Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice

by John A. Nagl

From one of the most important Army officers of his generation, a memoir of the military’s revolution in counterinsurgency warfare

Delivering a profound education in modern warfare, John Nagl’s Knife Fights is essential reading for anyone who cares about the fate of America’s soldiers and the purposes for which their lives are put at risk.

As an army tank commander in the first Gulf War, Nagl was an early convert to the view that America’s greatest future threats would come from asymmetric warfare—guerrillas, terrorists, and insurgents. His Oxford thesis on the lessons of Vietnam—eventually published as a book called Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife —became the bible of the counterinsurgency movement. But it would take 9/11 and the botched aftermath of the Iraq invasion to give his ideas contemporary relevance. After a year’s hard fighting in Iraq’s Anbar Province, where Nagl served as operations officer of a tank battalion in the 1st Infantry Division, he was asked by General David Petraeus to coauthor the new Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency field manual—rewriting core doctrine that would change the course of two wars and the thinking of an army. Knife Fights is the definitive account of counterinsurgency and its consequences by the man who was the doctrine’s leading architect.

Genres: Military Fiction, History, Nonfiction, War, Military History, Biography, Memoir

288 pages, Paperback

First published October 16, 2014

Reviews

[Michael Burnam-Fink · Rating 3 out of 5]

If you've been following the War on Terror, you probably know Nagl; Author of the influential Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, one of the COINdinista who along with General Petraeus wrote the Army's first Counter-Insurgency field manual. Nagl is a classic soldier-scholar, seeing combat first in Desert Storm and then in post-2003 occupation of Iraq, and also a Rhodes scholar with a Masters and PhD from Oxford. As such Nagl's 'knife fights' aren't really about battle. They're about trying to shift the Pentagon over to counter-insurgency, working from within the Army as a speechwriter and training officer, and outside as founder and President of the Center for a New American Security. This is potentially a very interesting theme, but while Nagl has some fascinating things to say about his collaborators and obstacles, the quest to get the army on track in Iraq is obscured rather than clarified. Rumsfeld is the clear villain (he would not let the military use the word 'insurgency'). Petraeus is the clear hero for implementing COIN principles, but the day to day is rather vague. Compared to Adams' incredible "War of Numbers", there is relatively little about the decision-making and learning of the military.

It's interesting to see who Nagl thinks is toast and who's coming back, by the people he calls out and praises. Rumsfeld is obviously gone. Joe Biden is irrelevant. Petraeus will be coming back. Hillary has potential, or at least is someone you don't want to cross. One reviewer on Amazon said that this is Nagl's 2016 positioning book, and while that's uncharitable, it's not entirely unfair. Though Nagl is currently a school principle in Philadelphia (and claims to have a commitment for several more years due to his son), he has credibility as a Washington power-player with CNAS, and may be back for round two.

That is in some ways worrying, because this more than a memoir about taking the theory of counter-insurgency and applying it to practice. This is Nagl's chance to develop the strategy of COIN, particularly applying the events of the Arab Spring, and he doesn't do so with any particular insight. COIN principles require a major investment, 1 soldier per 50 locals, to build local security and institutions. COIN implies multi-year, multi-billion dollar investments. Meanwhile, the New World Disorder is expanding; in Syria, in the Ukraine, in West Africa. Caution about putting American soldiers on the ground is warranted, but for all Nagl's principles, there's little about building a capability for Military Operations Other than War into the Department of Defense. More tellingly, small strokes at the start of a conflict may be cheaper and more efficient than nation-building at the end (would ISIS have arisen if the Free Syrian Army had toppled Assad with American advisers in 2012?). The New World Disorder spreads quickly and unpredictably--how can the American Empire contain it, while still working within Constitutional limits? Not saying that Nagl should be perfectly predictive, but there's a particular dark irony to publishing a book that says "Iraq was the midterm, Afghanistan is the final" as Iraq War Round 3 erupts.

There are also some areas where tighter editing would helped. Nagl repeats himself more than once. He's a smart man, and evidently a nice one, he might be one of the few field grade officers with a sense of humor, but this book doesn't quite make it. Consider this a four star book that got dropped to three stars, either because Nagl isn't willing to tell us where to go next, or because he (more worryingly, for a strategic thinker) doesn't know.

