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Being and Some Philosophers
The study of being was one of the main preoccupations of Etienne Gilson's scholarly and intellectual life. Being and Some Philosophers is at once a testament to the persistence of those concerns and an important landmark in the history of the question of being. The book charts the ways in which being is translated across history, from unity in Plato and substance in Aristotle to essence in Avicenna and the act of existence in Aquinas. It examines the vicissitudes of essence and existence in Suarez and Christian Wolff, in Hegel and Kierkegaard, in order to uncover the metaphysical and existential foundations of modern thought. And yet Being and Some Philosophers remains not so much an historical investigation (although it could only have been written by a scholar steeped in the history of philosophy) but, in the words of its author, "a philosophical book, and a dogmatically philosophical one at that." Its passionate vigour has proven, over many years, at once fresh and provocative. Indeed, the appendix to this revised edition contains critiques of the book by two Thomists as well as Gilson's replies to their objections.
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First published January 1, 1949
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About the author
Étienne Gilson
248 books163 followersÉtienne Henri Gilson was born into a Roman Catholic family in Paris on 13 June 1884. He was educated at a number of Roman Catholic schools in Paris before attending lycée Henri IV in 1902, where he studied philosophy. Two years later he enrolled at the Sorbonne, graduating in 1907 after having studied under many fine scholars, including Lucien Lévy Bruhl, Henri Bergson and Emile Durkheim.
Gilson taught in a number of high schools after his graduation and worked on a doctoral thesis on Descartes, which he successfully completed (Sorbonne) in 1913. On the strength of advice from his teacher, Lévy Bruhl, he began to study medieval philosophy in great depth, coming to see Descartes as having strong connections with medieval philosophy, although often finding more merit in the medieval works he saw as connected than in Descartes himself. He was later to be highly esteemed for his work in medieval philosophy and has been described as something of a saviour to the field.
From 1913 to 1914 Gilson taught at the University of Lille. His academic career was postponed during the First World War while he took up military service. During his time in the army he served as second lieutenant in a machine-gun regiment and was awarded the Croix de Guerre for bravery upon relief from his duties. After the war, he returned to academic life at Lille and (also) Strasbourg, and in 1921 he took up an appointment at the Sorbonne teaching the history of medieval philosophy. He remained at the Sorbonne for eleven years prior to becoming Professor of Medieval Philosophy at the College de France in 1932. During his Sorbonne years and throughout his continuing career Gilson had the opportunity to travel extensively to North America, where he became highly influential as a historian and medievalist, demonstrating a number of previously undetermined important differences among the period’s greatest figures.
Gilson’s Gifford Lectures, delivered at Aberdeen in 1931 and 1932, titled ‘The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy’, were published in his native language (L’espirit de la philosophie medieval, 1932) before being translated into English in 1936. Gilson believed that a defining feature of medieval philosophy was that it operated within a framework endorsing a conviction to the existence of God, with a complete acceptance that Christian revelation enabled the refinement of meticulous reason. In this regard he described medieval philosophy as particularly ‘Christian’ philosophy.
Gilson married in 1908 and the union produced three children, two daughters and one son. Sadly, his wife died of leukaemia in late 1949. In 1951 he relinquished his chair at the College de France in order to attend to responsibilities he had at the Institute of Medieval Studies in Toronto, Canada, an institute he had been invited to establish in 1929. Gilson died 19 September 1978 at the age of ninety-four.
Gilson taught in a number of high schools after his graduation and worked on a doctoral thesis on Descartes, which he successfully completed (Sorbonne) in 1913. On the strength of advice from his teacher, Lévy Bruhl, he began to study medieval philosophy in great depth, coming to see Descartes as having strong connections with medieval philosophy, although often finding more merit in the medieval works he saw as connected than in Descartes himself. He was later to be highly esteemed for his work in medieval philosophy and has been described as something of a saviour to the field.
