Uncompromising, often startling, meticulously documented—this book is an account of the government, and the governed, of colaborationist France.
Basing his work on captured German archives and contemporary materials rather than on self-serving postwar memoirs or war-trial testimony, Professor Paxton maps out the complex nature of the ill-famed Vichy government, showing that it in fact enjoyed mass participation. The majority of the Frenchmen in 1940 feared social disorder as the worse imaginable evil and rallied to support the State, thereby bringing about the betrayal of the Nation as a whole.
Robert Owen Paxton is an American political scientist and historian specializing in Vichy France, fascism, and Europe during the World War II era. After attending secondary school in New England, he received a B.A. from Washington and Lee University in 1954. Later, he won a Rhodes Scholarship and spent two years earning an M.A. at Merton College, Oxford, where he studied under historians including James Joll and John Roberts. He earned a Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1963. Paxton taught at the University of California, Berkeley and the State University of New York at Stony Brook before joining the faculty of Columbia University in 1969. He served there for the remainder of his career, retiring in 1997. He remains a professor emeritus. He has contributed more than twenty reviews to The New York Review of Books, beginning in 1978 and continuing through 2017.
This is a well-rounded work on the Vichy years that is at times sympathetic, but Paxton does point out how odious this regime could be.
Vichy was not coerced by Germany, but tried endlessly (and unsuccessfully) to make agreements with their German conquerors. It was Vichy that rounded up "immigrant" Jews who had sought sanctuary in France and sent them to their death in Germany. It was Vichy that was impotent to prevent total annexation in November 1942. It was Vichy that fruitlessly attempted to make a Peace Accord out of the Armistice. After the Americans entered the war, Petain and Laval thought they could arrange a peace between Hitler and the Allied forces (Britain and the U.S.). What planet did these two inhabit? Obviously their Anglophobia and pro-German viewpoint gave them a blinkered myopia.
Petain, Laval, and Darlan in their quest of Vichy power are well exposed in this book of Paxton; perhaps there could have been more on their human side. Also there is little on post-Normandy France.
Mr. Paxton stresses that only a small percentage of the population was actively involved in the Resistance (which is to some extent understandable when German retribution was swift). A significant portion of the population feared the Allied invasion.
this is the book i want to write, except i want to write it about algeria, and not vichy.
it's impossible to overestimate the impact this book had on modern France, and the history of the country. it has been said (and rightly so) that this book could not have been written by a frenchman - it had to be done by an outsider. this was the first book to really explode the history/memory conflict, and call into question all the history that everyone believed to be true regarding WWII.
this is the story that answers the now-famous question in france, "what did you do during the war, daddy?" france was occupied from the beginning of the war, and set up a collaborationist government in the south of france, in vichy. this government colluded with the germans to export at least 8,000 french jews to the concentration camps east. that means, the french government themselves made the lists and rounded these people up. while the number is small, it is mostly small because those are the only ones with proof. it's important to note also that france was amazingly anti-semitic (see the dryfuss affair to start), and if the war was based merely on ideology, france probably would have aligned with germany. but because of the deep fissures between the countries and their terrorial arguments, vichy is what happened.
the pervasive national narrative up until paxton was the story of the french resistance and charles de gaulle. there was no mention of vichy, no mention of papon and barbi and the others that would be tried for crimes against humanity forty years after the war. and with one book, paxton toppled one of the most popular heroic narratives to exist after WWII.
honestly, this is the book that started the contemporary history movement (that is based largely in france, with henri rousso doing most of the heading up stuff), that started asking questions of the heroic war narrative - asking, wait, what really happened? what aren't you telling us? what is the story of the losers? did people disagree? what is the dark side?
