What do you think?
Rate this book
America in Retreat: The New Isolationism and the Coming Global Disorder
“Wise counsel for a constructive, tough-minded, and sensible foreign policy. Read and learn.” —GEORGE SHULTZ, U.S. Secretary of State, 1982–1989
The world is tipping into chaos. Why?
In this acclaimed and influential book, Pulitzer Prize–winning columnist Bret Stephens shows how the retreat of American power, orchestrated by Barack Obama, has created the power vacuums now being filled by our enemies. From Vladimir Putin’s quest to restore the old czarist empire, to China’s efforts to dominate the South China Sea, to Iran’s nuclear ambitions, to ISIS’s dreams of an Islamic caliphate, we have entered an era in which our foes no longer fear us and our friends no longer trust us.
With his stylistic flair and analytical brilliance, Stephens explains the ideological roots of Obama’s suspicions of American power. He demonstrates how a false belief in American decline has led to a disastrous prescription of retreat, as if the cure for domestic weakness is international weakness. In a prophetic chapter, he warns of what the world could look like in 2019 if we do not change course. And he lays out the right formula for U.S. foreign policy—the same formula that brought order to our once crime-ridden streets.
America in Retreat is shaping the greatest foreign policy debate of our decade.
The world is tipping into chaos. Why?
In this acclaimed and influential book, Pulitzer Prize–winning columnist Bret Stephens shows how the retreat of American power, orchestrated by Barack Obama, has created the power vacuums now being filled by our enemies. From Vladimir Putin’s quest to restore the old czarist empire, to China’s efforts to dominate the South China Sea, to Iran’s nuclear ambitions, to ISIS’s dreams of an Islamic caliphate, we have entered an era in which our foes no longer fear us and our friends no longer trust us.
With his stylistic flair and analytical brilliance, Stephens explains the ideological roots of Obama’s suspicions of American power. He demonstrates how a false belief in American decline has led to a disastrous prescription of retreat, as if the cure for domestic weakness is international weakness. In a prophetic chapter, he warns of what the world could look like in 2019 if we do not change course. And he lays out the right formula for U.S. foreign policy—the same formula that brought order to our once crime-ridden streets.
America in Retreat is shaping the greatest foreign policy debate of our decade.
289 pages, Paperback
First published June 3, 2014
69 people are currently reading
657 people want to read
About the author
Bret Stephens
30 books29 followersAmerican journalist who won a Pulitzer Prize in 2013. He works for The Wall Street Journal as the foreign-affairs columnist and the deputy editorial page editor, responsible for the editorial pages of the Journal's European and Asian editions. From 2002 to 2004, he was editor in chief of the Jerusalem Post.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 30 of 62 reviews
December 23, 2023
For decades it has been conventional social wisdom ( and something of a cliche) that the US cannot be the world's policeman. This is not true according to Bret Stephens. The author uses this book to make the case that the US must be the world's policeman because no one else can. He is clearly correct that no other country is close to having the ability to police the world, but, as everyone's mother at one time or another told them, just because you can do something does not mean that you should do something.
Mr. Stephens makes the case for the US to maintain the international order, and do it through having overwhelming force and the willingness to use such force. He is distressed that liberals do not agree with this position and surprised that most conservatives don't agree with this position. He points out, perhaps too enthusiastically, the foreign policy shortcomings of the Obama administration. He doesn't, but could, point to the statements of most Republicans about foreign policy that can be boiled down to "I would do the same thing Obama is doing, but would talk differently about it". It would be easy to dismiss Stephens as just another Obama critic, outlining the three axioms of Fox News Foreign Policy: 1) The world is a dangerous place; 2) The US is in a lot of trouble; 3) It's all Obama's fault.
However, the troubling thing about Mr. Stephens' analysis is that he might be right. He describes many areas in which the US would be better off with having the kind of military superiority that has overawed potential opponents for the last seven decades. His thought-provoking analysis lists a number of reasons why the US has not been willing to use its military superiority, but totally ignores the most important. The most significant obstacle to the type of muscular American foreign policy envisioned by Stephens is not ISIS, or Vladimir Putin, or even Barack Obama. It is Grover Norquist and the world-view he represents. American voters have convinced themselves that they pay way-too-much in taxes. If Stephens wants 1950s-style American military hegemony, he must tolerate 1950s-level tax rates. Voters have continually expressed their unwillingness to tax themselves for any reason. Had Donald Trump not stipulated that his wall would be paid for by Mexico, his campaign would have ended months ago. Not only must American voters be promised the impossible, but it must be the free impossible. Until Mr. Stephens finds a way to overcome American taxophobia (and its lack of even a mention in this book strongly suggests that he has not), his foreign policy dreams must be necessarily frustrated.
Mr. Stephens makes the case for the US to maintain the international order, and do it through having overwhelming force and the willingness to use such force. He is distressed that liberals do not agree with this position and surprised that most conservatives don't agree with this position. He points out, perhaps too enthusiastically, the foreign policy shortcomings of the Obama administration. He doesn't, but could, point to the statements of most Republicans about foreign policy that can be boiled down to "I would do the same thing Obama is doing, but would talk differently about it". It would be easy to dismiss Stephens as just another Obama critic, outlining the three axioms of Fox News Foreign Policy: 1) The world is a dangerous place; 2) The US is in a lot of trouble; 3) It's all Obama's fault.
However, the troubling thing about Mr. Stephens' analysis is that he might be right. He describes many areas in which the US would be better off with having the kind of military superiority that has overawed potential opponents for the last seven decades. His thought-provoking analysis lists a number of reasons why the US has not been willing to use its military superiority, but totally ignores the most important. The most significant obstacle to the type of muscular American foreign policy envisioned by Stephens is not ISIS, or Vladimir Putin, or even Barack Obama. It is Grover Norquist and the world-view he represents. American voters have convinced themselves that they pay way-too-much in taxes. If Stephens wants 1950s-style American military hegemony, he must tolerate 1950s-level tax rates. Voters have continually expressed their unwillingness to tax themselves for any reason. Had Donald Trump not stipulated that his wall would be paid for by Mexico, his campaign would have ended months ago. Not only must American voters be promised the impossible, but it must be the free impossible. Until Mr. Stephens finds a way to overcome American taxophobia (and its lack of even a mention in this book strongly suggests that he has not), his foreign policy dreams must be necessarily frustrated.
January 29, 2016
Normally, as a rule, I'm not public about my political preferences (and I really hope this review doesn't reveal any of them in particularly). When I first started this book the introduction really put me off. The voice of the narrator was very pretentious and conceited. And I'll be even more honest, the guy just had a very bad way of illustrating a view I don't agree with. I do think, especially in political discourse, that you can have a difference of opinion as long as you have the evidence and language to back up your belief. To me, that is what this book sincerely lacked.
I originally found this book at the library because I began teaching a Civics class this semester and am doing a rather large unit on foreign policy. This book really did get the ball rolling and despite my disagreement with the author, there were some really interesting points made by the author. I just can't resonate with books where the author puts so much of their voice, their opinion into the narrative of the book. I really did feel like I got too much of Stephen's opinions and not much of the facts. In fact, after reading this I still don't understand why he believes we should be the world police, only that he strongly, strongly disagrees with Obama's current foreign policy plan (and never offers up a better one).
