To put this book in military terms: this is a tactical and operational handbook, not a strategic plan. This book, which I liked overall, is about how to adjust communications, rhetoric, campaigning, and other "how-to-win" issues, most of which are designed to win over swing voters, independents, and disillusioned Trump voters. The source base, if you will, is the hundreds of focus groups that Longwell and her firm have conducted with different sets of voters.
This body of evidence can tell you a lot, but not everything. Still, there are some great insights in here for Democrats. Here are a few:
1. Talking about democracy doesn't really work. It fires up liberals, but not the kinds of voters Democrats need to reach. Most people don't really feel like democracy is in jeopardy; after all, they voted Trump in, and they voted Trump out. I disagree, but at this point they probably aren't going to Instead, talk less about democracy and more about American values and welfare.
2. You can't go wrong fixating on the economy and affordability. It is what matters most to . You have to not only have policies but genuine empathy (even for people you don't like) about how Americans are struggling. Throwing economic facts (the economy is good, actually! GDP is up!) at voters doesn't change the fact that it's hard to fill up the gas tank and buy groceries. Longwell is not a big fan of Zohran's actual policies, but she holds him up as a model for how to communicate on
3. Speaking of communications, Longwell blasts Democrats for being behind the 8-ball on modern comms. Democrats are way too focused on fact-based, think-tanky reports and traditional campaigning, and they are not getting into the spaces where voters (esp young ones) spend most of their time: podcasting, social media, and other non-traditional spaces.
4. Finally, Longwell advocates a new relationship between Democratic politicians and the activist class on the left. Activist groups (or many of them) from the left approach Democrats as their vector of influence, and they often seek to hold Democrats "accountable" for not taking the maximal position on trans issues, immigration, Gaza, etc. This is not really how activism works on the right; most right-wing activist groups are far more slavishly supportive of Republicans, for both ideological and financial reasons. This puts Democratic politicians in the constant dilemma of threading the needle between an activist base that is trying to get them to take manifestly unpopular positions (on trans people in sports, for example) that tar the Democrats as radical and a larger voter base that wants more "common sense" approaches. The answer, Longwell suggests, is that activists should focus less on pressing Democrats into taking these positions and more on what the gay marriage movement did: combining assertive legal strategies wtih broad efforts to move the needle on public opinion so that it is easier for politicians to take more progressive stances.
Longwell also has some nice insights into what makes Trump so maliciously effective as a politicians. Trump achieves "narrative dominance" through constant reinforcement of the same themes and claims, even when most of what he says isn't true. He sets the agenda, and Democrats react. He even did this while out of office because of the Biden team's ineffective media strategy. Trump also is a master of "schema activation," in which he links immigration, for instance, to everything else bad happening in the country: crime, opioid abuse, overloaded public services, etc. When he says "America First," he immediately activates resentment against elites from both parties who are perceived as serving interests other than what is best for AMerica. The fact that this slogan has a dark history doesn't matter to most people, so Democrats hammering that point isn't effective.
Still, this is very much the book of a political operative, and a former Republican operative at that. As such, it has significant blind spots. First, Longwell is much more trusting and forgiving of Trump voters than I am. She tends to believe that most of them come from a good place: from justified resentment of the establishment, from a sense of betrayal by Democrats, from an overall sense of bewilderment, or from everyday experiences of life in America as not-so-great. She profiles their frustration that, in Trump 2.0, Trump "isn't doing what he said he would do!" and she sees this as a big opportunity for Democrats.
However, we have now had 3 straight elections where the vast majority of this coalition chose Trump 3 times in spite of, well, everything. There's just no excuse in 2024 to not realize that Trump doesn't actually give a crap about ordinary people, that he's not for peace, that he revels in cruelty and enacts cruelty through policy, and that his whole strategy is to make the AMerican people hate each other as much as possible. I'm much more on the side of Jonathan van Last, Longwell's colleague, who puts much more blame on the voters for simply being irresponsible and stupid, for believing things like "Trump is a good businessman" even though there's not a shred of evidence that that's the case, or for pooh-poohing or conspiracizing about January 6.
I suppose I am intellectually and emotionally with JVL and strategically with Longwell on this; I'm not sure what choice Democrats have than to compete for low-information, distrustful voters, because there's a lot of them. Still, I think that the focus group evidence base is flawed; focus groups allow people to project themselves at their most reasonable (oh, I don't hate trans people or Mexicans at all) whereas when you look at behavior (how you vote, what media you consume) it becomes clear that there is much more of an appetite for conspiracy, authoritarianism, and unadulterated cruelty than you could learn from a focus group (or, at least an apathy toward Trump's bigotry and cruelty).
But a big source of dissonance for me in this book is that Longwell's view of the pre-Trump GOP is overly rosy. This makes sense; she was a GOP operative. Her breaking from the GOP over Trump and gay rights issues was admirable, but as a historian her claims that Trump is a radical discontinuity from the earlier GOP does not hold water. This was not a party "defined by ideology," as she asserts; the party intelligenstia and operative class may have been ideologically charged, but the majority of the party's voters and probably the majority of elected Republicans were driven much more by identity/cultural politics than fealty to Burke and Hayek. Moreover, she portrays the Democrats as way more dovish on foreign affairs than they really were, and Republicans as way more devoted to a rules-based world order than they ever were. I get it; she's an operative, she's trying to devise ways to win, she's looking forward. But as a historian, that selective representation of the past rubbed me the wrong way.
So this is a worthwhile, thoughtful, and pithy book from someone I respect and see as a political ally. This is a playbook, not a strategic vision. If you take it at that level, it's quite good. But that's also a limited argument, much more about form than content, leaving me a bit unsatisfied.