Thinking machines, machines that don’t think. Financial wizards who make or lose billions. The experts who model their behaviour or fail to. The sense that love is somehow irreducible to the random motion of molecules. And coincidences which may not be.
After a gap of nearly ten years, Tom Stoppard has come back with another play, The Hard Problem, that is right up there with his best. The hard problem of the title is the question of mind-matter dualism: if the universe is made of nothing but matter and motion, without God or spirit, then where does thinking come from?
No less a figure than Alan Turing answered quite simply, in his notion of the “imitation game”, that if a machine appears to think so that we can’t tell whether it is or it isn’t, then we have to assume it is. That viewpoint suggests that we can build simple thinking machines, made up of electronic components. We ourselves are far more complex, and made up of organic components, but in essential principle, we are the same. The fact that we can’t build a human being, though we can build a computer, doesn’t refute the general proposition, that we like they are thinking machines.
Stoppard doesn’t do philosophical treatises, he writes plays. So The Hard Problem isn’t a dissertation, it’s a play with human characters who have emotions and react to each other. The setting is a research institute for “brain science”, financed by a man who’s made a fortune in financial services. Most of the scientists are psychologists; at the start of the play, the protagonist Hilary is there for an interview, as is Amal who despite his brilliance in mathematics as well as neuro-science, draws attention more by his uncanny knack for predicting movements in the financial markets.
It is through their contrasting views that we explore the questions of whether our thinking is determined by our physical make-up, or whether we have free will, of whether we’re just thinking machines or not.
“Computers compute. Brains think. Is the machine thinking?” asks one of the psychologists.
He receives a reply Turing would have approved, from Amal.
“If it’s playing chess and you can’t tell from the moves if the computer is playing white or black, it’s thinking.”
That’s not a view Hilary can accept, because:
“It’s not deep. If that’s thinking. An adding machine on speed. A two-way switch with a memory. Why wouldn’t it play chess? But when it’s me to move, is the computer thoughtful or is sitting there like a toaster? It’s sitting there like a toaster.”
“So, what would be your idea of deep?”
“A computer that minds losing.”
Losing is something we all do, and we can’t always tell what the consequences will be. Even Amal with his brilliant insights into how human behaviour will make financial markets rise or fall, miscalculates the personal impact of an action of his, and the consequences on him.
And Hilary has experienced loss too. The pain of it never leaves her. It is a pain of love denied, but also of the ethical quandary into which she fell when she denied it. And now, again, love, or in some cases merely lust, surrounds her, in one instance leading to the next ethical dilemma, the one whose resolution closes the action of the play.
The closure works well, but it doesn’t close the debate. Stoppard knows better than that: he leaves the issues out there for us to consider. Would Amal’s problems have arisen in a purely thinking machine? Would Hilary’s? Is love an experience that a machine can feel, or suffer? Is ethical uncertainty?
On the way, Stoppard entertains us with his usual wit, though this is less a play of wit than some of his earlier ones – the underlying issues are too deep for that. But the wit helps bring them out.
He also indulges another predilection of his, for coincidence. Already in Night and Day, Dick Wagner tells us that “one of the things that makes novels less plausible than history, I find, is the way they shrink from coincidence.”
In telling the story of Hilary’s loss, Stoppard shrinks not at all from coincidence. And the way he handles it only makes the play more of a gem.