Robert O. Paxton's Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order recreates the political functions and ideological underpinnings of France's collaborationist government during the Second World War. Paxton spurns the suggestion that Vichy was merely imposed on the French by Nazi invaders; although literally true, this framing ignores how heavily Vichy drew on reactionary strands of French society. Disenchantment with the instability of the Third Republic, backlash against the leftist Popular Front of the '30s and guilt and rage over France's military defeat (and the country's long-dormant Anglophobia, which Dunkirk and Britain's sinking of the French fleet exacerbated) enabled Petain, Laval and Darlan (among others) to install an authoritarian regime with little fuss, and a reasonable degree of popular support. Thus the "National Revolution" of Petain's government was less that than a counterrevolution: the Petainists imposed a variety of reactionary policies, from dismantling democracy to replacing secular schools with Catholic education, from an obsession with agricultural development as an antidote to urban decadence to passing anti-Semitic legislation and repressing socialists and communists, all of which needed little encouragement from the Nazis. Nor were Vichy's leadership mere puppets: Petain, self-servingly, framed himself as a "shield" to spare France the hardships of direct occupation (an argument Paxton dismantles by showing Vichy military cooperation with the Axis and collaboration in the Holocaust) and maintaining a neutral foreign policy (America continued to recognize Vichy as the legitimate French government through 1942). As war turned against the Axis, Laval in particular hoped to use Vichy's "neutral" status to negotiate a peace between the Allies and spare France from invasion - a gambit which failed, as the Allies distrusted him and the Germans viewed him and Petain with contempt. Both the political and moral ledger of the Second World War do not reflect well on Vichy; far from a "shield" from German depredations, it perpetrated its own cruelties in tandem with the Third Reich while allowing the French Right to settle scores with liberal, leftist and religious enemies. The book's sole shortcoming is a focus on policies and politics over the experiences of everyday Frenchmen and women, though that's been well-covered in other works. It remains a worthy analysis of this troubling time, showing how easily fascists can coopt conservative grievances to their own benefit - and how nationalism can be perverted to collaboration.
I rarely find myself reading history books these days, but ‘Vichy France’ was a totally engaging experience. Paxton focuses in on the Vichy government during the German Occupation. Two things really struck me. The first was a growing awareness of why the ‘Vichy’ French felt the need to actually collaborate with Germany even when the Germans, to some extent, seemed fairly uninterested in that collaboration. Having been defeated and occupied, and I think believing, as most people did at that time, that Germany would soon win the war, it was important to insure against losing French land to their victors, losing their colonies to Germany’s allies, and seeing their economy destroyed in the post war peace talks. This was a genuine concern following the way France and the Allies had squeezed ‘the German lemon until the pips squeaked’ following the 1914-18 war. It was something I never really thought about before. The second thing that struck me was how that Vichy government used the occupation to push through their own nationalist, anticommunist, and racist policies by suggesting a German coercion that didn’t seem to have existed. I am always amazed to find out how fascistic and antisemitic the whole of Europe was between the wars, and how much we like to heap all our sins on Hitler and the Nazis. People are so naughty!
I got this book because after years of liking the movie, "Casablanca", and knowing very little except that it was a temporary government permitted by the Germans, I wanted to know something about Vichy.
I was hoping for a book that might explain a) why the Germans allowed/created this entity, b) how it operated, and c) how did it affect the lives of people in France and French territories during it's existence.
While not specifically recommended by a co-worker who has a PhD in WWII history, he thought it might be a good.
It's definitely not the book I was hoping for. But, having said that, it is an exhaustive (and exhausting) history of the politicians and laws of Vichy France. For a historian it may be just what they hoped for, but not me. It was one of the driest and most unappealing books that I have read in the past decade.
But I did read it all. Always hoping that it would deliver what I wanted. And, in a strange way, it did. It was the appendices (or notes) that actually gave me a glimpse in to why Vichy France existed and how people lived in it. So, perseverance paid off.
I wanted to read about Vichy France after reading Irene Nemirovsky’s 'Suite Francaise', set in the early days of the Nazi occupation of France in 1940. Nemirovsky’s novel explores the dilemmas faced by individuals as they grapple with the moral dilemmas posed by occupation and I wanted to read a non-fiction background to the times. However, I found ‘Vichy France’ a dry and difficult read. If you are looking for a social history of the occupation or the impact of occupation on the everyday lives of French people, this is not the history for you. The book very much concentrates on the political, diplomatic and government aspects of Vichy.
