What do you think?
Rate this book
Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin
From the KGB to the Kremlin: a multidimensional portrait of the man at war with the West. Where do Vladimir Putin's ideas come from? How does he look at the outside world? What does he want, and how far is he willing to go?
The great lesson of the outbreak of World War I in 1914 was the danger of misreading the statements, actions, and intentions of the adversary. Today, Vladimir Putin has become the greatest challenge to European security and the global world order in decades. Russia's 8,000 nuclear weapons underscore the huge risks of not understanding who Putin is. Featuring five new chapters, this new edition dispels potentially dangerous misconceptions about Putin and offers a clear-eyed look at his objectives. It presents Putin as a reflection of deeply ingrained Russian ways of thinking as well as his unique personal background and experience.
Praise for the first edition
If you want to begin to understand Russia today, read this book. —Sir John Scarlett, former chief of the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6)
For anyone wishing to understand Russia's evolution since the breakup of the Soviet Union and its trajectory since then, the book you hold in your hand is an essential guide.—John McLaughlin, former deputy director of U.S. Central Intelligence
Of the many biographies of Vladimir Putin that have appeared in recent years, this one is the most useful. —Foreign Affairs
This is not just another Putin biography. It is a psychological portrait. —The Financial Times
Q: Do you have time to read books? If so, which ones would you recommend? "My goodness, let's see. There's Mr. Putin, by Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy. Insightful." —Vice President Joseph Biden in Joe Biden: The Rolling Stone Interview.
983 pages, Kindle Edition
First published December 18, 2012
936 people are currently reading
2958 people want to read
About the author
Fiona Hill
34 books24 followersLibrarian Note: There is more than one author in the Goodreads database with this name.
This name is a pseudonym for Ellen Pall (also known as Ellen Jane Pall).
She chose Fiona Hill when she wrote Regency romance novels. She has since published mysteries and literary novels under her own name.
This name is a pseudonym for Ellen Pall (also known as Ellen Jane Pall).
She chose Fiona Hill when she wrote Regency romance novels. She has since published mysteries and literary novels under her own name.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 30 of 150 reviews
November 22, 2019
Description: From the KGB to the Kremlin: a multidimensional portrait of the man at war with the West. Where do Vladimir Putin's ideas come from? How does he look at the outside world? What does he want, and how far is he willing to go?
The great lesson of the outbreak of World War I in 1914 was the danger of misreading the statements, actions, and intentions of the adversary. Today, Vladimir Putin has become the greatest challenge to European security and the global world order in decades. Russia's 8,000 nuclear weapons underscore the huge risks of not understanding who Putin is. Featuring five new chapters, this new edition dispels potentially dangerous misconceptions about Putin and offers a clear-eyed look at his objectives. It presents Putin as a reflection of deeply ingrained Russian ways of thinking as well as his unique personal background and experience.
Part One: The Operative Emerges
1: Who is Mr. Putin?: On March 18 2014, still bathed in the afterglow of the Winter Olympics that he had hosted in the Black Sea resort of Sochi, Russian president Vladimir Putin stepped up to the podium in the Kremlin to address the nation.
it is written in 2014 so all the current woes are not included.
The great lesson of the outbreak of World War I in 1914 was the danger of misreading the statements, actions, and intentions of the adversary. Today, Vladimir Putin has become the greatest challenge to European security and the global world order in decades. Russia's 8,000 nuclear weapons underscore the huge risks of not understanding who Putin is. Featuring five new chapters, this new edition dispels potentially dangerous misconceptions about Putin and offers a clear-eyed look at his objectives. It presents Putin as a reflection of deeply ingrained Russian ways of thinking as well as his unique personal background and experience.
Part One: The Operative Emerges
1: Who is Mr. Putin?: On March 18 2014, still bathed in the afterglow of the Winter Olympics that he had hosted in the Black Sea resort of Sochi, Russian president Vladimir Putin stepped up to the podium in the Kremlin to address the nation.
it is written in 2014 so all the current woes are not included.
July 25, 2020
A certain kind of liar, when lying, will double down on enunciation, moving his or her mouth with extra vigor and precision for emphasis. Russian President Vladimir Putin lies regularly and frequently, usually adopting a particularly aggressive (or defensive) physical stance, whether standing or sitting, to brace for the whopper he is about to emphatically impart. I feel I speak for all Westerners who understand Putin in Russian when I say he is mystifyingly banal. To me, at least, it is an absolute wonder he is widely regarded with awe anywhere, even inside Russia.
Neither of the two current must-read English-language Putin bios dispels the mystery of Putin's banality. Masha Gessen’s The Man Without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin opts for the colorful approach, as if—by consciously attempting to give personality to someone who discernibly has none—the author has ended up painting a sinister portrait of a two-dimensional character whose path to (and consolidation of) power is his most remarkable quality, because it's an alarming trail of unsolved murders.
The other bio, by Brookings Institution scholars Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy, centers its subject in a larger picture, tracing the system building around him as he progresses. The book is as much a history and sociology of Russia as a biography of a Russian. Again, neither work makes Putin three-dimensional. But neither should. This would be impossible: Putin is a two-dimensional personality. He is both 'thug’ (Gessen) and ‘operative’ (Hill and Gaddy), but even when combining those two qualities, we're left with a kind of non-entity in the person of Vladimir Putin.
This paragraph (p. 271) adroitly summarizes the Putin phenomenon:
The first sentence of the next paragraph reads: ‘As a student of Russian history, Putin has internalized and adapted these basic Russian political patterns to modern times.’ Indeed, Putin, an avid reader of history books, doesn't believe in making strategic plans in a temporal vacuum or bubble, cut off from the past. He should be given credit for reading any books at all, since most politicians—if their level of sophistication is anything to go by—don't. Putin draws on the past in forging the future, and the above paragraph is what he's drawn on as the Russian ideal. This means he hasn't made Russia into anything most Westerners would recognize as ‘democratic,’ and while Western societies and governments are fraught with problems, the Russian solution—via the firm hand of Tsar Vlad—doesn't appear to be any sort of attractive alternative at all.
Putin isn't some aberration or anomaly. He isn't substantively imitating Western-style (and certainly not American-style) democracy. He feels he fully understands Russia’s ‘soul’ and doesn’t need a lecture on it. If anyone's ever wondered why the elected State Duma (the lower house of Russia’s national parliament) never opposes or obstructs the country’s chief executive (as the legislative branches in Western countries’ governments often do), it isn't only because Putin wants the same status that the tsar of Russia had in days gone by. It's also because in Russia, this is ‘normal,’ even by the standards of 21st-century social mores.
Russia isn't Western, and the seventeen or so years of Putin’s undisputed leadership more or less prove the point. Putin's subjects (broadly) accept him as legitimate and even benevolent. Putin himself often exhibits an attitude that the rest of the world should both accept and admire the ‘strongman,’ and that the term shouldn't carry negative connotations. It should be taken literally: 'strong man.' It sounds very manly, especially in Russian. If Russia's parliament were a parliament in the sense most Westerners understand the term, the 'strong man' wouldn't look as 'strong.' The Russian parliament is, rather, a ‘division of labor' in the executive branch. But the fact that just about anyone from the West who visits Russia today agrees that it is not the sort of place they'd want to live likely means humanity has a long way to go to bridge the gap in understanding and affection between Russia and the West.
That isn't to say Putin doesn’t have his own, 'new' ideology or ideal of how the 21st-century Russian state should be organized. He does. Unfortunately, as this book details, it isn't terribly inspiring or impressive. It's also, ironically, partly of Western origin. The authors identify it in a Western MBA textbook that Putin read many years ago, and the thesis of which he later applied to his regime. After the chaos, corruption and decay of the 1990s in Russia, Putin’s model of 'Russia, Inc.,' with himself as Tsar-CEO, is arguably an improvement, even if it suffers from key defects which are at least partly a result of the leader’s fundamental misinterpretation of the book’s thesis.
In implementing his model, Putin has proven himself resolute, acting quickly, rarely exhibiting pangs of doubt. Russians as a whole applaud Putin for the fact that, once he decides to do something, he moves forward swiftly, a trait partially attributable to his training in the Soviet security services. He knows how to co-opt people and sets his methods in motion immediately upon identifying a target. Blackmail is a big part of it, and Russia is—depressingly—a place where people are far more susceptible to blackmail than in Western societies. But he's still a 'decisive' leader, and that's the important thing for most Russians.
Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin doesn't engage in hyperbole or get emotional in its value judgments about its subject the way Masha Gessen’s book does (to great effect). It simply chronicles Putin's success in scholarly detail, and the picture one is left with is - in a different way - no less grim than that created by The Man Without a Face. The book augments the historically enigmatic quality of Russia by laying out in detail the 'what' and the 'how' of Putin's state, leaving the reader to draw his or her own conclusions about the 'why.'
Nevertheless, a reader who stays with this one to the end will have just as big a picture of the man. It's grim, but it feels very real. Some might find it a ‘slog' if they're not already interested in Russia, as it's very dense with information, and while it would be unfair to call it ‘turgid,’ it does suffer from the occasional shortcomings of prose even if generally well edited. Anyone who digests this impressive achievement in its entirety will feel like an expert on Putin and his era afterwards. I found it very satisfying to complete.
Personally, I have to say that neither of the two Putin bios has dispelled a strange suspicion I've entertained over the past few years. If anything, they heighten it. That is, namely, that Putin is so lacking in personality—so ‘android-like’—precisely because he is, like many of his Soviet forbears and compatriots, actually a brainwashed or ‘programmed’ agent or operative himself. If he were in any way an ‘interesting personality,’ he might generate very serious obsession in me as opposed to merely irritated preoccupation, but he has no human depth or warmth. His ordinary Russian features and bland persona confound my understanding as to how millions of people could find him impressive, yet supposedly the vast majority of Russians both at home and abroad think he’s wonderful. At least with Donald Trump, even those who find him off-putting have to admit there's some ‘show’ to the man. He offends and insults, but he also does a ‘song and dance.’ Putin is a ‘dead fish’ by contrast. He is a cunning and determined dullard.
Since Putin was posted to Dresden, Germany, in 1985 and did not return to Leningrad until the Soviet Union was collapsing in 1990, perhaps he is a brainwashed or programmed agent of the now-defunct Stasi, the East German secret police. Just as Lenin was sent back to Petrograd in 1917 by Imperial Germany to knock Russia out of WWI by seizing control of the Allied government there, maybe Putin was sent back to to the USSR by the Germans along with other brainwashed Russian agents, and only one (Putin) was able to rise to the top ranks of the squalid, corrupt post-Soviet Russian government and establish ‘Russia, Inc.’ to make doing business in Russia easier for German companies. That isn't to say that Putin is Lenin: the Russian president of today is no revolutionary ideologue. But Putin has established a stable authoritarian government, and Russo-German commerce certainly boomed after Putin took charge in 2000. Cui bono?
Herewith, a passage from a section of the book entitled ‘Putin’s German Patriarchs’ (p. 280):
Neither of the two current must-read English-language Putin bios dispels the mystery of Putin's banality. Masha Gessen’s The Man Without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin opts for the colorful approach, as if—by consciously attempting to give personality to someone who discernibly has none—the author has ended up painting a sinister portrait of a two-dimensional character whose path to (and consolidation of) power is his most remarkable quality, because it's an alarming trail of unsolved murders.
The other bio, by Brookings Institution scholars Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy, centers its subject in a larger picture, tracing the system building around him as he progresses. The book is as much a history and sociology of Russia as a biography of a Russian. Again, neither work makes Putin three-dimensional. But neither should. This would be impossible: Putin is a two-dimensional personality. He is both 'thug’ (Gessen) and ‘operative’ (Hill and Gaddy), but even when combining those two qualities, we're left with a kind of non-entity in the person of Vladimir Putin.
This paragraph (p. 271) adroitly summarizes the Putin phenomenon:
The tsar came in a political and spiritual package with the Russian Orthodox Church. His position was “unlimited by any but divine law.” This essentially unassailable position of the tsar created a “unipolar political context.” The tsar enjoyed a unity of command, which enabled the autocracy to overcome systemic and popular resistance to modernizing reforms. Representative institutions in tsarist Russia developed from the top down to facilitate the transmission of orders from the tsar and his inner circle down to the level of the narod. These institutions were intended to be a “staff meeting, not a parliament.” This is entirely in keeping with Pyotr Stolypin’s idea that the role of the first Russian Duma was to work directly with the tsar’s government to help implement reforms. Stolypin did not believe that the Duma should provide alternative input or impose any kind of check on his activities. Representative institutions were also one way of showing respect to those far beneath the system. By giving a hearing to different voices, they helped to foster a sense of unity and consensus between the tsar and his people.
The first sentence of the next paragraph reads: ‘As a student of Russian history, Putin has internalized and adapted these basic Russian political patterns to modern times.’ Indeed, Putin, an avid reader of history books, doesn't believe in making strategic plans in a temporal vacuum or bubble, cut off from the past. He should be given credit for reading any books at all, since most politicians—if their level of sophistication is anything to go by—don't. Putin draws on the past in forging the future, and the above paragraph is what he's drawn on as the Russian ideal. This means he hasn't made Russia into anything most Westerners would recognize as ‘democratic,’ and while Western societies and governments are fraught with problems, the Russian solution—via the firm hand of Tsar Vlad—doesn't appear to be any sort of attractive alternative at all.
Putin isn't some aberration or anomaly. He isn't substantively imitating Western-style (and certainly not American-style) democracy. He feels he fully understands Russia’s ‘soul’ and doesn’t need a lecture on it. If anyone's ever wondered why the elected State Duma (the lower house of Russia’s national parliament) never opposes or obstructs the country’s chief executive (as the legislative branches in Western countries’ governments often do), it isn't only because Putin wants the same status that the tsar of Russia had in days gone by. It's also because in Russia, this is ‘normal,’ even by the standards of 21st-century social mores.