From 1913 to 1914 Gilson taught at the University of Lille. His academic career was postponed during the First World War while he took up military service. During his time in the army he served as second lieutenant in a machine-gun regiment and was awarded the Croix de Guerre for bravery upon relief from his duties. After the war, he returned to academic life at Lille and (also) Strasbourg, and in 1921 he took up an appointment at the Sorbonne teaching the history of medieval philosophy. He remained at the Sorbonne for eleven years prior to becoming Professor of Medieval Philosophy at the College de France in 1932. During his Sorbonne years and throughout his continuing career Gilson had the opportunity to travel extensively to North America, where he became highly influential as a historian and medievalist, demonstrating a number of previously undetermined important differences among the period’s greatest figures.
Gilson’s Gifford Lectures, delivered at Aberdeen in 1931 and 1932, titled ‘The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy’, were published in his native language (L’espirit de la philosophie medieval, 1932) before being translated into English in 1936. Gilson believed that a defining feature of medieval philosophy was that it operated within a framework endorsing a conviction to the existence of God, with a complete acceptance that Christian revelation enabled the refinement of meticulous reason. In this regard he described medieval philosophy as particularly ‘Christian’ philosophy.
Gilson married in 1908 and the union produced three children, two daughters and one son. Sadly, his wife died of leukaemia in late 1949. In 1951 he relinquished his chair at the College de France in order to attend to responsibilities he had at the Institute of Medieval Studies in Toronto, Canada, an institute he had been invited to establish in 1929. Gilson died 19 September 1978 at the age of ninety-four.
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Displaying 1 - 16 of 16 reviews
September 23, 2013
By far one of Etienne Gilson's better works and without question the most revealing of his familiarity with non-Christian philosophers. The work deals with one of philosophy's greatest themes: Being; and does a fantastic job at getting right to the heart of the matter, combining a unique approach which few others have managed to repeat which takes the history of ideas and intellectual history as non-vying alternatives to the study of human thought through the ages. Although Gilson wrote this work as a history of the idea of Being, there is a lot of useful commentary by the author himself which demonstrates Gilson's own philosophical acumen. There is of course one weakness in Gilson's analysis of Avicenna's key distinction between essence and existence: Gilson consistently argues that the Iranian philosopher believed existence to be a real accident of essence, which is just not the case. This is unfortunate; not only is it a distortion of Avicenna's thought, it also affects Gilson's historiography of the idea subsequently and portrays Aquinas's views about the act of being (esse) as a correction, rather than continuation, of Avicenna's metaphysics.
On the whole, Gilson's analysis is fair and his approach to the problem as it has manifested itself historically worthy of commendation. There are few thinkers who can write in the manner which Gilson wrote, and fewer still who can write about a topic as sophisticated and philosophically pertinent such as Being. This is a fantastic read and most deserving of a place on any serious thinker's bookshelf. Although I would disagree with other readers who recommend Gilson's work as being suitable for the beginner: it quite obviously is not meant for the novice in philosophy; and even those more familiar with the ideas expressed in this work will find parts challenging them to re-think their understanding of the concept of Being.
On the whole, Gilson's analysis is fair and his approach to the problem as it has manifested itself historically worthy of commendation. There are few thinkers who can write in the manner which Gilson wrote, and fewer still who can write about a topic as sophisticated and philosophically pertinent such as Being. This is a fantastic read and most deserving of a place on any serious thinker's bookshelf. Although I would disagree with other readers who recommend Gilson's work as being suitable for the beginner: it quite obviously is not meant for the novice in philosophy; and even those more familiar with the ideas expressed in this work will find parts challenging them to re-think their understanding of the concept of Being.
December 18, 2008
I mean, the title says it all. How could this not be awesome?
May 12, 2023
Reading the first half during the semester, this ended up being a balmy 5-month slog. This easily ranks among the most difficult books I've ever read. The main reason is probably just my dense intellect and the abstract nature of the content, but I'd imagine some of the clumsiness comes from the translation.