My main gripe with this book is the complex structure – a not atypical paragraph is; "The elimination of communism followed by parliamentary socialism opened the way for these outsiders of the Left. René Belin became minister of industrial production and labor from 14 July 1940 to 23 February 1941 and remained minister of labor until 18 April 1942. Raymond Froideval and Georges Lefranc served on his staff. Some of the anti-Communist union officials had already gotten their pre-1936 jobs back with the suppression of the Communist party in September 1939. Antibolshevism carried Georges Dumoulin, Marcel Roy, and others as far as cooperation with Abetz’ labor propaganda newspapers in Paris, La France au travail and L’Atelier. Dumoulin went on to serve as inspector-general of the Comités Sociaux, those stillborn local mixed committees of workers, administrators, and employers foreseen under the Charte du travail, when Henry Lagardelle became minister of labor in 1942. Marcel Roy was named a workers’ delegate to the Organization Committee for the automobile industry. Even a number of more circumspect union leaders cooperated for a time with the new labor machinery, if Georges Lefranc’s memory is correct." (Loc 5192)
Phew, that’s a lot of names of individuals and organisations being juggled in that paragraph, with only the briefest introduction to each of them. If there was ever a book that needed a Cast List it’s this one but unfortunately none is provided. The book was published in 1972 and I think, with the allegedly short attention span of 21st century readers, it would be structured differently if written today.
The book is clearly well researched, and one of Paxton’s key themes, is that the Vichy government aimed to sweep away the perceived failings of the ‘decadent’ Third Republic and start anew. “Collaboration no longer meant merely accomplishing one’s daily round under enemy occupation. Collaboration now meant taking advantage of a foreign army to carry out major changes in the way Frenchmen were governed, schooled and employed” (Loc 536). The Sections on Collaboration demonstrate that a broad section of French political operatives on both the right and left, as well as civil servants and industrialists supported and were supported by the Vichy regime.
Paxton’s research demonstrates how little the civil service changed from the structures in place during Vichy and post-war France, which provided a stability and continuity valued above everything else before and after ‘liberation’. As Paxton summarises ‘At bottom, however, the decisive reason holding men to the Vichy solution was an instinctual commitment to public order as the highest good.’ (Loc 5468)
A very good history of Vichy that puts it in the context of French history instead of as an imposition by the Nazis. Particularly good at setting the context of French fatigue and disgust by the late 1930s and consequently how Vichy was seized on as a moment to re-set French culture by parties ranging from traditionalists to modernizers. The attempts by Petain, Laval et al to get the Germans to treat Vichy as a willing partner would be comic if they weren’t tragic. Paxton destroys the idea that Vichy was a “shield” against worse Nazi depredations.The main fear of the collaborationists was disorder and even Revolution. Ironically, both the Germans and the Vichyites just wanted social peace.
Paxton liefert in diesem Buch aufschlussreiche Einblicke in die Lage Frankreichs während des Zweiten Weltkriegs. Besonders bemerkenswert ist seine nüchterne Analyse des französischen Nationalmythos, der nahelegt, dass nahezu die gesamte Bevölkerung Teil der Résistance gewesen sei. Die Realität sah jedoch anders aus: Nur etwa 2 % der erwachsenen Bevölkerung schlossen sich aktiv dem Widerstand an, rund 10 % leisteten passiven Widerstand. Die große Mehrheit war nach dem traumatischen Ersten Weltkrieg und der verheerenden Niederlage von 1940 vor allem an Frieden, Ruhe und Stabilität interessiert, und das Vichy-Regime erfuhr anfangs breite Unterstützung. Viele Franzosen setzten auf Marschall Pétain als „starken Mann“, der das als dysfunktional empfundene parlamentarische System durch eine autoritäre Technokratie ersetzen sollte.
