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Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991
Kenneth M. Pollack, formerly a Persian Gulf military analyst at the CIA and Director for Persian Gulf Affairs at the National Security Council, describes and analyzes the military history of the six key Arab states—Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Syria—during the post–World War II era. He shows in detail how each Arab military grew and learned from its own experiences in response to the specific objectives set for it and within often constrained political, economic, and social circumstances. This first-ever overview of the modern Arab approach to warfare provides a better understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the Arab militaries, some of which are the United States’ most likely adversaries, and some of which are our most important allies.
698 pages, Hardcover
First published January 9, 2002
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Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews
July 18, 2022
The aircraft managed to miss the entire city, and its bombs killed a large number of antelope when they landed in a nearby game preserve.
Pollack once wrote a bad book about how it would be a good idea to invade Iraq. It does retrospectively impact his other work, but I do consider Arabs at War a good work nonetheless. It covers the Middle East from Libya to Iraq, and why Arab forces didn't fight that well, though Pollack indicates they actually were at least reasonable in a number of elements, such as logistics and unit cohesion, with some variability. Instead they appear to have been bad from a tactical perspective. Why that was isn't covered here, but it is a good starting point.
The wider lens
The performance of Iraq's tactical forces was awful in virtually every category of military effectiveness.
While written from a Western perspective, conflicts by Arab forces extend beyond the Arab-Israeli Wars and the Gulf War. One outstanding highlight of Arabs at War are the interventions by Libya in Chad, but there's also combat with Tanzania, the Kurds, Iran, and the Yemenis. Black September is made comprehensible.
Whether Pollack's analysis is correct, the inclusion of these cpnflicts creditworthy. I haven't seen anything comparable in breadth and at an interesting level of detail. There are readily available books on some of the wars, particularly the Iran-Iraq war, but Arabs at War is still useful and I doubt I could easily find texts on 1960s Kurdish revolts in Iraq.
Presented by country, but less repetitive than expected considering a number of them were parties to the same conflicts, Arabs At War will broaden your understanding.
Operational Art of War
Little was asked of the Saudi military during the Gulf War; little was delivered.
Arabs at War analyses a number of elements in the performance of Arab armies, but two that do repeat are strategical and tactical performances. Generally speaking, the analysis is readable and at least makes sense with regards to the narratives of conflict presented. I can't say whether they're correct or not, but they're understandable.
However, "operational performance" is missing or conflated with "strategy". Strategy, operational warfare and tactics are not easily delineated concepts and often overlap, but the divisions do exist and it is a weakness of the book not to match this categorisation. Strategy is different from operations, and it is different enough that if Pollack had separated them, he might have got different (or a greater level of granularity) in his results.
The version I had included an afterword running up to about 2003, where Pollack broadens his assessment to briefly include asymmetrical forms of fighting and cultural elements underpinning his elements. He would have been better off not adding this, as it introduces new elements better covered off in another book, which he presumably has done in the later Armies of Sand.
I have seen this book criticised for its limited perspective in that it does not assess the military effectiveness of Arab armies in non combat roles, such as internal security/propping up the regime. While these are mentioned, it's about how these elements adversely affected combat performance.
To be honest, I don't really care. It's a big book as it is, so sacrifices for readability clearly had to be made. Pollack is upfront as to what he is looking at, and keeps at it. It's Arabs at War, not Arab soldiers doing chores.
In some cases Syrian tanks and APCs did not stop despite the lack of bridges: they kept rolling forward according to plan and drove straight into the antitank trenches.
Otherwise, my complaints are limited. It's a good book, or at least a good basis for assessing performance of Arab forces. Even if the answer lies elsewhere than the conclusions reached in the book, it is clearly presented and easy to understand.
Pollack once wrote a bad book about how it would be a good idea to invade Iraq. It does retrospectively impact his other work, but I do consider Arabs at War a good work nonetheless. It covers the Middle East from Libya to Iraq, and why Arab forces didn't fight that well, though Pollack indicates they actually were at least reasonable in a number of elements, such as logistics and unit cohesion, with some variability. Instead they appear to have been bad from a tactical perspective. Why that was isn't covered here, but it is a good starting point.
The wider lens
The performance of Iraq's tactical forces was awful in virtually every category of military effectiveness.
While written from a Western perspective, conflicts by Arab forces extend beyond the Arab-Israeli Wars and the Gulf War. One outstanding highlight of Arabs at War are the interventions by Libya in Chad, but there's also combat with Tanzania, the Kurds, Iran, and the Yemenis. Black September is made comprehensible.
Whether Pollack's analysis is correct, the inclusion of these cpnflicts creditworthy. I haven't seen anything comparable in breadth and at an interesting level of detail. There are readily available books on some of the wars, particularly the Iran-Iraq war, but Arabs at War is still useful and I doubt I could easily find texts on 1960s Kurdish revolts in Iraq.