Russia isn't Western, and the seventeen or so years of Putin’s undisputed leadership more or less prove the point. Putin's subjects (broadly) accept him as legitimate and even benevolent. Putin himself often exhibits an attitude that the rest of the world should both accept and admire the ‘strongman,’ and that the term shouldn't carry negative connotations. It should be taken literally: 'strong man.' It sounds very manly, especially in Russian. If Russia's parliament were a parliament in the sense most Westerners understand the term, the 'strong man' wouldn't look as 'strong.' The Russian parliament is, rather, a ‘division of labor' in the executive branch. But the fact that just about anyone from the West who visits Russia today agrees that it is not the sort of place they'd want to live likely means humanity has a long way to go to bridge the gap in understanding and affection between Russia and the West.
That isn't to say Putin doesn’t have his own, 'new' ideology or ideal of how the 21st-century Russian state should be organized. He does. Unfortunately, as this book details, it isn't terribly inspiring or impressive. It's also, ironically, partly of Western origin. The authors identify it in a Western MBA textbook that Putin read many years ago, and the thesis of which he later applied to his regime. After the chaos, corruption and decay of the 1990s in Russia, Putin’s model of 'Russia, Inc.,' with himself as Tsar-CEO, is arguably an improvement, even if it suffers from key defects which are at least partly a result of the leader’s fundamental misinterpretation of the book’s thesis.
In implementing his model, Putin has proven himself resolute, acting quickly, rarely exhibiting pangs of doubt. Russians as a whole applaud Putin for the fact that, once he decides to do something, he moves forward swiftly, a trait partially attributable to his training in the Soviet security services. He knows how to co-opt people and sets his methods in motion immediately upon identifying a target. Blackmail is a big part of it, and Russia is—depressingly—a place where people are far more susceptible to blackmail than in Western societies. But he's still a 'decisive' leader, and that's the important thing for most Russians.
Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin doesn't engage in hyperbole or get emotional in its value judgments about its subject the way Masha Gessen’s book does (to great effect). It simply chronicles Putin's success in scholarly detail, and the picture one is left with is - in a different way - no less grim than that created by The Man Without a Face. The book augments the historically enigmatic quality of Russia by laying out in detail the 'what' and the 'how' of Putin's state, leaving the reader to draw his or her own conclusions about the 'why.'
Nevertheless, a reader who stays with this one to the end will have just as big a picture of the man. It's grim, but it feels very real. Some might find it a ‘slog' if they're not already interested in Russia, as it's very dense with information, and while it would be unfair to call it ‘turgid,’ it does suffer from the occasional shortcomings of prose even if generally well edited. Anyone who digests this impressive achievement in its entirety will feel like an expert on Putin and his era afterwards. I found it very satisfying to complete.
Personally, I have to say that neither of the two Putin bios has dispelled a strange suspicion I've entertained over the past few years. If anything, they heighten it. That is, namely, that Putin is so lacking in personality—so ‘android-like’—precisely because he is, like many of his Soviet forbears and compatriots, actually a brainwashed or ‘programmed’ agent or operative himself. If he were in any way an ‘interesting personality,’ he might generate very serious obsession in me as opposed to merely irritated preoccupation, but he has no human depth or warmth. His ordinary Russian features and bland persona confound my understanding as to how millions of people could find him impressive, yet supposedly the vast majority of Russians both at home and abroad think he’s wonderful. At least with Donald Trump, even those who find him off-putting have to admit there's some ‘show’ to the man. He offends and insults, but he also does a ‘song and dance.’ Putin is a ‘dead fish’ by contrast. He is a cunning and determined dullard.
Since Putin was posted to Dresden, Germany, in 1985 and did not return to Leningrad until the Soviet Union was collapsing in 1990, perhaps he is a brainwashed or programmed agent of the now-defunct Stasi, the East German secret police. Just as Lenin was sent back to Petrograd in 1917 by Imperial Germany to knock Russia out of WWI by seizing control of the Allied government there, maybe Putin was sent back to to the USSR by the Germans along with other brainwashed Russian agents, and only one (Putin) was able to rise to the top ranks of the squalid, corrupt post-Soviet Russian government and establish ‘Russia, Inc.’ to make doing business in Russia easier for German companies. That isn't to say that Putin is Lenin: the Russian president of today is no revolutionary ideologue. But Putin has established a stable authoritarian government, and Russo-German commerce certainly boomed after Putin took charge in 2000. Cui bono?
Herewith, a passage from a section of the book entitled ‘Putin’s German Patriarchs’ (p. 280):
In interacting with Germany and the rest of the world outside the russkiy mir, Putin has adopted the same approach he uses to run Russia, Inc. He deals with the smallest number of people possible. Just as he relies on formal and informal ombudsmen to channel information to various interest groups inside Russia and to manage connections with international business, Putin uses a network of intermediaries as his connections with the West. They are usually at a very high level. In the case of Germany… Putin has famously befriended Angela Merkel’s predecessor, Gerhard Schröder, chancellor of Germany from 1998 to 2005, Putin and Schröder bonded over a common hardscrabble background, some similar professional experiences, and a shared interest in creating an economic partnership between Russia and Germany, based on Russia’s and Gazprom’s huge natural gas reserves and Germany’s status as Europe’s largest gas consumer.
Yes, it’s far-fetched, and no, you can't brainwash someone to take over a government. Besides, Berlin had a falling-out with Moscow in the mid-2000s over Russia’s shortcomings in democracy, the rule of law and corporate governance. But the fluent German-speaking Putin does seem uninterested in any foreign country other than Germany, which has always received the overwhelming lion’s share of his attention in foreign affairs, and this did initially seem to pay off for German business, just as Lenin initially worked to take Russia out of WWI.
Ultimately, of course, Lenin proved to have been a bad idea for Berlin and many other Western governments, and now Putin has complicated matters for Germany too by unilaterally redrawing European borders (something not done since WWII). Everything Putin does these days with regard to Germany seems like a test and a probe for weakness, and at the moment he's testing and probing Angela Merkel, provoking her and being a constant nuisance. His preoccupation with Germany is of course understandable beyond the programmed Stasi android theory, since Germany and Russia have a kind of ‘special relationship’ in trade and economics that long predates Putin. It's just that it always seems to come a cropper eventually.
Former US President George W. Bush related the story not long ago of how, in Moscow, Putin had shown him his dog and boasted: 'Bigger, stronger and faster than Barney.' Barney was, of course, the Bushes' beloved Scottish terrier. Putin had previously seen Barney on a visit to America and quipped: 'You call that a dog?' The incident emblemizes the divide between Putin and decent human beings. In response to a comment like 'bigger, stronger and faster,' the obvious retort should be: 'So what?' Barney was very likely in every way a more lovable and interesting creature than whatever beast Putin trotted out to impress. Sadly, 'lovable and interesting' are unlikely to be qualities Putin would ever recognize, whether in animals or people.
In short, Putin is what many Americans would recognize as an 'asshole,' a personality type devoid of sentimentality and generally dismissive of anyone who exhibits sentimentality. Putin is objectively unlikable, which is something I'd felt since long before reading this book. Since nothing in Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin disabused me of my prejudices, I was pleased to read it.
January 25, 2015
An absorbing read that seeks to understand Putin despite the dearth of information available out there on him.
Newly updated (to Nov 2014) Hill and Gaddy have put together a detailed book detailing how Putin’s ideology is formed directly from his life experiences. Whilst not unusual an interpretation in itself, Putin’s life was not a privileged upbringing of the likes of the many of the Western political elite. His was from the school of hard knocks on the mean streets of Soviet Leningrad and in Dresden during the terminal decline of East Germany as a mid-level KGB officer.
They argue that it is these experiences, the tragic history of Russia, his parents struggle to survive the Leningrad siege, and the implosion of East Germany that drive many of his policies today.
The authors’ take on the Ukraine crisis is an interesting one. Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 exposed a number of weaknesses in the Russian military resulting in downsizing and the evolution of a new approach of non-linear war which saw its first use in the 2014 Crimean crisis.
Hill and Gaddy also say that Putin’s view is that the West was already engaging in non-linear war by expanding EU and NATO membership to the borders of Russia as well as infiltration by western funded non-governmental organisations (NGOs) threatening in Putin's view Russian's very existence.
There’s much more in this book besides, creating an absorbing read that seeks to understand Putin despite the dearth of information available out there on him.
January 27, 2023
Mr. Putin is a very interesting, and IMHO, quite accurate analysis of Russia's President. Dr. Hill's Putin makes a great deal of sense when you realize that he is a former KGB officer. That has a great deal to do with his outlook and his actions.
The book details Putin's rise to power and then shines when it looks at the six "personas" of Mr. Putin. The Statist shows how Putin has a vested interest in developing the power of the "State", as in the organs of power that control Russia.
The History Man persona is his attempts to draw on past Russian Imperial and Soviet history to make appeals, and excuses, for his actions regarding Russia's personal sphere of influence (which is in essence reestablishing the border security of the USSR). Though this book was written in 2014, these are the very same excuses and spurious history Putin would use in his 2022 invasion.
The Survivalist persona takes into account his ability to survive and grow in power in the Russian system. It also highlights lessons Putin learned about the destruction of the Soviet Empire and his ability to go from KGB officer to head of state.
The Outsider persona is more for the domestic audience where he portrays himself as the outsider. This hearkens back to the days of when Russian peasants thought ill of the Tsar's advisors but never the Tsar himself.
The Free Marketeer shows how Putin wished to leverage trade and natural resources into influence and power. How he feels trade showed a path to pour money into Russian coffers, to fund his various wars and conflicts.
The Case Officer is the aptest. At the end of the day, he views these events as a Case Officer would and his mission goals remain unchanged- to secure the borders of Russia from perceived invasion by NATO (aka US) forces. To resist Western "influences" inside his country and those aligned with him.
After this insightful analysis, we are treated to a history of Putin's actions and his interactions with Western governments. From Georgia (2008) to Ukraine in 2014, time and again Putin has always shown who he truly is. If you read this and wonder why the allegedly "most intelligent people in the room" (the elected leaders of the West) didn't know this or get this until Feb of 2022? Likely for the same reason, we are treated to a daily barrage of why working with and doing business with Communist China is a good idea. Until it isn't.
Not the most easily readable book for a layperson. It is a very good academic poli-sci book and very insightful for anyone who is interested in the personality of Mr. Putin. I guess it shows Hanna Ardent's quip that evil is, indeed, banal.
The book details Putin's rise to power and then shines when it looks at the six "personas" of Mr. Putin. The Statist shows how Putin has a vested interest in developing the power of the "State", as in the organs of power that control Russia.
The History Man persona is his attempts to draw on past Russian Imperial and Soviet history to make appeals, and excuses, for his actions regarding Russia's personal sphere of influence (which is in essence reestablishing the border security of the USSR). Though this book was written in 2014, these are the very same excuses and spurious history Putin would use in his 2022 invasion.
The Survivalist persona takes into account his ability to survive and grow in power in the Russian system. It also highlights lessons Putin learned about the destruction of the Soviet Empire and his ability to go from KGB officer to head of state.
The Outsider persona is more for the domestic audience where he portrays himself as the outsider. This hearkens back to the days of when Russian peasants thought ill of the Tsar's advisors but never the Tsar himself.
The Free Marketeer shows how Putin wished to leverage trade and natural resources into influence and power. How he feels trade showed a path to pour money into Russian coffers, to fund his various wars and conflicts.
The Case Officer is the aptest. At the end of the day, he views these events as a Case Officer would and his mission goals remain unchanged- to secure the borders of Russia from perceived invasion by NATO (aka US) forces. To resist Western "influences" inside his country and those aligned with him.
After this insightful analysis, we are treated to a history of Putin's actions and his interactions with Western governments. From Georgia (2008) to Ukraine in 2014, time and again Putin has always shown who he truly is. If you read this and wonder why the allegedly "most intelligent people in the room" (the elected leaders of the West) didn't know this or get this until Feb of 2022? Likely for the same reason, we are treated to a daily barrage of why working with and doing business with Communist China is a good idea. Until it isn't.
Not the most easily readable book for a layperson. It is a very good academic poli-sci book and very insightful for anyone who is interested in the personality of Mr. Putin. I guess it shows Hanna Ardent's quip that evil is, indeed, banal.
April 15, 2020
Part of my reason for reading “Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin,” is Dr. Hill’s expertise on the subject of Russia and Vladimir Putin. The other reason is I find him mystifying. Unlike any other world leader I’ve observed, he is unabashedly direct. Vladimir Putin once stated, “I’m not your friend, I’m not your bride or your groom… I am the President of the Russian Federation.” — I’ll add he’s armed with 8,000 nuclear weapons!
Without intervention from the West, he currently occupies the Georgian territories and annexed the Crimean Peninsula. Dr. Hill’s perspective and personal first-hand (she is fluent in Russian) observations of him are fascinating. Two years in a row at the Valdai Group dinners, Dr. Hill was seated directly beside Putin.
I’ll concede the book is academically rigorous but well worth the effort. Here are a few of my 'what else didn’t I know?' points of interest:
• Putin is the leader who keeps the system going, the plans on track, and adamantly focused on a robust economy.
• He leads a team of close trusted allies.
• He’s a nationalist, no explanation nor apology.
• The Russian economy for him is second only to Russian defense. Putin focuses heavily on enticing foreign pharmaceutical production and European automobile manufacturing firms to relocate within Russia. Through his special economic zones these firms are protected from the exorbitant kickbacks and bribes that are part of the bureaucracy of doing business in Russia.
• He never flinches, he’s trained not to.
• Despite his seemingly embrace of Xi Jinping and China’s greater cooperation with Russia, Putin is fully aware that China is a major threat to the economic future of Russia.
• He is adamantly against the U.S. fracking shale gas.
“Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin,” aims to properly place the current president of Russia in historical context. Informing us on lesser known US-Russia challenges. A heavy read but also an opportunity to illuminate the darker geopolitical landscape.