Dieses Projekt scheiterte jedoch relativ schnell, vor allem durch das sich wendende Kriegsglück zugunsten der Alliierten. Interessant ist dabei auch, dass nach dem britischen Angriff auf Mers-el-Kébir die Möglichkeit bestand, dass Frankreich an der Seite Deutschlands in den Krieg eintritt. Diese engere Verknüpfung Frankreichs mit Deutschland scheiterte jedoch letzlich nicht am Willen der französischen Kollaborateure, sondern am Desinteresse Hitlers.
Ohne tiefere Kenntnisse der französischen Zwischenkriegszeit kann das Buch stellenweise sehr anspruchsvoll sein. Ich musste viele Namen und Ereignisse nachschlagen, da Paxton häufig tief in die Details des politischen Systems eintaucht, das dem Krieg vorausging.
Davon unabhängig sind auch Paxtons allgemeinere Überlegungen zum Begriff des Faschismus sehr interessant. Eine einheitliche Definition hält er für schwierig, da faschistische Bewegungen nie aus eigener Kraft an die Macht gelangten und daher nie in ihrer revolutionären Reinform existierten. Trotz erheblicher Unterschiede bezüglich gesellschaftlicher Hierarchien, in der Wirtschaftspolitik sowie im Verhältnis zu Tradition und Religion wurden alle Faschisten letztlich von konservativen Machthabern an die Regierung gebracht, wodurch es jeweils zu einer teilweisen Vermischung der Motive kam.
Paxton schlägt deshalb vor, faschistische Regime als Teil eines Spektrums zu betrachten: Am einen Ende stehen Vichy-Frankreich und Salazars Portugal, wo konservative Kräfte durchgehend die Kontrolle behielten und dogmatische Faschisten kaum Einfluss hatten. In der Mitte befinden sich die Regime Francos und Mussolinis, die zwar autoritär regierten, aber dauerhaft auf die Unterstützung von Militär, Kirche und Monarchie angewiesen blieben. Am anderen Ende steht der Nationalsozialismus, bei dem sich die NSDAP nach der Machtübernahme rasch aller konservativen Verbündeten – wie von Papen und von Schleicher – entledigte und freie Hand bei der Verfolgung ihrer Ideologie hatte.
Diese Perspektive halte ich auch hilfreich für die Einordnung moderner faschistoider Bewegungen. Paxtons Ansatz erlaubt eine differenzierte Betrachtung jenseits einfacher Schwarz-Weiß-Muster (😉) wie „Faschist“ und „Demokrat“.
I became interested in Vichy after reading some of Allan Massie's books, particularly the excellent ''A Question of Loyalties''.
Some people thought there was an argument to be made for Vichy in 1940. Well, there was, for some Frenchmen. There was the possibility of a last round of the Third Republic politics, and of preventing chaos -- points that resonated with many people and was reinforced by the prestige of Petain. And perhaps a speedy peace would follow the Armistice, and France could be neutral in the continuing war.
These are some of the points that Prof Paxton raise in this excellent history, reflecting his deep knowledge of the period. I will not try to summarise the book -- for that is beyond me -- but will state his conclusion that France didn't profit from Vichy and might have been no worse off had the French government gone out of business in 1940 and let the Germans occupy and run the country, as had the Dutch and Belgians. The children would still have gone to school and the municipal services would have been provided, but France would not have collaborated with the horrible policies of the Third Reich. In fact, Vichy's pseudo-independence and endless concern about colonies and borders might have been a hindrance, as they traded off some other points in vain attempts to preserve these, and to make peace before the end of the war.
I picked this book up because although World War 2 is one of my preferred topics to study in history, I had never really gotten around to reading much about Vichy France. I can say Paxton’s book fulfilled my goal in this area. He does a good job of going through the ins and out of the regime from start to finish. I feel like he is at his best when he makes broad statements and talks more about his thoughts than the facts themselves.
