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The President and the Apprentice: Eisenhower and Nixon, 1952-1961
More than half a century after Eisenhower left office, the history of his presidency is so clouded by myth, partisanship, and outright fraud that most people have little understanding of how Ike’s administration worked or what it accomplished. We know—or think we know—that Eisenhower distrusted his vice president, Richard Nixon, and kept him at arm’s length; that he did little to advance civil rights; that he sat by as Joseph McCarthy’s reckless anticommunist campaign threatened to wreck his administration; and that he planned the disastrous 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. None of this is true.
The President and the Apprentice reveals a different Eisenhower, and a different Nixon. Ike trusted and relied on Nixon, sending him on many sensitive overseas missions. Eisenhower, not Truman, desegregated the military. Eisenhower and Nixon, not Lyndon Johnson, pushed the Civil Rights Act of 1957 through the Senate. Eisenhower was determined to bring down McCarthy and did so. Nixon never, contrary to recent accounts, saw a psychotherapist, but while Ike was recovering from his heart attack in 1955, Nixon was overworked, overanxious, overmedicated, and at the limits of his ability to function.
The President and the Apprentice reveals a different Eisenhower, and a different Nixon. Ike trusted and relied on Nixon, sending him on many sensitive overseas missions. Eisenhower, not Truman, desegregated the military. Eisenhower and Nixon, not Lyndon Johnson, pushed the Civil Rights Act of 1957 through the Senate. Eisenhower was determined to bring down McCarthy and did so. Nixon never, contrary to recent accounts, saw a psychotherapist, but while Ike was recovering from his heart attack in 1955, Nixon was overworked, overanxious, overmedicated, and at the limits of his ability to function.
816 pages, Hardcover
First published July 28, 2015
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265 people want to read
About the author
Irwin F. Gellman
11 books8 followersIrwin F. Gellman is the author of four previous books on American presidents. He is currently at work on a volume on Nixon and Kennedy. He lives in Parkesburg, PA.
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Displaying 1 - 20 of 20 reviews
May 24, 2024
"Ike matured into an exceptional bureaucratic manager who brought peace and prosperity to the United States. Nixon evolved into one of the president's chief advisors and popularized for public consumption the president's domestic policies and foreign affairs initiatives. As a result of a long and profitable relationship, the Eisenhower presidency gained stature. Ike was pleased, and Nixon hoped to expand on that record by moving into 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue in 1961. That was the beauty of their relationship." pg 569
This was an excellent overview of the 1950s domestic, political, and moreso diplomatic America. The author wrote from the angle of Eisenhower, Nixon, and them together as a team. His introduction dispelled accusations of a tense relationship between the two, lacking of trust, and other disparaging opinions that were cited from several authors and their books.
This was a large-scale narrative that ran in two part: each term 1952-57 and 1957-61. The narrative discussed post WW2 America leading up to 1950s national politics and domestic issues (presidential nomination, the election, Civil Rights, the effects of post-war Korean conflict on American military and unemployment, military and civil desegregation, and many other changes that occured in the 1950s).
The author showed the two as individuals, as politicians, and as teammates. Gellman showed Eisenhower's transition from a General to a Manager as he slashed Truman's economic spending to earn the title of fiscal conservative; and Nixon, the conservative Quaker, who backed Ike's views of a conservative Christian society as he urged Americans to practice the Judeo-Christian tradition daily (pg 79).
One of the things I learned was the committed internationalism from the administration. This sparked as a result of Eisenhower's Allied Commander billet in Europe and participating in Latin American bureaucratic policy (pg 157). Moreso the administration was heavily involved in Latin and South American politics, Southeast Asia, the Suez Crisis, and the CIA's sponsored anti-communist foreign policy of continued containment.
Overall this was a very informative narrative. I learned a great deal about both men and their collaborative efforts in American politics. The book covered so much: dealing with McCarthy, the Soviets and Khrushchev, Little Rock, Arkansas and activating the National Guard and 101st Airborne, Dixiecrats, politics in Africa & India, and much more. I would recommend this to anyone interested in 20th-century America.
This was an excellent overview of the 1950s domestic, political, and moreso diplomatic America. The author wrote from the angle of Eisenhower, Nixon, and them together as a team. His introduction dispelled accusations of a tense relationship between the two, lacking of trust, and other disparaging opinions that were cited from several authors and their books.
This was a large-scale narrative that ran in two part: each term 1952-57 and 1957-61. The narrative discussed post WW2 America leading up to 1950s national politics and domestic issues (presidential nomination, the election, Civil Rights, the effects of post-war Korean conflict on American military and unemployment, military and civil desegregation, and many other changes that occured in the 1950s).