Without intervention from the West, he currently occupies the Georgian territories and annexed the Crimean Peninsula. Dr. Hill’s perspective and personal first-hand (she is fluent in Russian) observations of him are fascinating. Two years in a row at the Valdai Group dinners, Dr. Hill was seated directly beside Putin.
I’ll concede the book is academically rigorous but well worth the effort. Here are a few of my 'what else didn’t I know?' points of interest:
• Putin is the leader who keeps the system going, the plans on track, and adamantly focused on a robust economy.
• He leads a team of close trusted allies.
• He’s a nationalist, no explanation nor apology.
• The Russian economy for him is second only to Russian defense. Putin focuses heavily on enticing foreign pharmaceutical production and European automobile manufacturing firms to relocate within Russia. Through his special economic zones these firms are protected from the exorbitant kickbacks and bribes that are part of the bureaucracy of doing business in Russia.
• He never flinches, he’s trained not to.
• Despite his seemingly embrace of Xi Jinping and China’s greater cooperation with Russia, Putin is fully aware that China is a major threat to the economic future of Russia.
• He is adamantly against the U.S. fracking shale gas.
“Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin,” aims to properly place the current president of Russia in historical context. Informing us on lesser known US-Russia challenges. A heavy read but also an opportunity to illuminate the darker geopolitical landscape.
September 23, 2022
As of today, Ukrainian forces have launched a successful counter-offensive against Russia in the northeastern part of the country and have liberated the key city of Izyum and have had success throughout the Kharkiv region. For the first time there may be rumblings in Moscow concerning how the war is evolving – the question is how Vladimir Putin will respond. An excellent source to consult is Fiona Hill and Clifford G. Gaddy’s thorough study MR. PUTIN: OPERATIVE IN THE KREMLIN. The book was originally published in 2013 and updated shortly after the Russian seizure and annexation of Crimea in 2014. The authors dispel certain misconceptions about Putin and offer an analysis of where Putin’s ideas originate, how he perceives the outside world, and how far he is willing to go. Though the book is seven years old its conclusions are very prescient and offers a psychological, political, diplomatic, and economic approach to try and understand Putin and in many cases their observations have been quite accurate.
Hill and Gaddy have written a perceptive account of what Putin really wants for Russia and how it could possibly be undone. As David Hearst writes in The Guardian, May 2013; “The many sources of the system he has created are amply and brilliantly clarified in this book. Mr Putin, Operative in the Kremlin (note the mister, not comrade) is a readable and informed portrait painted by two students of Russian history who had, at various times in their careers, a front-row view. Fiona Hill, a Brookings Institution academic, spent 2006-9 as national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the US National Intelligence Council. The economist Clifford Gaddy once advised the Russian finance ministry on regional tax and has investigated how Putin's financial dealings relate to his KGB past.”
From the outset the authors argue there is very little information regarding Putin that is “definitive, confirmable, or reliable.” However, there are observations that seem appropriate. First, Putin has shaped his overall fate. Second, there is little documentary evidence to support the idea of Putin’s extensive wealth. Even if Putin did enrich himself, the authors argue they do not believe that “a quest for personal wealth is primarily what drives him.” Third, Putin likes to employ misinformation and contradictory information to create an image that is unknowable and unpredictable, and therefore dangerous – keep people guessing and fear what he might do. Fourth, Putin likes to stage a number of outfits and scenarios to portray himself as the ultimate Russian action man, capable of dealing with every eventuality. Each outfit and scenario are designed to pay a degree of respect for certain goals and validates their place in Russian society and history. The authors present numerous examples to support these observations.
The key to the analysis presented rests on the authors breaking down Putin’s six identities which explain his actions from his rise to power, reinvigorating the Russian economy in the 2000-2012 period, controlling the oligarchs, returning to the presidency in 2013, to an aggressive foreign policy in dealing with Georgia, Ukraine and the west in general designed to restore Russia’s rightful place in the world balance of power. These identities are; Statist, History Man, Survivalist, Outsider, Free Marketeer, and Case Officer. After explaining the context of each in a succinct and thoughtful manner the authors have provided important perceptions and insights into what Putin thinks and why he does what he does.
The 1990s, a period of chaos, corruption, and economic decline form the basis of the Statist, History Man, and Survivalist identities, and Putin’s personal narrative. The next three identities the Outsider, Free Marketeer, and Case Officer are more personal. The authors center on Putin growing up in a working class neighborhood of Leningrad, a city which survived the Nazi siege, starvation, and 750,000 deaths, a situation which greatly impacted Putin’s psychological and emotional development. Further, the authors point to Putin’s years in the KGB at home and abroad, particularly his 1985-1989 years in Dresden where he missed Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost and perestroika and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Importantly, the authors develop Putin’s post-Soviet St. Petersburg activities as a participant in local government and in a series of below-the-radar positions in the Kremlin in the late 1990s allowing him to develop a unique combination of skills and experiences that propelled him to the presidency in 1999-2000. But, overall, Putin’s persona was as an Outsider as he was outside of Russia or ensconced in St. Petersburg away from policy makers in Moscow.
An excellent example of how the authors analysis works is to point to Putin’s world view through his speeches. The first, March 18, 2014, and the speech he made yesterday on September 21, 2022. Remarkably, both speeches support the conclusion that Putin’s perception of the outside world has not changed in eight years and probably from previous decades. The March 2014 speech came on the heels of the Russian annexation of Crimea a belief that he was restoring Russia’s position as a great power and world civilization. This was part of the Statist role for Putin in addition to that of the History Man internationally as he staked out a place for the Russian people in the great sweep of global history and has rewritten the narrative of Russia’s interactions with the outside world. He has acted as a Survivalist who sets out to ensure that Russia can protect itself against all external threats, by preparing and deploying “every reserve or resource-even history itself-in the state’s defense. The author’s insights are on the mark as they argue, “the operative in the Kremlin has projected himself abroad by drawing on his firsthand experiences and insights as an Outsider and the Free Marketeer, and by applying the professional tools of the Case Officer.”
Putin’s rationale for his invasion of Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea, and the current invasion of Ukraine are all similar. The European Union is a stalking horse for the West, the expansion of NATO, and western opposition to Russian actions are all designed to destroy Russia from within and without. Putin believes that containing Russia has been a western priority since the 1700s and continues in the case of Ukraine. Putin’s speech yesterday is a rerun arguing that Russia only pursues defensive actions to counteract western support for Ukraine. Threats of nuclear war, calling up 300,000 reservists to complete his “special operation” emanate from the same place in Putin’s psyche.
Putin’s disenchantment with the United states developed from 1999. The importance of NATO bombing of Yugoslavia over Kosovo in 1999 deeply impacted Putin. He saw it as a threat to Slavs and highlighted Russian weakness and distrust of the west. Putin claims that he tried to improve relations with the United States by helping after 9/11 and the war against al-Qaeda. But he was put off by the Bush administration who invaded Iraq, pulled out of nuclear arms treaties, allowed for Baltic states becoming NATO members, all reflecting America’s lack of respect for Russia. Putin’s true feelings emerge publicly in his 2007 speech at the Munich Security Conference where he lambasted the United States where he stressed how NATO actions were an American provocation that reduced the level of trust Russia had toward the west. Even when the Obama administration sought a reset with Russia, Congress passed the Sergei Magnitsky Act which imposed sanctions against Russian officials who were complicit in the death of the crusading lawyer, further Putin was angered by US actions in Libya and Syria.
The authors correctly argue that the invasion of Georgia was a dress rehearsal for events that would take place in Ukraine in December 2013. With Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych fleeing to Moscow in February 2014 after refusing to move closer to the European Union and joining Putin’s Eurasian Union protestors took to the streets in Kyiv’s Maidan (Independence) Square - the Russian autocrat would have visions of Dresden in December 1989. Putin’s assessment of developments was seen through the lens of his experiences in Dresden in 1989 when East Germany fell without a fight as did the Soviet Union upending Moscow’s position in Europe destroying the entire Soviet bloc. In Putin’s mind if Ukrainian protests were allowed to continue then Kyiv would push toward the European Union and eventually NATO membership circumventing his economic plans for the east.
Putin believed Western and European leaders encouraged protestors and the opposition and once again the United States and its EU allies had overthrown a regime without firing a shot. Since Putin strongly believed that “Ukrainians and Russians were not just fraternal peoples: there were one single, united people” events were devastating to Moscow’s goals. Putin reached into his Case Officer’s bag of tricks to punish Ukraine – cutting off $10 billion worth of trade, turning off the energy spigot, demanding Kyiv pay off its debts to Russia, the usual misinformation surrounding Ukraine’s role in World War II, and played on the fears of ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine. Based on events and Putin’s raison d’etre it is not surprising that Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, and subsequently invaded all of Ukraine eight years later.
The concise analysis and extensive research based on academic and government experience and delving into Putin’s speeches and writings serve the authors well in developing their narrative. It is clear from their analysis that Putin believes his personal destiny is that of the Russian state and its past – for him it provides legitimacy. This is Putin the Statist as he rejects autocracy and claims Russia is a “sovereign democracy.” In addition, Putin wraps himself in the Orthodox church, and the collective people of Russia – nationalism. Putin hates social upheaval and identifies himself as a Survivalist as he and his parents survived World War II in Leningrad. The Survivalist moniker is very apt when one examines Putin’s life. First, his childhood and the politics in St. Petersburg. Second, his career as Deputy Mayor when he bungled the food crisis in St. Petersburg. Third, the chronic food shortages throughout the 1990s. Fourth, dealing with the economic crisis of 2008-2010.
There are many more examples, but in all cases he emerged intact politically with a strengthened ego. He learned new strategies particularly how to manipulate Russian natural resources to achieve his goals, something he continues to do today by cutting off energy supplies to Western Europe as a means of changing the course of the war in Ukraine. Putin’s Survivalist actions comport with historian, Masha Gessen’s analysis in that he is proud of his “thuggish” reputation, and it is central to his public persona dating back to his childhood “courtyard culture,” and “outsider” status, i.e.., treatment of Chechnya in 1999, today’s Ukraine, blackmailing oligarchs to submit to his will etc.
If there is an area that the authors could have made clearer is when they get bogged down in the minutia of Putin’s approach to the Russian economy and industrial production. Putin’s mantra is “strategic planning,” a concept he plagiarized from the works of David Cleland and William King’s book, STRATEGIC PLANNING AND POLICY which he lifted to write his supposed “dissertation.” Either way the author’s final analysis is spot on – the strategic model Putin has put in place cannot work. Putin runs Russia like a corporation, Russia, Inc., but it is a country. Putin sees himself as a CEO, but he can never be fired. The system he has created is built on mistrust and all decisions run through Putin as he does not accept anything but total loyalty. People are bought off, but not in the traditional way. First they are compromised, and loyalty is created through blackmail – Putin as Case officer!
Corruption is the glue that keeps Putin’s informal system afloat. With no strategic reserve of qualified people, Putin just moves people around to keep them guessing and under his control. This hyper personalized system is a failure, and the Russian people are paying the price. Russia has come full circle. With his misinformation onslaught in 2013-14 (the rhetoric is similar to today) Putin managed to move Russia psychologically back to the 1980s and the Cold War with perceptions, threat, and fears of an American attack. By engaging in this type of former KGB head and Soviet president Yuri Andropov thinking, Putin has moved Russia closer to the world view of the 1980s more than outside observers realized. Putin’s Russia is a very different country from the 1990s and the west in general.
The book should be read by anyone seeking to understand Putin’s modus operandi, what he hopes to achieve, and the threat he presents to those who favor the rule of some type of “international accommodation,” (notice I did not say law!) Interestingly, the section where the authors allude to future Putin actions and rationales as of today seem quite accurate.
Hill and Gaddy have written a perceptive account of what Putin really wants for Russia and how it could possibly be undone. As David Hearst writes in The Guardian, May 2013; “The many sources of the system he has created are amply and brilliantly clarified in this book. Mr Putin, Operative in the Kremlin (note the mister, not comrade) is a readable and informed portrait painted by two students of Russian history who had, at various times in their careers, a front-row view. Fiona Hill, a Brookings Institution academic, spent 2006-9 as national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the US National Intelligence Council. The economist Clifford Gaddy once advised the Russian finance ministry on regional tax and has investigated how Putin's financial dealings relate to his KGB past.”
From the outset the authors argue there is very little information regarding Putin that is “definitive, confirmable, or reliable.” However, there are observations that seem appropriate. First, Putin has shaped his overall fate. Second, there is little documentary evidence to support the idea of Putin’s extensive wealth. Even if Putin did enrich himself, the authors argue they do not believe that “a quest for personal wealth is primarily what drives him.” Third, Putin likes to employ misinformation and contradictory information to create an image that is unknowable and unpredictable, and therefore dangerous – keep people guessing and fear what he might do. Fourth, Putin likes to stage a number of outfits and scenarios to portray himself as the ultimate Russian action man, capable of dealing with every eventuality. Each outfit and scenario are designed to pay a degree of respect for certain goals and validates their place in Russian society and history. The authors present numerous examples to support these observations.
The key to the analysis presented rests on the authors breaking down Putin’s six identities which explain his actions from his rise to power, reinvigorating the Russian economy in the 2000-2012 period, controlling the oligarchs, returning to the presidency in 2013, to an aggressive foreign policy in dealing with Georgia, Ukraine and the west in general designed to restore Russia’s rightful place in the world balance of power. These identities are; Statist, History Man, Survivalist, Outsider, Free Marketeer, and Case Officer. After explaining the context of each in a succinct and thoughtful manner the authors have provided important perceptions and insights into what Putin thinks and why he does what he does.