It can be a little dry and overly-academic at times, and isn’t for the uninitiated, but if you’re interested in learning about Vichy, this is where to start.
Robert Paxton is best known for his short book on "generic" fascism, but this book is the one that really made his career in academia. it was originally published in 1972 and shattered the mythologies of Vichy up to that time. It's still cited in contemporary books on occupied France and the major findings hold up. It is very much worth reading today. The historiographical introduction to the 2002 edition is also very good, and could be teachable in history research methods courses.
A remarkably well-ordered and sober assessment of the Vichy phenomenon, focusing on the years from the fall of France to the German occupation of previously unoccupied area, but giving also some information on the times preceding and following that period. Mostly a synthetic approach, somewhat hampered by limited archival sources available at the time of writing (which the author skilfully alleviated by incisive analysis of memoirs and other publications). Written in a clear, unemotional style, yet not overly dry, this is just about a perfect historical book.
A brilliant academic book on one of the most disgraceful regime of cowards, criminals and cretins to have ever disgraced the Earth. Vichy, a regime ran by squabbling technocrats and traditionalists, and any apologia attached to it is demolished by Paxton's brilliant study. A job well done.
I have had a longstanding interest in how people rationalize their wrongdoing. Paxton's history of Vichy addresses this problem on a grand scale. No other choice, better than the alternative, to preserve something, to salvage something and so on… It is hard to think about Vichy after the fact and not become judgmental, but Paxton does a wonderful job of putting the reader into the situation and gets as close as i can imagine to allowing the reader to see things as they saw them. In the end I felt that what Pétain wanted [an anti-semitic, patriarchal, authoritarian state] was itself so bad that i had no sympathy for his rationalizing his pact with Hitler, and no sympathy for the leaders of Vichy in the post-war period. Of course, that would have been an easy judgment to make without reading Paxton. The importance of reading Paxton was that it allowed me to feel that I had "been there" and had abundant reasons for my judgment.
Groundbreaking, fantastic, must-read for Vichy etc. If you've read anything about Vichy written in the last 40 years, they cite him. Can you imagine writing a book with such explosive and enduring impact? I only wish. I have a history crush on Paxton and think I'd probably get all stammery and silly if I met him.
A fascinating look at a what happened to France when they chose not to rebuff Hitler & his minions. There is a nice balance of both the French side & the German side of the Occupation, and I for one, learned quite a bit, more than I ever did in school, that's for sure! It's no wonder that every book that is written about this time, uses Robert Paxton as a source.
While I like Paxton's other book enormously -- and I really liked the writing here -- I found I got bogged down after about 1/3 the way through and moved on -- or rather -- skimmed my way home..., so to speak....
When Hitler and his tanks, troops, and Stuka dive-bombers blitzkrieged across France, reaching Paris in six weeks, the French leaders and people thought that Hitler, like Napoleon, would control the continent of Europe for decades. The patriotic socialist politicians of France fled into exile, leaving behind the conservative, pro-fascist, pro-Catholic, and pro-life conservative leaders who were eager to collaborate with the Nazis. Hitler thought it was advantageous to allow them to organize a puppet government in Vichy France, the agricultural region southeast of Paris.
For many decades after the Allies invaded the beaches of Normandy, expelling the Nazi invaders, the French, ashamed of their past, clung to the myth that few French collaborated with the Nazis, that most French eagerly supported the Resistance in resisting the Nazis.
Robert Paxton’s book, Vichy France, was both a sensation and very controversial when it was release in 1972, causing the French to revise their collective memory of the uncomfortable history of Vichy France. Quoting from his Wikipedia page: “In the preface to the 1982 edition of Vichy France, Paxton disagreed with the assertion of his opponents that he had written in "easy moral superiority" from the perspective of a "victor": "In fact [it] was written in the shadow of the war in Vietnam, which sharpened my animosity against nationalist conformism of all kinds. Writing in the late 1960s, what concerned me was not the comparison with defeated France but the confident swagger of the Germans in the summer of 1940." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Paxton After you read Paxton’s book you should also read the book by WD Halls to hear many interesting stories of how both Catholic and Protestant clergy and laymen collaborated with and resisted the policies of the Nazi regime and Vichy France during World War II. Halls had so many footnotes to Paxton’s history that it was abundantly clear that the Paxton book was the primary history of Vichy France.
