is nothing like 1914. And so we close the circle.
I quite liked the book. The historical sections were insightful and clear. The metaphysical sections (mercifully, they were few) were obscure and hard reads. The book has become a bit dated because it has been overtaken by events. However, it still has a relevance and it lays down a template by which we can measure how close, or hoe far, we are to open armed conflict. Let's hope that we continue not to need this information.
A favoured topic amongst much of the analyst class is the likelihood of there being a great power war between a declining, at least in relative terms, USA and the rising power of China. Coker presents an interesting study of some of the likely factors that could give rise to a conflict between the two. I don't know a great deal about Coker so unsure how much credence to give the arguments he makes but is well written and does make some thought-provoking arguments and so would recommend for anyone interested in the topic.
Only a political scientist could make such a cogent, compelling, and provocative argument so "on-the-one-hand-yet-on-the-other-hand", academically mundane.