The 1990s, a period of chaos, corruption, and economic decline form the basis of the Statist, History Man, and Survivalist identities, and Putin’s personal narrative. The next three identities the Outsider, Free Marketeer, and Case Officer are more personal. The authors center on Putin growing up in a working class neighborhood of Leningrad, a city which survived the Nazi siege, starvation, and 750,000 deaths, a situation which greatly impacted Putin’s psychological and emotional development. Further, the authors point to Putin’s years in the KGB at home and abroad, particularly his 1985-1989 years in Dresden where he missed Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost and perestroika and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Importantly, the authors develop Putin’s post-Soviet St. Petersburg activities as a participant in local government and in a series of below-the-radar positions in the Kremlin in the late 1990s allowing him to develop a unique combination of skills and experiences that propelled him to the presidency in 1999-2000. But, overall, Putin’s persona was as an Outsider as he was outside of Russia or ensconced in St. Petersburg away from policy makers in Moscow.
An excellent example of how the authors analysis works is to point to Putin’s world view through his speeches. The first, March 18, 2014, and the speech he made yesterday on September 21, 2022. Remarkably, both speeches support the conclusion that Putin’s perception of the outside world has not changed in eight years and probably from previous decades. The March 2014 speech came on the heels of the Russian annexation of Crimea a belief that he was restoring Russia’s position as a great power and world civilization. This was part of the Statist role for Putin in addition to that of the History Man internationally as he staked out a place for the Russian people in the great sweep of global history and has rewritten the narrative of Russia’s interactions with the outside world. He has acted as a Survivalist who sets out to ensure that Russia can protect itself against all external threats, by preparing and deploying “every reserve or resource-even history itself-in the state’s defense. The author’s insights are on the mark as they argue, “the operative in the Kremlin has projected himself abroad by drawing on his firsthand experiences and insights as an Outsider and the Free Marketeer, and by applying the professional tools of the Case Officer.”
Putin’s rationale for his invasion of Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea, and the current invasion of Ukraine are all similar. The European Union is a stalking horse for the West, the expansion of NATO, and western opposition to Russian actions are all designed to destroy Russia from within and without. Putin believes that containing Russia has been a western priority since the 1700s and continues in the case of Ukraine. Putin’s speech yesterday is a rerun arguing that Russia only pursues defensive actions to counteract western support for Ukraine. Threats of nuclear war, calling up 300,000 reservists to complete his “special operation” emanate from the same place in Putin’s psyche.
Putin’s disenchantment with the United states developed from 1999. The importance of NATO bombing of Yugoslavia over Kosovo in 1999 deeply impacted Putin. He saw it as a threat to Slavs and highlighted Russian weakness and distrust of the west. Putin claims that he tried to improve relations with the United States by helping after 9/11 and the war against al-Qaeda. But he was put off by the Bush administration who invaded Iraq, pulled out of nuclear arms treaties, allowed for Baltic states becoming NATO members, all reflecting America’s lack of respect for Russia. Putin’s true feelings emerge publicly in his 2007 speech at the Munich Security Conference where he lambasted the United States where he stressed how NATO actions were an American provocation that reduced the level of trust Russia had toward the west. Even when the Obama administration sought a reset with Russia, Congress passed the Sergei Magnitsky Act which imposed sanctions against Russian officials who were complicit in the death of the crusading lawyer, further Putin was angered by US actions in Libya and Syria.
The authors correctly argue that the invasion of Georgia was a dress rehearsal for events that would take place in Ukraine in December 2013. With Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych fleeing to Moscow in February 2014 after refusing to move closer to the European Union and joining Putin’s Eurasian Union protestors took to the streets in Kyiv’s Maidan (Independence) Square - the Russian autocrat would have visions of Dresden in December 1989. Putin’s assessment of developments was seen through the lens of his experiences in Dresden in 1989 when East Germany fell without a fight as did the Soviet Union upending Moscow’s position in Europe destroying the entire Soviet bloc. In Putin’s mind if Ukrainian protests were allowed to continue then Kyiv would push toward the European Union and eventually NATO membership circumventing his economic plans for the east.
Putin believed Western and European leaders encouraged protestors and the opposition and once again the United States and its EU allies had overthrown a regime without firing a shot. Since Putin strongly believed that “Ukrainians and Russians were not just fraternal peoples: there were one single, united people” events were devastating to Moscow’s goals. Putin reached into his Case Officer’s bag of tricks to punish Ukraine – cutting off $10 billion worth of trade, turning off the energy spigot, demanding Kyiv pay off its debts to Russia, the usual misinformation surrounding Ukraine’s role in World War II, and played on the fears of ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine. Based on events and Putin’s raison d’etre it is not surprising that Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, and subsequently invaded all of Ukraine eight years later.
The concise analysis and extensive research based on academic and government experience and delving into Putin’s speeches and writings serve the authors well in developing their narrative. It is clear from their analysis that Putin believes his personal destiny is that of the Russian state and its past – for him it provides legitimacy. This is Putin the Statist as he rejects autocracy and claims Russia is a “sovereign democracy.” In addition, Putin wraps himself in the Orthodox church, and the collective people of Russia – nationalism. Putin hates social upheaval and identifies himself as a Survivalist as he and his parents survived World War II in Leningrad. The Survivalist moniker is very apt when one examines Putin’s life. First, his childhood and the politics in St. Petersburg. Second, his career as Deputy Mayor when he bungled the food crisis in St. Petersburg. Third, the chronic food shortages throughout the 1990s. Fourth, dealing with the economic crisis of 2008-2010.
There are many more examples, but in all cases he emerged intact politically with a strengthened ego. He learned new strategies particularly how to manipulate Russian natural resources to achieve his goals, something he continues to do today by cutting off energy supplies to Western Europe as a means of changing the course of the war in Ukraine. Putin’s Survivalist actions comport with historian, Masha Gessen’s analysis in that he is proud of his “thuggish” reputation, and it is central to his public persona dating back to his childhood “courtyard culture,” and “outsider” status, i.e.., treatment of Chechnya in 1999, today’s Ukraine, blackmailing oligarchs to submit to his will etc.
If there is an area that the authors could have made clearer is when they get bogged down in the minutia of Putin’s approach to the Russian economy and industrial production. Putin’s mantra is “strategic planning,” a concept he plagiarized from the works of David Cleland and William King’s book, STRATEGIC PLANNING AND POLICY which he lifted to write his supposed “dissertation.” Either way the author’s final analysis is spot on – the strategic model Putin has put in place cannot work. Putin runs Russia like a corporation, Russia, Inc., but it is a country. Putin sees himself as a CEO, but he can never be fired. The system he has created is built on mistrust and all decisions run through Putin as he does not accept anything but total loyalty. People are bought off, but not in the traditional way. First they are compromised, and loyalty is created through blackmail – Putin as Case officer!
Corruption is the glue that keeps Putin’s informal system afloat. With no strategic reserve of qualified people, Putin just moves people around to keep them guessing and under his control. This hyper personalized system is a failure, and the Russian people are paying the price. Russia has come full circle. With his misinformation onslaught in 2013-14 (the rhetoric is similar to today) Putin managed to move Russia psychologically back to the 1980s and the Cold War with perceptions, threat, and fears of an American attack. By engaging in this type of former KGB head and Soviet president Yuri Andropov thinking, Putin has moved Russia closer to the world view of the 1980s more than outside observers realized. Putin’s Russia is a very different country from the 1990s and the west in general.
The book should be read by anyone seeking to understand Putin’s modus operandi, what he hopes to achieve, and the threat he presents to those who favor the rule of some type of “international accommodation,” (notice I did not say law!) Interestingly, the section where the authors allude to future Putin actions and rationales as of today seem quite accurate.
October 10, 2023
(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
Это очередная книга о Путине и в очередной раз я констатирую, что автор не понял, кто такой Путин и что происходит в России в целом.
Читать западных авторов по поводу России в целом и о Путине в частности всегда легко, ибо всегда можно предсказать, что они напишут. Странно, что люди, заявляющие, что они эксперты по России, на самом деле знают о России, базируясь на том, что пишут о России СМИ (зачастую, что пишут иностранные СМИ). Да даже российские СМИ предлагают ту картинку якобы реальной России и её правительства, что иной раз удивляешься, как это люди, которые живут в России, в это могу верить? Вот примерно такое у меня возникло ощущение от этой книги, т.е. «как автор может выдавать пропаганду за реальность?».
Проблема с этой книгой состоит в том, что автор абсолютно не фильтрует, что есть имитация реальности, а что есть реальность. Первая часть книги была самой тоскливой в этом плане, ибо автор зачем-то цитировала весь этот пропагандистский бред в стиле Дугина и Проханова о «величии страны, которая встаёт с колен с помощью бывших сотрудников КГБ». В общем, очередная пугалка обывателей, которые живут на Западе. А что такой западный обыватель знает о России? Да только «КГБ», «диктатура», «железный занавес» и «водка». Нет, я не хочу сказать, что в России демократия и пр. Я хочу сказать, что любая аналогия с СССР и КГБ – всегда ошибочна. Попытка представить нынешнюю диктатуру в России как продолжение советской – неправильно. Отличия есть и они довольно существенные. Ну, взять хотя бы тот факт, что в таком огромной количестве как это имеет место в сегодняшней России, чиновники в СССР не воровали, не держали всё своё имущество на Западе и пр. Да, у партноменклатуры были государственные дачи, магазины типа «Берёзка» и пр., но они не могли себе позволить купить виллу в Италии или квартиру в Нью-Йорке. А если судить по тому, что пишет автор, разница между СССР и нынешней РФ, не велика. Ошибается автор, ибо велика и очень. Да, книга была издана, когда о Дворце в Геленджике ещё мало кто знал, но информация о недвижимости, которой владеют российские чиновники и о коррупции непомерных масштабов, люди, как в России, так и за рубежом, уже знали. То, что автор проигнорировала эту информацию говорит о том, что она так себе «эксперт по России». К чему это я? А к тому, что в этой книге Путин в очередной раз рисуется не как простой коррупционер, а как гений зла, эдакий новый Сталин или хотя бы, Андропов. Автор пишет, что чтобы понять Путина нужно посмотреть на его КГБэшное прошлое. Нет, это не верно. Если мы хотим понять, кто такой Путин, нужно смотреть на его прошлое в пору работы в мэрии Санкт-Петербурга. Я намекаю не только на знаменитое дело Салье, по поводу коррупции с Санкт-Петербуржской мэрии, а я намекаю в целом на «бандитский Петербург», на «малиновые пиджаки» и на политику Ельцина «все, что нельзя купить за деньги можно купить за очень большие деньги». Именно тогда и сформировалась личность Путина, которого мы знаем сегодня, т.е. что всех можно купить за деньги, включая западных политиков. Именно сегодня, когда весь мир увидел что «вторая армия мира» вся разворована и что все современные разработки типа танка Армата существуют чуть ли не в единственном экземпляре, мы может сделать вывод о тотальной коррупции, а не о гении стратегии и тактики, неприметном офицере КГБ, который привык всегда наблюдать со стороны. Эта книга в очередной раз пичкает западную аудиторию пирогами созданных на PR кухне в Кремле. Автор должна была знать одно из самых знаменитых и возможно самых точных определений Росси, которое дал много лет назад один француз, который был в Петербурге: Россия – страна фасадов. Это очень точное определение того, чем была Россия при царе, при генсеках и чем она является сейчас (при Ельцине-Путине). Очень многое из того что автор включила в свою книгу является чистой пропагандой, призванной убедить Россиян…в общем, в каком-то смысле в том о чём пишет автор этой книги. Только если для Россиян это является плюсом Владимира Путина, то для западного читателя, это явный минус.
Так если это всё иллюзия, PR, тогда где настоящий Путин? К сожалению, разобраться в этом достаточно тяжело, хотя можно. Но одно знать необходимо: всё что говорит и пишет Путин, является PR. Никогда, никогда нельзя верить в то, что заявляет Кремль, ибо это делается, чтобы сформировать образ, а не сказать, что на самом деле они думают. Исходя из этого, книга хоть и описывает исторические события, которые имели место, достаточно точно и информативно, т.е. подъём диктатуры Путина, но она сообщает только часть реальности, предлагая также большую дозу пропагандистского мусора.
Кстати, я не увидел, чтобы автор концентрировалась на теме нефтегазовых доходов, а ведь это – главный ключ успеха Путина в России, ибо если бы не высокие цены на нефть и газ, то никакого «офицера КГБ В. В. Путина» на посту президента после 2008 года не было бы. А возможно его не было бы и раньше. Этого автор не учитывает, а зря.
Что касается описываемых исторических событий, то об это я давно знал и ничего нового тут не увидел. Об этом же можно прочесть фактически в любой книге о современной России.
Забыл добавить самое главное. Автор ничего или почти ничего не пишет о той роли, которую играли лидеры западных стран в подъёме диктатуры Путина. Почему-то автор забыла упомянуть, про американского президента, который увидел в глазах Путина душу, про Меркель, которая чуть ли не каждый год ездила к Путину, про французского президента который в 2008 году скорее обвинял Грузию, нежели Россию в начале военного конфликта, про символические санкции после 2008 года за войну с Грузией и пр. Т.е. она это упоминает, но не говорит, что всё это вселяло уверенность в Путина, что «Запад слаб» и что он купит всех западных политиков. Как так получилось, что заявляя о ценностях свободы и демократии, Запад не только не пытался избавиться от нефтегазовой зависимости от России, но наоборот делал всё возможное, чтобы такая зависимость была максимально полной? Если верить словам автора, все понимали кто такой Путин, но тогда почему не проводили реальную политику санкций, начиная хотя бы с 2008 года? И если на то пошло, почему автор не сконцентрировалась на описании «друзей Путина», которых полным полно в Европе и которые очень сильно помогли упрочить позиции Путина как внутри страны, так и за её пределами? И действительно, как-то не очень гармонирует Саркози, Шрёдер и Берлускони в компании человека, чей образ нам хотят представить в виде типичного злого КГБэшника, который пришёл во власть и строит СССР ver. 2.0.