I mean, this is Bret Stephens' book so if he wants to put in his own political agenda into the novel than he can do it. But as far as its educational merit and how it can benefit someone trying to learn about our current foreign policy affairs, I just don't think it would cut it for my students.
Pop Sugar Challenge: A Political Memoir
I originally found this book at the library because I began teaching a Civics class this semester and am doing a rather large unit on foreign policy. This book really did get the ball rolling and despite my disagreement with the author, there were some really interesting points made by the author. I just can't resonate with books where the author puts so much of their voice, their opinion into the narrative of the book. I really did feel like I got too much of Stephen's opinions and not much of the facts. In fact, after reading this I still don't understand why he believes we should be the world police, only that he strongly, strongly disagrees with Obama's current foreign policy plan (and never offers up a better one).
I mean, this is Bret Stephens' book so if he wants to put in his own political agenda into the novel than he can do it. But as far as its educational merit and how it can benefit someone trying to learn about our current foreign policy affairs, I just don't think it would cut it for my students.
Pop Sugar Challenge: A Political Memoir
July 3, 2016
The Cuban intellectual José Martí once adroitly observed that there are more rats than eagles with many rats claiming that they can fly better than eagles. While I am certainly not calling Bret Stephens a rat, I have to point out that there is a “rat” in his rationale. America Retreats purports to be a critique of current U.S. foreign policy (essentially 2000-2014) relying heavily on innuendo, counterfactual history and a fantastical imagination (chapter 9), but it is really an apologia for a realist approach that defends the misbegotten efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Bret Stephens is a foreign correspondent for the Wall Street Journal who has been embedded with U.S. troops but has not directly participated in combat. Nor has he ever worked in the U.S. State Department. I hardly think this qualifies him to provide a blue print for U.S. foreign policy. Reading his book reminds me of Bruce Reynolds’s The Communist Shakes His Fist, an anti-Communist book from the 1930s that strove to call Americans to action against the Communist menace. Where Reynolds relied on songs to make his point (at one point changing the name of the song “London Bridge is Falling Down” to “Capitalism is Falling Down), Stephens relies on Internet websites. We know how reliable those can be. Unlike Reynolds, at least Stephens cites some of his “sources.”
Mr. Stephens makes no secret that he dislikes Barack Obama and mistakes his diplomatic and pragmatic tendencies for a retreat. But this is just the tip of the interventionist iceberg. He loathes any effort to establish peace through non-violent means. Unbelievably he compares the Kellog-Briand Pact (1922) with Prohibition (the Volstead Act-1919) (pg.99). My sense is that he is very far removed from the current economic and political realities that we live in. On page 134 he writes, “The worst of the shocks of the financial crises in the United States and the euro crisis are now behind us.” He is clearly not in touch with the people and regions devastated by the recession. Yet he plainly states that we should stop concentrating on the problems at home to invade other countries that are supposedly rubbing our noses in it. Similarly, Stephens takes pride in the number of engineering PhDs that are produced in the US, boasting that the US produces 17% of the world’s science and engineering PhDs. If he had looked closer at the data, he would have realized that the majority of engineering PhDs in the US are foreign born. He should modify his statement that the “US produces 17% of the world’s foreign born PhDs.”
The fact that Stephens refuses to acknowledge the havoc that the U.S. wreaked on Iraq (“We hadn’t ‘broken’ Iraq.” “The Pottery Barn rule is not a theory of international relations the United States should recognize.”-Note: do not invite Bret Stephens to your home; if he breaks something, he will not pay for it or have it fixed.) What is more disturbing is that he seems blissfully unaware (although he has made use) of social media. He writes on page 77 that, “Obama speaks about foreign policy in moral terms so much so that it sometimes sounds as if he’s running not a superpower but a social movement.” The nature of government and how it communicates with the people has changed. It is surprising that Stephens misses this point. Similarly, he does not recognize the new battlefields where “combat” will be fought. It would have been nice if he had at least mentioned cyberterrorism. Sure, there might not be another Son of Sam lurking around the city of New York, but that does not mean that he/she did not move to the Internet to propagate their crimes. I am not sure why he decided not to mention the financial crisis and economic terrorism. Perhaps he didn’t because it would have challenged the premise of his book.
As I mentioned, there is a lot of anecdotes and innuendo in this book and text that I wanted to investigate in more detail had no citation. For example, on page 101 the author writes, “It’s also no accident that democratic countries that do the most to slash their military budgets and global commitments also have comparatively high welfare states; giving up on the notion that government has martial responsibilities is an invitation to give in to the temptation of ever-greater entitlements.” Where does he get this information from? I found this factoid hard to believe, but Stephens provides no way of verifying this. The danger of scattering anecdotes and innuendo throughout a book is you never know where one will explode in your face. On page 222 he writes, “‘Broken Windows’ theory emphasizes the importance of the surface of things; the look of the neighborhood, the types of people walking the streets, their behavior.” This comes dangerously close to endorsing racial profiling. Was this Stephens’s intention? Probably not, but this happens because he did not properly contextualize the theory. The ‘Broken Windows’ theory cannot really be applied internationally as Stephens is advocating. Windows come in different shapes and forms and some do not even have glass. Would Stephens consider a glassless window broken? If so, how would he fix it? Things that work at the microcosmic level do not work very well at the macrocosmic level. Ultimately, for the author global disorder occurs when other nations assume greater roles in international leadership.
On page 226 Stephens regales us with another “If-we-had-only-done-this” argument. He writes, “A cruise missile strike against a single radio tower in Rwanda could have helped prevent the Hutus from broadcasting the plan of attack against the Tutsis during the 1994 genocide, potentially saving thousands of innocent civilians at no cost in lives, and little in treasure to the United States.” How does he know this? As with his other open speculations, there is no consideration of collateral damage. The cruise missile strike might have killed numerous civilians. Who knows? The early strike might have incensed the Hutus enough to implement their attacks sooner.
Chapter nine is an imagined scenario that would be better served being located in a work of science fiction. Stephens is creative, I will give him that, but he is offering pure speculation as the future that will arrive in the next few years. He assumes that Hillary Clinton will run for president and win. It is nice to surmise what the future might bring, but these types of conversations are best kept at bars and pool halls, not in a publication unless it is Mad magazine.
As an international educator I was particularly concerned by his use of the term “internationalism.” On page 15 he writes, “An era of American internationalism is giving way, with amazing swiftness, to a period of American indifference.” It seems to me that he equates internationalism with military intervention and belligerence. He could not be more wrong. Every year more American university students are studying abroad and more international students study in the US. School curricula are becoming more global. The fact that the US chooses negotiation and engagement rather than military intervention is a sign of maturity, not indifference. Nations around the world are not hostile to the US because it is weak, but because in the past it has meddled in their affairs. It is incredulous that Stephens wants to go back to this foreign policy.
I was disappointed that Stephens did not address a couple of items in his book: the drone attacks that the US is leading in Pakistan, the US unwillingness to recognize the International Court of Justice and the divide between the US people and the military (James Fallows wrote an excellent article about this in The Atlantic magazine). The best way the US can inspire multilateral partnerships is by simply following the rules: allow the ICJ to try people such as Henry Kissinger. Stephens hopes to maintain American exceptionalism through military intervention. For him America’s renewed efforts to work with other nations through dialog, diplomacy and conversation is a “retreat.” He is off the mark here. While I agree with him about declinism and civilizational pessimism, he does not make a strong enough argument to convince the reader that the US should intervene militarily in other countries with more frequency.
This was a hard book for me to read and I struggled to finish it because I disagree with every argument and pseudo-argument the author put forth. It is important to read the thoughts of someone who has a different perspective or philosophy, but this book is not a game changer. In fact, as I read it, I became convinced that Bret Stephens likes to play the board game Risk. Much of his arguments should be discussed on the kitchen table, not the negotiating table. Stephens is clearly a talented journalist, but at best he is an armchair statesman.
Bret Stephens is a foreign correspondent for the Wall Street Journal who has been embedded with U.S. troops but has not directly participated in combat. Nor has he ever worked in the U.S. State Department. I hardly think this qualifies him to provide a blue print for U.S. foreign policy. Reading his book reminds me of Bruce Reynolds’s The Communist Shakes His Fist, an anti-Communist book from the 1930s that strove to call Americans to action against the Communist menace. Where Reynolds relied on songs to make his point (at one point changing the name of the song “London Bridge is Falling Down” to “Capitalism is Falling Down), Stephens relies on Internet websites. We know how reliable those can be. Unlike Reynolds, at least Stephens cites some of his “sources.”
Mr. Stephens makes no secret that he dislikes Barack Obama and mistakes his diplomatic and pragmatic tendencies for a retreat. But this is just the tip of the interventionist iceberg. He loathes any effort to establish peace through non-violent means. Unbelievably he compares the Kellog-Briand Pact (1922) with Prohibition (the Volstead Act-1919) (pg.99). My sense is that he is very far removed from the current economic and political realities that we live in. On page 134 he writes, “The worst of the shocks of the financial crises in the United States and the euro crisis are now behind us.” He is clearly not in touch with the people and regions devastated by the recession. Yet he plainly states that we should stop concentrating on the problems at home to invade other countries that are supposedly rubbing our noses in it. Similarly, Stephens takes pride in the number of engineering PhDs that are produced in the US, boasting that the US produces 17% of the world’s science and engineering PhDs. If he had looked closer at the data, he would have realized that the majority of engineering PhDs in the US are foreign born. He should modify his statement that the “US produces 17% of the world’s foreign born PhDs.”
The fact that Stephens refuses to acknowledge the havoc that the U.S. wreaked on Iraq (“We hadn’t ‘broken’ Iraq.” “The Pottery Barn rule is not a theory of international relations the United States should recognize.”-Note: do not invite Bret Stephens to your home; if he breaks something, he will not pay for it or have it fixed.) What is more disturbing is that he seems blissfully unaware (although he has made use) of social media. He writes on page 77 that, “Obama speaks about foreign policy in moral terms so much so that it sometimes sounds as if he’s running not a superpower but a social movement.” The nature of government and how it communicates with the people has changed. It is surprising that Stephens misses this point. Similarly, he does not recognize the new battlefields where “combat” will be fought. It would have been nice if he had at least mentioned cyberterrorism. Sure, there might not be another Son of Sam lurking around the city of New York, but that does not mean that he/she did not move to the Internet to propagate their crimes. I am not sure why he decided not to mention the financial crisis and economic terrorism. Perhaps he didn’t because it would have challenged the premise of his book.
As I mentioned, there is a lot of anecdotes and innuendo in this book and text that I wanted to investigate in more detail had no citation. For example, on page 101 the author writes, “It’s also no accident that democratic countries that do the most to slash their military budgets and global commitments also have comparatively high welfare states; giving up on the notion that government has martial responsibilities is an invitation to give in to the temptation of ever-greater entitlements.” Where does he get this information from? I found this factoid hard to believe, but Stephens provides no way of verifying this. The danger of scattering anecdotes and innuendo throughout a book is you never know where one will explode in your face. On page 222 he writes, “‘Broken Windows’ theory emphasizes the importance of the surface of things; the look of the neighborhood, the types of people walking the streets, their behavior.” This comes dangerously close to endorsing racial profiling. Was this Stephens’s intention? Probably not, but this happens because he did not properly contextualize the theory. The ‘Broken Windows’ theory cannot really be applied internationally as Stephens is advocating. Windows come in different shapes and forms and some do not even have glass. Would Stephens consider a glassless window broken? If so, how would he fix it? Things that work at the microcosmic level do not work very well at the macrocosmic level. Ultimately, for the author global disorder occurs when other nations assume greater roles in international leadership.
On page 226 Stephens regales us with another “If-we-had-only-done-this” argument. He writes, “A cruise missile strike against a single radio tower in Rwanda could have helped prevent the Hutus from broadcasting the plan of attack against the Tutsis during the 1994 genocide, potentially saving thousands of innocent civilians at no cost in lives, and little in treasure to the United States.” How does he know this? As with his other open speculations, there is no consideration of collateral damage. The cruise missile strike might have killed numerous civilians. Who knows? The early strike might have incensed the Hutus enough to implement their attacks sooner.
Chapter nine is an imagined scenario that would be better served being located in a work of science fiction. Stephens is creative, I will give him that, but he is offering pure speculation as the future that will arrive in the next few years. He assumes that Hillary Clinton will run for president and win. It is nice to surmise what the future might bring, but these types of conversations are best kept at bars and pool halls, not in a publication unless it is Mad magazine.
As an international educator I was particularly concerned by his use of the term “internationalism.” On page 15 he writes, “An era of American internationalism is giving way, with amazing swiftness, to a period of American indifference.” It seems to me that he equates internationalism with military intervention and belligerence. He could not be more wrong. Every year more American university students are studying abroad and more international students study in the US. School curricula are becoming more global. The fact that the US chooses negotiation and engagement rather than military intervention is a sign of maturity, not indifference. Nations around the world are not hostile to the US because it is weak, but because in the past it has meddled in their affairs. It is incredulous that Stephens wants to go back to this foreign policy.
I was disappointed that Stephens did not address a couple of items in his book: the drone attacks that the US is leading in Pakistan, the US unwillingness to recognize the International Court of Justice and the divide between the US people and the military (James Fallows wrote an excellent article about this in The Atlantic magazine). The best way the US can inspire multilateral partnerships is by simply following the rules: allow the ICJ to try people such as Henry Kissinger. Stephens hopes to maintain American exceptionalism through military intervention. For him America’s renewed efforts to work with other nations through dialog, diplomacy and conversation is a “retreat.” He is off the mark here. While I agree with him about declinism and civilizational pessimism, he does not make a strong enough argument to convince the reader that the US should intervene militarily in other countries with more frequency.
This was a hard book for me to read and I struggled to finish it because I disagree with every argument and pseudo-argument the author put forth. It is important to read the thoughts of someone who has a different perspective or philosophy, but this book is not a game changer. In fact, as I read it, I became convinced that Bret Stephens likes to play the board game Risk. Much of his arguments should be discussed on the kitchen table, not the negotiating table. Stephens is clearly a talented journalist, but at best he is an armchair statesman.