This blog also references a blog on the Vatican II decree on Religious Freedom, which discards the medieval notion that the absolute monarchies and the Catholic Church are partners, and the modern notion that since the Communism is the enemy of the Catholic Church, and since Fascism is the deadly enemy of Communism, then the Church can tolerate Fascism. Vatican II embraces democracy and rejects fascism.
The Vichy regime in France that collaborated with the Nazis in World War II: Were they your garden variety, scumbag opportunists? Or were they brave souls who sacrificed their reputations to mitigate as much as possible the evils of the occupation?
Actually, most of them didn't fall on that continuum at all. First, some history:
June, 1940: Germany invaded France. Within a few weeks, the German army had seized the northern half of France including Paris. The government of the Third Republic abandoned France and turned leadership over to Marshal Phillipe Petain, a popular World War I hero.
Germany established an east-west line across France. North of that line was the Occupied Zone under direct German control. In the south, the Germans allowed Petain to form a collaborationist regime in Vichy, France. The regime was to govern the “Free Zone” of southern France and France’s colonies. Nominally, Petain’s regime was the French government, and France was neutral in World War II. But actually, Vichy was almost completely subordinate to Germany’s authority.
November, 1942: To defend against an Allied offensive from North Africa, the German army moved south and occupied the former “Free Zone.” Germany continued to recognize the Vichy regime as France’s government, but Vichy exercised almost no control over territory.
June, 1944: After the successful Normandy invasion, Allied troops liberated France and the Vichy regime was eliminated.
On to the book review: In 1940, after the German invasion, Petain & Co. made a catastrophic misjudgment: That Germany had won World War II and France had lost; and that France would have to find its way in the New Europe that Hitler was building. Vichy's overriding aim was to persuade Germany, as the reigning European power, to allow France to continue as a political entity and player.
Hitler, on the other hand, just wanted France's material support and manpower for the war effort. He wanted no trouble from France that would require diversion of resources from the fronts. A compliant "French" government in Vichy suited his needs.
Vichy had almost no leverage to apply to Germany. It suggested it could be helpful by acting as a neutral in diplomacy with the U.S. Hitler ignored that. It suggested that an easing of the terms of occupation would increase productivity and popular support for Germany. Hitler ignored that, too. The one bargaining chip it had was the powerful French naval fleet, which was based in France's colonies. But Vichy never convinced Hitler that they could or would deliver the ships. And after 1942, they were off the table.
Did Vichy act as a "shield" against Nazi exploitation? The author says no. The data is a little shaky, but living standards in Vichy France don't seem to have been any better than in occupied areas.
Most importantly, did Vichy protect Jews and others from the camps? In the post-war trials, the Vichy defendants claimed they did. They noted that 92% of the native Jews in other occupied countries disappeared while 95% of French Jews survived.
This is impressive but misleading. To meet German deportation quotas, Vichy targeted foreign Jews who are not included in the 95%. The author points out the real question: Were less Jews shipped out by Vichy than would have been taken by Germany without Vichy? Not really. And early in the war, Vichy had some latitude to facilitate Jewish escape but didn't use it.
Some Goodreads reviews found the writing in this book to be dry. I disagree. The author makes many droll observations about policies and personalities. It is intended to be an authoritative history, so there is a lot more detail and supportive data than a casual reader needs. But a very worthwhile read.
For a modern reader, it’s difficult to imagine the splash that this book must have made upon its original publication. A testament to Paxton’s enormous influence, I think of Vichy not as a stopgap regime to protect Frenchmen until an inevitable Allied victory, but rather an earnest attempt by reactionary Frenchmen to dispose of their Jewish countrymen and establish a fascist regime to undo the legacy of the French Revolution.