This is yet another book about Putin and, once again, I find that the author has not understood who Putin is and what is going on in Russia as a whole.
It is always easy to read Western authors about Russia in general and Putin in particular because you can always predict what they will write. It is strange that people who claim to be experts on Russia know about Russia based on what the media (often foreign media) write about Russia. Even the Russian media offers a picture of the allegedly real Russia and its government that sometimes makes you wonder how people who live in Russia can believe it. This is roughly the feeling I got from this book, i.e., "How can the author pass off propaganda as reality?".
The problem with this book is that the author does not filter at all what is an imitation of reality and what is reality. The first part of the book was the most dreary in this respect because the author, for some reason, quoted all that propaganda nonsense in the style of Dugin and Prokhanov about "the greatness of the country that rises from its knees with the help of former KGB officers." All in all, another scarecrow for the average people who live in the West. And what does such a Westerner know about Russia? Only "KGB," "dictatorship," "Iron Curtain" and "vodka". No, I don't want to say that Russia has democracy, etc. My point is that any analogy with the USSR and the KGB is always wrong. Trying to present the current dictatorship in Russia as a continuation of the Soviet dictatorship is wrong. There are differences, and it's significant. Well, take at least the fact that officials in the USSR did not steal as much as they do in today's Russia, did not keep all their property in the West, and so on. Yes, the Party nomenklatura had state dachas, shops like "Beryozka," (The Beryozka shops), etc., but they could not afford to buy a villa in Italy or a flat in New York. And if we judge by what the author writes, the difference between the USSR and the current Russian Federation is not big. The author is mistaken. Yes, the book was published when few people knew about the Palace in Gelendzhik (see "Putin's Palace"), but people both in Russia and abroad already knew about the real estate owned by Russian officials and about corruption of exorbitant proportions. The fact that the author ignored this information shows that she is not much of an "expert on Russia." What I mean is that this book once again portrays Putin not as a simple corruptor but as a genius of evil, a kind of new Stalin, or at least Andropov. The author writes that to understand Putin, you need to look at his KGB past. No, this is not true. If we want to understand who Putin is, we need to look at his past when he worked in the mayor's office in St. Petersburg. I am not only referring to the famous Marina Salye case, regarding corruption in the St. Petersburg mayor's office, but I am referring in general to the "gangster St. Petersburg," to the "crimson jackets," and to Yeltsin's policy of "everything that cannot be bought with money can be bought with a lot of money." This is when the personality of Putin we know today was formed, i.e. that everyone can be bought with money, including Western politicians. It is today when the whole world has seen that the "second army of the world" has been plundered and that all modern developments, such as the Armata tank, exist almost in a single copy, that we can conclude about total corruption, rather than about a genius of strategy and tactics, an inconspicuous KGB officer who is used to always watching from the sidelines. This book once again feeds a Westernised audience with pies created in the PR kitchen in the Kremlin. The author should have known one of the most famous and perhaps the most accurate definitions of Russia, which was given many years ago by a Frenchman who was in St Petersburg: Russia is a country of facades. This is a very accurate definition of what Russia was under the Tsar, under the General Secretaries, and what it is now (under Yeltsin-Putin). A lot of what the author includes in her book is pure propaganda designed to convince Russians...well, in a sense, what the author of this book is writing about.
So if this is all an illusion, PR, then where is the real Putin? Unfortunately, it is quite difficult to figure this out, although it is possible. But one thing you must know is that everything Putin says and writes is PR. You should never, ever believe what the Kremlin says because it is done to form an image, not to say what they really think. On this basis, although the book describes the historical events that took place quite accurately and informatively, i.e., the rise of Putin's dictatorship, it reports only part of the reality, offering also a large dose of propaganda rubbish. By the way, I did not see that the author concentrated on the topic of oil and gas revenues, which is the main key to Putin's success in Russia because if it were not for high oil and gas prices, there would be no "KGB officer V.V. Putin" as president after 2008. And perhaps he would not have been there even before. The author does not take this into account, and in vain.
As for the historical events described, I knew about it long ago and saw nothing new here. You can read about it in virtually any book about modern Russia.
I forgot to add the most important thing. The author writes nothing or almost nothing about the role played by the leaders of Western countries in the rise of Putin's dictatorship. Somehow the author forgot to mention the American president who saw a soul in Putin's eyes, Merkel, who visited Putin almost every year, the French president who in 2008 blamed Georgia rather than Russia for the beginning of the military conflict, symbolic sanctions after 2008 for the war with Georgia and so on. I.e., she mentions it, but she does not say that all this gave Putin confidence that "the West is weak" and that he would buy all Western politicians. How is it that while claiming the values of freedom and democracy, the West not only did not try to get rid of oil and gas dependence on Russia but on the contrary, did everything possible to make such dependence as complete as possible? If we believe the author's words, everyone understood who Putin is, but then why didn't they implement a real policy of sanctions, starting at least from 2008? And for that matter, why didn't the author concentrate on describing "Putin's friends," who are full of them in Europe and who helped strengthen Putin's position both inside and outside the country? Indeed, somehow Sarkozy, Schroeder, and Berlusconi are not very harmonious in the company of a man whose image they want to present to us in the form of a typical evil KGB man who came to power and is building the USSR ver. 2.0.
Это очередная книга о Путине и в очередной раз я констатирую, что автор не понял, кто такой Путин и что происходит в России в целом.
Читать западных авторов по поводу России в целом и о Путине в частности всегда легко, ибо всегда можно предсказать, что они напишут. Странно, что люди, заявляющие, что они эксперты по России, на самом деле знают о России, базируясь на том, что пишут о России СМИ (зачастую, что пишут иностранные СМИ). Да даже российские СМИ предлагают ту картинку якобы реальной России и её правительства, что иной раз удивляешься, как это люди, которые живут в России, в это могу верить? Вот примерно такое у меня возникло ощущение от этой книги, т.е. «как автор может выдавать пропаганду за реальность?».
Проблема с этой книгой состоит в том, что автор абсолютно не фильтрует, что есть имитация реальности, а что есть реальность. Первая часть книги была самой тоскливой в этом плане, ибо автор зачем-то цитировала весь этот пропагандистский бред в стиле Дугина и Проханова о «величии страны, которая встаёт с колен с помощью бывших сотрудников КГБ». В общем, очередная пугалка обывателей, которые живут на Западе. А что такой западный обыватель знает о России? Да только «КГБ», «диктатура», «железный занавес» и «водка». Нет, я не хочу сказать, что в России демократия и пр. Я хочу сказать, что любая аналогия с СССР и КГБ – всегда ошибочна. Попытка представить нынешнюю диктатуру в России как продолжение советской – неправильно. Отличия есть и они довольно существенные. Ну, взять хотя бы тот факт, что в таком огромной количестве как это имеет место в сегодняшней России, чиновники в СССР не воровали, не держали всё своё имущество на Западе и пр. Да, у партноменклатуры были государственные дачи, магазины типа «Берёзка» и пр., но они не могли себе позволить купить виллу в Италии или квартиру в Нью-Йорке. А если судить по тому, что пишет автор, разница между СССР и нынешней РФ, не велика. Ошибается автор, ибо велика и очень. Да, книга была издана, когда о Дворце в Геленджике ещё мало кто знал, но информация о недвижимости, которой владеют российские чиновники и о коррупции непомерных масштабов, люди, как в России, так и за рубежом, уже знали. То, что автор проигнорировала эту информацию говорит о том, что она так себе «эксперт по России». К чему это я? А к тому, что в этой книге Путин в очередной раз рисуется не как простой коррупционер, а как гений зла, эдакий новый Сталин или хотя бы, Андропов. Автор пишет, что чтобы понять Путина нужно посмотреть на его КГБэшное прошлое. Нет, это не верно. Если мы хотим понять, кто такой Путин, нужно смотреть на его прошлое в пору работы в мэрии Санкт-Петербурга. Я намекаю не только на знаменитое дело Салье, по поводу коррупции с Санкт-Петербуржской мэрии, а я намекаю в целом на «бандитский Петербург», на «малиновые пиджаки» и на политику Ельцина «все, что нельзя купить за деньги можно купить за очень большие деньги». Именно тогда и сформировалась личность Путина, которого мы знаем сегодня, т.е. что всех можно купить за деньги, включая западных политиков. Именно сегодня, когда весь мир увидел что «вторая армия мира» вся разворована и что все современные разработки типа танка Армата существуют чуть ли не в единственном экземпляре, мы может сделать вывод о тотальной коррупции, а не о гении стратегии и тактики, неприметном офицере КГБ, который привык всегда наблюдать со стороны. Эта книга в очередной раз пичкает западную аудиторию пирогами созданных на PR кухне в Кремле. Автор должна была знать одно из самых знаменитых и возможно самых точных определений Росси, которое дал много лет назад один француз, который был в Петербурге: Россия – страна фасадов. Это очень точное определение того, чем была Россия при царе, при генсеках и чем она является сейчас (при Ельцине-Путине). Очень многое из того что автор включила в свою книгу является чистой пропагандой, призванной убедить Россиян…в общем, в каком-то смысле в том о чём пишет автор этой книги. Только если для Россиян это является плюсом Владимира Путина, то для западного читателя, это явный минус.
Так если это всё иллюзия, PR, тогда где настоящий Путин? К сожалению, разобраться в этом достаточно тяжело, хотя можно. Но одно знать необходимо: всё что говорит и пишет Путин, является PR. Никогда, никогда нельзя верить в то, что заявляет Кремль, ибо это делается, чтобы сформировать образ, а не сказать, что на самом деле они думают. Исходя из этого, книга хоть и описывает исторические события, которые имели место, достаточно точно и информативно, т.е. подъём диктатуры Путина, но она сообщает только часть реальности, предлагая также большую дозу пропагандистского мусора.
Кстати, я не увидел, чтобы автор концентрировалась на теме нефтегазовых доходов, а ведь это – главный ключ успеха Путина в России, ибо если бы не высокие цены на нефть и газ, то никакого «офицера КГБ В. В. Путина» на посту президента после 2008 года не было бы. А возможно его не было бы и раньше. Этого автор не учитывает, а зря.
Что касается описываемых исторических событий, то об это я давно знал и ничего нового тут не увидел. Об этом же можно прочесть фактически в любой книге о современной России.
Забыл добавить самое главное. Автор ничего или почти ничего не пишет о той роли, которую играли лидеры западных стран в подъёме диктатуры Путина. Почему-то автор забыла упомянуть, про американского президента, который увидел в глазах Путина душу, про Меркель, которая чуть ли не каждый год ездила к Путину, про французского президента который в 2008 году скорее обвинял Грузию, нежели Россию в начале военного конфликта, про символические санкции после 2008 года за войну с Грузией и пр. Т.е. она это упоминает, но не говорит, что всё это вселяло уверенность в Путина, что «Запад слаб» и что он купит всех западных политиков. Как так получилось, что заявляя о ценностях свободы и демократии, Запад не только не пытался избавиться от нефтегазовой зависимости от России, но наоборот делал всё возможное, чтобы такая зависимость была максимально полной? Если верить словам автора, все понимали кто такой Путин, но тогда почему не проводили реальную политику санкций, начиная хотя бы с 2008 года? И если на то пошло, почему автор не сконцентрировалась на описании «друзей Путина», которых полным полно в Европе и которые очень сильно помогли упрочить позиции Путина как внутри страны, так и за её пределами? И действительно, как-то не очень гармонирует Саркози, Шрёдер и Берлускони в компании человека, чей образ нам хотят представить в виде типичного злого КГБэшника, который пришёл во власть и строит СССР ver. 2.0.
This is yet another book about Putin and, once again, I find that the author has not understood who Putin is and what is going on in Russia as a whole.
It is always easy to read Western authors about Russia in general and Putin in particular because you can always predict what they will write. It is strange that people who claim to be experts on Russia know about Russia based on what the media (often foreign media) write about Russia. Even the Russian media offers a picture of the allegedly real Russia and its government that sometimes makes you wonder how people who live in Russia can believe it. This is roughly the feeling I got from this book, i.e., "How can the author pass off propaganda as reality?".
The problem with this book is that the author does not filter at all what is an imitation of reality and what is reality. The first part of the book was the most dreary in this respect because the author, for some reason, quoted all that propaganda nonsense in the style of Dugin and Prokhanov about "the greatness of the country that rises from its knees with the help of former KGB officers." All in all, another scarecrow for the average people who live in the West. And what does such a Westerner know about Russia? Only "KGB," "dictatorship," "Iron Curtain" and "vodka". No, I don't want to say that Russia has democracy, etc. My point is that any analogy with the USSR and the KGB is always wrong. Trying to present the current dictatorship in Russia as a continuation of the Soviet dictatorship is wrong. There are differences, and it's significant. Well, take at least the fact that officials in the USSR did not steal as much as they do in today's Russia, did not keep all their property in the West, and so on. Yes, the Party nomenklatura had state dachas, shops like "Beryozka," (The Beryozka shops), etc., but they could not afford to buy a villa in Italy or a flat in New York. And if we judge by what the author writes, the difference between the USSR and the current Russian Federation is not big. The author is mistaken. Yes, the book was published when few people knew about the Palace in Gelendzhik (see "Putin's Palace"), but people both in Russia and abroad already knew about the real estate owned by Russian officials and about corruption of exorbitant proportions. The fact that the author ignored this information shows that she is not much of an "expert on Russia." What I mean is that this book once again portrays Putin not as a simple corruptor but as a genius of evil, a kind of new Stalin, or at least Andropov. The author writes that to understand Putin, you need to look at his KGB past. No, this is not true. If we want to understand who Putin is, we need to look at his past when he worked in the mayor's office in St. Petersburg. I am not only referring to the famous Marina Salye case, regarding corruption in the St. Petersburg mayor's office, but I am referring in general to the "gangster St. Petersburg," to the "crimson jackets," and to Yeltsin's policy of "everything that cannot be bought with money can be bought with a lot of money." This is when the personality of Putin we know today was formed, i.e. that everyone can be bought with money, including Western politicians. It is today when the whole world has seen that the "second army of the world" has been plundered and that all modern developments, such as the Armata tank, exist almost in a single copy, that we can conclude about total corruption, rather than about a genius of strategy and tactics, an inconspicuous KGB officer who is used to always watching from the sidelines. This book once again feeds a Westernised audience with pies created in the PR kitchen in the Kremlin. The author should have known one of the most famous and perhaps the most accurate definitions of Russia, which was given many years ago by a Frenchman who was in St Petersburg: Russia is a country of facades. This is a very accurate definition of what Russia was under the Tsar, under the General Secretaries, and what it is now (under Yeltsin-Putin). A lot of what the author includes in her book is pure propaganda designed to convince Russians...well, in a sense, what the author of this book is writing about.