[James · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good book from an author I admire - a memoir that's equal parts modern war, as the title indicates, and modern military politics, with a generous helping of LtCol. Nagl's life with family and friends tossed in. The modern war part is focused mostly on counterinsurgency (COIN), the kind of war the U.S. will see the most of for the foreseeable future, and the kind for which Nagl literally co-wrote the book, the current Army/Marine Corps doctrinal manual on the subject. He passed up the kind of postings that could have led to his being a general because he saw the doctrinal work as being of greater service to the Army and the country, a real act of generosity.

The people of the United States are lucky that we have men and women of the caliber of John Nagl serving us. As a thinker, writer, and on-the-ground leader, everything I've read by and about him tells me he's one I'd have felt lucky to serve with.

I'm giving it four stars only because I wish it had focused more on actual military strategy and tactics in general and COIN in particular; the Army politics were interesting but not what I was looking for.

I'd recommend reading this together with David Kilcullen's work - another retired lieutenant colonel, in Kilcullen's case from the Australian army. The two complement one another pretty well (they served together, so that makes sense.) Highly recommended.

[Nick Lloyd · Rating 3 out of 5]

An interesting topic from a highly revered author, but does not offer a lot of new information from previous works. If you wanted a one volume synopsis of counterinsurgency woven into a biography of a former Army officer, this would suffice. Then again, if you were interested in counterinsurgency, you probably wouldn't limit yourself to just one volume anyway.

[Tyler Zimmer · Rating 3 out of 5]

This was a special read for me. Nagl was the headmaster of my high school before making inflammatory statements about Trump’s threat to democracy and a peaceful transition of power (he wasn’t wrong lmao, the board of trustees were). He gifted this book to me for some award I didn’t deserve (bc I didnt read it at the time) and I just found it on my shelf last week.

In high school i didn’t take his middle eastern politics class bc I was too worried about keeping a perfect GPA and he was known as a tough grader.

Nagl was a lieutenant colonel in the army who let a platoon in Operation Desert storm (‘91) and provided valuable insights into the 2003 Iraqi freedom tour and the subsequent Afghani occupation. The book was written in 2014 so it was neat to compare his predictions vs how Afghani withdrawal played out.

[Michael · Rating 3 out of 5]

A breezy memoir. Interesting, but thin on detail. I had hoped for a more thorough account of Nagl applying his theoretical work to an actual counterinsurgency.

[R. · Rating 5 out of 5]

Fantastic. One of the best memoirs I've read from one of the brightest of the Soldier-Scholars of this generation of warriors. One of the most interesting things that I am noticing about officers retiring in the last several years who were close to the halls of power during the beginning of the war on terror is that they all seem to be coming out as critical of the Bush administration once they're out of uniform. One of the most scathing of those types that I read recently was 'Before The First Shots Are Fired' by Gen. Tony Zinni, USMC, Retired.

"Rumsfeld's role in the planning and preparation for the Iraq War was spectacularly bad." Nagl goes into detail explaining how and why he feels that way. He isn't alone in having come to that conclusion though, far from it. I've yet to read a book by a military man who was in and around the Pentagon who has had good things to say about it.

"If General Casey had been correct that "President Bush has given me a load of shit" in Iraq, President Obama could perhaps be forgiven for feeling the same way about Afghanistan." This whole line was pretty funny as far as I'm concerned and sets the stage for the general tone that most people publishing memoirs of this time seem to be coming across with.

Nagl's first book was excellent and this is no different. If you're a fan of military history, wanting to learn more about Iraq and Afghanistan, or looking for something to read as a military memoir then I highly recommend this book.

I was fortunate enough to be given an advanced reader's copy of this as a winner of the Goodread's First Reads program and I'm obligated to disclose that when reviewing the book as such. Don't let that fool you, look at my rating of his other book 'Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife,' I read and rated it years ago and it's also five stars.