The author showed the two as individuals, as politicians, and as teammates. Gellman showed Eisenhower's transition from a General to a Manager as he slashed Truman's economic spending to earn the title of fiscal conservative; and Nixon, the conservative Quaker, who backed Ike's views of a conservative Christian society as he urged Americans to practice the Judeo-Christian tradition daily (pg 79).
One of the things I learned was the committed internationalism from the administration. This sparked as a result of Eisenhower's Allied Commander billet in Europe and participating in Latin American bureaucratic policy (pg 157). Moreso the administration was heavily involved in Latin and South American politics, Southeast Asia, the Suez Crisis, and the CIA's sponsored anti-communist foreign policy of continued containment.
Overall this was a very informative narrative. I learned a great deal about both men and their collaborative efforts in American politics. The book covered so much: dealing with McCarthy, the Soviets and Khrushchev, Little Rock, Arkansas and activating the National Guard and 101st Airborne, Dixiecrats, politics in Africa & India, and much more. I would recommend this to anyone interested in 20th-century America.
January 30, 2021
Could have been edited to a finer point. The author's thesis is provocative in a productive way, that Eisenhower and Nixon actually had a good professional relationship that might be described as warm. At times Gellman comes up for air to remind the reader of how this or that event being described supports the thesis, but not very often. The reader, I find, is often slogging through the relative minutia of the vice president's schedule. The book could have been much shorter and thereby better.
July 20, 2015
Gellman’s biography covers Nixon’s tenure as Vice President of the USA under President Dwight Eisenhower; he covers the election campaign beforehand as well as the famous “Checkers Speech”. Thank you to Net Galley and Yale University Press for the DRC, which I took in exchange for an honest review.
It is a little bit hard to be sure about this work, because the galley I got was so rough that it was difficult to judge its fluency. I settled on 3 stars rather than 4 stars because I saw some issues with organization, small tidbits that only marginally bore mentioning showed up in multiple chapters.
That said, it’s a good resource for anyone looking to study the Eisenhower administration or Nixon’s early years in government. I learned some things I didn’t know, and I have read my share (and maybe your share too!) of Nixon-related literature. Gellman has done a great job with research, and even offers pictures of primary documents, such as Ike’s notes during Nixon’s famous speech, at the end of the book.
I learned that the USA of that time period was a much more innocent one than that which we live in now. The Checkers Speech is one good example: now it is regarding laughingly as a mawkish bit of theater, but what is not widely publicized anymore is that the American public was asked to respond as to whether he should stay on the ticket, and they flooded the Republican headquarters and media centers with letters that supported him 350 to 1.
Now that it is known that he used public dollars for personal gain as president, I had rather assumed he had done the same during the funding crisis in question, but actually, back then he was guilty of nothing. The donations that were made were a travel fund, because the Nixons didn’t have the money to travel around the country campaigning. Donors pitched in for their air fare, cab fare, and hotels. There was no law regarding campaign spending limits back then; no law was violated.
As vice president, Nixon had more responsibilities, and occupied a position of greater trust, than most who occupied the same position. He was sent overseas, not only as a good will ambassador or ribbon cutter, but to do unpleasant, tricky things, like talking down the heads of state in South Korea and Taiwan. In addition, Ike never cared to do his own dirty work domestically, and so if someone needed to be officially taken apart, there was a good chance Nixon would be tapped for the job. He had an unstoppable work ethic and was unflinchingly loyal.
If Nixon’s vice presidency is of interest to you, get a copy of Gellman’s book. It goes up for sale in late November, so you can also consider it as a holiday gift if someone you know would appreciate it.
It is a little bit hard to be sure about this work, because the galley I got was so rough that it was difficult to judge its fluency. I settled on 3 stars rather than 4 stars because I saw some issues with organization, small tidbits that only marginally bore mentioning showed up in multiple chapters.
That said, it’s a good resource for anyone looking to study the Eisenhower administration or Nixon’s early years in government. I learned some things I didn’t know, and I have read my share (and maybe your share too!) of Nixon-related literature. Gellman has done a great job with research, and even offers pictures of primary documents, such as Ike’s notes during Nixon’s famous speech, at the end of the book.
I learned that the USA of that time period was a much more innocent one than that which we live in now. The Checkers Speech is one good example: now it is regarding laughingly as a mawkish bit of theater, but what is not widely publicized anymore is that the American public was asked to respond as to whether he should stay on the ticket, and they flooded the Republican headquarters and media centers with letters that supported him 350 to 1.
Now that it is known that he used public dollars for personal gain as president, I had rather assumed he had done the same during the funding crisis in question, but actually, back then he was guilty of nothing. The donations that were made were a travel fund, because the Nixons didn’t have the money to travel around the country campaigning. Donors pitched in for their air fare, cab fare, and hotels. There was no law regarding campaign spending limits back then; no law was violated.