So if this is all an illusion, PR, then where is the real Putin? Unfortunately, it is quite difficult to figure this out, although it is possible. But one thing you must know is that everything Putin says and writes is PR. You should never, ever believe what the Kremlin says because it is done to form an image, not to say what they really think. On this basis, although the book describes the historical events that took place quite accurately and informatively, i.e., the rise of Putin's dictatorship, it reports only part of the reality, offering also a large dose of propaganda rubbish. By the way, I did not see that the author concentrated on the topic of oil and gas revenues, which is the main key to Putin's success in Russia because if it were not for high oil and gas prices, there would be no "KGB officer V.V. Putin" as president after 2008. And perhaps he would not have been there even before. The author does not take this into account, and in vain.
As for the historical events described, I knew about it long ago and saw nothing new here. You can read about it in virtually any book about modern Russia.
I forgot to add the most important thing. The author writes nothing or almost nothing about the role played by the leaders of Western countries in the rise of Putin's dictatorship. Somehow the author forgot to mention the American president who saw a soul in Putin's eyes, Merkel, who visited Putin almost every year, the French president who in 2008 blamed Georgia rather than Russia for the beginning of the military conflict, symbolic sanctions after 2008 for the war with Georgia and so on. I.e., she mentions it, but she does not say that all this gave Putin confidence that "the West is weak" and that he would buy all Western politicians. How is it that while claiming the values of freedom and democracy, the West not only did not try to get rid of oil and gas dependence on Russia but on the contrary, did everything possible to make such dependence as complete as possible? If we believe the author's words, everyone understood who Putin is, but then why didn't they implement a real policy of sanctions, starting at least from 2008? And for that matter, why didn't the author concentrate on describing "Putin's friends," who are full of them in Europe and who helped strengthen Putin's position both inside and outside the country? Indeed, somehow Sarkozy, Schroeder, and Berlusconi are not very harmonious in the company of a man whose image they want to present to us in the form of a typical evil KGB man who came to power and is building the USSR ver. 2.0.
Read
May 22, 2017The idea behind Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin is enticing. Many recent books have endeavored to tap into the world’s interest in Russia’s leader, with varying results. An attempt at a psychological study might seem to stand apart, particularly when it so juicily breaks up Putin’s personality into six categories, each which could hold a piece to the puzzle of this mysterious yet globally prominent individual. It goes without saying that the shifty-eyed kid with the greasy lock of blond hair staring out of a black-and-white grade school photo transformed into the bare-chested, rough-tongued KGB-influenced President of Russia not only due to luck or an accident of history; this meme-inspiring, arguable totalitarian that the West loves to revile knew what he was about from an early age. Unfortunately, this book creates a flat-looking image of Putin, through the guise of showing him as a complex, multi-faceted leader.
According to the authors, Putin’s psyche can be broken down into six compartments, the perspectives through which Putin views the world. These are the statist, the “history man,” the survivalist, the outsider, the free marketer, and the case officer. A compelling premise, no? But instead of really getting into Putin’s head through these six lenses, the authors skim the surface of their knowledge of him, fixating on a limited number of episodes in his life even when Putin has offered up dozens of examples for study. Though they insist that they “concentrate on events that shaped him,” their focus is nevertheless narrow and unsatisfying.
One such episode is that of the St. Petersburg food scandal of the 1990s. The authors come back to this event repeatedly. Scant food supplies in St. Petersburg risked a protest situation. Putin was delegated to barter resources in exchange for food from foreign countries. But only a fraction of the food reached Russia’s second city. The authors come back to the food scandal so often that the reader is tired of hearing about it. While the authors indicate that some periods in Putin’s life are fuzzy, the facts regarding which cannot be verified, this cannot be an excuse for their determined focus on a limited number of situations.
The book does a couple of things well. For example, someone who wants an inside peek into the linguistic underpinnings of ideas and policies will benefit from the authors’ explanations of Russian terminology and the choice of one word over another in speeches and official documents. The authors explain such terms as vlast’, or government authority, vs. gosudarstvo, or the state, as a way of illustrating political players’ intentions and motivations. Though sources about Russian politics and history often refer to the following particularities of Russian language, the authors of Mr. Putin create greater clarity by giving them context:
For students of Russian language, those interested in Russian politics, or word nerds in general, the book provides a wealth of opportunity to get down and dirty with the Russian political vocabulary.
While some aspects of Putin’s several roles/personalities feel insufficiently argued, those who look to Russian history for answers to the current Russian state of affairs will appreciate the authors’ nod to Russia’s tsarist past with respect to Putin’s image of himself. The authors argue that Putin has resurrected the idea of a constitutional monarchy, with himself as president in place of the tsar or emperor. Putin looked to Peter the Great for inspiration into building a great government bureaucracy, calling its officials chinovniki in reference to Pyotr Velikiy’s Table of Ranks, and he has turned to “White Russian” emigres for support of his ideas; White Russians were anticommunists and often in support of the monarchy, with nobility and other individuals loyal to the tsar making up their greatest number. Furthermore, as the authors argue, his “tough boss” persona ties in with the historical idea of the “Good Tsar,” who sees the concerns of the narod, or the people, as important no matter their size—through this image, Putin pretends that he, above all others and despite interference from self-serving parties, is able to get to the heart of “the people’s” problems to fix them, imitating the tsarist father figure who guides, protects, and helps his “children” or subjects. Combine these careful choices about language, constituency, and images with Putin’s alignment with the Orthodox Church and the concept that the tsar was closest of all people to God, and we can clearly draw the line from the Russian monarchs to today’s Putin presidency.
Clearly, and as the book indicates, there is more to Putin than Putin himself: Russian culture and history have also shaped Putin’s presidency, and he uses these important elements to his advantage. Whether they are more intentionally strategic or subtly instinctive, or a combination of calculated intuition, it matters little. Putin’s understanding and manipulation of the Russian psyche has facilitated his rise to the top. Perhaps his six personas have enabled him to more successfully control his personal and Russia’s political situation, but breaking down his character into separate parts may be an oversimplification.
Regardless of whether Mr. Putin is a successful psychological biography, it nevertheless contributes to the body of work on Russia’s most influential person and how he has molded the country’s course during his tenure. Mr. Putin is at least a considered, thoughtful, and focused book about Russia’s president, in contrast to the many poorly written books that exist about twenty-first century Russia and its most influential political figures. It may also appeal to those who seek to have a broader understanding of why Russia has taken the direction it has by revealing behind-the-scenes factors that may not be immediately clear to someone who is newly arrived to the topic.
According to the authors, Putin’s psyche can be broken down into six compartments, the perspectives through which Putin views the world. These are the statist, the “history man,” the survivalist, the outsider, the free marketer, and the case officer. A compelling premise, no? But instead of really getting into Putin’s head through these six lenses, the authors skim the surface of their knowledge of him, fixating on a limited number of episodes in his life even when Putin has offered up dozens of examples for study. Though they insist that they “concentrate on events that shaped him,” their focus is nevertheless narrow and unsatisfying.
One such episode is that of the St. Petersburg food scandal of the 1990s. The authors come back to this event repeatedly. Scant food supplies in St. Petersburg risked a protest situation. Putin was delegated to barter resources in exchange for food from foreign countries. But only a fraction of the food reached Russia’s second city. The authors come back to the food scandal so often that the reader is tired of hearing about it. While the authors indicate that some periods in Putin’s life are fuzzy, the facts regarding which cannot be verified, this cannot be an excuse for their determined focus on a limited number of situations.
The book does a couple of things well. For example, someone who wants an inside peek into the linguistic underpinnings of ideas and policies will benefit from the authors’ explanations of Russian terminology and the choice of one word over another in speeches and official documents. The authors explain such terms as vlast’, or government authority, vs. gosudarstvo, or the state, as a way of illustrating political players’ intentions and motivations. Though sources about Russian politics and history often refer to the following particularities of Russian language, the authors of Mr. Putin create greater clarity by giving them context:
The Duma committee’s use of the term Russkaya ideya had a very specific resonance in the debate about a national idea. It underscored the ethnic Russian elements of the concept, not its more neutral attributes, which would have come under the rubric of a Rossiyskaya ideya. Russkiy is the adjective associated with ethnic Russianness, while rossiyskiy is derived from Rossiya, or Russia, the name of the state.
For students of Russian language, those interested in Russian politics, or word nerds in general, the book provides a wealth of opportunity to get down and dirty with the Russian political vocabulary.
While some aspects of Putin’s several roles/personalities feel insufficiently argued, those who look to Russian history for answers to the current Russian state of affairs will appreciate the authors’ nod to Russia’s tsarist past with respect to Putin’s image of himself. The authors argue that Putin has resurrected the idea of a constitutional monarchy, with himself as president in place of the tsar or emperor. Putin looked to Peter the Great for inspiration into building a great government bureaucracy, calling its officials chinovniki in reference to Pyotr Velikiy’s Table of Ranks, and he has turned to “White Russian” emigres for support of his ideas; White Russians were anticommunists and often in support of the monarchy, with nobility and other individuals loyal to the tsar making up their greatest number. Furthermore, as the authors argue, his “tough boss” persona ties in with the historical idea of the “Good Tsar,” who sees the concerns of the narod, or the people, as important no matter their size—through this image, Putin pretends that he, above all others and despite interference from self-serving parties, is able to get to the heart of “the people’s” problems to fix them, imitating the tsarist father figure who guides, protects, and helps his “children” or subjects. Combine these careful choices about language, constituency, and images with Putin’s alignment with the Orthodox Church and the concept that the tsar was closest of all people to God, and we can clearly draw the line from the Russian monarchs to today’s Putin presidency.
Clearly, and as the book indicates, there is more to Putin than Putin himself: Russian culture and history have also shaped Putin’s presidency, and he uses these important elements to his advantage. Whether they are more intentionally strategic or subtly instinctive, or a combination of calculated intuition, it matters little. Putin’s understanding and manipulation of the Russian psyche has facilitated his rise to the top. Perhaps his six personas have enabled him to more successfully control his personal and Russia’s political situation, but breaking down his character into separate parts may be an oversimplification.
Regardless of whether Mr. Putin is a successful psychological biography, it nevertheless contributes to the body of work on Russia’s most influential person and how he has molded the country’s course during his tenure. Mr. Putin is at least a considered, thoughtful, and focused book about Russia’s president, in contrast to the many poorly written books that exist about twenty-first century Russia and its most influential political figures. It may also appeal to those who seek to have a broader understanding of why Russia has taken the direction it has by revealing behind-the-scenes factors that may not be immediately clear to someone who is newly arrived to the topic.
May 14, 2022
4.2-4.5 stars. "Mr. Putin" is indeed a very good book.
What did I like most?
1. This is not a traditional biography that depicts tons of meaningless facts in chronological order. The author has proposed some sort of a conceptual model ("dimensions" of Putin as a person) and then has dedicated a chapter to each aspect of his figure (how he tries to present himself or what does he do that can be associated with a given perspective: e.g. "a statesman" or "a survivalist"). That works surprisingly well.
2. The book sounds surprisingly objective and good when it comes to avoiding being judgemental. E.g. it's clearly stated that Putin has done a lot e.g. to eliminate Russian foreign debt and there were certain positive consequences of that.
3. The analysis here is purely geopolitical, not psychological. The author doesn't try to create a depiction of a monster, psychopath, or even a ruthless KGB agent. She tries (very hard) to do well when it comes to understanding his actual way of thinking - all the cultural differences, sentiment for a past Soviet Empire glory, etc. I believe it was not easy, but the author apparently did really well here.
Unfortunately, there are parts I didn't like:
1. It's clear that the author didn't do sufficiently extensive research in some cases. E.g., she does not a complete picture of the Janukovitch crisis and why people well rebelling. In fact, her simplifications here are HARMFUL to the general narration. It's like she doesn't really understand what has caused "the colorful revolutions". That was very unexpected.
2. While the analysis of Putin's western geopolitics sound quite accurate and correct (but Schroeder's thread is far from complete TBH), the eastern one lacks detail and elaboration - especially when it comes to: China and some former Soviet republics (e.g., Kazakhstan, Belarus)
In the end - I got pretty much what I expected. The book succeeds in the most important category: describing how Putin thinks, what are the main motivations behind his actions, what are his goals and why he thinks he has rights to do so. Recommended.
What did I like most?
1. This is not a traditional biography that depicts tons of meaningless facts in chronological order. The author has proposed some sort of a conceptual model ("dimensions" of Putin as a person) and then has dedicated a chapter to each aspect of his figure (how he tries to present himself or what does he do that can be associated with a given perspective: e.g. "a statesman" or "a survivalist"). That works surprisingly well.
2. The book sounds surprisingly objective and good when it comes to avoiding being judgemental. E.g. it's clearly stated that Putin has done a lot e.g. to eliminate Russian foreign debt and there were certain positive consequences of that.