After the brief introduction where Gilson defined his terms and gave the general outline of his argument, the first ~150 pages are a philosophical washing machine in which I found myself newly gulping down the circling Tide Pods of various philosophers and their unique takes on being. Gilson is an unapologetic Thomist, and from time to time his Thomistic critiques of the disperate positions would reorient me toward exactly what he was arguing. However, I did end up thoroughly lost for most of the book, since he spent so much time talking about positions with which he disagreed, providing only minimal clarifications and criticisms.
In the last two chapters he laid out Thomas' position, which was much more clearly represented and comprehensible than most of the others. These last chapters masterfully brought his argument together, but I find myself wishing I had known Gilson's "solution" before getting so bogged down in all the "problems." This should make for a much more productive second read, which I am looking forward to. Again, most of my issues with this read come from my own shortcomings, and I'm sure that his argument is far more brilliant than I am currently able to appreciate with my relative lack of education in this area.
I wouldn't recommend this to most people, unless this is an area of particular interest. Furthermore, if you are considering reading it, I suggest you have a thorough understanding of philosophical concepts and language, and the permutations these have undergone throughout the roughly 2000 years of Western philosophical history.
After the brief introduction where Gilson defined his terms and gave the general outline of his argument, the first ~150 pages are a philosophical washing machine in which I found myself newly gulping down the circling Tide Pods of various philosophers and their unique takes on being. Gilson is an unapologetic Thomist, and from time to time his Thomistic critiques of the disperate positions would reorient me toward exactly what he was arguing. However, I did end up thoroughly lost for most of the book, since he spent so much time talking about positions with which he disagreed, providing only minimal clarifications and criticisms.
In the last two chapters he laid out Thomas' position, which was much more clearly represented and comprehensible than most of the others. These last chapters masterfully brought his argument together, but I find myself wishing I had known Gilson's "solution" before getting so bogged down in all the "problems." This should make for a much more productive second read, which I am looking forward to. Again, most of my issues with this read come from my own shortcomings, and I'm sure that his argument is far more brilliant than I am currently able to appreciate with my relative lack of education in this area.
I wouldn't recommend this to most people, unless this is an area of particular interest. Furthermore, if you are considering reading it, I suggest you have a thorough understanding of philosophical concepts and language, and the permutations these have undergone throughout the roughly 2000 years of Western philosophical history.
January 22, 2024
Pseudo-Dionisio vive, la lucha sigue.
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June 20, 2020Très technique mais passionnant à lire (pas du tout ennuyant). Je veux dire que ce n'est pas un répertoire ou une liste des philosophies ou un dictionnaire. Je vous conseille de prendre des notes ou de surligner le livre pour ne pas finir perdu...
Une histoire de la métaphysique surtout autour de les notions d'être, d'essence (ens) et d'existence (esse) depuis les Grecs à l'existentialisme. Il passe par Parménide, Platon, Aristote, Plotin, Avicenne, Averroès, Siger de Brabant, Thomas d'Aquin, Suarez, Wolff, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard et des remarques en appendices sur Sartre et Heidegger.
En résumé, les philosophes (Suarez, Wolff, Averroès, Kant, Hegel...) se sont souvent trompés en voulant conceptualiser l'existence, une notion inconceptualisable (ce qui est impossible) ou alors en l'ignorant alors qu'elle est indispensable pour une métaphysique qui débouche sur de la connaissance réelle au lieu de produire seulement des spéculations infructueuses. Cette erreur est comparable à la création d'une théorie scientifique seulement comme un système logique avec une suite de déductions purement théoriques au lieu de faire des expériences pratiques et avancer la théorie avec.
La voie à suivre est celle qu'a ouverte Thomas d'Aquin en acceptant de donner une place à l'existence sans chercher à la conceptualiser. Ce faisant, il a bien voulu accepter une part d'inexplicable et de mystère. Mais cela sans mettre en péril la métaphysique comme l'être (essence actualisée par l'existence) demeure intact et n'est pas détruit par cette part de mystère.
