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Wittgenstein and Relativism
When scholars discuss the question whether Wittgenstein was a relativist, they invariably draw their criteria from recent definitions of relativism. This study tries a different it identifies conceptions of relativism that were influential in the early twentieth century, and uses them as foils for interpreting Wittgenstein's philosophy. Section 1 investigates what Wittgenstein meant in speaking of his 'ethnological perspective,' and how this perspective relates to 'cultural relativism' in anthropology around 1900. Section 2 focuses on Wittgenstein's reflections on logic and mathematics as 'ethnological phenomena.' In this context, the ethnological perspective brought Wittgenstein close to positions that many of his contemporaries denounced as 'psychologism' and 'sociologism.' Section 3 highlights the role of the ethnological perspective in Wittgenstein's remarks on 'certainties.' Many of these remarks would have been counted as relativistic by leading members of the 'Vienna Circle.'
88 pages, Hardcover
Published May 14, 2026
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Is Wittgenstein A Relativist?
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 -- 1951) is one of the greatest and most discussed 20th Century philosophers. His difficult thought changed markedly throughout his life.
Cambridge University Press publishes a series of short monographs called "Elements" which includes 22 volumes on the thought of Wittgenstein edited by philosopher David Stern. This recent volume in the series is "Wittgenstein and Relativism" by Martin Kusch (b. 1959) a highly regarded Professor of Philosophy at the University of Vienna. This short, difficult and thoughtful book taught me a great deal.
A difficulty at the outset is understanding the nature of "relativism", a term Wittgenstein never uses. Still, a great deal of scholarly work has been done on the question whether Wittgenstein is or is not a relativist. Kusch gives a historical account placing Wittgenstein's thought in the context of the thought of his time which was then considered to be relativist. He explores how Wittgenstein responded to these then current views of relativism. Thus, Kusch tries to relate Wittgenstein's thought to the intellectual trends of his day and see how his thought ties in with concepts of relativism. Kusch says his goal is more historical, understanding what Wittgenstein says, than assessing the extent to which his position was right. Nevertheless, there is provocative philosophical analysis in this book.
Kusch concludes that Wittgenstein's thought was relativistic and explores what this meant and what were the many nuances Wittgenstein brought to his thinking. His study explores an outstanding range of intellectual activity in its three chapters.
In the first chapter, "Cultural Relativism, Historicism, and the Ethnological Approach" Kusch sees, in Wittgenstein's work after the "Tractatus", a strongly enthnological influence, emphasizing how different cultures create different ways of thinking. Much of this discussion reminded me of the American pragmatist and naturalist, John Dewey. Kusch discusses figures including Franz Boas, Ruth Benedict, Alexander Goldenweiser, Ostwald Spengler, and others to support an ethnographically based understanding of knowledge as opposed to the evolutionary base urged by James Fraser in "The Golden Bough". Kusch argues that Wittgenstein uses the "ethnological perspective" as a philosophical basis to reject absolutistic ways of thinking and to stress the importance of culture. This "ethnological perspective" carries through the remainder of Kusch's study.
In the second chapter, "Psychologism, Sociologism, Ethnology" considers psychologistic forms of relativism and sociolgistic forms, evidenced in the work of Karl Mannheim. He also introduces another difficult philosophical term, "naturalism" and finds it has two forms, a scientifically-based naturalism, and a naturalism which is much looser and harder to pin down. He considers thinkers including Frege, Husserl, and Schlick and explores Wittgenstein's thinking on measurement, logic, and mathematics. Kusch finds Wittgenstein rejects both psychologism and the Platonizing of Frege or Husserl in favor of a scientifically based naturalism which relies heavily on enthnology. Here again philosophy functions at a greater level of generality and detachment than do the findings of the sciences. Ethnology remains crucial to Wittgenstein's thinking about mathematics and logic.
In the third chapter, "Relativism, Pseudorationalism, and the Ethnological Approach to Certainty" Kusch examines Wittgenstein's late work "On Certainty". He admits his understanding of this book is not shared by all readers. He compares and contrasts Wittgenstein's position with the positions of Schlick and Neurath on the nature of truth and on whether truth involves a strong correspondence with reality or a looser coherence-based position. Yet again, Kusch finds Wittgenstein's thought ethnological. While Wittgenstein's thought is relativistic, Kusch denies that this means that one form of thinking is always as good as any other. He develops a careful pattern, in a short work, of the differening ways people respond to experience and to those who think differently from themselves. Wittgenstein's thought is relativistic in its heavy ethnological emphasis and in its rejection of absolutism. Here is Kusch's conclusion.