3. The analysis here is purely geopolitical, not psychological. The author doesn't try to create a depiction of a monster, psychopath, or even a ruthless KGB agent. She tries (very hard) to do well when it comes to understanding his actual way of thinking - all the cultural differences, sentiment for a past Soviet Empire glory, etc. I believe it was not easy, but the author apparently did really well here.
Unfortunately, there are parts I didn't like:
1. It's clear that the author didn't do sufficiently extensive research in some cases. E.g., she does not a complete picture of the Janukovitch crisis and why people well rebelling. In fact, her simplifications here are HARMFUL to the general narration. It's like she doesn't really understand what has caused "the colorful revolutions". That was very unexpected.
2. While the analysis of Putin's western geopolitics sound quite accurate and correct (but Schroeder's thread is far from complete TBH), the eastern one lacks detail and elaboration - especially when it comes to: China and some former Soviet republics (e.g., Kazakhstan, Belarus)
In the end - I got pretty much what I expected. The book succeeds in the most important category: describing how Putin thinks, what are the main motivations behind his actions, what are his goals and why he thinks he has rights to do so. Recommended.
March 16, 2022
That was one of the most clearly written and eye-opening books I've read about Russia and Putin. Although the author obviously has little sympathy towards Putin, the analysis of his background as an operative, of the forming of his modus operandi puts a lot of things in the right perspective and enables us to obtain a better understanding of the current situation in Ukraine.
I only wish that publishers would choose narrators who have some basic grasp of the language that - due to the subject matter - is omnipresent throughout the book (Russian in this case). It is really annoying to listen to them stumble over words that a Russian speaker is supposed to understand, but only befuddle them.
I only wish that publishers would choose narrators who have some basic grasp of the language that - due to the subject matter - is omnipresent throughout the book (Russian in this case). It is really annoying to listen to them stumble over words that a Russian speaker is supposed to understand, but only befuddle them.
March 20, 2021
This was a dense read, one that I had to read in little snippets so that I would not lose focus. It was very interesting though - shedding some light on who Putin is and how Russia works under his rule. Not a page turner or a bedtime book, but definitely one worth reading if you are interested in Geopolitics and international relations.
October 11, 2018
great book overall and does try to be exceedingly fair, but there were some annoying sections (do you really need 40 pages to talk about a thesis that he probably didn't even write???) and a little too much unfounded psychoanalysis
June 1, 2020
The portions I read of this are very good, but events have overtaken its urgency. Perhaps I will return to it someday.
March 11, 2022
An absolutely fascinating examination of one of the most poorly understood political figures (largely by his own design) of this age. Gaddy and Hill's commentary provide a fair and clear-sighted insight into Vladimir Putin's political development and the grounding of his nationalistic values and policies. While this was written in 2014, on the background of other incursions into Ukrainian territory, it certainly makes discomfiting (and prescient) reading today.
April 7, 2023
A very lucid and probing account on Vladimir Putin's many personalites.
August 2, 2021
I would not say that this book made me sympathetic to Putin, but it was clear-eyed in explaining his perspective. He got his start in the KGB and was deployed to East Germany, at one point having to deal with an angry mob when the Eastern Bloc was collapsing. His time away from Russia during the fall of Communism is important because he was not around to see the cracks in the system and the realization that it was coming apart. He also did not understand the rationale behind Perestroika. Hill and Gaddy point out that Putin feels more affinity with Germans than he does with Americans, as he speaks German as a result of his time in Dresden and had a lot of exposure to German people and culture, whereas the US remains a mystery to him because he did not have much experience with Americans.
He then became a key figure in his native St. Petersburg, approving business licenses for Western companies and seeing first-hand the economic devastation that took place after the USSR came apart. (This is where the concept of Putin as "the Statist" arrives. He saw the Soviet state degrade and concluded that nothing like that could happen again because nothing is worse than anarchy.) He specifically took a lesson from the shortages that St. Petersburg suffered at the time, thus informing his later policies of always making sure to hoard reserves (currency, grain, oil, etc.), which is where Hill and Gaddy get the concept of Putin as "the Survivalist." However, because he grew up in a Communist system, he never got a sense for how private business should work and still struggles with the concept. (Hill and Gaddy refer to Putin as the "Free Marketeer," but they do not use the concept in the same way that an American might. Putin believes in private business, but always serving the interests of the state and often subject to state control.)
Hill makes is clear that Putin is a careful, calculated figure. He is careful not to appear weak, as he learned when he was harangued by locals after a crisis. He has Reagan's sense for stage managing his appearance, with a great example being his tendency to find local officials or business figures to attack in public so he always comes across as an advocate for the people. I was surprised to find that he likes to emphasize and celebrate the multicultural nature of Russia and although he plays up the Orthodox Church as an essential part of Russian identity, he's quite friendly to the Jews and sees them as an essential part of the Russian fabric.
His fall-out with the US was interesting. He wanted to ally with the George W. Bush Administration in the aftermath of 9/11, seeing that the US and Russia had shared interests in dealing with Muslim opposition forces, but Bush had no interest in cooperating with the Russians. Then Bush authorized the invasion of Iraq and Putin concluded that Bush was both reckless and ignorant, a threat to the established order capable of making a huge blunder. Vlad wasn't wrong!
Putin as "the History Man" was also interesting to me. It's simplistic to say that he wants to be a new Czar or General Secretary. He identifies, for example, with Piotr Stolypin, who attempted to reform the decaying Tsarist system in the aftermath of the 1905 Revolution, but was not able to get Nicholas II to commit to his ideas and was ultimately assassinated in 1912. Putin is steeped in Russia's history, especially the numerous instances of foreign invasions, and therefore acted in Georgia and then Ukraine to push back on Western encroachments. He was inherently skeptical of the Ukrainian pro-democracy movement, as he assumed that the West would manipulate a local movement to advance its own interests because that's what Putin would do in a similar situation.
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publicat...
He then became a key figure in his native St. Petersburg, approving business licenses for Western companies and seeing first-hand the economic devastation that took place after the USSR came apart. (This is where the concept of Putin as "the Statist" arrives. He saw the Soviet state degrade and concluded that nothing like that could happen again because nothing is worse than anarchy.) He specifically took a lesson from the shortages that St. Petersburg suffered at the time, thus informing his later policies of always making sure to hoard reserves (currency, grain, oil, etc.), which is where Hill and Gaddy get the concept of Putin as "the Survivalist." However, because he grew up in a Communist system, he never got a sense for how private business should work and still struggles with the concept. (Hill and Gaddy refer to Putin as the "Free Marketeer," but they do not use the concept in the same way that an American might. Putin believes in private business, but always serving the interests of the state and often subject to state control.)
Hill makes is clear that Putin is a careful, calculated figure. He is careful not to appear weak, as he learned when he was harangued by locals after a crisis. He has Reagan's sense for stage managing his appearance, with a great example being his tendency to find local officials or business figures to attack in public so he always comes across as an advocate for the people. I was surprised to find that he likes to emphasize and celebrate the multicultural nature of Russia and although he plays up the Orthodox Church as an essential part of Russian identity, he's quite friendly to the Jews and sees them as an essential part of the Russian fabric.
His fall-out with the US was interesting. He wanted to ally with the George W. Bush Administration in the aftermath of 9/11, seeing that the US and Russia had shared interests in dealing with Muslim opposition forces, but Bush had no interest in cooperating with the Russians. Then Bush authorized the invasion of Iraq and Putin concluded that Bush was both reckless and ignorant, a threat to the established order capable of making a huge blunder. Vlad wasn't wrong!
Putin as "the History Man" was also interesting to me. It's simplistic to say that he wants to be a new Czar or General Secretary. He identifies, for example, with Piotr Stolypin, who attempted to reform the decaying Tsarist system in the aftermath of the 1905 Revolution, but was not able to get Nicholas II to commit to his ideas and was ultimately assassinated in 1912. Putin is steeped in Russia's history, especially the numerous instances of foreign invasions, and therefore acted in Georgia and then Ukraine to push back on Western encroachments. He was inherently skeptical of the Ukrainian pro-democracy movement, as he assumed that the West would manipulate a local movement to advance its own interests because that's what Putin would do in a similar situation.
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publicat...
March 19, 2020
I've just finished this book, co-authored by Fiona Hill as well as Mr Gaddy (Goodreads should have included her name!) I picked it up because I wanted fo find out more about Ms Hill, who gave testimony in private to the House Intelligence Committee re Trump's Impeachment. I found what she had to say (from the transcripts) smart and powerful.
Glad I did. This is a dense, academic account (Ms Hill has a Masters in Russian and a PhD in history from Harvard) of the several guises of Mr P, of which "Operative" is possibly the most important. The word is used to describe his work in the KGB and its successor group, and it incorporates, the authors argue, lessons he learned in his intelligence training and activity to hone his other (dis)guises. It doesn't pretend to be a complete biography, but is a keen analysis of his rise to power and his successful attempts to hold on to it for 14 years. The book was published in 2015 and ends with his manipulation in a "21st century war" of Ukraine.
If you're interested in Russian history, Putin and his political actions, or even if the Ukraine debacle that is at the center of the impeachment hearings going on literally today, I highly recommend it - and if you read my review in mid to late November 2019 - I'd put down whatever else you're reading at the moment and read it IN the moment so to speak.
Glad I did. This is a dense, academic account (Ms Hill has a Masters in Russian and a PhD in history from Harvard) of the several guises of Mr P, of which "Operative" is possibly the most important. The word is used to describe his work in the KGB and its successor group, and it incorporates, the authors argue, lessons he learned in his intelligence training and activity to hone his other (dis)guises. It doesn't pretend to be a complete biography, but is a keen analysis of his rise to power and his successful attempts to hold on to it for 14 years. The book was published in 2015 and ends with his manipulation in a "21st century war" of Ukraine.
If you're interested in Russian history, Putin and his political actions, or even if the Ukraine debacle that is at the center of the impeachment hearings going on literally today, I highly recommend it - and if you read my review in mid to late November 2019 - I'd put down whatever else you're reading at the moment and read it IN the moment so to speak.
November 18, 2025
Finished: 26.11.2019
Genre: non-fiction
Rating: B+
Quick Scan
I am watching the Impeachment Hearings
...on television this week. (21-25 November)
The officials who testified were nearly all career diplomats and
nonpartisan experts, professionals.
They decided, at genuine risk, to fulfill their
legal and moral obligation” to appear before Congress.
I was so impressed by Dr. Fiona Hill.
...for her smarts, directness, and her steely self-confidence
She said she felt a “duty” to testify.
She is an example to many potential witnesses who
...will not testify...to finally "woman-up".
Dr. Fiona Hill was NOT someone the Republicans wanted to hear from.
I KNEW after her testimony...I had to read her book!
Conclusion:
Why is Putin the world's new strong guy
...and why should you know more about him?
Read this impressive book for beginners
Putin 101.
Russia has an
-- economy the size of Spain
-- corruption on a par with Papua New Guinea
-- life expectancy below Libya
But Putin is still the puppet master and is pulling the strings!
-- well-armed, largely professional fighting force
-- is politically more astute than the West
-- sticks by his allies.
-- plays to his strengths
-- does not buckle under pressure...he adapts.
-- does not create a vacuum that can be filled by a rival power
March 17, 2022
It isn't a book about Russia as a country or its geopolitics (partially). This book tries to build an image of Putin as a person who is on the task he claimed for himself.
It goes into Putin's past and present (by 2015), his previous experience, skills, and how he built his world view based on it. Then it goes into how it shapes his vision and the mission he embarked on for Russia.
I've read it during the 2020 war on Ukraine. It correctly depicts the mindset of a person who took on such a mission and correlates with many actions during this war. It also matches my conclusions from "Dragons and the Snakes" (recommended).
If you think that Mr. Putin is a mad man, read this book. He isn't mad - he has a plan, which comes from his past experience, skills, and how he deploys those skills in action on the geopolitical front.
I found it very informative and gave good insights into what might come out of Russia in the future.
Recommended if you want to grasp why Mr. Putin and Russia behave in the way they behave right now, from the angle of its leader.
It goes into Putin's past and present (by 2015), his previous experience, skills, and how he built his world view based on it. Then it goes into how it shapes his vision and the mission he embarked on for Russia.
I've read it during the 2020 war on Ukraine. It correctly depicts the mindset of a person who took on such a mission and correlates with many actions during this war. It also matches my conclusions from "Dragons and the Snakes" (recommended).
If you think that Mr. Putin is a mad man, read this book. He isn't mad - he has a plan, which comes from his past experience, skills, and how he deploys those skills in action on the geopolitical front.
I found it very informative and gave good insights into what might come out of Russia in the future.
Recommended if you want to grasp why Mr. Putin and Russia behave in the way they behave right now, from the angle of its leader.
October 19, 2014
Hill and Gaddy provide a unique analysis of Vladimir Putin through his six major "identities". Overall it is a fair book, not the usual Putin-bashing that is so typical here. If you are interested in Russia and/or President Putin, you will probably enjoy it.
April 9, 2022
I've started to see the current 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine as a personal Putin project to resurrect a romanticized Soviet glory and part of a series of such motivated conflicts in the region. This book goes from Putin's rather lackluster if mysterious career with state spying in East Germany to leadership in St. Petersburg to rising to the top in post-Yeltsin Russia. As for the regional incursions by Russia, this book draws a straight line from the effective appeasement of NATO and the West in the Russo-Georgian War (2008) to the 2014 annexation of Crimea and inflaming separatist notions in eastern Ukraine.
April 17, 2022
This is a superb analysis of Putin. An intellectual biography and something of a limited focus psychological assessment. Given what is currently taking place in Eastern Europe, and the potential for global escalation, this may very well be the most important book currently in print.
May 9, 2022
very nice overview of Putin's Russia, though the second half of the book is a considerably weaker read than the first
December 20, 2022
The approach in this book is necessarily not the traditional biographical one, mostly due to the lack of information about Putin's life. Instead, we are shown the 'types' within which Putin has built his life, political and otherwise, and has operated and presented himself. These are proposed and explored through his career decisions, networks, and political decisions. (My description is nowhere near as well expressed as it is in the book.) It's a very good basis for examining a political life.