[Chris · Rating 4 out of 5]

Nagl is ten years my junior and one of those guys who is a scholar warrior like Petraeus( Petraeus could be considered one of his mentors too). He starts his book as a young Lieutenant at Desert Storm. It sounds like he's an ordinary young officer. What you don't know about him is he's West Point and he'd been selected for graduate studies. That's a pretty good indicator of a guy who is on the fast track and has unlimited potential. He writes humbly and has a contrarian sense of humor. It's an engaging read. You wonder why a guy like this is not a general in the Army. He explains why further in the book. As at LtCol he actually had more juice than some generals in the Army, something generals don't like. The latter pages of this book are an objective and scathing critique of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq-SecDef, POTUS, the Army's general officers are good targets. Nagl spares no one including himself. He has left the world of war, politics, strategy, and think tanks for academia and family. He was able to do some good in the Army, and more good outside of the Army as well, but you finally reach a point when it's time to go and move to a new chapter in your life. He seems pretty happy now too as the headmaster of an exclusive school for boys in the Philadelphia area.

[Will · Rating 3 out of 5]

Nagl's book is more of a philosophical biography than one detailing his life, as it provides an account of his military career and the development of his form of thinking related to counterinsurgency. It discusses his experience in the Gulf War, Iraq War and later as an advisor in Afghanistan. This book is likely only going to be interesting to those already knowledgeable of Nagl due to his earlier book ("Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife") and might not be hugely interesting to those not already interested in counterinsurgency.

[Vic · Rating 2 out of 5]

Excellent summing up on last chapter but more a bio of an officer stating how good am I. If you are looking for theory and practice of modern war it has little depth... more a bio of authors qualifications and study at university. Maybe more boots on ground time by US officers and less theory (study) the lessons may be passed on and remembered.

[Eric Haas · Rating 5 out of 5]

John Nagl’s Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice is a great read that lays out a compelling period in U.S. Army doctrinal development. Dr. Nagl was in the center of the push to incorporate counterinsurgency thinking and methods into U.S. Army practices. This is a quick read and does provide some interesting insights into the U.S. military bureaucracy. He highlights the role that advocacy and timing can play into decisions for military direction.

The strength of this work is when Dr. Nagl focused on his personal struggles to incorporate his academic findings into how his units conducted counterinsurgency operations in Iraq. This work also details the information and messaging campaign that General Petraeus executed as the Combined Arms Center Commander (before becoming the Commander in Iraq) to market the ideas detailed in Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency.

The weak point of the books is when Dr. Nagl turns his eye to Afghanistan. This book was written in 2014, so the focus is more on the shift to a smaller footprint decided on by the Obama Administration in 2013-2014. Dr. Nagl highlights that Afghanistan had different factors that drove the instability, compared to Iraq. However, his conclusions do not provide a viable roadmap for Afghanistan, outside of an unstated “Do more COIN for however long it takes.”

Overall, this is a very compelling read and an interesting memoir for a military officer that was in the middle of the maelstrom for the rise of counterinsurgency thinking during the darkest days of the nation’s operations in Iraq.

[Simon · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was a very 'focussed' read for a RUSI book review at very short notice. Marketing pitches for Knife Fights implied that it was a blueprint for the future and I began my read somewhat sceptical: I think 'on future war' is better a title and theme for fiction that otherwise.

John Nagl's dissertation and later book, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, contributed to the philosophies manifested in the 2006 Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency. I was expected more of the same but was pleasantly disappointed.

In Knife Fights, he acknowledges those who guided and mentored him through his Army career, into the world of Washington-based think tanks, and on into academia. At its simplest, Knife Fights says thank you. As a simple memoir, it succeeds and I found myself wanting more as I turned the last page.

As a collection of insights and lessons of post-Cold War conflict, Knife Fights is less a recipe for the present or a guideline for the future, than a glance at how we got here. It does work well as a memoir and in that vein, I enjoyed reading it and it is a work that I will read again and again.

For more, you'll need to hunt out the December 2014 issue of the RUSI Journal... http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/6r7...

[Gilad Buchman · Rating 5 out of 5]

I found this book interesting on a couple of levels.

On a personal level as an ex armor office, reading Memoir of another tanks office in another army.

