The Reference Error Why the Problem of Consciousness Is Not a Problem T-Reality Series — Volume 2 The Ontological Domain
What is consciousness, and what do neuroscience and cognitive science actually explain when they describe it
Over the past decades, philosophy of mind, theoretical neuroscience, and cognitive science have developed increasingly precise models of brain function. Researchers such as Karl Friston, Thomas Metzinger, David Marr, Andy Clark, and David Chalmers have demonstrated that the brain operates through generative models that actively construct perception, cognition, and the self.
Yet a fundamental question remains unresolved. What is the relationship between these scientific models and the operational structure of cognitive experience itself
This book provides a rigorous interdisciplinary analysis of this question. It demonstrates that the problem of consciousness emerges from a structural distinction between scientific description and the operational domain of the cognitive system. Neuroscience describes neural activity. Cognitive science formalizes computational processes. Philosophy of mind analyzes representational structure. But the cognitive system itself operates through internally generated generative models that define its operational reality.
This volume explains
the role of generative models in cognition the structure of predictive processing the emergence of the self-model in cognitive systems the relationship between neural activity and cognitive representation the ontological structure of cognitive reality the scientific status of consciousness in contemporary neuroscience the methodological distinction between scientific models and operational cognitive content
Building on the foundational work of Karl Friston, Thomas Metzinger, David Marr, Andy Clark, and David Chalmers, this book provides a clear and systematic framework for understanding consciousness within the structure of modern cognitive science.
T-Reality is a fifteen-volume interdisciplinary research project integrating philosophy of mind, neuroscience, computational neuroscience, and cognitive science to examine consciousness as an emergent property of generative cognitive systems.
This book is ideal for readers interested in
philosophy of mind cognitive science neuroscience consciousness studies predictive processing self-model theory generative models computational neuroscience neurophilosophy
Kheprias A. is a philosopher and essayist active in the United States. His work focuses on consciousness, philosophy of mind, and non-dual traditions. He has an academic background in philosophy and additional U.S.-certified professional training in the clinical study of cognitive and perceptual processes.
Kheprias A. is the editorial identity of a research and publishing framework dedicated to consciousness, philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and non-dual traditions. Inspired by the root Khepri, traditionally associated with transformation and renewal, the project develops through two autonomous yet complementary lines of inquiry: one scientific and one traditional, both oriented toward the exploration of human experience and consciousness.
His work is organized into distinct lines.
The T-Reality Series develops a systematic inquiry into philosophy of mind, self-models, predictive processing, identity, perception, and consciousness, from a rigorous and scientific perspective, without introducing metaphysical elements into its method of work. These domains are kept distinct by design: traditional teachings are treated without reductionism, while scientific inquiry is conducted without spiritual or metaphysical overlay.
The Masters of the One presents major non-dual traditions — Advaita Vedānta, the Navnath–Inchagiri Sampradaya, Zen, Madhyamaka Buddhism, classical Taoism, and the Western tradition of the One — each approached in its own integrity, without syncretism. Any resonance between them is left to the reader’s own understanding.
The Advanced Series focuses more specifically on Advaita Vedānta and the Navnath–Inchagiri lineage, treating them as distinct but convergent expressions of non-identification.
No conceptual part of his work is generated by artificial intelligence systems; any external support is strictly limited to editorial and technical aspects.