If anything, Paxton’s book has slightly complicated my formerly simplistic assessment of Marshal Petain’s regime. At Vichy, the French people did not submit themselves to a fascist coup so much as they voluntarily handed over power to a certain contingent of vengeful elites: arch-traditionalists like Pétain, power-hungry anti-Communists like Laval, and of course a number of self-professed anti-Semitic fascists like the villainously-named Louis Darquier de Pellepoix. Petain’s National Revolution—an entirely French initiative in which Hitler seemed utterly disinterested—was a curious blend of radically racist legislation, old-school Catholic authoritarianism, and technocratic tinkering.
Thus Paxton demonstrates that much of Vichy’s evil was not imposed by the Germans but initiated by the French. And, rather brilliantly, Paxton argues that this indigenous attempt to refashion France in the mold of Germany, Italy, and Spain was not an asset for the French in their dealings with the Axis Powers, but rather a liability. Granting Vichy some independence was a concession made by an indifferent Hitler that consequently weakened Vichy’s already-tenuous bargaining position. And what Vichy bargained for in the first place was certainly not the protection of its Jews—who were subject to a suite of discriminatory laws that ultimately facilitated Germany’s implementation of the Final Solution in France—but the opportunity to join Germany and Italy as architects of a new Europe. On this front, as on countless others—namely the material well-being of French citizens, who endured privations equal to or worse than those of neighboring Western European nations—Vichy was a total failure. For the French, Petain was neither sword nor shield.
In the foreword, Paxton, an American, admits with some regret that his entire historical study, conducted in the late ‘60s and early ‘70s, was infused with righteous indignation at American swashbuckling in Vietnam and its alleged parallels to Nazi triumphalism in 1940. For an American reader in 2024, I can’t help but think about the long shadow cast by events of the distant past. Just as Vichy leaders relitigated the legacy of a revolution a century and a half prior—with its bold declarations of egalitarianism and emancipation—we Americans constantly grapple with the unhealed scars and unfulfilled promises of our 150-year-old Civil War. In America, as in France, le passé ne passe pas.
After being significantly impressed with Paxton's THE ANATOMY OF FASCISM, I decided to give his much heralded study on Vichy France a whirl and wasn't disappointed. Paxton is an underrated historian who is quite subtle about his breadth and depth. In addition to helpfully unpacking the collaborationist shenanigans of Marshal Petain, he draws several reasonable conclusions about how France's acceptance of Nazi occupation had much to do with their dissatisfaction with the Third Republic. Various intellectuals claimed that the freedoms had "gone too far" and used this thesis as a method to negotiate their way through the troubling authoritarian arrangement. I had no idea that there was no active Resistance movement in France for the first year of Vichy France and that the Nazis were a little more hands-off than I had believed, allowing French character to find ways of accepting the unhappy circumstances. I did know about the way that France was splintered, with letters and resources cruelly and strictly cut off throughout the nation. Germany was so hell-bent on defeating England during the war that it took them some time to recognize the true nature of the French population. Paxton also offers us some very useful quotes on how Charles de Gaulle was perceived during this time. This book is very much worth reading in 2025 fascist America. Because while French intellectuals found ways of justifying living under the Vichy government, America simply accepts it. Under authoritarianism, we must be reminded that people become VERY comfortable with "Lockean" arrangements that were previously inconceivable.
