The equation "Mind = Machine" is false. This pocket lexicon of "neuromythology" shows why. Taking a series of key words such as calculation, language, information and memory, Professor Tallis shows how their misuse has a lured a whole generation into accepting the computational model of the mind. First of all these words were used literally in the description of the human mind. Then computer scientists applied them metaphorically to the workings of their machines. And finally, their metaphorical status forgotten, the use of the terms was called as evidence of artificial intelligence in machines and the computational nature of conscious thought.
Professor Raymond Tallis is a philosopher, poet, novelist and cultural critic and was until recently a physician and clinical scientist. In the Economist's Intelligent Life Magazine (Autumn 2009) he was listed as one of the top living polymaths in the world.
Born in Liverpool in 1946, one of five children, he trained as a doctor at Oxford University and at St Thomas' in London before going on to become Professor of Geriatric Medicine at the University of Manchester and a consultant physician in Health Care of the Elderly in Salford. Professor Tallis retired from medicine in 2006 to become a full-time writer, though he remained Visiting Professor at St George's Hospital Medical School, University of London until 2008.
Prior to his retirement from medicine to devote himself to writing, Raymond Tallis had responsibility for acute and rehabilitation patients and took part in the on-call rota for acute medical emergencies. He also ran a unique specialist epilepsy service for older people. Amongst his 200 or so medical publications are two major textbooks - The Clinical Neurology of Old Age (Wiley, 1988) and the comprehensive Brocklehurst's Textbook of Geriatric Medicine and Gerontology (Harcourt Brace, co-edited with Howard Fillitt, 6th edition, 2003). Most of his research publications were in the field of neurology of old age and neurological rehabilitation. He has published original articles in Nature Medicine, Lancet and other leading journals. Two of his papers were the subject of leading articles in Lancet. In 2000 Raymond Tallis was elected Fellow of the Academy of Medical Sciences in recognition of his contribution to medical research; in 2002 he was awarded the Dhole Eddlestone Prize for his contribution to the medical literature on elderly people; and in 2006 he received the Founders Medal of the British Geriatrics Society. In July 2007, he received the Lord Cohen Gold Medal for Research into Ageing, and in November 2011 he was honoured with the International League Against Epilepsy's Special Excellence in Epilepsy Award. He is a Patron of Dignity in Dying.
Over the last 20 years Raymond Tallis has published fiction, three volumes of poetry, and 23 books on the philosophy of mind, philosophical anthropology, literary theory, the nature of art and cultural criticism. Together with over two hundred articles in Prospect, Times Literary Supplement and many other outlets, these books offer a critique of current predominant intellectual trends and an alternative understanding of human consciousness, the nature of language and of what it is to be a human being. For this work, Professor Tallis has been awarded three honorary degrees: DLitt (Hon. Causa) from the University of Hull in 1997; LittD (Hon. Causa) at the University of Manchester 2002 and Doc (Med) SC, St George's Hospital 2015. He was Visiting Professor of English at the University of Liverpool until 2013.
Raymond Tallis makes regular appearances at Hay, Cheltenham, Edinburgh and other book festivals, and lectures widely.
Raymond Tallis's national roles have included: Consultant Advisor in Health Care of the Elderly to the Chief Medical Officer; a key part in developing National Service Framework for Older People, in particular the recommendations of developing services for people with strokes; membership of the National Institute for Clinical Excellence Appraisal Committee; Chairmanship of the Royal College of Physicians Committee on Ethics in Medicine; Chairman of the committee reviewing ethics support for front-line clinicians; and membership of the Working Party producing a seminal report Doctors in Society, Medical Professionalism in a Changing World (2005). From July 2011 to October 2014 he was the elected Chair, Healthcare Professionals for Assisted Dying (HPAD).
In 2012 he was a member of the judges' panel for the Samuel Johnson Prize.
If philosophy is the practice of being precise with speech and seeing where it gets you, then this book is a must for any philosopher with an interest in consciousness or the mind. It's a superb little read: very informative, thought-provoking, engaged with many conversations among leading philosophers, and genuinely funny in a way reminiscent of The Devil's Dictionary.
This book basically goes through the computerization of the mind and the anthropomorphism of computers and shows how sloppiness with certain key linguistic phrases has created an illusion that we know more than we do about how consciousness works. The introduction and the section in "Information" are alone worth the price of entry. "Complexity" is also a great section.