Presented by country, but less repetitive than expected considering a number of them were parties to the same conflicts, Arabs At War will broaden your understanding.
Operational Art of War
Little was asked of the Saudi military during the Gulf War; little was delivered.
Arabs at War analyses a number of elements in the performance of Arab armies, but two that do repeat are strategical and tactical performances. Generally speaking, the analysis is readable and at least makes sense with regards to the narratives of conflict presented. I can't say whether they're correct or not, but they're understandable.
However, "operational performance" is missing or conflated with "strategy". Strategy, operational warfare and tactics are not easily delineated concepts and often overlap, but the divisions do exist and it is a weakness of the book not to match this categorisation. Strategy is different from operations, and it is different enough that if Pollack had separated them, he might have got different (or a greater level of granularity) in his results.
The version I had included an afterword running up to about 2003, where Pollack broadens his assessment to briefly include asymmetrical forms of fighting and cultural elements underpinning his elements. He would have been better off not adding this, as it introduces new elements better covered off in another book, which he presumably has done in the later Armies of Sand.
I have seen this book criticised for its limited perspective in that it does not assess the military effectiveness of Arab armies in non combat roles, such as internal security/propping up the regime. While these are mentioned, it's about how these elements adversely affected combat performance.
To be honest, I don't really care. It's a big book as it is, so sacrifices for readability clearly had to be made. Pollack is upfront as to what he is looking at, and keeps at it. It's Arabs at War, not Arab soldiers doing chores.
In some cases Syrian tanks and APCs did not stop despite the lack of bridges: they kept rolling forward according to plan and drove straight into the antitank trenches.
Otherwise, my complaints are limited. It's a good book, or at least a good basis for assessing performance of Arab forces. Even if the answer lies elsewhere than the conclusions reached in the book, it is clearly presented and easy to understand.
August 15, 2015
No matter what academic sins Kenneth Pollack later committed with The Threatening Storm, his earlier book, Arabs at War, is comprehensive, convincing, and massively – indispensably -- relevant, even 20 years after much of the initial research was done. This will remain true as long as the Arab world remains a violent place and as long as the conventionally-structured regular armies of organized Arab states, often equipped and trained at great expense by foreign powers, continue to perform poorly in combat against, variously: radical terrorist and extremist groups; Israel; Iran; each other; home grown insurgents; France; The United Kingdom; Canada; Australia; Poland; the Kurds; Chad; camel spiders; and The United States. Some who have worked with, or against, an Arab army will have theories and anecdotes that get at the causes of this poor performance, but nowhere are these causes so clearly articulated and explained as here.
Briefly, these are: having been brought up in a largely patronage-and-loyalty-based socioeconomic system, Arab officers in hierarchical armies (but not in less-hierarchical insurgent groups), particularly at the Division level and below, often have more to lose by displeasing the boss than by being defeated, and, on the rare occasion when this is not the case, have not developed the lifetime habits of independent thought and action that prompt essential initiative and rapid decision-making on the battlefield, as opposed to the practice of running every decision through the big boss and/or passively waiting for instructions; and that a culturally-engrained desire to save “face” and build status within the organization leads these same officers to treat information (and other resources) as power and to hoard or manipulate it, to the detriment of the larger goal. Less unique, but still relevant reasons identified are poor weapons handling and maintenance practices, which Arab armies share in common with those of some other less-developed countries. Just as importantly, the author takes the time to refute inaccurate, reductionist or racially-based theories that are not supported by historical evidence: the “Arabs are cowards” or “Arabs won’t fight” theses being foremost among these.
This book is an _absolute_ must-read for any military professional or civil servant who expects to be working with Arab armies, or for anyone interested in just how the Iraqi Army has managed to fight so badly, against so many of its enemies, for so long.
Briefly, these are: having been brought up in a largely patronage-and-loyalty-based socioeconomic system, Arab officers in hierarchical armies (but not in less-hierarchical insurgent groups), particularly at the Division level and below, often have more to lose by displeasing the boss than by being defeated, and, on the rare occasion when this is not the case, have not developed the lifetime habits of independent thought and action that prompt essential initiative and rapid decision-making on the battlefield, as opposed to the practice of running every decision through the big boss and/or passively waiting for instructions; and that a culturally-engrained desire to save “face” and build status within the organization leads these same officers to treat information (and other resources) as power and to hoard or manipulate it, to the detriment of the larger goal. Less unique, but still relevant reasons identified are poor weapons handling and maintenance practices, which Arab armies share in common with those of some other less-developed countries. Just as importantly, the author takes the time to refute inaccurate, reductionist or racially-based theories that are not supported by historical evidence: the “Arabs are cowards” or “Arabs won’t fight” theses being foremost among these.
This book is an _absolute_ must-read for any military professional or civil servant who expects to be working with Arab armies, or for anyone interested in just how the Iraqi Army has managed to fight so badly, against so many of its enemies, for so long.