October 19, 2017
Oh lord I only made it about 16 pages before I realized that this book would be nothing but one man's anti-Obama rant. When you have quotes from the prince of Saudi Arabia as your proof that Obama is the worst thing that ever happened to democracy and the free world, well you lose a bit of your credibility. When you reference sensationalist headlines from the paper you write for, again...credibility in question. If you voted for Trump (and therefore want to go up against the world in war) and blame Obama for everything, then this book is probably for you. Apologies if I'm way off and this book ended up being really good,but I wasted enough time on the first 16 pages to see.
August 3, 2020
America in Retreat: The New Isolationism and the Coming Global Disorder by Bret Stephens tackles a controversial topic of how much involvement America should have as the world's policeman. In December 2011 when President Obama announced that the last American combat troops had left Iraq he added that "we leave behind a sovereign, stable. and self-reliant Iraq." This was quickly proved to be completely wrong when, within less than three years, major cities in Iraq were captured by Islamist jihadis and the country descended into chaos and anarchy. When compared to the real stability of democracies in Germany and Japan because of America's long-term commitment to helping them rebuild after the war, strategic mistakes become obvious. Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Bret Stephens provides analysis and facts to build a strong case supporting America's intervention and involvement abroad. While this does not mean that the US is perfect but rather, even with its problems, most people in the world look to America as a friend, helper, and even destination more than any other country. The author describes the current status of our place in the world as in retreat by choice, not decline despite its efforts. I found his arguments educational as well as hopeful for America going forward. If you are concerned about the future of America, you should read this book.
July 14, 2022
Stephens is a columnist, partisan, and foreign policy hack. The combination--and the fact that this was published less than two years before a presidential election--makes for a surprisingly bad book.
This is really too bad because his premise, that a U.S.-led global order is beneficial to America, is a solid one. He's right to say that "our long commitment to Western security paid fruitful dividends in the globalization of democracy and prosperity," and that "the American interest is to be the defender of the world's responsible citizens."
He's also right to suggest that declinist attitudes are self-defeating, and that isolationist tendencies often spring from the false assertion that foreign and domestic policy function as a zero-sum game. 'Nation-building at home' makes for good soundbites but misses the important fact that prosperity also comes from a world order shaped by American values and interests. That Stephens chose to focus on the gathering clouds of isolationism in 2014 was in and of itself commendable.
But there is much to not like about this book. Perhaps most off-putting is Stephens' haste to lay the blame at the feet of the then sitting commander-in-chief, President Obama, while at the same time acknowledging that Americans, by 2014, were fed up with U.S. "global stewardship." Had he for a moment averted his eyes from the looking glass of partisan rancor, I think Stephens may have found a leader whose judicious execution of American foreign policy was a necessary and corrective salve to the poorly-executed overextensions of the previous administration. It's a point made all the more salient when read in the wake of the Trump administration's chaotic and nativist foreign policy, a backdrop against which the Obama years seem, dare I say, fair and balanced.
Another criticism is the quality of the book's thought and writing. One expects from someone who pens 800 word columns several times a week an airy quality. But the best airy prose should still at least try to convey a façade of gravity, if not sagacity. Feinting towards hypothetical counterfactuals (if Barack Obama had been in Harry Truman's shoes...), dropping Friedman-like maxims ("The Pottery Barn rule is not a theory of international relations the United States should recognize."), and taking cheap shots on issues not related to foreign policy (Obama's "attempt to reengineer 18 percent of the U.S. economy with the Rube Goldberg device known as the Affordable Care Act") are all unworthy of serious analysis.
Finally, a complaint about the extended metaphor that Stephens uses to frame the book, that of the idea that America should be the world's policeman. On the surface I like it. It's intuitive and easy to grasp. But there's a big problem. A police officer swears an oath to enforce and uphold the law. Stephens, however, does not accept "international 'laws' of dubious enforceability." His preferred American policing of "global norms" is more akin to a local tough guy creeping around the block selectively fixing whatever self-declared norm he doesn't like.
When it comes to policing, I'm a proponent of stop and frisk. I think it takes illegal guns off the street and saves lives, especially in places where gun violence is an all-too-common occurrence. I also like the idea of a stop and frisk diplomacy, but as with its urban analog, I think it likely most sustainable when it hues as closely as possible to international laws, not neighborhood norms. Stephens' vigilanteeist vision for American foreign policy will only result in more penduluming back and forth between freedom agendas and nativist nonsense.
If you want a more serious and convincing book on the necessity of American leadership in the world, I recommend Robert Kagan's slim The Jungle Grows Back: America and Our Imperiled World. (c)Jeffrey L. Otto, July 13, 2022
This is really too bad because his premise, that a U.S.-led global order is beneficial to America, is a solid one. He's right to say that "our long commitment to Western security paid fruitful dividends in the globalization of democracy and prosperity," and that "the American interest is to be the defender of the world's responsible citizens."
He's also right to suggest that declinist attitudes are self-defeating, and that isolationist tendencies often spring from the false assertion that foreign and domestic policy function as a zero-sum game. 'Nation-building at home' makes for good soundbites but misses the important fact that prosperity also comes from a world order shaped by American values and interests. That Stephens chose to focus on the gathering clouds of isolationism in 2014 was in and of itself commendable.
But there is much to not like about this book. Perhaps most off-putting is Stephens' haste to lay the blame at the feet of the then sitting commander-in-chief, President Obama, while at the same time acknowledging that Americans, by 2014, were fed up with U.S. "global stewardship." Had he for a moment averted his eyes from the looking glass of partisan rancor, I think Stephens may have found a leader whose judicious execution of American foreign policy was a necessary and corrective salve to the poorly-executed overextensions of the previous administration. It's a point made all the more salient when read in the wake of the Trump administration's chaotic and nativist foreign policy, a backdrop against which the Obama years seem, dare I say, fair and balanced.
Another criticism is the quality of the book's thought and writing. One expects from someone who pens 800 word columns several times a week an airy quality. But the best airy prose should still at least try to convey a façade of gravity, if not sagacity. Feinting towards hypothetical counterfactuals (if Barack Obama had been in Harry Truman's shoes...), dropping Friedman-like maxims ("The Pottery Barn rule is not a theory of international relations the United States should recognize."), and taking cheap shots on issues not related to foreign policy (Obama's "attempt to reengineer 18 percent of the U.S. economy with the Rube Goldberg device known as the Affordable Care Act") are all unworthy of serious analysis.
Finally, a complaint about the extended metaphor that Stephens uses to frame the book, that of the idea that America should be the world's policeman. On the surface I like it. It's intuitive and easy to grasp. But there's a big problem. A police officer swears an oath to enforce and uphold the law. Stephens, however, does not accept "international 'laws' of dubious enforceability." His preferred American policing of "global norms" is more akin to a local tough guy creeping around the block selectively fixing whatever self-declared norm he doesn't like.
When it comes to policing, I'm a proponent of stop and frisk. I think it takes illegal guns off the street and saves lives, especially in places where gun violence is an all-too-common occurrence. I also like the idea of a stop and frisk diplomacy, but as with its urban analog, I think it likely most sustainable when it hues as closely as possible to international laws, not neighborhood norms. Stephens' vigilanteeist vision for American foreign policy will only result in more penduluming back and forth between freedom agendas and nativist nonsense.