A story of a researcher on counter-insurgency (COIN) that was deployed to Iraq and was forced to put to the test his own theories.

The backstage story of change in approach to fighting Al Qaeda in Iraq and the figures involved like Generals David Petraeus, Jim Mattis, H. R. McMaster and Stanely McChrystal, all still play an important role in American public sphere.

The biggest lesson, was the importance of setting up a learning organization to enable change, from having top leadership that believes in research and learning, to the building functions to support it, like internal think tanks, schools to research and train and spread information. Learning and quick adaptation needs to be in the DNA of an organization for it to succeed.

Finally, that to enable a learning organization, you need to allow time for some of your people to invest in research and expanding their horizon, which can take your best people off the top priorities for some time. but this investment is worth it for the organization in the long term

[Vivek · Rating 3 out of 5]

Lt. Col. John Nagl's book about the mistakes made by the USA in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan advances his and other military thinkers' theories on Counter-insurgency . The book is written more from an theoretician's point of view, though it is backed by Nagl's experience in the two wars in Iraq. Some of the illustrations are from Powerpoint presentations! Interesting reading and written with wry humour in parts. Would be of interest to students of military theory.

[Medusa · Rating 3 out of 5]

There’s a bit of fluctuation between refreshing candor and “hey, I was wrong” vs some humble brags, but in all I enjoyed this book. It’s part memoir, part theory, part self justification. There’s some genuine wit and humor here, and overall I’d call it a worthy read and an interesting book end to “Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife.” As with all books written before our ignominious defeat in Afghanistan, it’ll break your heart a bit when he discusses possible outcomes and his hopes for those.

[Aiden Atchison · Rating 4 out of 5]

Great read, engaging and provides LTC Nagle’s perspective on the revolution in doctrine he helped orchestrate.
Reading this book with Kaplan’s “Insurgents” and Nagle’s “Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife” tied the concepts together more holistically.
Interesting perspective from someone who studied COIN for his doctorate and then had the opportunity to engage in COIN- high recommend!

[Kevin · Rating 4 out of 5]

Quick read. Interesting to read his thoughts on the development of US counterinsurgency policy in Iraq including its aftermath post-surge. Actually thought this was better than Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife.

[Todd · Rating 3 out of 5]

A book about someone who saw what was important when no one knew what to even be looking for. I find myself repeatedly hearkening back to lessons he learned and how it gives me insight into other aspects of my own experience. A very thought provoking book.

[Relstuart · Rating 4 out of 5]

If this books sounds like it speaks to a subject you would find interesting you should read it. =)

Good critique on military readiness and changing mission sets to fight the battle you actually have to fight instead of the one you expected or wanted.

[Liam Owen · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very easy to read and nice perspective of the Iraq conflict

[The Bookster · Rating 4 out of 5]

One part an interesting memoir of soldiering and military academia, the other part why the war in Iraq failed and what could've been done differently.

[Michael Szydlo · Rating 5 out of 5]

Fantastic, Knife fights by Josh Nagl is a modern book on the failure of the government. Lt. Col Josh Nagl is a veteran of the Gulf war and Iraq war. The beginning of the book started off very strong. He started the book by describing his time in Iraq during the Gulf War. The stories he tells are fun and made the war seem easy. He then transitions into his time in training after the war. Many facts about his life are portrayed here. After the attacks in 2001 he was sent back overseas to Iraq. He described the time as hell. After the militaries failure in Vietnam the military tried to bury all the new skills they learned. That means when America went to war in Iraq they were under prepared and under staffed. Lt Nagl learned the hard way that the US military was unprepared. Lt Nagl survived his tour in Iraq. (obviously) When he returned he went to work in the pentagon. During his time in the pentagon he wrote military handbook Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife. While in the pentagon Nagl pushed for more training in counter insurgency and more support in Afghanistan. Another point of Nagl was to help woefully under supplied troops in Afghanistan. Knife Fights was a great book. A book for those very interested in the military or for those who are simply looking for a good read.