As vice president, Nixon had more responsibilities, and occupied a position of greater trust, than most who occupied the same position. He was sent overseas, not only as a good will ambassador or ribbon cutter, but to do unpleasant, tricky things, like talking down the heads of state in South Korea and Taiwan. In addition, Ike never cared to do his own dirty work domestically, and so if someone needed to be officially taken apart, there was a good chance Nixon would be tapped for the job. He had an unstoppable work ethic and was unflinchingly loyal.
If Nixon’s vice presidency is of interest to you, get a copy of Gellman’s book. It goes up for sale in late November, so you can also consider it as a holiday gift if someone you know would appreciate it.
July 12, 2016
This is the second volume in Irwin F. Gellman’s sympathetic biography of Richard Nixon, focusing on the subject’s years as vice president. The work is strictly revisionist, which doesn’t mean it is wrong; even Dick Nixon deserves a kind word now and then. As revisionism, the book is exceptionally well researched and argued. Gellman must consider himself as a kind of Robert A. Caro to Lyndon Johnson. Gellman specifically takes Caro to task for the latter’s comments and conclusions about Nixon and LBJ in
Master of the Senate: The Years of Lyndon Johnson - Volume 3
(see below). Yet, Gellman’s argument suffers from what I consider to be a huge contradiction: Nixon, he argues, was Eisenhower’s “major utility player” (p. 563) and “the most knowledgeable vice president in foreign affairs who ever reached the White House” (p. 566), yet Nixon was “out-of-the-loop” with respect to Ike’s covert missteps in foreign affairs (Guatemala, Iran, Cuba).
Gellman’s prime objective is to dispute the historical record that Eisenhower and Nixon were not close, that Ike had little confidence in his vice president, and that the president was a weak leader. He mostly succeeds in this revisionism, I think. On the other hand, he does this by taking gratuitous swipes at Democrats and excusing Republicans for behaving much the same. For example, Gellman disputes the accounts of Michael Beschloss and others that Nixon was a mean drunk during his trip to the USSR in 1959, but cites Beschloss approvingly in claiming that Ike “had been appalled at having to put an inebriated FDR to bed” (p. 529). In his previous volume, The Contender: Richard Nixon: The Congress Years, 1946 To 1952 , Gellman notes with approval the Republicans’ unrelenting denunciations of Truman’s failure to rid the U.S. government of Soviet infiltrators, but states that Nixon and Eisenhower took J. Edgar Hoover’s warning “seriously” that the government was more than ever a target of communist espionage (p. 540). And then there is Hungary.
Eisenhower and Nixon campaigned vigorously in 1952 that the Truman/Acheson policy of “containment” abandoned millions behind the Iron Curtain in slavery, while the Republicans would instead “roll back” communism. Nixon was a strong advocate for anti-communist propaganda and demanded that the U.S. Information Agency hire more sophisticated propagandists and receive larger budgets (p. 475). But after U.S.I.A. implored the Hungarian people to throw off the yoke of Soviet Communism in 1956, the Eisenhower/Nixon administration did little to help them beyond wringing its hands. To its credit, the Eisenhower administration facilitated the immigration of over 20,000 Hungarian refugees to the United States despite the fear in many quarters that communist infiltrators would arrive among the displaced masses (p. 352). Compare this to the underwhelming U.S. response to the plight of Syrian refugees by the Obama administration today. The reproduction of the painting, Nixon at Andau (1970), on the other hand, is laughable (photo opposite p. 269).
Gellman is at his revisionist best with respect to civil rights, and in particular the Civil Rights Act of 1957. Contrary to the analysis by Robert Caro, Gellman attributes the successful enactment of the law to … wait for it … Richard Nixon (and maybe Eisenhower)! Nixon and Ike were responsible for changing the Republican votes in the Senate that invoked cloture on Strom (the future Republican) Thurmond’s historic filibuster, and not LBJ’s arm-twisting and backroom deal making. Johnson, Gellman argues, acted out of cynical, political expediency anyway; LBJ and the Democrats were desperate to win the Negro vote in 1960. Nixon and Eisenhower on the other hand, were sincere and passionate advocates of equality for people of color. Needless to say, most historians have a different opinion about Ike’s commitment to racial justice.
Caro makes no bones about Johnson’s racism or the fact that LBJ never let conscience or principle stand in the way of his personal political advantage. Gellman, however, evinces no such skepticism about Nixon’s motives. I can accept the notion that Nixon was no white supremacist and most likely a more tolerant man than Lyndon Johnson, but there were political advantages to Nixon’s role in the debate over the civil rights bill, too. Like Democrats, Republicans coveted the black vote in 1960 and hoped to portray the Democrats as intolerant racist boobs, a label that most definitely fitted many Southern senators. Nixon, like Johnson, had a keen sense of politics and electoral calculations.