If you want a more serious and convincing book on the necessity of American leadership in the world, I recommend Robert Kagan's slim The Jungle Grows Back: America and Our Imperiled World. (c)Jeffrey L. Otto, July 13, 2022
September 29, 2024
Probably 3.5, I really liked the chapters as it got to the end and I thought it was really insightful and a good read. Chapters 8 9 and 10 I thought were especially good.
January 24, 2016
The author ft the book takes the stand that the world, and The United States would be better off if the US was involved in keeping every nation and anti-nation in line - mainly through military might.
Lots of historical information is thrown at the reader, but without sufficient details around the issues, and then tenant in Monday night quarterback for. Hindsight is 20/20.
The books covers both democrat and republican parties, but his bias is anti-Obama.
Everybody wants autonomy and a fair share. Others crave power and control to various degrees. At a global level there used to be the Great Game - nations vying for power indirectly through third world country engagements: Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, etc.
The challenges now are that nations and leaders are needed to form alliances to mutually prosper and to keep unjust and aggressiveness in check. Unfortunately, that seems hard to enact. It's what the average person would think th United Nations is for : a collective approach to,global power gardening. Obviously one country can't police the world. They can be a leader of nations, the stars that stirs the drink, but not the only one. Why? The world will come to hate them. Sooner or later someone will use that power for harmful, if not destructive, actions (this always happens) , and third, it's not economically viable or fair to that nation. Every nation is part of the whole, even if not defined as such, and needs to be responsible and involved with preventing abuse, aggression, and destructive policies, as well as tending and fostering fairness, security and prosperity.
One note on the US: calling on the US to engage and shape every country and be a military presence is a strain on the budget. Meaning, money goes there instead of things like education and infrastructure. With a tight relationship with big money (business and wealthy) and politics, the majority have less money and the wealthy pay less taxes. That means those who prosper the most (thanks to what the US provided via taxes and laws) will pay less, or not at all, and the majority, taxed higher and with stagnant wages, will bear the brunt while seeing the internal instituitions that made the country prosperous, fail.
Lots of historical information is thrown at the reader, but without sufficient details around the issues, and then tenant in Monday night quarterback for. Hindsight is 20/20.
The books covers both democrat and republican parties, but his bias is anti-Obama.
Everybody wants autonomy and a fair share. Others crave power and control to various degrees. At a global level there used to be the Great Game - nations vying for power indirectly through third world country engagements: Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, etc.
The challenges now are that nations and leaders are needed to form alliances to mutually prosper and to keep unjust and aggressiveness in check. Unfortunately, that seems hard to enact. It's what the average person would think th United Nations is for : a collective approach to,global power gardening. Obviously one country can't police the world. They can be a leader of nations, the stars that stirs the drink, but not the only one. Why? The world will come to hate them. Sooner or later someone will use that power for harmful, if not destructive, actions (this always happens) , and third, it's not economically viable or fair to that nation. Every nation is part of the whole, even if not defined as such, and needs to be responsible and involved with preventing abuse, aggression, and destructive policies, as well as tending and fostering fairness, security and prosperity.
One note on the US: calling on the US to engage and shape every country and be a military presence is a strain on the budget. Meaning, money goes there instead of things like education and infrastructure. With a tight relationship with big money (business and wealthy) and politics, the majority have less money and the wealthy pay less taxes. That means those who prosper the most (thanks to what the US provided via taxes and laws) will pay less, or not at all, and the majority, taxed higher and with stagnant wages, will bear the brunt while seeing the internal instituitions that made the country prosperous, fail.
December 23, 2021
Bret Stephens has written a very useful and thought-provoking book. It may not please a lot of liberals, and it will irritate the America-firsters, such as Donald J. Trump and Joe Biden. Stephens reminds us that the United States can only leave the rest of the world alone as long as it leaves us alone, and it won't leave us alone as long as we are the 400-pound gorilla in the global neighborhood.
The book, published in 2014, is well-written, well-researched, and full of interesting anecdotes and acute observations.
The one mistake Bret Stephens makes is Chapter 9: A Scenario for Global Disorder. He gets into prophecy, and that is a risky business. He imagines the world as of December 2019, and all the bad things that might happen between 2014 and 2019 if current trends continue. He starts off by positing that Hillary Clinton defeated Rand Paul in 2016, so that the Clinton administration largely continues the policies and attitudes of the Obama administration. Now, because the premise was totally blown up by the election of 2016, when Donald Trump, whom Stephens never thought to mention in 2014, won the U. S. Presidency.
However, it would be unwise to ignore Chapter 9. Some of the events forecast by Mr. Stephens did occur, or at least some trends have continued. He forecast the U. S. withdrawal from Afghanistan happening earlier than it did, but the consequences may be similar to those Stephens forecast. Russia has continued to press on Ukraine and the Baltic states, and China has continued to covet dominance in the South China Sea. In one sense, Stephens illustrates for us the elemental fact that some of the forces in international politics do not depend on who, or which party, controls the White House.
Perhaps the best line in the book is a quote from Henry Nau, "Focus on freedom where it counts the most, namely on the borders of existing free societies."
In sum, I'm not sure whether we should be reassured by the predictions that Bret Stephens got wrong, or terrified by the analysis he got right.
The book, published in 2014, is well-written, well-researched, and full of interesting anecdotes and acute observations.
The one mistake Bret Stephens makes is Chapter 9: A Scenario for Global Disorder. He gets into prophecy, and that is a risky business. He imagines the world as of December 2019, and all the bad things that might happen between 2014 and 2019 if current trends continue. He starts off by positing that Hillary Clinton defeated Rand Paul in 2016, so that the Clinton administration largely continues the policies and attitudes of the Obama administration. Now, because the premise was totally blown up by the election of 2016, when Donald Trump, whom Stephens never thought to mention in 2014, won the U. S. Presidency.
However, it would be unwise to ignore Chapter 9. Some of the events forecast by Mr. Stephens did occur, or at least some trends have continued. He forecast the U. S. withdrawal from Afghanistan happening earlier than it did, but the consequences may be similar to those Stephens forecast. Russia has continued to press on Ukraine and the Baltic states, and China has continued to covet dominance in the South China Sea. In one sense, Stephens illustrates for us the elemental fact that some of the forces in international politics do not depend on who, or which party, controls the White House.
Perhaps the best line in the book is a quote from Henry Nau, "Focus on freedom where it counts the most, namely on the borders of existing free societies."
In sum, I'm not sure whether we should be reassured by the predictions that Bret Stephens got wrong, or terrified by the analysis he got right.
June 15, 2018
It is always easier to criticize than to do. I like Bret. I saw him on Bill Maher and he was intelligent and level headed. His advocacy for immigration and opposition to President Trump motivated me to look up his writing.
But he wrote an entire book on how much he despised President Obama’s foreign policies while not offering any understanding on what were at stakes. He underplayed the catastrophic failure that was the war in Iraq and was convinced that the US must giddy up for wartime again. He completely missed the current state of the domestic economy, especially the shrinking middle class and why President Obama was so hesitant to go to war in Syria, in Crimea and in the South China Sea. Sure, the former President left a lot to be desired in his foreign policies, but if Bret was the President for the day, you suspect he would go to war with all of the US enemies, all at the same time! They can’t be the right course of action neither.
