Henry Wallace was, next to FDR, the pre-eminent figure of the 1940’s, universally regarded as Roosevelt’s heir to the New Deal wing of the Democratic Party, a major Cabinet figure under bot Roosevelt and Truman. But in 1948 he quit the Cabinet and ran for the presidency on the independent ticket of the Progressive Party, challenging Truman on a number of issues; indeed September and October 1948 saw the last public debate on the basic assumptions of American foreign policy until the late 1960’s.
In this fascinating study of that campaign—of Henry Wallace, Harry Truman, and their debate of the origins of the Cold War—Richard Walton does more than throw light on a crucial turning point in American history. He gives us a detailed and in many ways surprising account of how Wallace developed his critique of administration policies and his proposals for new ones, and he also considers the response made to Wallace by the administration, the press, and anti-Wallace liberals. Why did Wallace lose so badly? Mr. Walton offers some important evidence as to our single-minded anti-Communism which already in 1948 had been a motivating force of our foreign policy for too long.
“Henry Wallace mounted the most vigorous attack on political Jim Crowism in American history.” Richard believes if Henry A. Wallace was heeded, Korea and Vietnam would have remained civil wars. Shutting down Wallace in ’48 meant shutting down all foreign policy debate for the next 15 years. “If his challenge to American foreign policy had been better known to the antiwar protestors of the 1960s, he might have become the patron saint of the Movement, for he was a ‘dove’ and a ‘peacenik’ long before those terms were coined.” Wallace becoming Vice-President in 1940 upset two groups: southerners and “big city bosses”. Both groups will deny him the VP slot in 1944. Wallace said, “The new democracy, the democracy of the common man, includes not only the Bill of Rights but also economic democracy, and democracy in the treatment of the sexes.” In 1944 he said, “Fascism in the postwar era will inevitably push steadily for Anglo-Saxon imperialism and eventually for war with Russia.” Wallace upset the British because he openly wrote against Imperialism. Roosevelt tells Wallace privately that “I was four or six years ahead of my time, that what I stood for would inevitably come.” FDR thought Greece should be left alone to its own civil war; Truman would be the opposite and totally takes the side of the fascists (called the Royalists).
Wallace’s view of cooperating with Russia was FDR’s view as well, Truman therefore was “dangerously departing from Roosevelt’s conviction.” Richard clearly states that America, as grand victor after the war, was the most responsible for creating a peaceful world. Russia may have “behaved badly” but it was never “a military threat”. Richard says, “So grievous were Russia’s wartime wounds, so powerful was the United States, that such a threat simply did not exist.” But to Truman’s exceptionalist thinking, the Russians could only understand force. That approach brought misery to millions. 90% of businessmen thought in a 1945 Fortune poll that we should be trading with Russia. Wallace says, “Secretary Byrnes has felt that we could use the bomb as a pistol to get what we wanted in international diplomacy.” Richard saw that anti-communist hysteria removed most of the skilled foreign observers, leaving riffraff and those employees who did nothing to rock the single-focus anti-commie boat.
Back then, anyone to the Left of you was a Commie and anyone to the Right of you was a Fascist. HAW quote: “If the English-speaking people have any destiny at all, it is to serve the world not to dominate it.” Wallace gets fired for writing Truman an amazing courageous document that partly says, to the world, “we look as though we are preparing a war of our own making”, or, we are trying to “intimate the rest of mankind.” HAW also mentioned concern over “the effort to secure air bases spread over half the globe from which the other half of the globe can be bombed”. He wrote to Truman that Americans could not see the similarity between the need for Russian satellites and American control over all Latin American dictators. HAW wrote: “Russian history for over a thousand years has been a succession of attempts, often unsuccessful, to resist invasion and conquest.” “Any talk on our part about the need for strengthening our defenses further is bound to appear hypocritical to other nations.” “To other nations our foreign policy consists not only of the principles that we advocate but the actions we take.” “If modern war can cost us four hundred billion dollars, we should be willing to pay much more for peace.” “It is even more important to invest four billion dollars into the industrialization of underdeveloped areas in the so-called backward nations. This would not only be good politics and good morals. It would be good business.” “I am just as much against a strong conservative Democratic party as I am against a strong conservative Republican Party. If the Democratic Party is not going to become genuinely progressive, the quicker it dies the better.” “‘Getting tough’ never bought anything real or lasting.” “I realize that the danger of war is much less from communism than it is from imperialism.” “If we can overcome the imperialistic urge in the Western world, I’m convinced there’ll be no war.” “Communism can only thrive on scarcity and inequality.” Richard writes, “Henry Wallace is one of the few top-ranking officials in American history to leave government on a matter of principle and take his case to the public. He was willing to risk his future in public life.” Elliot Roosevelt took the same position as HAW in a book and got away with it fine. He said FDR wanted colonialism to stop and we had “to recognize Russia’s legitimate interests and fears”. HAW’s career gets destroyed for essentially the same comment.