I gave Knife Fights a 4/5 because it has the ability to appeal to a wide audience. If you’re looking for a book about the war in Iraq, a book on government failures or just a good read Knife Fights might just scratch your itch. Knife Fights isn’t perfect though some more editing would be a good idea. Nagl repeats himself many times throughout the book. Also I was hoping for more actual military tactics not just military policies. Overall the book had a few faults but many great quality so I’m going to give it a ⅘

[Nathan Shumate · Rating 5 out of 5]

(I received this book in a Goodreads giveaway in exchange for an honest review.)

I will admit it: I supported the Iraq war on principle -- specifically, the principle that any world in which a man who fed enemies to a woodchipper and supported his sons as state-empowered rapist-torturers did not hold power was better than a world that did.

However, I also admit that I was naive. I assumed that the largest and best-funded military establishment in the world knew how to do its job.

KNIFE FIGHTS is written by one of the few men in the military who knew at the time how the military involvement in Iraq should have been run, and this is a memoir of his service, from trying to get support for the idea of counterinsurgency strategy (at a time when Donald Rumsfeld outlawed even the use of the word "insurgency") before the war to his own deployment, to the near-civil war in Iraq thanks to the U.S.'s disastrous and willful mishandling of the post-collapse occupation and to, thankfully, the replacement of Cold War barnacles who insisted on fighting the kind of war they knew how to fight with General Petraeus and others who were determined to understand the war they were presently fighting.

An eye-opening account not only of how counterinsurgency needs to be handled in a world in which no one's stupid enough to take on the United States in open warfare, but of how the military focus on preparation for the kind of warfare they knew how to fight left them completely unprepared for the kind of war they would likely have to fight.

[Marks54 · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is a memoir by a former tank commander and think tanker who played a large role in the US move to adopt a counter-insurgency approach to combat in Iraq and Afghanistan after 2006. He is best known for his doctoral dissertation "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife" that studied the counter-insurgency lessons of the Vietnam and Malaysian wars. He combined his scholarly knowledge with practical experience gained from fighting in Iraq, so that he combines theory (or doctrine) with practice in a manner that is uncommon in books on military history and theory. The book is written in a memoir format and the critical chapters show how he was linked to other scholar engaged by David Petraeus as he tried to change the Army's approach to war. He was one of the major contributors to the famous US Army field manual on counter-insurgency, one of the most unlikely million selling books ever.

The writing is excellent and the book moves quickly. The memoir format was helpful in seeing how the evolution of Nagl's thought interacted with military developments going on around him. The limits of the format are clearer in the chapters on the author's move to running a think tank and discussing the policy wonk environment during Obama's first term. This is covered more effectively by other authors, such as Robert Gates or Andrew Bacevich. It is a nice read that will complement other books on these topics, especially COIN strategies.

[Charles Gonzalez · Rating 4 out of 5]

I ploughed through this book having put the authors " Eating soup with a knife" on my to read list, where it still remains; I bought this book and jumped in. I was attracted to the memoir style, and looked forward to John Nagl's unique insights into this country's longest wars. I was not disappointed. The author is a passionate and articulate example of the best of America's warrior class. The type of officer who does NOT get to be a general officer because they get shunted aside for unpopular views. This soldier , one of America's founding spirits of current counter insurgency strategy offers the reader a wonderful, at times frustrating and insightful recounting and analysis of the last 13 years of American warfare. His closing chapter reinforces his oft stated themes, the war in Iraq was wrong, we wasted time and energy there instead of focusing on Afghanistan and, most importantly, that the future of warfare for the United States will be in asymmetric combat, making little use of the over designed, super expensive, defence and politically driven defence budgets that have swallowed the American defence budget...a remarkable and most important read for any American citizen concerned about where we are going in the world and how and why we should put our young men and women in harm's way.....

[Matt · Rating 4 out of 5]

I received this book as part of a First Reads promotion.

I enjoyed Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice, especially the comparisons of the modern wars in which the United States has engaged to wars in the past such as Desert Storm and Vietnam. The book backs up John Nagl's claims that now, more than ever, counterinsurgency is key to combat operations for the United States. As we move away from the conflicts where we can clearly identify our enemies to ones where insurgents may be the local businessman down the street, the United States needs to become well-versed in counterinsurgency in order to avoid the mistakes made in Iraq.