Une histoire de la métaphysique surtout autour de les notions d'être, d'essence (ens) et d'existence (esse) depuis les Grecs à l'existentialisme. Il passe par Parménide, Platon, Aristote, Plotin, Avicenne, Averroès, Siger de Brabant, Thomas d'Aquin, Suarez, Wolff, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard et des remarques en appendices sur Sartre et Heidegger.
En résumé, les philosophes (Suarez, Wolff, Averroès, Kant, Hegel...) se sont souvent trompés en voulant conceptualiser l'existence, une notion inconceptualisable (ce qui est impossible) ou alors en l'ignorant alors qu'elle est indispensable pour une métaphysique qui débouche sur de la connaissance réelle au lieu de produire seulement des spéculations infructueuses. Cette erreur est comparable à la création d'une théorie scientifique seulement comme un système logique avec une suite de déductions purement théoriques au lieu de faire des expériences pratiques et avancer la théorie avec.
La voie à suivre est celle qu'a ouverte Thomas d'Aquin en acceptant de donner une place à l'existence sans chercher à la conceptualiser. Ce faisant, il a bien voulu accepter une part d'inexplicable et de mystère. Mais cela sans mettre en péril la métaphysique comme l'être (essence actualisée par l'existence) demeure intact et n'est pas détruit par cette part de mystère.
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February 6, 2024I cannot properly rate this work. My impressions were excellent on the one hand, but it is one of the hardest and most specific books I've read, dealing with some specific issues in metaphysics. I would say this is something people with a more scientific interest in philosophy should read, but readers such as myself, who only have a passing interest in the subject should skip it. The work requires serious dedication, taking notes, and discussing what was read in a rewarding environment.
March 29, 2018
So apparently St. Thomas solves all metaphysical difficulties (which is true), but only according to Gilson's disputed interpretation of him (which is false).
August 24, 2013
A good concise history on the philosophy of being, especially from a Thomistic tradition.
February 10, 2015
A difficult introduction to metaphysics by a sympathetic Thomist.
August 26, 2022
Une lecture très profitable !
En vrai, je ne crois pas que le livre soit parfait, de nombreux passages me semblent même douteux (celui sur Hegel en particulier), mais je maintiens le 5/5 pour l'importance du livre et parce qu'il contient largement la matière d'un livre à 5 étoiles.
C'est étrange, de penser qu'on va se mettre à penser sérieusement à la différence de l'être et de l'essence et à l'origine et la nature de l'acte d'être et en quel sens ce dernier peut être dit impliquer un acte premier d'être, mais voilà, la chose est clairement posée, définie, fait sens, on se trouve à faire de la métaphysique thomiste avec Gilson.
La thèse centrale de l'oeuvre est qu'il faut distinguer ce qui relève de l'essence (la quiddité, ce que sont les étants ou les êtres, le domaine du conceptualisable, de ce qui est envisageable ou possible même en dehors de l'existence) et ce qui est en un sens au-delà de l'essence, et distinguable d'elle, quoi qu'elle l'implique et soit ultimement impliquée par elle : l'existence, ou l'acte d'être, qui est l'acte de l'essence par quoi l'étant, qui a une essence, est.
Il note très justement que la question de l'être comme tel, comme acte, n'est pas interrogée par Aristote (qui ne se demande pas, par exemple, pourquoi il y a quelque chose plutôt que rien, pourquoi il y a de l'actualité en général, l'origine radicale ou la possibilité réelle radicale des choses), et que la métaphysique a dû s'y confronter après lui. Qu'elle a eu, néanmoins, tendance à tenter de la résoudre en sortant de l'étant lui même (au profit d'une volonté, divine, ou de l'Un, ou du Bien chez Plotin par exemple), mais que ces voies manquent une solution plus directe et simple et conforme au problème, développée notamment par Thomas, comme quoi l'acte d'être de chaque étant est simplement l'actualité ultime de l'essence, en cet étant, qui l'individualise, et qu'elle suppose un pur acte d'être premier, au-delà de toute essence, comme sa cause ou source ultime, ce qu'on nomme Dieu.