The biggest disappointment for me was reading about Nixon’s role in the Eisenhower administration’s coups in Guatemala and Iran and its preparations for ousting Fidel Castro and the communists in Cuba. In short, Nixon had no role (according to Gellman). Gellman’s accounts of Guatemala and Iran are cursory (about two pages each) and are presented mostly in terms of Nixon’s visits to the countries after the deeds were done. Gellman spends considerably more time describing “Ike, Nixon, Kennedy, and Castro,” but writes that Nixon “did not participate” in most of the special committee meetings regarding Cuba (p. 550). The key qualifier here is “most,” but Gellman does not tell us which meetings Nixon did or did not attend or what the vice president’s advice to Eisenhower might have been. Gellman relates that in one meeting, Eisenhower speculated that the United States could “manufacture” an excuse for invading Cuba if Castro didn’t provide a legitimate reason (p. 554). Was Nixon at that meeting? Did he have an opinion? Here Gellman is silent. Gellman quotes Nixon as telling the press that he “was in the minority” on the question of invading Cuba, a statement that appeared after the fiasco was revealed by the Kennedy administration (pp. 556-7). Some hero.
Gellman makes a convincing argument that it was Kennedy—not Eisenhower—who bears responsibility for the failure at the Bay of Pigs, but the author fails the reader by not disclosing more fully Nixon’s role in the pre-invasion planning. Given Gellman’s repeated assertions that Nixon was a close adviser to Eisenhower on foreign affairs, perhaps second only to the Dulles brothers (or maybe Milton Eisenhower), it is odd that the vice president was not more intimately aware of and involved in some of the biggest foreign policy disgraces of the Eisenhower years.
Gellman’s prime objective is to dispute the historical record that Eisenhower and Nixon were not close, that Ike had little confidence in his vice president, and that the president was a weak leader. He mostly succeeds in this revisionism, I think. On the other hand, he does this by taking gratuitous swipes at Democrats and excusing Republicans for behaving much the same. For example, Gellman disputes the accounts of Michael Beschloss and others that Nixon was a mean drunk during his trip to the USSR in 1959, but cites Beschloss approvingly in claiming that Ike “had been appalled at having to put an inebriated FDR to bed” (p. 529). In his previous volume, The Contender: Richard Nixon: The Congress Years, 1946 To 1952 , Gellman notes with approval the Republicans’ unrelenting denunciations of Truman’s failure to rid the U.S. government of Soviet infiltrators, but states that Nixon and Eisenhower took J. Edgar Hoover’s warning “seriously” that the government was more than ever a target of communist espionage (p. 540). And then there is Hungary.
Eisenhower and Nixon campaigned vigorously in 1952 that the Truman/Acheson policy of “containment” abandoned millions behind the Iron Curtain in slavery, while the Republicans would instead “roll back” communism. Nixon was a strong advocate for anti-communist propaganda and demanded that the U.S. Information Agency hire more sophisticated propagandists and receive larger budgets (p. 475). But after U.S.I.A. implored the Hungarian people to throw off the yoke of Soviet Communism in 1956, the Eisenhower/Nixon administration did little to help them beyond wringing its hands. To its credit, the Eisenhower administration facilitated the immigration of over 20,000 Hungarian refugees to the United States despite the fear in many quarters that communist infiltrators would arrive among the displaced masses (p. 352). Compare this to the underwhelming U.S. response to the plight of Syrian refugees by the Obama administration today. The reproduction of the painting, Nixon at Andau (1970), on the other hand, is laughable (photo opposite p. 269).
Gellman is at his revisionist best with respect to civil rights, and in particular the Civil Rights Act of 1957. Contrary to the analysis by Robert Caro, Gellman attributes the successful enactment of the law to … wait for it … Richard Nixon (and maybe Eisenhower)! Nixon and Ike were responsible for changing the Republican votes in the Senate that invoked cloture on Strom (the future Republican) Thurmond’s historic filibuster, and not LBJ’s arm-twisting and backroom deal making. Johnson, Gellman argues, acted out of cynical, political expediency anyway; LBJ and the Democrats were desperate to win the Negro vote in 1960. Nixon and Eisenhower on the other hand, were sincere and passionate advocates of equality for people of color. Needless to say, most historians have a different opinion about Ike’s commitment to racial justice.
Caro makes no bones about Johnson’s racism or the fact that LBJ never let conscience or principle stand in the way of his personal political advantage. Gellman, however, evinces no such skepticism about Nixon’s motives. I can accept the notion that Nixon was no white supremacist and most likely a more tolerant man than Lyndon Johnson, but there were political advantages to Nixon’s role in the debate over the civil rights bill, too. Like Democrats, Republicans coveted the black vote in 1960 and hoped to portray the Democrats as intolerant racist boobs, a label that most definitely fitted many Southern senators. Nixon, like Johnson, had a keen sense of politics and electoral calculations.