The autobiographical account helps to provide a logical timeline of events throughout the book, and I can see subsequent books being written about how the armed forces have reacted to Nagl's recommendations in the years to come.

I would recommend this book to anyone interested in modern warfare, military tactics, and learning the basics of how to implement a successful counterinsurgency plan.

[Gordon · Rating 5 out of 5]

5 stars. A superb tale of a brilliant officer and scholar who was one of the earliest advocates for refocusing the Army on counterinsurgency. His journey from cadet to Rhodes Scholar to tank officer to PhD COIN theorist & professor to COIN practitioner and agent of change is a must read for military leaders today and for the future. As John and so many others point out -- our most likely interventions and wars of the future will involve insurgencies. We must internalize the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan and prepare to fight small wars with the benefit of the new doctrine we have developed and experience gained in blood and sacrifice. I read John Nagl's Counterinsurgency Lessons (later re-titled as Eating Soup with a Knife) as a Brigade Commander in Iraq. I later invited him out to Afghanistan to view what we were doing in late 2008 and he became a much welcome advocate for change in our strategic policy in that war as well.

[Michael · Rating 4 out of 5]

Big massive battles are out, small guerrilla actions are the future. Short wars are out, long drawn out counter-insurgency methods are the future. America will really need to weigh its future involvement in other country's actions, in blood, time and money. Well written, good information, a book that very likely foretells the future that America's armed forces will take to win the minds and hearts of countries we come to the aid of. Three main points I drew from this book are; 1), state to state wars have been declining for the past 100 years (good). 2) with the proliferation of social media, more and more "Arab Spring" type events will be occurring, and more guerrilla warfare is on the horizon (bad), 3) due to social media, the state is losing its hold on the individual, and individuals now have the information and knowledge to know when their "betters" are screwing up the country, and also will be able to organize demonstrations against the state (good).

[Idfaciamus · Rating 3 out of 5]

The book was interesting in viewing the career of an army officer and what it entailed. Despite the title and the knife on the front, it did not talk very much of the combat experience. It was interesting to know that Nagl considered the invasion of Iraq a mistake, but that's hardly an epiphany for most. Nagl portrayed himself and some others as leading an uphill fight to persuade those in command to accept the fact that the future of war will be counter-insurgency, not the traditional war of set-piece battles complete with armor and air units.

However, counter-insurgency as Nagl describes it sounds like nation-building, something we cannot afford even if we wanted to do it. We have become a nation at constant war which is starving our civilian needs. We will become, if this continues, "a skeleton in armor." Moreover, with the rise of a very aggressive and increasingly bellicose China, I am not convinced that we may not find ourselves someday in a conventional war.

[George Avery · Rating 5 out of 5]

Having worked a bit on the development of the counterinsurgency doctrine (as a consultant working on Medical Civic Action doctrine for the Joint Forces Command's Joint Irregular Warfare Center), I was quite familiar with John's work, particularly his doctoral dissertation "Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife." I thoroughly enjoyed this work, his professional autobiography, for the insights into the challenges faced by the junior officers who attempted to get the United States military to wake up and realize that counterinsurgency and fourth generation conflict are likely to form the context of the majority of US military operations in the future, given US dominance in the area of conventional warfare. Like his peers H.R. McMaster and T.X. Hammes, he faced a daunting challenge, and the extent to which they were able to get DoD to recognize the problem is a notable achievement. His retirement from the Army was a significant loss for the citizens of the United States.

[Uwe Hook · Rating 4 out of 5]

In the now crowded genre of books about the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, most can be divided into either first person narratives of the soldiering or analytical treatises about the conflicts. This book is unique from the others that I've read in that it is not merely the perspective of the "boots on the ground" nor is it an overly academic and sterile analysis. Nearly every American already has an opinion about these conflicts and many are searching merely for validation of their opinion, albeit pro or con, red or blue. As such, this book will disappoint all, since it not a purely partisan propaganda piece. However, for the curious reader searching to insight rather than validation, this is an excellent book. You'll be wiser and better informed for reading it. If you need a "Bush bad" or "Obama bad" opinion piece, other manuscripts will serve you better.