Yes, Stalin was a threat to his own people, but he wasn’t a threat to world peace. HAW writes, “We have permitted the Russians to parade themselves before all the colonial peoples as the only enemy of ‘imperialism’.” “Whether we like the Russians or not, we only have two ultimate courses. One is to make war on them. The other is to find a way to live in the world with them.” “How does support to the undemocratic governments of Greece and Turkey aid the cause of freedom?” “Once America stands for opposition to change, we are lost. America will become the most hated nation in the world.” “I predict Truman’s policy will spread communism in Europe and Asia.” “We must give the common man all over the world something better than communism.” Richard says, “Truman was not only encouraging a Red Scare, he was making it legitimate.” Henry wrote, “The red-baiting of reactionaries stems, as I have said before, not from fear of communism, but from fear of democracy.” “We can’t suppress ideas with force or legislation.” “Communists are not responsible for American’s problems.” Wallace believed the Marshall Plan was merely the Truman Doctrine applied to economics, a plan to “contain communism”. “We cannot chart a course for America on either blind hate or blind love for what the Russians do.” “The word ‘communism’ is a much greater menace than the communists. The word has been applied to every idea slightly to the left of slavery.” “…the repression of freedom in the Soviet Union. But however loathsome, that repression did not threaten the safety of the United States or even of Western Europe.” “If you accept the idea that Communists have no right to express their opinions, then you don’t believe in democracy.” “The greatest irony of all is that a quarter century of foreign policy designed to counter communism has done infinitely more harm to the United States at home and abroad than unopposed communism could ever have done.” Because Wallace got so few votes, Truman could assume that the anti-war voice was just a few crackpots easily ignored. Wallace couldn’t remove communists from his organization because they deserved the same rights as other Americans, and if he did, America would move even more to the right against communists because no one else would protect their freedom of speech. HAW asks, “How much could be accomplished if the money spent prosecuting the Cold War were spent at home.” Richard brilliantly states, “It is difficult to think of a single instance where the United States took effective measures to end repressive, undemocratic practices of a regime it claimed to be supporting in the defense of democracy. One searches for a single instance in which the United States did anything effective.” Richard also states, “Truman’s foreign policy contributed directly to the course that led to the Vietnam War planned and executed by liberals.” Among those pro-war liberals was Arthur Schlesinger who loved attacking HAW from the center. Richard states, “Getting along with Russia did not mean condoning repressive practices within Russia.” But centrist Americans respond to “communism’, like their counterparts in Russia respond to ‘capitalism’, with emotion not reason. “The press should not make friends with those in power.” Wallace stated that he believed that we should be depending on a Department of Peace for security, certainly not a Department of Defense. “Henry Wallace said the United States could not purchase reliable friends. He said that the United States would end up supporting corrupt, incompetent, and repressive dictators all over the world.” And he was right. Amazing five-star book, by Richard J. Walton.
I came across this very interesting -- and well written -- book as a consequence of my digging into the "causes" of the Cold War. I believe the conventional understanding of most Americans is that it was a consequence of the Soviet Union's desire -- supported by an aggressive expansion of its military -- to expand its ring of satellite communist states ever westward.
After reading Susan' Butler's superb "Roosevelt and Stalin," I came to understand that not only was the Cold War far from being "inevitable," but it was a result of at least as many missteps by the United States as by the Soviet Union. FDR's extremely untimely death in the spring of 1945 prevented him not only from seeing the war through to conclusion but, even more important, from putting into place the post-war organization -- founded on the continuing friendship and cooperation of the Soviet Union and the United States -- towards which he had arduously worked for years.
Henry Wallace had been FDR's Vice-President during his third term but, because of strong opposition from conservative forces within the Democratic Party, he had been put aside in preference of Harry Truman, an amiable but conservative man who knew little about FDR's foreign policy efforts. At Roosevelt's sudden death, Truman was thrust into a leadership role for which he was but little prepared.
Despite Wallace's continuing to champion the ongoing cooperation with the Soviet Union intended by Roosevelt, Truman began listening to a minority of conservative members of the Cabinet who were very anti-Soviet (because they were ardent anti-Communists). This also caused him to side with Great Britain's Winston Churchill who himself deeply distrusted the Russians.
Wallace, correctly understanding that this realignment would both doom postwar cooperation between the two surviving great powers from World War II, also warned against the widening wave of anti-communism within the United States that was already widening the witch hunts that were to culminate with the McCarthy hearings of the 1950s and the activities of the notorious House UnAmerican Activities Committee.
Walton's account does a wonderful job in recreating the fear and hysteria of those not so long ago days, a time that was directly responsible for the freezing of the Cold War and -- ultimately -- the the United States' foolhardy venture in Viet Nam.
Because Walton uses extensive quotes from speeches, letters, and newspaper articles, the reader gets an excellent "first person" testimony of key players and witnesses to these events.
The seeds of today's far Right are also clear in these events: start "us" vs. "them" rhetoric; dismissive, even vitriolic language used against opponents; and the polarization of American citizens between the "good patriotic citizens" vs. the less worthy, suspicious, and "liberal" elements working to undermine true "Americanism."
In this sense, the book contributes to a deeper understanding of our own parlous times.
Again, I see 0 ratings on this App. I know there was a Henry C Wallace and a Henry A Wallace. I don't have this book but I think this is the Communist Henry A Wallace. Is it any wonder he got trounced. Too bad he didn't draw enough votes away for Dewey to really win? What would Dewey have done differently?
I read this book on a bit of a whim, I am thankful I did. This book is a very limited view of Henry Wallace as an American leader/politician, only covering his brief period as VP and Secretary of Commerce during WWII and his presidential campaign against Truman/Dewey in 1948. It lays down the issues Wallace campaigned on, his differences with Truman and liberal democrats, and the extreme political climate of the time which dipped into the initial stages of cold war hysteria. The author clearly was a supporter of Wallace's progressive views, but I do not view this as an inherent defect, just a characteristic to be mindful of. This book was written in the aftermath of the Vietnam War and Wallace's progressive views proved almost prophetic as he correctly predicted America's McCarthyist red scare (fueled by Truman and liberal democrats as well) would lead to devastating war. Wallace's progressive campaign in 1948 was almost certainly doomed to failure, but it was interesting to read about and wonder how the future would have progressed if his campaign for peace was adhered to. We will never know but my interest in Wallace is piqued thanks to this book and I will do my best to read up on him more in the future. I would recommend this to anyone interested in Cold War politics, both domestic and international, as well as those who have been tempted by a third party vote rather than simply choosing "the lesser of two evils" when both evils can feel effectively the same in outcome.