Que l'être, et donc Dieu, n'est ainsi pas "conceptualisable" au sens de la pensée des essences ou des choses possibles, même si elle peut être l'objet de la pensée (du fait que la pensée est elle même l'acte second d'un étant pensant dont l'acte premier est son être). Et qu'on court divers dangers à ignorer cette différence et à tomber dans une métaphysique de l'essence qui espère tirer l'être de l'essence elle-même, comme dans la preuve ontologique et exemplairement la métaphysique leibnizo-wolffienne. Un de ces dangers étant la méprise sur ce qu'est l'essence, et la croyance dans des essences totalement déterminées et parfaitement intellectualisables des choses avant leur existence, alors que, comme il le note dans mon passage peut-être préféré du livre, "dans l'expérience humaine du moins, on ne rencontre rien de tel que des essences pleinement déterminées avant leur actualisation par l'existence. Leur esse est nécessairement requis pour la plénitude de leur détermination, ce qui revient à dire que, pour être ce qu'ils sont, il leur faut d'abord le devenir" (pp. 307-308). Ce par quoi il développe des thèmes où il reprend à mon sens ce qu'il y a d'excitant et de vrai dans le bergsonisme et l'existentialisme sartrien, sans certains aspects difficiles à avaler.
L'ouvrage passe l'essentiel de son temps à faire de l'histoire de la philosophie, et en un sens c'est autant une force qu'une faiblesse. J'ai toujours un faible pour les ouvrages directement argumentatifs et dogmatiques, et j'aurais envie ici de recouper le livre pour ne garder que le fil principal du propos. Mais en fait, il faut distinguer. Même dans ce découpage, je garderai tout ce qui fait l'objet plus précis de l'histoire de l'aristotélisme et de la scolastique, d'Aristote à Kant en passant par Avicenne et Averroès, Siger de Brabant, Thomas d'Aquin bien sûr, puis Duns Scot et surtout Suarez et Wolff sur qui j'ai beaucoup appris. Je dois dire que les passages sur les penseurs arabes, et notamment Avicenne, me paraissaient suspects, et j'ai vu au moins un commentaire qui dit qu'ils sont en effet erronés, mais je ne peux pas vraiment être juge.
Le passage sur Platon est, un en sens, parfait, en ce qu'il est l'excellente expression de ce qu'on doit apprendre sur Platon en France au début des études ou en prépa, mais il se trouve que je suis depuis des années en désaccord avec cette lecture, qui m'a donc agacée ici mais je ne peux pas le reprocher à un livre de 1948. En revanche le passage sur Hegel me paraît plus problématique qu'autre chose, plus gênant qu'eclairant pour la compréhension de la Logique (non pas que je saurais dire exactement ce que fait Hegel dans la logique, mais penser qu'il passe outre l'acte d'être me paraît une fausse lecture de ce qu'est l'idéalisme, à voir), et le passage sur Kierkegaard souffre de sa dépendance à l'égard de celui sur Hegel. En revanche, j'ai beaucoup apprécié les passages sur Bergson auxquels, ainsi qu'à ceux sur Sartre et Heidegger (mais là je dois plaider l'incompétence) je n'ai rien à reprocher.
Un livre certainement daté, et certainement marqué par son contexte, mais un classique pour de bonnes raisons !
En vrai, je ne crois pas que le livre soit parfait, de nombreux passages me semblent même douteux (celui sur Hegel en particulier), mais je maintiens le 5/5 pour l'importance du livre et parce qu'il contient largement la matière d'un livre à 5 étoiles.
C'est étrange, de penser qu'on va se mettre à penser sérieusement à la différence de l'être et de l'essence et à l'origine et la nature de l'acte d'être et en quel sens ce dernier peut être dit impliquer un acte premier d'être, mais voilà, la chose est clairement posée, définie, fait sens, on se trouve à faire de la métaphysique thomiste avec Gilson.