The biggest disappointment for me was reading about Nixon’s role in the Eisenhower administration’s coups in Guatemala and Iran and its preparations for ousting Fidel Castro and the communists in Cuba. In short, Nixon had no role (according to Gellman). Gellman’s accounts of Guatemala and Iran are cursory (about two pages each) and are presented mostly in terms of Nixon’s visits to the countries after the deeds were done. Gellman spends considerably more time describing “Ike, Nixon, Kennedy, and Castro,” but writes that Nixon “did not participate” in most of the special committee meetings regarding Cuba (p. 550). The key qualifier here is “most,” but Gellman does not tell us which meetings Nixon did or did not attend or what the vice president’s advice to Eisenhower might have been. Gellman relates that in one meeting, Eisenhower speculated that the United States could “manufacture” an excuse for invading Cuba if Castro didn’t provide a legitimate reason (p. 554). Was Nixon at that meeting? Did he have an opinion? Here Gellman is silent. Gellman quotes Nixon as telling the press that he “was in the minority” on the question of invading Cuba, a statement that appeared after the fiasco was revealed by the Kennedy administration (pp. 556-7). Some hero.
Gellman makes a convincing argument that it was Kennedy—not Eisenhower—who bears responsibility for the failure at the Bay of Pigs, but the author fails the reader by not disclosing more fully Nixon’s role in the pre-invasion planning. Given Gellman’s repeated assertions that Nixon was a close adviser to Eisenhower on foreign affairs, perhaps second only to the Dulles brothers (or maybe Milton Eisenhower), it is odd that the vice president was not more intimately aware of and involved in some of the biggest foreign policy disgraces of the Eisenhower years.
July 27, 2020
When my son selected this as a gift, he saw a review that said that one would think that the Apprentice wrote the book. Knowing what I think of Richard Nixon he thought I would like it. Both he and the reviewer are right. “The President And the Apprentice” is a very sympathetic study of the interaction between President Eisenhower and Vice-President Nixon from Nixon’s selection for the ticket in 1952 through the end of the Eisenhower Administration in 1961.
The chapters are arranged by topics and as chronologically as feasible. The facts are laid out, focusing on the involvement of Ike and Nixon, and conclusions are drawn. The subjects include the primary issues of the era; the nomination, the Nixon “Fund”, managing the administration, civil rights, foreign policy in Asian, Europe, Africa and the Americas, re-nomination and election, presidential illness and the 1960 election. The bibliography is long. I would prefer if books and articles were listed separately.
Author Irwin F. Gellman reports on the common “myths” of the Eisenhower administration and the Eisenhower-Nixon relationship then forcefully refutes them through facts and analysis. Some historians posit that Eisenhower was so disgusted during Nixon’s televised explanation about the Fund that he jammed his pencil through his note paper and never trusted Nixon again. Gellman not only draws attention to the uninterrupted sequence of favorable comments in the notes, but includes photos the notes establishing the absence of any holes. Eisenhower is shown is an active manager as opposed to the golfing, vacationing do-nothing president portrayed in other works. Refuting the claim that Nixon was an uninvolved vice president, he is presented as a trusted advisor, front man for the administration in the civil rights struggle confronting Southern Democratic senators led by majority leader, Lyndon Johnson, and, at Eisenhower’s insistence, an apprentice of the presidency so he would be ready, if necessary, in contrast to FDR’s neglect of vice-president Truman. Ike is shown as lacking appreciation of the political requirements of his high office, a void which he relied upon Nixon to fill. The Nixon-Dulles partnership is examined in detail, reflecting favorably on the stature of both. Nixon’s overseas trips are depicted as being substantive fact-finding journeys in which Nixon served as the eyes, ears and, on occasions, voice of the president. Nixon’s vice-presidency is advanced as changing the office to a more active and consequential one. The author repeatedly takes issue other historians whose facts, inferences or conclusions he disputes.
This tome is very favorable to Eisenhower and even more so to Nixon. I believe that this places Gellman in line with more modern scholarship that recognizes Ike’s accomplishments and his mastery of the office. I have read extensively about both Eisenhower and Nixon and still learned much from this work. The book is long but is worth sticking to the end. “The President And The Apprentice” is a valuable addition to the history of the 1950s.
The chapters are arranged by topics and as chronologically as feasible. The facts are laid out, focusing on the involvement of Ike and Nixon, and conclusions are drawn. The subjects include the primary issues of the era; the nomination, the Nixon “Fund”, managing the administration, civil rights, foreign policy in Asian, Europe, Africa and the Americas, re-nomination and election, presidential illness and the 1960 election. The bibliography is long. I would prefer if books and articles were listed separately.