The book did a great job highlighting the geopolitical issues and the hostile states while emphasizing the strength of America as a country and its responsibility to maintain the world order. I understand and learned a lot from his arguments. My least favorite chapters were when Bret turned the book into a fiction piece and started to dream up worst case scenarios for a completely chaotic world. I skipped and was relieved when he followed that with some solid arguments on how the US should proceed in foreign policies. His ideas were definitely idealistic and theoretical.
Also, don’t pick up the book and think you will be introduced to ideas chronologically. The book is more of a randomized collection of thoughts/columns.
A good book to gain insight in what an aggressive foreign policies look like. Something left of what Bret presented and right of what President Obama did would be a perfect formula.
But he wrote an entire book on how much he despised President Obama’s foreign policies while not offering any understanding on what were at stakes. He underplayed the catastrophic failure that was the war in Iraq and was convinced that the US must giddy up for wartime again. He completely missed the current state of the domestic economy, especially the shrinking middle class and why President Obama was so hesitant to go to war in Syria, in Crimea and in the South China Sea. Sure, the former President left a lot to be desired in his foreign policies, but if Bret was the President for the day, you suspect he would go to war with all of the US enemies, all at the same time! They can’t be the right course of action neither.
The book did a great job highlighting the geopolitical issues and the hostile states while emphasizing the strength of America as a country and its responsibility to maintain the world order. I understand and learned a lot from his arguments. My least favorite chapters were when Bret turned the book into a fiction piece and started to dream up worst case scenarios for a completely chaotic world. I skipped and was relieved when he followed that with some solid arguments on how the US should proceed in foreign policies. His ideas were definitely idealistic and theoretical.
Also, don’t pick up the book and think you will be introduced to ideas chronologically. The book is more of a randomized collection of thoughts/columns.
A good book to gain insight in what an aggressive foreign policies look like. Something left of what Bret presented and right of what President Obama did would be a perfect formula.
December 19, 2014
Very good but of course, not edge-of-your-seat reading. Focuses on the effects and potential effects of the us shrinking its sphere of influence.
November 5, 2016
DNF. Couldn't do it. I just wasn't interested enough to finish this, it felt like I was reading the nightly news...
February 2, 2015
Bret Stephens, America in Retreat: The New Isolationism and the Coming Global Disorder (New York: Sentinel, 2014). Hardcover | Kindle
Should America walk the beat as the world’s policeman?
Many Americans on both sides of the political aisle think not. For example, President Barack Obama, a Democrat, flatly states, “We should not be the world’s policeman.” Similarly, Senator Rand Paul, a Republican, avers: “America’s mission should always be to keep the peace, not police the world.” After more than a decade of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the sentiment is understandable.
Understandable, Bret Stephens argues in his new book, America in Retreat—but still dangerous. “No great power can treat foreign policy as a spectator sport and hope to remain a great power,” he writes. “A world in which the leading liberal-democratic nation does not assume its role as world policeman will become a world in which dictatorships contend, or unite, to fill the breach. Americans seeking a return to an isolationist garden of Eden—alone and undisturbed in the world, knowing neither good nor evil—will soon find themselves living within shooting range of global pandemonium.”
To be the world’s policeman, Stephens quickly qualifies, “is not to say we need to be its priest; preaching the gospel of the American way.” Nor does America need to be “the world’s martyr.” “Police work isn’t altruism,” he explains. “It is done from necessity and self-interest. It is done because it has be done and there’s no one else to do it, and because the benefits of doing it accrue not only to those we protect but also, indeed mainly, to ourselves.”
Stephens draws on a famous 1982 essay in The Atlantic Monthly to explain what it would mean for America to police the world. That essay, “Broken Windows,” attempted to understand “the nature of communal order, the way it is maintained, and the ways in which order turns into disorder.” Penned by George Kelling, a Rutgers criminologist, and James Q. Wilson, a political scientist then at Harvard, the essay became the intellectual foundation of the New York Police Department’s much heralded and much criticized, yet very successful strategy to combat crime in Gotham.
Citing a 1969 study by Philip Zimbardo, Kelling and Wilson argued: “Disorder and crime are usually inextricably linked, in a kind of developmental sequence. Social psychologists and police officers tend to agree that if a window in a building is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be broken.” Why? Not because “some areas are inhabited by determined window-breakers,” but rather because “one unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one cares, and so breaking more windows costs nothing.” Rather than deal with crime’s “root causes,” then, Kelling and Wilson urged police to enforce sanctions on “petty crimes” and “social incivilities.” An orderly city—one where “broken windows” are fixed—reduces crime rates.
Applied to foreign policy, Stephens suggests that the current international order, the one from which America is in retreat, is “a broken-windows world”: “Rules are invoked but not enforced. Principles are idealized but not defended. International law is treated not as a complement to traditional geopolitical leadership but as the superior alternative to it.” This broken-windows world is one in which Russia invades Ukraine, China threatens its neighbors, Syria uses chemical weapons against its citizens, Iran develops its atomic weapons program, and Palestinians ignore the strictures of the Oslo Accords and seek United Nations’ recognition of Palestinian statehood—all without serious repercussions, if any repercussions at all. The consequences of these broken windows—the “coming global disorder,” as Stephens calls it—will be even worse.
So what should be the “broken-windows formula for U.S. foreign policy”?
In other words, a broken-windows foreign policy would be neither the nation building of George W. Bush nor the leading-from-behind of Barack Obama. It would be both internationalist and realist, as opposed to both isolationist and idealist. It would not attempt to “save” the world (a priestly role), but merely to make it incrementally safer.
Are there alternatives? “Broadly speaking,” Stephens writes, “there are three alternatives: a liberal peace, the balance of power, or collective security.” But China’s bullying in Asia Pacific calls into question Immanuel Kant’s insistence that “the spirit of trade cannot coexist with war, and sooner or later that spirit dominates every people.” Given America’s global dominance economically—both now and for the foreseeable future—it’s difficult to see “how a balance-of-power can be practiced in the absence of a genuine balance of power.” And, anyway, who would be on the balancing end opposite the U.S. China? Russia? Finally, there’s collective security, specifically, the United Nations. Here, the danger is the same one as during the Cold War, when “the Soviet Union would happily use the UN as an instrument of its propaganda but would not submit to it as a check on its power.” That conceptual flaw in the UN’s very design renders it an unlikely restraint on political bad actors, an outcome proven by the UN’s dismal track record.
And so, Stephens concludes, Pax Americana—the U.S. as the world’s policeman—is the best way to restore global order. It is a credible option, though it depends on a bipartisan consensus—for internationalism, against idealism—that’s unlikely to materialize any time soon. Plus, after more than a decade of nation building in the Middle East, Americans seem unwilling to put on the badge and walk the beat. Finally, many view America as an incorrigibly corrupt cop rather than an honest law enforcer. (America is not perfect, I agree, but comparing the U.S. to bad actors like China or Russia is, in my opinion, a false moral equivalence.)
However you slice things, then, it seems that we are in for a lot of broken windows and all the global disorder they portend.
P.S. If you found my review helpful, please vote “Yes” on my Amazon.com review page.
Should America walk the beat as the world’s policeman?