March 22, 2012
Pollack takes as his topic, "why do Arab armies do badly on the battlefield." The topic is an interesting one, and important for the light it sheds both on Arab culture and on military effectiveness. His main conclusion, which I think is both correct and un-obvious, is that the main problem faced by the Arab armies is weak junior officers and a culture of concealing mistakes.
Pollack's methodology is to review, systematically, every significant conflict involving the major Arab states of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. I enjoyed reading the narratives. The original reason I picked up the book was to read his account of the Iran-Iraq war, which had been recommended to me.
The price of this systematic approach is that it results in a somewhat repetitive narration. Pollock chose to review these countries in alphabetical order, meaning that various stories -- for instance, the fighting near the Golan in 1973 -- get told in duplicate or triplicate, from the perspective of each combatant. The conclusions are also repetitive -- Pollock gives a summary of his observations after describing each war, each country, and then at the end of the book.
Pollack's methodology is to review, systematically, every significant conflict involving the major Arab states of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. I enjoyed reading the narratives. The original reason I picked up the book was to read his account of the Iran-Iraq war, which had been recommended to me.
The price of this systematic approach is that it results in a somewhat repetitive narration. Pollock chose to review these countries in alphabetical order, meaning that various stories -- for instance, the fighting near the Golan in 1973 -- get told in duplicate or triplicate, from the perspective of each combatant. The conclusions are also repetitive -- Pollock gives a summary of his observations after describing each war, each country, and then at the end of the book.
December 1, 2010
An insightful look at a very interesting question. A balanced examination of the many theories why Arab armies have faired so badly in the modern era with some interesting conclusions.
November 22, 2015
An exhaustive case study of Arab militaries since 1945. It is well known that Arab militaries have not fared well against Israel, but Pollack shows that they suck in general against everyone else as well, including against each other. There are many theories as to why. If an individual Syrian soldier for example is courageous and willing to die in combat, why is the army ineffective? Unfortunately combat is not about an individual's willingness to die. A courage of individual soldiers were betrayed by incompetence of the leaders, squandering their most important national treasure. In the end, Arab leaders, then and now, do not deserve the loyalty and sacrifices of young men who have to face a foe better equipped, trained, and led than they are.
March 30, 2015
The book provides absolutely superb analysis of Arabs military performance in the second half of 20th century. Kenneth Pollack argues with a long-standing view that failure in strategic generalship, inferior Soviet weapon systems, cowardice of the regular soldiers, poor unit cohesion, and problems with logistics were the main source of appalling performance of all Arab armies. Instead, he identifies poor tactical leadership, poor information management, poor weapons handling, and poor maintenance as the source of the problem. The book so well written and provides so much information that I highly recommend it to all aficionados of modern military history.
December 11, 2021
Pollack did a decent job in his assessment of the tactical and strategic effectiveness of the Arab armies in the period between 1948 and 1991. One thing that was extremely off-puting is the author's mistake in attributing the planning and success of the Egyptian crossing of the Suez canal in the Yom Kippur war to General Ismail Ali instead of General Shazly. This literally contradicts every source out there about the war including Western and Israeli accounts. With this obvious and naive mistake, it was very hard to trust the credibility of the author's assessments for the rest of the book.
April 6, 2016
Even though I'm no longer in the military its still in my blood so like to keep on this discussions. Having been in Desert Storm and remembering all the briefings of what hideous conflict it was supposed to be my curiosity is peaked even more as to why it was such a lopsided conflict.
The author does an excellent job of examining each of the Arab countries in their conflicts from nearly 50 years. He states his points and provided interpretation of events to support those issues. The language is clear and concise so that even a non-military person would understand the complexities of why Arab militaries time and time again get soundly defeated by opponents despite advantages in manpower and hardware.
This book I would put on the reading list of every combat arms officer in the Army and Marines.
The author does an excellent job of examining each of the Arab countries in their conflicts from nearly 50 years. He states his points and provided interpretation of events to support those issues. The language is clear and concise so that even a non-military person would understand the complexities of why Arab militaries time and time again get soundly defeated by opponents despite advantages in manpower and hardware.
This book I would put on the reading list of every combat arms officer in the Army and Marines.
Currently reading
September 18, 2016I am finding the differences between my values and what the author assumes to be my values to be kind of amusing. He seems to think it obvious that cowardice in the face of an aggressive, armed enemy is somehow more shameful than, for example, not knowing (and not doing whatever is necessary to learn) how to operate or maintain the equipment and weapons systems that it is your job to operate and maintain.
Personally, I find cowardice rather more relatable than a lack of curiosity.
Personally, I find cowardice rather more relatable than a lack of curiosity.
October 1, 2014
A very interesting read that looks at the military history of six Arab nations: Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Saudi Arabia from 1948 through 1991. The shorter version is that the Arab world hasn't produced very many good soldiers since the 8th century.
Want to read
December 10, 2015Intersting book about military tactics and genral inefectivness
April 13, 2014
Very boring!
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews