Thirteen Days : Diplomacy and Disaster - The Countdown to the Great War

by Clive Ponting

At the end of World War I, Germany was demonized. The Treaty of Versailles contained a "war guilt" clause pinning the blame on the aggression of Germany and accusing her of "supreme offence against international morality". Here, Ponting rejects this thesis, having made a thorough study of the incredibly complex international diplomatic documents. His interpretation rejects also the thesis that Europe in 1914 had reached such a boiling point it was bound to erupt or that the origins of the war lay in a mighty arms race. Instead, he argues that the war occurred becauase of the situation in the Balkans, while he gives full weight to Austria-Hungary's desire to cripple Serbia instead of negotiating and to Russia's militaristic programme of expansion. Ponting begins with a dramatic recreation of the assassination in Sarajevo (he agrees that this was the starting point). He then examines what happened in the 13 days that led to war. His story criss-crosses Europe city-by-city - Belgrade, Paris, London, Budapest, St Petersburg, Vienna, Rome etc - and describes developments day by day, latterly indeed hour by hour, as the tension builds.

Genres: History, Nonfiction

384 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2003

Reviews

[Andy Hart · Rating 2 out of 5]

Ponting begins his book by rejecting '...the common view of [Germany's] primary responsibility for the war'. Sadly much of the evidence he goes on to offer supports this, the academically accepted view.

From the 'Blank Check' to Berlin's haranguing of Vienna to declare war on Serbia and subsequent failure to assist the efforts of third parties to mediate, Ponting provides a balance of evidence to suggest that Germany played not just a part, but the principal role in escalating an assassination in Sarajevo to the point of global crisis. He also offers primary source evidence of Berlin's diplomatic efforts to avoid the blame for the outcome of their actions.

Of 30 July 1914, Ponting argues that the ... Russian decision to order general mobilisation was the one move in the crisis that was bound to produce a European war. This conveniently ignores the fact that Russian mobilisation did not lead inexorably to war, and while Russian decision makers would have deduced that their own mobilisation would trigger a corresponding German reaction, they could not have known that for Germany, mobilisation and war were one and the same thing. These charges can be laid upon Germany alone.

Germany's only military plan, the Schlieffen Plan, demanded a speedy and direct transition from mobilisation to war - and all before Russia could complete its own mobilisation. Many senior German politicians and diplomats were entirely unaware of the details of this plan, so it beggars belief that their Russian, French or even allied Austro-Hungarian counterparts might know of its details and implications. Unlike the Russians and Austro-Hungarian military staffs who were prepared and able to amend their mobilisation plans, The German General Staff refused to do so, knowing that this allowed no other avenue but war with Russia and France, violating Belgian neutrality on the way and in all probability dragging the British Empire in.

If the densely inter-woven brocade of 'isms' - Nationalism, Miltarism, Imperialism, Social Darwinism - formed the necessary and always dangerous critical mass, it was Germany's Schlieffen Plan alone that provided the initiator for the massive chain reaction that would engulf Europe and the world in the Great War.

The main body of Ponting's book follows the diplomatic to-ing and fro-ing of the 13 days leading up to the British declaration of war in concise daily chapters; I read each of these on its centenary. They offer many interesting and colourful anecdotes, personal portraits and insights, but do nothing to dispel the orthodoxy that the lion's share of responsibility for the outbreak of the Great War in 1914 rests deservedly in Berlin.

[Donald Pryde · Rating 5 out of 5]

Great book about the diplomacy or lack of it leading up to the First World War. In the age of telegraphs everyone was one step behind the other, the ambassadors where inclined to be more friendly to the country they where in than their own country. I never new that although Austria - Hungry started the war she was only at war with Serbia until a few weeks into the war.

[Greg · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very detailed, blow by blow, account of the diplomatic manoeuvrings in the lead up to the outbreak of World War One.