Many Americans on both sides of the political aisle think not. For example, President Barack Obama, a Democrat, flatly states, “We should not be the world’s policeman.” Similarly, Senator Rand Paul, a Republican, avers: “America’s mission should always be to keep the peace, not police the world.” After more than a decade of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the sentiment is understandable.
Understandable, Bret Stephens argues in his new book, America in Retreat—but still dangerous. “No great power can treat foreign policy as a spectator sport and hope to remain a great power,” he writes. “A world in which the leading liberal-democratic nation does not assume its role as world policeman will become a world in which dictatorships contend, or unite, to fill the breach. Americans seeking a return to an isolationist garden of Eden—alone and undisturbed in the world, knowing neither good nor evil—will soon find themselves living within shooting range of global pandemonium.”
To be the world’s policeman, Stephens quickly qualifies, “is not to say we need to be its priest; preaching the gospel of the American way.” Nor does America need to be “the world’s martyr.” “Police work isn’t altruism,” he explains. “It is done from necessity and self-interest. It is done because it has be done and there’s no one else to do it, and because the benefits of doing it accrue not only to those we protect but also, indeed mainly, to ourselves.”
Stephens draws on a famous 1982 essay in The Atlantic Monthly to explain what it would mean for America to police the world. That essay, “Broken Windows,” attempted to understand “the nature of communal order, the way it is maintained, and the ways in which order turns into disorder.” Penned by George Kelling, a Rutgers criminologist, and James Q. Wilson, a political scientist then at Harvard, the essay became the intellectual foundation of the New York Police Department’s much heralded and much criticized, yet very successful strategy to combat crime in Gotham.
Citing a 1969 study by Philip Zimbardo, Kelling and Wilson argued: “Disorder and crime are usually inextricably linked, in a kind of developmental sequence. Social psychologists and police officers tend to agree that if a window in a building is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be broken.” Why? Not because “some areas are inhabited by determined window-breakers,” but rather because “one unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one cares, and so breaking more windows costs nothing.” Rather than deal with crime’s “root causes,” then, Kelling and Wilson urged police to enforce sanctions on “petty crimes” and “social incivilities.” An orderly city—one where “broken windows” are fixed—reduces crime rates.
Applied to foreign policy, Stephens suggests that the current international order, the one from which America is in retreat, is “a broken-windows world”: “Rules are invoked but not enforced. Principles are idealized but not defended. International law is treated not as a complement to traditional geopolitical leadership but as the superior alternative to it.” This broken-windows world is one in which Russia invades Ukraine, China threatens its neighbors, Syria uses chemical weapons against its citizens, Iran develops its atomic weapons program, and Palestinians ignore the strictures of the Oslo Accords and seek United Nations’ recognition of Palestinian statehood—all without serious repercussions, if any repercussions at all. The consequences of these broken windows—the “coming global disorder,” as Stephens calls it—will be even worse.
So what should be the “broken-windows formula for U.S. foreign policy”?
It would require the United States to sharply increase military spending to upwards of 5 percent of GDP. But unlike in the past, it would lay greater emphasis on raw numbers—of ships, planes, and troops—than on high-cost technological wizardry. It would deploy more military assets for the protection of our allies. But unlike in the past, it would do so on condition that those allies invest strategically in their own defenses. It would sharply punish violations of geopolitical norms, such as the use of chemical weapons, by swiftly and precisely targeting the perpetrators of the attacks. But the emphasis would be on short, mission-specific, punitive police actions, not open-ended occupations for idealistic ends. It would be global in its approach: no more “pivots” from this region to that. But it would also know how to discriminate between core interests and allies and peripheral ones. It would seek to prevent local conflicts, such as the one in Syria, from spilling over their borders and becoming regional catastrophes. But it would do so by working vigorously through local proxies. It would place an emphasis on stability and predictability in international affairs. But it would put greater stock in behavioral norms than in international law.
In other words, a broken-windows foreign policy would be neither the nation building of George W. Bush nor the leading-from-behind of Barack Obama. It would be both internationalist and realist, as opposed to both isolationist and idealist. It would not attempt to “save” the world (a priestly role), but merely to make it incrementally safer.
Are there alternatives? “Broadly speaking,” Stephens writes, “there are three alternatives: a liberal peace, the balance of power, or collective security.” But China’s bullying in Asia Pacific calls into question Immanuel Kant’s insistence that “the spirit of trade cannot coexist with war, and sooner or later that spirit dominates every people.” Given America’s global dominance economically—both now and for the foreseeable future—it’s difficult to see “how a balance-of-power can be practiced in the absence of a genuine balance of power.” And, anyway, who would be on the balancing end opposite the U.S. China? Russia? Finally, there’s collective security, specifically, the United Nations. Here, the danger is the same one as during the Cold War, when “the Soviet Union would happily use the UN as an instrument of its propaganda but would not submit to it as a check on its power.” That conceptual flaw in the UN’s very design renders it an unlikely restraint on political bad actors, an outcome proven by the UN’s dismal track record.
And so, Stephens concludes, Pax Americana—the U.S. as the world’s policeman—is the best way to restore global order. It is a credible option, though it depends on a bipartisan consensus—for internationalism, against idealism—that’s unlikely to materialize any time soon. Plus, after more than a decade of nation building in the Middle East, Americans seem unwilling to put on the badge and walk the beat. Finally, many view America as an incorrigibly corrupt cop rather than an honest law enforcer. (America is not perfect, I agree, but comparing the U.S. to bad actors like China or Russia is, in my opinion, a false moral equivalence.)
However you slice things, then, it seems that we are in for a lot of broken windows and all the global disorder they portend.
P.S. If you found my review helpful, please vote “Yes” on my Amazon.com review page.
Read
April 10, 2025America In retreat: An argument for America to be the world’s police. Written about 10 years ago, fascinating how much has already changed on foreign policy. Obama in retreat, moving away from the surveillance state, not investing in foreign countries. His argument will be for doing all of these. Ripping Obamas passive foreign policy. Isolationism and the moral superiority it breads from both sides. America effectively became the world super power post ww2 when Britain needed us to support Greece. Pax Americana. Progressive view that America had more to fear from what their own gov might do than others countries. Crazy how the last 10 years have shifted things. The tea party being the start of the modern Trump party. Pg 100, increased spending, higher unemployment and lower labor participation. Increase in Medicare and social security. His predictions on what would happen in the world are pretty accurate. He had Hilary beating Rand Paul, which Rand is similar to Trump and is continuing to be hands off while the rest of the world escalates conflicts in Russia, china and the Middle East. His proposal is the broken windows theory of global politics. Not the bush era wipe out and replace. Police the actions of non free countries who impede on others, and do it quickly. Saving time and money while maintaining order in the world. The value in prevention. Good read with a traditional republican perspective and well put together arguments from a decade ago. Interesting to see how the world is today.
May 9, 2017
Bret is a great writer. Despite being written in 2014 still up to date.Chock full of facts and a good primer on recent foreign policy history. Harsh on The Obama regime but GOP presidents don't escape criticism. Bret lays out a plan for the future and you have no doubt he continues to see the US as the world's policeman.
April 21, 2021
At times I thought Stephens was delusional, at others he was (somewhat) on the right track. The book was overly simplistic and didn't exactly incorporate counterarguments. Objectively speaking, his style of interventionism is dying (i.e., Donald Trump), and the consequences of that have yet to be fully understood in either America's foreign policy or global order.