La thèse centrale de l'oeuvre est qu'il faut distinguer ce qui relève de l'essence (la quiddité, ce que sont les étants ou les êtres, le domaine du conceptualisable, de ce qui est envisageable ou possible même en dehors de l'existence) et ce qui est en un sens au-delà de l'essence, et distinguable d'elle, quoi qu'elle l'implique et soit ultimement impliquée par elle : l'existence, ou l'acte d'être, qui est l'acte de l'essence par quoi l'étant, qui a une essence, est.
Il note très justement que la question de l'être comme tel, comme acte, n'est pas interrogée par Aristote (qui ne se demande pas, par exemple, pourquoi il y a quelque chose plutôt que rien, pourquoi il y a de l'actualité en général, l'origine radicale ou la possibilité réelle radicale des choses), et que la métaphysique a dû s'y confronter après lui. Qu'elle a eu, néanmoins, tendance à tenter de la résoudre en sortant de l'étant lui même (au profit d'une volonté, divine, ou de l'Un, ou du Bien chez Plotin par exemple), mais que ces voies manquent une solution plus directe et simple et conforme au problème, développée notamment par Thomas, comme quoi l'acte d'être de chaque étant est simplement l'actualité ultime de l'essence, en cet étant, qui l'individualise, et qu'elle suppose un pur acte d'être premier, au-delà de toute essence, comme sa cause ou source ultime, ce qu'on nomme Dieu.
Que l'être, et donc Dieu, n'est ainsi pas "conceptualisable" au sens de la pensée des essences ou des choses possibles, même si elle peut être l'objet de la pensée (du fait que la pensée est elle même l'acte second d'un étant pensant dont l'acte premier est son être). Et qu'on court divers dangers à ignorer cette différence et à tomber dans une métaphysique de l'essence qui espère tirer l'être de l'essence elle-même, comme dans la preuve ontologique et exemplairement la métaphysique leibnizo-wolffienne. Un de ces dangers étant la méprise sur ce qu'est l'essence, et la croyance dans des essences totalement déterminées et parfaitement intellectualisables des choses avant leur existence, alors que, comme il le note dans mon passage peut-être préféré du livre, "dans l'expérience humaine du moins, on ne rencontre rien de tel que des essences pleinement déterminées avant leur actualisation par l'existence. Leur esse est nécessairement requis pour la plénitude de leur détermination, ce qui revient à dire que, pour être ce qu'ils sont, il leur faut d'abord le devenir" (pp. 307-308). Ce par quoi il développe des thèmes où il reprend à mon sens ce qu'il y a d'excitant et de vrai dans le bergsonisme et l'existentialisme sartrien, sans certains aspects difficiles à avaler.
L'ouvrage passe l'essentiel de son temps à faire de l'histoire de la philosophie, et en un sens c'est autant une force qu'une faiblesse. J'ai toujours un faible pour les ouvrages directement argumentatifs et dogmatiques, et j'aurais envie ici de recouper le livre pour ne garder que le fil principal du propos. Mais en fait, il faut distinguer. Même dans ce découpage, je garderai tout ce qui fait l'objet plus précis de l'histoire de l'aristotélisme et de la scolastique, d'Aristote à Kant en passant par Avicenne et Averroès, Siger de Brabant, Thomas d'Aquin bien sûr, puis Duns Scot et surtout Suarez et Wolff sur qui j'ai beaucoup appris. Je dois dire que les passages sur les penseurs arabes, et notamment Avicenne, me paraissaient suspects, et j'ai vu au moins un commentaire qui dit qu'ils sont en effet erronés, mais je ne peux pas vraiment être juge.