Author Irwin F. Gellman reports on the common “myths” of the Eisenhower administration and the Eisenhower-Nixon relationship then forcefully refutes them through facts and analysis. Some historians posit that Eisenhower was so disgusted during Nixon’s televised explanation about the Fund that he jammed his pencil through his note paper and never trusted Nixon again. Gellman not only draws attention to the uninterrupted sequence of favorable comments in the notes, but includes photos the notes establishing the absence of any holes. Eisenhower is shown is an active manager as opposed to the golfing, vacationing do-nothing president portrayed in other works. Refuting the claim that Nixon was an uninvolved vice president, he is presented as a trusted advisor, front man for the administration in the civil rights struggle confronting Southern Democratic senators led by majority leader, Lyndon Johnson, and, at Eisenhower’s insistence, an apprentice of the presidency so he would be ready, if necessary, in contrast to FDR’s neglect of vice-president Truman. Ike is shown as lacking appreciation of the political requirements of his high office, a void which he relied upon Nixon to fill. The Nixon-Dulles partnership is examined in detail, reflecting favorably on the stature of both. Nixon’s overseas trips are depicted as being substantive fact-finding journeys in which Nixon served as the eyes, ears and, on occasions, voice of the president. Nixon’s vice-presidency is advanced as changing the office to a more active and consequential one. The author repeatedly takes issue other historians whose facts, inferences or conclusions he disputes.
This tome is very favorable to Eisenhower and even more so to Nixon. I believe that this places Gellman in line with more modern scholarship that recognizes Ike’s accomplishments and his mastery of the office. I have read extensively about both Eisenhower and Nixon and still learned much from this work. The book is long but is worth sticking to the end. “The President And The Apprentice” is a valuable addition to the history of the 1950s.
October 23, 2016
Gellman's breadth of research for The President and the Apprentice is absolutely extraordinary. Gellman was able to take what has largely been written off in history by writers, including biographers of both men and craft something that adds a fresh perspective to the lenses of history. Eisenhower and Nixon's working relationship in the White House deserved a better fate, Gellman has made his impact in providing it.
However there are two issues that ultimately plague The President and the Apprentice from entering the annals of history as a top-tier biography. These are issues that some biographies often suffer from, particularly with the breadth of research and time taken.
1.) A Jaundiced Eye: Gellman takes the opportunity to explore political craftsmanship at its finest while taking a deeper looker at Eisenhower and Nixon's actions while in office. However, in the process of "correcting the record" for his two main characters, Gellman managed to inflict upon the other individuals in the story the same kind of jaundiced eye that other authors offer to Nixon and Eisenhower. LBJ is a prime example of someone whose historical record is not given the same layer of complexities to his actions, instead often coming off as a villain of sorts to what Eisenhower and Nixon were trying to accomplish on say civil rights. In the midst of all this, Gellman often refuses to acknowledge or at least go into further detail about the amount of Republicans who were still opposed to Civil Rights Legislation alongside the Southern bloc of Senators. Which leads me to...
2.) The Richard Nixon Show: While this book is sold as a closer look at the working relationship of Eisenhower and Nixon, largely it is about redeeming Richard Nixon's time as Vice President. Nixon did a lot that went unnoticed in the historical record as Vice President, however I was hoping for more about exploring these two. Eisenhower largely comes off as a distant mentor who is willing to be there in Nixon's time of adversity but otherwise seems apart from the man.
Despite these two points, the book offers a great deal of new knowledge and would still consider it worth reading.
However there are two issues that ultimately plague The President and the Apprentice from entering the annals of history as a top-tier biography. These are issues that some biographies often suffer from, particularly with the breadth of research and time taken.
1.) A Jaundiced Eye: Gellman takes the opportunity to explore political craftsmanship at its finest while taking a deeper looker at Eisenhower and Nixon's actions while in office. However, in the process of "correcting the record" for his two main characters, Gellman managed to inflict upon the other individuals in the story the same kind of jaundiced eye that other authors offer to Nixon and Eisenhower. LBJ is a prime example of someone whose historical record is not given the same layer of complexities to his actions, instead often coming off as a villain of sorts to what Eisenhower and Nixon were trying to accomplish on say civil rights. In the midst of all this, Gellman often refuses to acknowledge or at least go into further detail about the amount of Republicans who were still opposed to Civil Rights Legislation alongside the Southern bloc of Senators. Which leads me to...
2.) The Richard Nixon Show: While this book is sold as a closer look at the working relationship of Eisenhower and Nixon, largely it is about redeeming Richard Nixon's time as Vice President. Nixon did a lot that went unnoticed in the historical record as Vice President, however I was hoping for more about exploring these two. Eisenhower largely comes off as a distant mentor who is willing to be there in Nixon's time of adversity but otherwise seems apart from the man.