Named after the town in which it organized its government, Vichy France was a French collaborationist (with Germany, that is) led by Marechal Philippe Petain during the World War II. After the initial shock of France surprisingly quick defeat against Germany, Petain and other figures as Pierre Laval and Admiral Francois Darlan chose to offer armistice to Germany, fearing that France could potentially fall into social disorder, rather than evacuating themselves just like General de Gaulle and Free French did. Vichy French, composed of traditionalists, fascists and generally anticommunists, believed that by collaborating with Germany, they could earn a place in a new european order led by Germany. These people went so far as replacing the old Liberte, Egalite and Fraternite with Travail, Familie and Patrie. In this goal, it tried its hardest to return themselves as a normal state allied with Germany, with eagerness to contribute to Axis’ war effort which even made Hitler cautious. However, in its quest to retain french sovereignty, Vichy ended up turning into more of a German subject as the war turned against Germany. After the war, Vichy France contributed towards the rebuilding the new France by its tendencies to favor technocrats, which in turn contributed to the centralization of french bureaucracy, making it more effective than before, putting French economy towards the path of dirigism and moderating the anticlericalism of french government.
This monumental 1972 study of Vichy France overturned previous ideas to show that Vichy France was not primarily a Nazi puppet; it arose organically under the pressure of the French military collapse, representing the development of preexisting trends in French politics and society. It wasn't a Nazi puppet so much as a French ultraconservative self-coup. Paxton extensively goes over their debates, their personell, their laws, and their diplomacy to show this. The Nazis pressed them into some individual actions, but little more.
The thing is, Vichy failed. They failed in their domestic policy, as conservative agrarian-focused economics didn't meet the needs of the modern world; even they themselves acknowledged that. They failed even worse in their foreign policy, as Hitler wasn't interested in independent allies and wouldn't ease the onerous Armistice terms even when Vichy was eager to partner with him. And because of that, they failed to gain popular support, as Frenchmen didn't see improvements in their life.
An important book in the historiography of the French Occupation. Paxton, using the German archives, proves that Vichy France tried, several times, to reach out to Nazi Germany for a bigger role in the new European Order.
Germany's refusal is what caused the État Français to fail, not Vichy's resistance.
Paxton also notes the harshness of the occupation regime, the general attitude of the population (shifting from supporting Pétain to De Gaulle), the ambigious attitude of the US, the difficult question of Mers-el-Kébir, the Holocaust and the role of Vichy. And finally, the question of punishment, which he believes the vast majority of Vichy's technocrats managed to escape.
A difficult read as Frenchman, but a fascinating one for sure.
This certainly exceeded my expectations, based mostly on what I had heard about Paxton and some of his more recent commentary.
In this book you will find a nuanced and well-developed sense of politics conveyed in clear and engaging prose. He's a good writer, certainly not boring to keep up with. The book is more or less what it promises to be: a narrative of Vichy with some additional Third Republic context as needed. At the end there is a sort of balance sheet and an attempt to trace the legacy of this government as carried forward by future authorities.
Probably the most interesting observation he makes is the rise of bureaucratic expertise and control. This persisted into the postwar period and, by my reckoning, seems to mirror many other societies as well.
This is a fantastic scholarly study. Others have described it better than I can so I just want to leave a few big take aways: -Paxton totally dispels the notion that Vichy France was some how serving as a “shield” against Nazi exploitation. The Vichy government was willing to work with Hitler so long as they were given free rein to restructure French society. Further Vichy-Nazi collaboration was prevented because of German indifference rather than French opposition. -the French citizenry acquiesced to the Vichy government because they wanted security; so much so that they were willing to sacrifice their liberty. In the end, they had neither security nor liberty. Something to think about during these times of rising authoritarianism across the western world.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
This is an engrossing history of a certain era that interests me. His writing is clear and interesting. He includes two introductions which are immensely helpful in understanding his approach and thesis since he first published his book in 1972 and this most recent edition from 2001. This paperback copy has a nice heft and the internal photos are helpful for placing faces to names especially with the endless last names starting with the letter D.
A recommendation for anyone interested in this historical period.
For a while, this was the absolute most vital source for the Vichy period of France. It was accessible and available. Even today it is still a good read, but is beginning to grow long in the tooth and, in my opinion, a new work is needed that uses the new sources that have come out since publication.
Absolutely still worth a read for those interested.
A good supplement to this info is the 30-odd pages on Vichy in Mazower's "Hitler's Emprie". Covers a lot of the same ground using newer sources