Le passage sur Platon est, un en sens, parfait, en ce qu'il est l'excellente expression de ce qu'on doit apprendre sur Platon en France au début des études ou en prépa, mais il se trouve que je suis depuis des années en désaccord avec cette lecture, qui m'a donc agacée ici mais je ne peux pas le reprocher à un livre de 1948. En revanche le passage sur Hegel me paraît plus problématique qu'autre chose, plus gênant qu'eclairant pour la compréhension de la Logique (non pas que je saurais dire exactement ce que fait Hegel dans la logique, mais penser qu'il passe outre l'acte d'être me paraît une fausse lecture de ce qu'est l'idéalisme, à voir), et le passage sur Kierkegaard souffre de sa dépendance à l'égard de celui sur Hegel. En revanche, j'ai beaucoup apprécié les passages sur Bergson auxquels, ainsi qu'à ceux sur Sartre et Heidegger (mais là je dois plaider l'incompétence) je n'ai rien à reprocher.
Un livre certainement daté, et certainement marqué par son contexte, mais un classique pour de bonnes raisons !
September 15, 2023
"A dogmatic book may also be something of a personal confession, and this book is one. Bearing in mind possible brethren in metaphysical misery, it is the public confession of what has actually been a wandering quest of truth" (p. x)
"This is why all Platonisms sooner or later lead to mysticism, and sooner rather than later. Now, mysticism in itself is excellent, but not in philosophy, and especially not in a philosophy whose professed ambition is to achieve perfect intelligibility" (p. 40).
"God knows essences, but he says existences, and He does not say all that He knows" (p. 177).
"In short, reality is neither a wholly inexpressible mystery, nor is it a mere collection of materialized concepts; it is a conceivable reality hanging on an act which itself escapes representation, yet does not escape intellectual knowledge, because it is included in every intelligible enunciation" (p. 209).
"The magnificent ‘systems’ of those idealists who bear the title of ‘great thinkers,’ and wholly deserve it, belong in the realm of art more than in that of philosophy. It is probably not by chance that Germany is the country of both idealistic metaphysics and of music. Hegel, Schelling, Fichte can assume a metaphysical theme and weave it into a world with no less freedom than Bach can write a fugue. Such metaphysical fabrics are far from lacking beauty, but Bach was right because, as an artist, his end was to achieve beauty, whereas Hegel was wrong, because, as a philosopher, his end should have been to achieve truth. No more than science, philosophy cannot be a system, because all systematic thinking ultimately rests on assumption, whereas, qua knowledge, philosophy must rest on being" (p. 212).
"To restore existence to being is therefore the first prerequisite to the restoring of being itself to its legitimate position as the first principle of metaphysics. To do so would by no means constitute a philosophical discovery, but it would put an end to the all-too-protracted neglect of an ancient truth. Such a metaphysics would do justice to all the metaphysical discoveries which have already been made in the past. It would grant to Parmenides that, when posited as a purely abstract essence, being is one with pure conceptual thinking. It would grant to Plato that essentiality is selfhood. It would grant to Aristotle that substance is both act and source of operations according to its specification by form. It would grant to Avicenna that existence is a determination which happens to finite essence in virtue of its cause. Last, but not least, it would grant to Thomas Aquinas that existence happens to essence in a most peculiar way, not as some sort of accidental determination, but as its supreme act, that is, as the cause of its being as well as of its operations. As to those metaphysics with which it cannot agree, it can at least understand why they arose and went their own several ways. For, indeed, the cognition of being entails an all-too-real difficulty, which is intrinsic to its very nature. When confronted with an element of reality for which no conceptual representation is available, human understanding feels bound; if not always to reduce it into nothingness, at least to bracket it, so that everything may proceed as though that element did not exist. It is unpleasant for philosophy to admit that it flows from a source which, qua source, will never become an object of abstract representation. Hence the ceaselessly renewed attempts of philosophers to pretend that there is no such source or that, if there is one, we need not worry about it. Yet the history of philosophy is there to show that the awareness of existence is the beginning of philosophical wisdom" (p. 214).
"This is why all Platonisms sooner or later lead to mysticism, and sooner rather than later. Now, mysticism in itself is excellent, but not in philosophy, and especially not in a philosophy whose professed ambition is to achieve perfect intelligibility" (p. 40).