"The three main sections of this Element are connected by the thought that the “ethnological perspective” is central to Wittgenstein’s later philosophy as a whole and that this perspective brings with it a methodological relativism. Still, Wittgenstein’s relativism is not just methodological, it is also substantive: Wittgenstein’s rejects absolutes in the assessment of magic, religious, or science; he undermines Platonism and other forms of absolutism in the philosophy of logic and mathematics; and he challenges absolutism in his account of certainties."
This book may be an "Element" but it is not for beginners. It is a wonderfully challenging book on Wittgenstein, on his intellectual milieu, and on his relationship to the relativisms of his day.
Robin Friedman
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 -- 1951) is one of the greatest and most discussed 20th Century philosophers. His difficult thought changed markedly throughout his life.
Cambridge University Press publishes a series of short monographs called "Elements" which includes 22 volumes on the thought of Wittgenstein edited by philosopher David Stern. This recent volume in the series is "Wittgenstein and Relativism" by Martin Kusch (b. 1959) a highly regarded Professor of Philosophy at the University of Vienna. This short, difficult and thoughtful book taught me a great deal.
A difficulty at the outset is understanding the nature of "relativism", a term Wittgenstein never uses. Still, a great deal of scholarly work has been done on the question whether Wittgenstein is or is not a relativist. Kusch gives a historical account placing Wittgenstein's thought in the context of the thought of his time which was then considered to be relativist. He explores how Wittgenstein responded to these then current views of relativism. Thus, Kusch tries to relate Wittgenstein's thought to the intellectual trends of his day and see how his thought ties in with concepts of relativism. Kusch says his goal is more historical, understanding what Wittgenstein says, than assessing the extent to which his position was right. Nevertheless, there is provocative philosophical analysis in this book.
Kusch concludes that Wittgenstein's thought was relativistic and explores what this meant and what were the many nuances Wittgenstein brought to his thinking. His study explores an outstanding range of intellectual activity in its three chapters.
In the first chapter, "Cultural Relativism, Historicism, and the Ethnological Approach" Kusch sees, in Wittgenstein's work after the "Tractatus", a strongly enthnological influence, emphasizing how different cultures create different ways of thinking. Much of this discussion reminded me of the American pragmatist and naturalist, John Dewey. Kusch discusses figures including Franz Boas, Ruth Benedict, Alexander Goldenweiser, Ostwald Spengler, and others to support an ethnographically based understanding of knowledge as opposed to the evolutionary base urged by James Fraser in "The Golden Bough". Kusch argues that Wittgenstein uses the "ethnological perspective" as a philosophical basis to reject absolutistic ways of thinking and to stress the importance of culture. This "ethnological perspective" carries through the remainder of Kusch's study.
In the second chapter, "Psychologism, Sociologism, Ethnology" considers psychologistic forms of relativism and sociolgistic forms, evidenced in the work of Karl Mannheim. He also introduces another difficult philosophical term, "naturalism" and finds it has two forms, a scientifically-based naturalism, and a naturalism which is much looser and harder to pin down. He considers thinkers including Frege, Husserl, and Schlick and explores Wittgenstein's thinking on measurement, logic, and mathematics. Kusch finds Wittgenstein rejects both psychologism and the Platonizing of Frege or Husserl in favor of a scientifically based naturalism which relies heavily on enthnology. Here again philosophy functions at a greater level of generality and detachment than do the findings of the sciences. Ethnology remains crucial to Wittgenstein's thinking about mathematics and logic.
In the third chapter, "Relativism, Pseudorationalism, and the Ethnological Approach to Certainty" Kusch examines Wittgenstein's late work "On Certainty". He admits his understanding of this book is not shared by all readers. He compares and contrasts Wittgenstein's position with the positions of Schlick and Neurath on the nature of truth and on whether truth involves a strong correspondence with reality or a looser coherence-based position. Yet again, Kusch finds Wittgenstein's thought ethnological. While Wittgenstein's thought is relativistic, Kusch denies that this means that one form of thinking is always as good as any other. He develops a careful pattern, in a short work, of the differening ways people respond to experience and to those who think differently from themselves. Wittgenstein's thought is relativistic in its heavy ethnological emphasis and in its rejection of absolutism. Here is Kusch's conclusion.
"The three main sections of this Element are connected by the thought that the “ethnological perspective” is central to Wittgenstein’s later philosophy as a whole and that this perspective brings with it a methodological relativism. Still, Wittgenstein’s relativism is not just methodological, it is also substantive: Wittgenstein’s rejects absolutes in the assessment of magic, religious, or science; he undermines Platonism and other forms of absolutism in the philosophy of logic and mathematics; and he challenges absolutism in his account of certainties."
This book may be an "Element" but it is not for beginners. It is a wonderfully challenging book on Wittgenstein, on his intellectual milieu, and on his relationship to the relativisms of his day.
Robin Friedman
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