This has given me a new insight to Putin's 'marketing' of himself, which makes sense in the light of Russian understanding, but not necessarily in other cultures and countries. It is also interesting to consider why Putin believes what he does about Russia, and what he does about the non-Russian world.
This has given me a new insight to Putin's 'marketing' of himself, which makes sense in the light of Russian understanding, but not necessarily in other cultures and countries. It is also interesting to consider why Putin believes what he does about Russia, and what he does about the non-Russian world.
March 7, 2023
With the one-year anniversary of Russians invation of Ukraine, I find it ever so important and relevat to understand Mr. Putin. The authors do a great job of opening a window into the mind of Vladimir Putin.
February 8, 2018
Important read, but repetitive.
The West doesn't understand Putin - this book fills in the blanks. However, the authors do repeat themselves. The book could have used a better editor.
The West doesn't understand Putin - this book fills in the blanks. However, the authors do repeat themselves. The book could have used a better editor.
February 6, 2022
Putin declared that he told himself that [ensuring the success of Russia] was “my mission, [my] historical mission,” and he was determined to accomplish it, even if it meant the end of his career as a politician. “That may sound like bombast,” he told his biographers. “But it's the truth.”
WHAT IS THIS BOOK ABOUT?
- The book is an effort to figure out who Mr. Putin is in terms of his motivations—what drives him to act as he does? Rather than present a chronicle of events in which Putin played a role, we concentrate on events that shaped him.
ASPECTS OF PUTIN’S IDENTITY
- We term these identities the Statist, the History Man, the Survivalist, the Outsider, the Free Marketeer, and the Case Officer.
- The first three identities help explain Mr. Putin's goals, while the next three—the Outsider, the Free Marketeer, and the Case Officer—are more personal.
LESSONS LEARNED
- First, many in the West underestimate Putin's willingness to fight for as long and as hard (and as dirty) as necessary to achieve his goals.
- Second, Western observers misread his skill as a strategist. Putin is not, as some have said, a mere tactician. He thinks strategically, and he has great advantages over Western leaders in his ability to translate that thinking into action.
- Vladimir Putin needs to be taken seriously. He will make good on every promise or threat.
- In the domestic and foreign policy arenas, Putin constantly sizes up his opponents and probes for physical and psychological weaknesses.
- If they are prepared to fight, and he is outweighed or outgunned by his adversaries, then he will look for unconventional moves that get around their defenses so that he can outmaneuver them.
- His image is carefully branded and rebranded. Putin's appearances and public pronouncements are highly orchestrated and well prepared.
- Vladimir Putin is, and is supposed to be, unknowable to the outsider. The goal is to keep everyone confused and off balance.
PUTIN AS A PLANNER, LEADER
- The notion that Putin is an opportunist, at best an improviser, but not a strategist, is a dangerous misread.
- for Putin, strategic planning is contingency planning. There is no step-by-step blueprint. There are strategic objectives, and there are many ways to achieve those objectives. Exactly what Putin's next step will be toward his objectives depends on the circumstances. It also depends on how his adversary reacts.
- As Russia's president, Putin is the Statist set on restoring, consolidating, and defending Russia's position.
- Another aspect of Putin's strategic approach is to simplify and streamline his leadership at home and his interactions abroad. By creating a system in which he has to deal with only a small number of actors, Putin frees himself from having to deal with details and messy dynamics…and he steps in only if things go wrong and he has to put things back on track.
DYNAMICS OF PUTIN’S ‘IDENTITIES’
- Putin is primarily the Statist and the Survivalist when it comes to foreign policy—his priority is the defense of Russia and his position.
- When Putin prepares for action abroad he falls back on his Case Officer identity and methods, including resorting to forms of blackmail, intimidation, punishment, and blatant distortion of the truth.
- Here, the History Man identity is fused with the Case Officer. History is a tool, and as a student of Russian history, Putin knows how to use narratives and symbolic events as weapons in waging information war.
- The Free Marketeer identity comes into play along with the Case Officer and History Man. Putin relies on wheeling and dealing and exploiting the economic vulnerabilities of others to gain additional leverage.
- The one identity that does not quite play out in foreign policy in the same way it does at home is the Outsider.
- He does live and operate “in another world,” as Chancellor Angela Merkel reportedly put it in March 2014. But the effective Outsider cannot live in a different world than those he observes.
- Ultimately, in pursuing his goals as the Statist, Putin remains a pragmatist.
PUTIN’S DESIRED GOVERNANCE
- Western-style democracy and open markets are a clear threat to a Russian political system that thrives as a closed one-boy network and an economic protection racket.
- For Putin, Russia is the only sovereign state in this neighborhood. None of the other states, in his view, has truly independent standing—they all have contingent sovereignty.
A GAME OF “CHICKEN” AND THE LONG GAME
- In Ukraine and elsewhere in Russia's neighborhood, Putin wants the West to sue for peace without jumping into the military war phase. The 2014 war is essentially a big (war) game of “chicken.”
- This game of chicken will be a long one. Putin's goal is security for Russia and his system. The means to achieve that goal is deterrence. As has often been pointed out, the Russian word for security, bezopasnost’, means literally “absence of danger or threat.” As a result, there is no definitive endgame.
- Putin's operational aims will continue to be to find the weaknesses in Western defenses, to goad and intimidate Western leaders and publics, and to make sure everyone knows he will make good on his threats. The onus will now be on the West to shore up its own home defenses, reduce the economic and political vulnerabilities, and create its own contingency plans if it wants to counter Vladimir Putin's new twenty-first-century warfare.
“A NEW KIND OF WAR”
- a “new kind of war” was being fought, one that involved the greater use of “nonmilitary methods to achieve political and strategic goals”: The emphasis in methods of struggle is shifting toward widespread use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary measures, implemented through the involvement of the protest potential of the population. All this is supplemented by covert military measures, including implementation of measures of information struggle and the actions of special operations forces. Overt use of force, often under the guise of peacekeeping and crisis management, occurs only at a certain stage, primarily to achieve definitive success in the conflict.
- “new way of war” that required “the close coordination of military, intelligence and information operations.”
- The GRU (Russia's military intelligence) first took the lead in Crimea. When the theater of operations shifted to eastern Ukraine, the Federal Security Service (FSB) was at the forefront, having “thoroughly penetrated the Ukrainian security apparatus…[and]…encouraged defections and monitored Kyiv's plans.”…the task for the Russian military was “to rattle sabres loudly on the border” for maximum effect…“as Gerasimov says…the war is everywhere.”
- January 2013 speech, he repeated the idea that twenty-first-century wars were first fought by nonmilitary means (political, information, supported by “international nongovernmental organizations”) followed by a military phase.
EVERYTHING IS SEEN AS AN INPUT TO THE LONG-TERM SCENARIO
- every event and development in the Ukraine crisis became a new scenario input.
- Military units and their commanders, whether involved in actual operations or formal training exercises, assume that what they are being deployed for is real.
- [New events seen as] “new inputs” into the situation.
*** *** *** *** ***
FACTOIDS
- the 2014 Olympics coincided with the 150th anniversary of the expulsion of the Circassian peoples from the Russian Caucasus to the Ottoman Empire. That expulsion effectively marked the end of the nineteenth-century Circassian Wars and Russia's final conquest of the region.
- being expelled from the community (literally ex-communication)
- a group of Viking raiders—the Rus’, who gave their name to the territory—
- [Putin] is the only Russian leader to have lived abroad since Vladimir Lenin and the early Bolsheviks.
BONUS
- (2014) Putin signs document to annex Crimea as part of Russian Federation: https://youtu.be/MaS0QXAoO_k
- ‘Madman Theory’ (famously employed by Nixon): https://youtu.be/ew8qiiDeZ6Q
- Author compares Putin’s persona changes to UK kid’s show character ‘Mr Benn’: https://youtu.be/CL3HsJlKATk
- Putin’s rise to power: https://youtu.be/lxMWSmKieuc
- Putin does fireside chat-style shows to go “one-on-one” with the public: https://youtu.be/w1aAcXUVX4I
- What is the Eurasian Economic Union?: https://youtu.be/q0XILaj8JeY
- Annexation of Crimea (2014): https://youtu.be/vYDxOnDGpHc
- Putin knew Merkel fears dogs so he brought one to their meeting: https://youtu.be/TY3jpVh0zTk
- 1954 USSR transfer of Crimea to Ukraine: https://youtu.be/-eVr3RqnCRA
September 6, 2020
When I tuned in to President Trump’s impeachment trial at the end of 2019, I was impressed with the testimony of Fiona Hill, at that time former Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European and Russian Affairs on Trump’s National Security Council. Her credentials seemed impeccable, and I told myself I would read the book she co-authors with Mr. Gaddy.
The Hill/Gaddy team paint a portrait of Russian President Vladimir Putin that is not personal. They do not delve much into his upbringing or family life, only as those elements may apply to his long political life. They formulate what they refer to as Putin’s six identities, by which the book is structured: “the Statist, the History Man, the Survivalist, the Outsider, the Free Marketeer, and the (KGB) Case Officer (18).” The man manipulates or exploits each one of these identities in order to further his own career, his own strategies, and each study is an eye-opening view into the life of the real Mr. Putin.
Mr. Putin declares himself to be a gosudarstvennik, “a builder of the state, a servant of the state . . . a person who believes that Russia must be and must have a strong state” (40). The State is of ultimate importance, not the individual. Hill/Gaddy claim that “Putin continued with an analysis that echoed the language of the tsarist statist school, noting that Russia will ‘muscle up’ by ‘being open to change’ through state-sanctioned procedures and rules’” (55). The authors reinforce what President Obama once said of Putin, that Putin still maintains a nineteenth-century view of the world. He may utilize some of the tactics he learns while serving in the KGB, but his worldview is rooted in a glorified, pre-Soviet past.
To summarize most of the other five areas, Putin manipulates history to strengthen his power. He is a survivalist who will do anything to get what he wants. Ultimately, his sense of strategy (over tactics, which only serve to fulfill his overarching set of goals) is one of his greatest strengths, one that Hill/Gaddy claim the West underestimates at its own peril. A man who creates a long-term strategy for the success of his State and is willing to do anything to see that it succeeds is to be to watched very carefully, something that the authors indicate the West has failed to do thus far. The West must see clearly how the man views himself, and the West, while not forfeiting its own values, must develop strategies for dealing with him, ones that realistically exploit his perceived strengths and weaknesses. Until the man is taken seriously, the rest of the world cannot deal with him in a realistic manner, and such a stance is not good for the world.
The Hill/Gaddy team paint a portrait of Russian President Vladimir Putin that is not personal. They do not delve much into his upbringing or family life, only as those elements may apply to his long political life. They formulate what they refer to as Putin’s six identities, by which the book is structured: “the Statist, the History Man, the Survivalist, the Outsider, the Free Marketeer, and the (KGB) Case Officer (18).” The man manipulates or exploits each one of these identities in order to further his own career, his own strategies, and each study is an eye-opening view into the life of the real Mr. Putin.
Mr. Putin declares himself to be a gosudarstvennik, “a builder of the state, a servant of the state . . . a person who believes that Russia must be and must have a strong state” (40). The State is of ultimate importance, not the individual. Hill/Gaddy claim that “Putin continued with an analysis that echoed the language of the tsarist statist school, noting that Russia will ‘muscle up’ by ‘being open to change’ through state-sanctioned procedures and rules’” (55). The authors reinforce what President Obama once said of Putin, that Putin still maintains a nineteenth-century view of the world. He may utilize some of the tactics he learns while serving in the KGB, but his worldview is rooted in a glorified, pre-Soviet past.
To summarize most of the other five areas, Putin manipulates history to strengthen his power. He is a survivalist who will do anything to get what he wants. Ultimately, his sense of strategy (over tactics, which only serve to fulfill his overarching set of goals) is one of his greatest strengths, one that Hill/Gaddy claim the West underestimates at its own peril. A man who creates a long-term strategy for the success of his State and is willing to do anything to see that it succeeds is to be to watched very carefully, something that the authors indicate the West has failed to do thus far. The West must see clearly how the man views himself, and the West, while not forfeiting its own values, must develop strategies for dealing with him, ones that realistically exploit his perceived strengths and weaknesses. Until the man is taken seriously, the rest of the world cannot deal with him in a realistic manner, and such a stance is not good for the world.
March 20, 2020
I read a sample of this work. I will read the whole book later. Based on the text I went thru it appears to be a thorough investigation into Putin's rise to power thru the late 1990's during Russia's experiment with democracy and unbridled capitalism. It debunks some of the myths that surround him for instance that he is extremely wealthy. It maintains that while he enjoys luxury his main drivers are image cultivation and the stability of the Russian state.
Review written by Shawn Callon author of The Diplomatic Spy.
Review written by Shawn Callon author of The Diplomatic Spy.
November 30, 2020
This book is important if for no other reason that Trump is Putin’s poodle.
I noticed Fiona Hill when I her saw testify in the impeachment.
This is an excellent book but a grind. It must have been based on her Harvard PhD. The book is instructive, interesting and exceptionally informative.
If Putin, or Russian history is your cup of tea, this book makes an excellent summation. As to the nexus to Trump, there is a very credible reason to summarize that Russian Oligarchs money laundered through Deutsche Bank keeps the Trump Organization afloat..
I noticed Fiona Hill when I her saw testify in the impeachment.
This is an excellent book but a grind. It must have been based on her Harvard PhD. The book is instructive, interesting and exceptionally informative.
If Putin, or Russian history is your cup of tea, this book makes an excellent summation. As to the nexus to Trump, there is a very credible reason to summarize that Russian Oligarchs money laundered through Deutsche Bank keeps the Trump Organization afloat..
Displaying 1 - 30 of 150 reviews