"God knows essences, but he says existences, and He does not say all that He knows" (p. 177).
"In short, reality is neither a wholly inexpressible mystery, nor is it a mere collection of materialized concepts; it is a conceivable reality hanging on an act which itself escapes representation, yet does not escape intellectual knowledge, because it is included in every intelligible enunciation" (p. 209).
"The magnificent ‘systems’ of those idealists who bear the title of ‘great thinkers,’ and wholly deserve it, belong in the realm of art more than in that of philosophy. It is probably not by chance that Germany is the country of both idealistic metaphysics and of music. Hegel, Schelling, Fichte can assume a metaphysical theme and weave it into a world with no less freedom than Bach can write a fugue. Such metaphysical fabrics are far from lacking beauty, but Bach was right because, as an artist, his end was to achieve beauty, whereas Hegel was wrong, because, as a philosopher, his end should have been to achieve truth. No more than science, philosophy cannot be a system, because all systematic thinking ultimately rests on assumption, whereas, qua knowledge, philosophy must rest on being" (p. 212).
"To restore existence to being is therefore the first prerequisite to the restoring of being itself to its legitimate position as the first principle of metaphysics. To do so would by no means constitute a philosophical discovery, but it would put an end to the all-too-protracted neglect of an ancient truth. Such a metaphysics would do justice to all the metaphysical discoveries which have already been made in the past. It would grant to Parmenides that, when posited as a purely abstract essence, being is one with pure conceptual thinking. It would grant to Plato that essentiality is selfhood. It would grant to Aristotle that substance is both act and source of operations according to its specification by form. It would grant to Avicenna that existence is a determination which happens to finite essence in virtue of its cause. Last, but not least, it would grant to Thomas Aquinas that existence happens to essence in a most peculiar way, not as some sort of accidental determination, but as its supreme act, that is, as the cause of its being as well as of its operations. As to those metaphysics with which it cannot agree, it can at least understand why they arose and went their own several ways. For, indeed, the cognition of being entails an all-too-real difficulty, which is intrinsic to its very nature. When confronted with an element of reality for which no conceptual representation is available, human understanding feels bound; if not always to reduce it into nothingness, at least to bracket it, so that everything may proceed as though that element did not exist. It is unpleasant for philosophy to admit that it flows from a source which, qua source, will never become an object of abstract representation. Hence the ceaselessly renewed attempts of philosophers to pretend that there is no such source or that, if there is one, we need not worry about it. Yet the history of philosophy is there to show that the awareness of existence is the beginning of philosophical wisdom" (p. 214).
October 18, 2021
"کتاب تحلیل سیر مفهوم «وجود» و «هستی» در نزد بزرگترین فیلسوفان سنت غربی است. نویسنده معتقد است که وجود در تاریخ فلسفه به دست فراموشی سپرده شده و فیلسوفان همواره امری غیر از وجود را سرلوحه تحقیقات فلسفی خود قرار داده اند. در واقع نویسنده معتقد است که بزرگترین فیلسوفان سنت ما بعد الطبیعه غربی، از پارمنیدس و افلاطون و ارسطو گرفته تا دکارت و کانت و هگل اصحاب اصالت ماهیت بوده اند و حذف و طرد «وجود» از ما بعد الطبیعه منجر به ایجاد ما بعد الطبیعه هایی نامنطبق با نظام وجودی عالم شده و حتی اگزیستانسیالیسم معاصر با دعوی بازگشت به وجود از درک حقیقی وجود بازمانده و شبحی تهی را جانشین آن کرده است. "
April 1, 2021
Una obra maestra. Clave para entender la historia de la filosofía
September 9, 2024
Honestamente, me alegra pensar que esta es la última vez que voy a leer a Gilson en un tiempo.
January 2, 2008
Ouch. This one medicinally cleared my head of years of clutter and filth. Thank you, Dr. Catan.
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