The downsides of this book are that it is 1) not constructive (although it doesn't ever purport to be); 2) even at its terse 93 pages, it's still about 10~15 pages too long, since the arguments get repetitive; 3) it needs a conclusion, especially since it ends with one of the least convincing/impressive critiques in the lexicon ("Rules"). I'm also unimpressed with the author's treatment of John R. Searle under "Levels", which seems to miss Searle's whole point about ontological frames (1st vs. 3rd person).
But even with those complaints, this book is a must-read for people interested in the philosophy of mind, especially anyone who is impressed with Daniel Dennett or Michael Shermer. The author is astoundingly adroit within a whole series of fields, including computer science (my own specialty), and brings that to bear to check a lot of the sloppiness that goes unnoticed and uncriticized in conversations about the mind and brain.
If I have one complaint about this very short, but highly informative little book, it is that, for a man whose stated purpose is to re-establish some clarity and transparency in a field too often bogged down by imprecise language, Tallis seems rather fond of using complicated words, and particularly of using more of them than necessary to get to this point; I had to re-read his introduction more than once in order to really understand the gist of what he was saying.
Be that as it may, the substance of the book is pretty much beyond reproach in my opinion. In a very short number of pages, Tallis diligently refutes what I personally have come to view as one of the most pernicious misconceptions of our modern age: that the mind functions like a highly advanced computer or machine. Tallis systematically dismantles this notion by showing how we subconsciously engage in an act of linguistic obfuscation when we use words like "calculation" or "memory" to simultaneously describe the workings of the human mind and those of a computer. The common thread between all of them, which Tallis elucidates (again, somewhat bombastically) in his introduction, is that they stem from what is essentially a process of reverse anthropomorphization: we attribute human-like qualities to machines and then mistakenly infer that human cognition operates in the same way.
This, Tallis argues, is not only a categorical error, but also a dangerous reduction of the rich and nuanced reality of human thought. In challenging these fallacious comparisons, he calls into question whether there is even a meaningful analogy to be drawn between human beings and machines: after all, to say that a machine (even a pocket calculator) "calculates" is in fact inaccurate; it merely performs (or undergoes) a series of operations based on inputs and pre-set rules without any awareness or understanding. In other words: machines don't "calculate", at least not in the sense of intentionally employing mathematical reasoning to solve a problem; humans calculate using machines as a tool.
I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in the philosophy of mind or cognitive science, especially those who are maybe just starting to become interested in these fields. Despite the occasionally dense language, I think the core of Tallis's argument should be accessible to most laypersons. Of course, a book this short is not meant to be a comprehensive treatment of the subject; nevertheless, I think it serves as a welcome and thought-provoking contribution to modern debates about the nature of consciousness and cognition.
Tallis takes issue with "neuromythology," which, as an extension of scientism, claims that everything human can be reduced to the language and conceptuality of neuroscience, cognitive science, and cognitive psychology, often at the expense of coherence and consistency—but most of all, of human experience.
Most of his criticism hinges on the notion of the "transferred epithet": “a term [with a multiplicity of meanings] most usually applied to human beings is transferred to machines… Machines described in human terms are then offered as models of the mind” (34). Put another way, “Epithet transfer is… two-way: machines are described anthropomorphically and, at the same time, the anthropic terms in which they are described undergo a machine-ward shift” (35).
Tallis covers over a dozen key terms, from "Computation" to "Rule" that he finds misused and abused in popular discourse these days by psychologists, engineers, philosophers (and nowadays, the layperson) who believe that the mind is a computer, which is obviously a backwards and faulty interpretation. Almost all of these fallacies end up resulting when we abstract ourselves from the picture, pretending that machines are autonomous and independent of us, when in fact we designed them.
It's a shame this book, which is short but dense, isn't more popular, because if anything, neuromythology has grown even more out of control, perhaps to the point of becoming neuroreligion. Of course, this was published before A.I. reached the "complexity"—one of the terms he criticizes!—it now "possesses." I'm sure he'd get a kick out of Chat GPT being a "good essayist" or "poet," for example...
This was a helpful book in a study path of consciousness and artificial intelligence. It was clearly very biased, and positioned as a lexicon even as it spent most of its time arguing against specific philosophers and cognitive scientists. The fonts and syntax were a little odd too. However, it was helpful as an overall point of view in interpreting how language is used, perhaps not as intentionally as it should be, in the transfer of epithets and other vocabulary that were minted specifically to refer to humans and are now freely used to include technology and computers without asterisk.
This contains excellent rebuttals to physicalism (aka materialism), the belief that physical entities constitute the only reality and that consciousness is an emergent or secondary feature. The author exposes numerous flavors of physicalist arguments as based on fallacies