Despite these two points, the book offers a great deal of new knowledge and would still consider it worth reading.
November 23, 2015
Words can hardly express how disappointed I am with this book. I had no idea when I picked up the book, that it would be a bloated study of the greatness of Vice President Nixon with a few antidotes about President Eisenhower. The title implies that it is a study of both men, but this is misleading. Would I have known I could have left the 791 page book on the shelf. This book is a nauseating volume of propaganda praising Nixon on every page. I am not against praise, but I do not believe that Nixon who was such an odious, unfeeling, dishonest man does not deserve such praise. For example, when the agriculture department released statistics showing that farm prices had dropped in August, Nixon was upset. He directed Agriculture Secretary Ezra Taft Benson that he was not to put out any statistics which was harmful to the administration or the GOP. Secretary Benson was perhaps the most honest of all of Eisenhower’s cabinet members and to direct him to lie to the American people is disgraceful. My recommendation is to stay clear of this book.
July 27, 2015
I am reviewing a digital ARC of this title.
Getting past the introduction was pretty difficult. The author wants the reader to appreciate how different the book is from Eisenhower or Nixon biographies and how much more research he has done in comparison to others. Such is said several times within the first pages. I found myself rolling my eyes and saying "we get it, move on" before diving into the chapters.
Once immersed in the storytelling, Gellman backs up his claims. The anecdotes are all interesting without being explosive or extraordinary. This book may not change how Nixon is viewed by the public but will intrigue readers interested in political science, regardless of their political affiliation. As such, it was an enjoyable read for me. Would it earn its way into my high school library? Probably not. It just wouldn't get picked up by my students for pleasure reading or research.
Getting past the introduction was pretty difficult. The author wants the reader to appreciate how different the book is from Eisenhower or Nixon biographies and how much more research he has done in comparison to others. Such is said several times within the first pages. I found myself rolling my eyes and saying "we get it, move on" before diving into the chapters.
Once immersed in the storytelling, Gellman backs up his claims. The anecdotes are all interesting without being explosive or extraordinary. This book may not change how Nixon is viewed by the public but will intrigue readers interested in political science, regardless of their political affiliation. As such, it was an enjoyable read for me. Would it earn its way into my high school library? Probably not. It just wouldn't get picked up by my students for pleasure reading or research.
January 2, 2016
The fruit of nearly two decades of careful historical research, Gellman provides us with a painstaking defense of Nixon's relationship with Eisenhower and his role as Vice President. Campaign staffers couldn't take more pleasure in the details of two uneventful presidential elections than Gellman does. Yet the substance of policy debates, both domestic and foreign, too often are subordinated to the details of personal dynamics and relationships. Gellman deploys his analysis most strongly against the documented accusations and perceived historical slights on Nixon's career and character. In so doing he misses the opportunity to make a more substantive case for the significance of Nixon's role during the Eisenhower era, particularly in foreign policy. This is unfortunate as it is clear from the book that ample evidence exists for such a case to be made, and no one is better equipped to make it than Gellman.
January 18, 2016
I wish they would let us rate books with half or even quarter stars. I'd go with 3 1/2 stars here. I think that the main failing with this book is that the author wants to make sure that he gets his thesis over to the reader that he buries the reader in too much fact; too minute detail. In doing so he turns a very interesting book into a slog. There are too many places where points are repeated too often and too soon.
With that said I will also say that I liked the book and I agree with his thesis. There is much more evidence emerging in the last few decades about Eisenhower and his ability as President. This book reinforces much of that. Eisenhower did not view the Presidency as a retirement position. He did not lose his ability to command in the few years between the end of WW II and his election. This is made clear throughout the book. If you can handle the amount of detail you will enjoy the perspective presented here.
With that said I will also say that I liked the book and I agree with his thesis. There is much more evidence emerging in the last few decades about Eisenhower and his ability as President. This book reinforces much of that. Eisenhower did not view the Presidency as a retirement position. He did not lose his ability to command in the few years between the end of WW II and his election. This is made clear throughout the book. If you can handle the amount of detail you will enjoy the perspective presented here.
September 11, 2016
Changed my view of Eisenhower. Thought he hated Nixon.
June 29, 2022
I have read several biographies of both Ike and Nixon. This book is specifically about their relationship between the 1952 and 1960 period. The author has done considerable research to discover the facts and clear up misconceptions about the two men. This was a slow read due to the detail that was provided. But I believe it gave a more authentic view of the totality of both presidents, especially in Nixon’s case. Overall I would recommend this book for students of presidential histories.