March 16, 2024
Stephens argues against declinist isolationism and criticizes the Obama administration a lot along the way. Like him, I wish he had been wrong about more things, but ten years later his warnings are still relevant.
November 13, 2023
While I don't agree with most of the author's politics, this was still an interesting and thought-provoking book.
The book was published in 2014, and I read it in 2023. I'd be very curious to read a sequel after many of the isolationist sentiments he decried have only exacerbated since then.
The book was published in 2014, and I read it in 2023. I'd be very curious to read a sequel after many of the isolationist sentiments he decried have only exacerbated since then.
December 9, 2017
Mainly world news. Do not read it.
February 16, 2018
Bret Stephens, if you voted for Trump, you should rename yourself Hippy the Hypocrite. He is the exact antithesis of everything you want from a government, managing to incorporate the worst offenses of international disgrace and overspending that you decry here. If you felt the need to vote "Republican" screw you.
March 8, 2017
An essential guide to today's news. But it raises an intriguing question - if Uncle Sam is stepping back from being the World's policeman - why is it wrong for Russian, Chinese and Iranian policemen to step-in and fill the gap? These are not just countries they are influential cultures & civilisations - and they have natural spheres of influence which span across political borders. Perhaps in 2015 Uncle Sam is broke like UK was in 1947 and it is time for others to step in and keep world order. Even if they are fascist states.
September 30, 2015
I'm a big fan of Bret Stephens' columns in The Wall Street Journal, so I was eager to read this book. He doesn't need sarcasm, wit or clever phrasing to win over readers; Stephens is level-headed, intelligent, and wise in his evaluation of where the United States is lacking in its foreign policy, and that's all he needs to make a great case for Pax Americana. "We can't be the world's policeman," bemoan liberals and, increasingly, conservatives. OK, but the world needs a policeman, and who would you rather it be? I found especially good Stephens' scenario for global disorder. It only takes, say, the Chinese seizing a disputed island in the South Pacific, nuclear envy in the Middle East and our allies' loss of confidence in U.S. protection to destabilize the world and plunge it into war and chaos. The United States can't do it all; we can't solve every problem. But we can return to a robust presence around the world, partly by scaling back on our pursuit of the latest, greatest weaponry and focusing more on quantity. The bottom line is that we are naïve and possibly stupid to assume other nations want the same things and value the same ideals we do. Hopefully some people in Congress -- and everyone angling for the White House -- are listening to Stephens.
April 13, 2015
The estimable Wall Street Journal columnist Bret Stephens surveys the world situation and finds (unsurprisingly) that the United States in general and the next president in particular will be facing multiple grave crises in the remainder of this decade.
Stevens describes what the term of the next president might be like. It ends with a 3 am call to President Clinton from the Israeli Prime Minister announcing that Israel they will strike illegal Iranian nuclear development sites with all weapons at their disposal, Iran having recently tested several nuclear weapons.
The author does provide a possible alternative (other than better leadership from the Office of the Presidency). He bases the strategy on the well known "broken windows" approach to reducing crime. In the area of foreign policy, he interprets this to mean more presence (e.g., more ships and aircraft rather than fewer, more capable ones) and employing those forces in short, focused "police actions" rather than extended campaigns. Overall, seems to be worth considering.
Stevens describes what the term of the next president might be like. It ends with a 3 am call to President Clinton from the Israeli Prime Minister announcing that Israel they will strike illegal Iranian nuclear development sites with all weapons at their disposal, Iran having recently tested several nuclear weapons.
The author does provide a possible alternative (other than better leadership from the Office of the Presidency). He bases the strategy on the well known "broken windows" approach to reducing crime. In the area of foreign policy, he interprets this to mean more presence (e.g., more ships and aircraft rather than fewer, more capable ones) and employing those forces in short, focused "police actions" rather than extended campaigns. Overall, seems to be worth considering.
February 7, 2017
An interesting read about the global trends of nationalism, drawing similarities to historic trends, and pointing out the delicate power balance that the US finds itself in, as well as the moral responsibilities it faces as the leader of the free world. The writer has a conservative point of view without seeming to use dog whistle politics to blame all missteps by liberal thinking, which is refreshing. I am interested in politics, and found this book quite informative, especially descriptions of the 'broken window' policing term, and how it applies to stability (both in neighborhoods as well as nations, continents, and the world).
February 6, 2017
This seems to be a collection of articles put together as a book in order to squeeze a few more dollars in the end. And Bret surely knows all about the subject. It says so on the cover, like being a janitor for a major financial newspaper automagically makes one an expert in other fields as well. Take chapter 6. The biggest private yacht is called Eclipse and it is in New York harbor. The newspaper janitor has no idea why, but he can put one and one together from circumstantial observations. Oh! The wit! And he plops something about some Chinese dude. And than the punch line: "If America is in eclipse, what was Eclipse doing in America?" And that in a book called "America in Retreat: The New Isolationism and the Coming Global Disorder." What disorder? Well, all two bit reporters know that the sky must be falling or nobody will care about their news .
November 16, 2015
Clearly Stephens is no friend to the current administration, and his prognosticating over a potential Hillary succession with a informed fanciful possible outcome will undoubtedly be called a stretch by some. But he paints a picture that we should all take at least a moment to admire; whether we are faux realist Rand Paul supporter, possibly deluded Hillary followers, or even (or maybe especially) Donald Trump immigration-phobics. The world has functioned better, albeit imperfectly, with an America more willing to implement 'broken window' theory than head-in-the-sand 'why can't we just all get along' utopianism. Pay careful attention to what our next potential president has to say about how he/she will balance and fund adequate military power to attain US interests.
July 4, 2015
Probably a 3.5 star, but first 8 chapters, how to write a review? Then Chapter 9. A Scenario of Global Disaster. Hillery running for 2nd term. In 2017 chaos hits, China takes an island belonging to Taiwan, Other Asian countries want war, Hillary urges restraint. Iran gets the bomb, Saudis quickly do also & invade Bahrain, Russia takes the Baltic and Belarus, Hillary urges restraint, so it goes. Chapter ends, Hillary is thinking, why didn't I bake cookies instead. (my words) Last 2 chapters equally good, fracking saves US bacon.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
January 4, 2015
America in Retreat gives new insight as to why we as a country need to be the cop on the beat even though it seems to be easier to be isolationist. The world seems to be retreating into global disorder which no country can escape. Well though out with a doomsday scenario if America continues it's retreat. He also proposes a way forward with other countries participating in their own defense and not completely relying on the US
August 7, 2018
Certainly challenged the way I've thought about foreign policy recently, which is a good thing. It will take some time to digest but I found much of his argument convincing: namely that there is a need for America to step back up and "police" the world (in the sense that we make examples of tyrants and protect exploited minorities). Retreating militarily (like most of Europe has) benefits not us, nor the free world, but only tyranny wherever it may be around the globe.
January 26, 2015
Good read. The author lays out his arguments for why the United States must remain engaged in and with the world and what the absence of our leadership, presence, influence, and power would mean for the world at large. In fact, he argues the world is already starting to see the consequences of U.S. withdrawal and disengagement from the world. I don't agree with everything the author states but it's thought-provoking for sure.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 62 reviews