December 23, 2020
Gellman's thesis grates and his arguments alternate between "sure," "that's stretching it but okay," and "now you're embarrassing yourself." The embarrassing moments are quit bad.
But no one beats Gellman for thoroughness. It seems as though every detail of every meeting is here and if you want an up-close look inside the Eisenhower admin., you can't do better than this.
But no one beats Gellman for thoroughness. It seems as though every detail of every meeting is here and if you want an up-close look inside the Eisenhower admin., you can't do better than this.
June 30, 2022
Shitty writing. Large paragraphs virtually the same in back to back chapters. Some Arguments not even remotely persuasive, especially his McCarthy and civil rights conclusions. Whole lot of “…but Truman was worse” whines as Eisenhower defenses, and how This Book was bad, or this writer was a leftist…just shitty.
February 26, 2021
Too much of daily schedules. Could have trimmed some of that out as irrelevant, but his position that Eisenhower trusted Nixon to handle day to day tasks Mr. Gellman may have felt it was important to include. Enjoyed reading it overall
June 8, 2020
There is a major move recently to reevaluate the presidency of Dwight Eisenhower.
This bit of revisionist history is actually a move to build up Richard Nixon through that reevaluation.
This rather dry dive into the Eisenhower years through the prism of the widely held view that Ike didn't much care for RN.
Gellman take earlier historians of the Nixon canon to task for intellectual laziness and misreading their sources and creating what he feels is the myth regarding Ike and Nixon.
Several of the stories are interesting but get bogged down in minutia.
As is my beef with many histories lately, it appears the editor role is done with.
This dry recitation of facts and opinion runs long.
Not for the casual reader 2 and a half jimmys out of five.
This bit of revisionist history is actually a move to build up Richard Nixon through that reevaluation.
This rather dry dive into the Eisenhower years through the prism of the widely held view that Ike didn't much care for RN.
Gellman take earlier historians of the Nixon canon to task for intellectual laziness and misreading their sources and creating what he feels is the myth regarding Ike and Nixon.
Several of the stories are interesting but get bogged down in minutia.
As is my beef with many histories lately, it appears the editor role is done with.
This dry recitation of facts and opinion runs long.
Not for the casual reader 2 and a half jimmys out of five.
January 22, 2016
Gellman is unabashedly, but thoroughly, revising the history of Nixon. In this book, Nixon is a trusted political advisor to Eisenhower, a vigorous voice and force for Republican politics, an astute and brave foreign diplomat and the recipient of lavish praise from Ike. All of it is meticulously researched and thoroughly sourced. I have no idea what is "right", but it is interesting to consider.
n the same work, Eisenhower was a civil rights progressive more effective in pursuing equality than either Truman or FDR, a visionary in cultivating Latin America and Africa and nearly blameless for the Bay of Pigs. This part is equally interesting but no easier to believe.
Rhetoric aside, I found Eisenhower's managerial tactics the most interesting and believable; he was a master of bureaucracy and clearly worked hard to put good people in a position to succeed. How he handled Nixon is interesting and does bring out fascinating questions about Nixon's own Presidency and the leadership of many who have held the office since.
Finally, as we consider our next President, the story of a man in office from age 63-71 who was so concerned about his health, his energy and his ability to focus is fascinating.
All of this is interesting and provocative. If you can handle the slant, and want to go deep into this slice of Eisenhower's administration, read the book.
n the same work, Eisenhower was a civil rights progressive more effective in pursuing equality than either Truman or FDR, a visionary in cultivating Latin America and Africa and nearly blameless for the Bay of Pigs. This part is equally interesting but no easier to believe.
Rhetoric aside, I found Eisenhower's managerial tactics the most interesting and believable; he was a master of bureaucracy and clearly worked hard to put good people in a position to succeed. How he handled Nixon is interesting and does bring out fascinating questions about Nixon's own Presidency and the leadership of many who have held the office since.
Finally, as we consider our next President, the story of a man in office from age 63-71 who was so concerned about his health, his energy and his ability to focus is fascinating.
All of this is interesting and provocative. If you can handle the slant, and want to go deep into this slice of Eisenhower's administration, read the book.
December 30, 2015
While the extensive research reveals new insights into the relationship between Eisenhower and Nixon the author's bias is obvious and often seems suspect for instance in his apologists approach to Eisenhower and civil rights. Nixon's ultimate expertise in foreign relations becomes clearer now that we know that he was sent all over the world as the eyes and ears for Ike.
Want to read
October 11, 2015Have not read it yet. From cspan 2. Heard him on tv. By the way, the write up says Nixon never say a psychiatrist is wrong. I just heard him say he say one 7 times, but the dr. Testified he never treated him.
February 13, 2016
Read my full review at The Federalist:
http://thefederalist.com/2016/02/13/r...
http://thefederalist.com/2016/02/13/r...
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