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Quarterly Essay #101
Blind Spot: Southeast Asia and Australia's Future
Australia has forgotten what keeps it safe. So argues Michael Wesley in this sharp and compelling essay about our place in the world.
Southeast Asia is the key to our national security and prosperity. If China dominates the region, as it plans to, Australia will be very vulnerable. So why are we following an American strategy that isolates and alienates us from our neighbours?
Wesley argues that the focus on AUKUS and sticking with Trump is a dangerous distraction. Whereas the United States has little at stake in Southeast Asia, Australia has everything to lose. How did our foreign policy elite become so wedded to the US worldview? What do our Southeast Asian neighbours have to tell us, if only we would listen? *The Crucible* is a gripping essay about strategic folly and the future of our region.
"It should be clear that Australia has made the wrong that relying on the US alliance to address the threat of a Chinese-centred Sphere of Deference on its northern doorstep has left it dangerously exposed and unprepared. If anything, Canberra's adherence to the US strategy has led to an increasing divergence of interests and perceptions between Australia and its neighbours. As a consequence, Australia is arguably at an all-time low in its ability to shape events and attitudes in Southeast Asia."—**Michael Wesley, *The Crucible***
Southeast Asia is the key to our national security and prosperity. If China dominates the region, as it plans to, Australia will be very vulnerable. So why are we following an American strategy that isolates and alienates us from our neighbours?
Wesley argues that the focus on AUKUS and sticking with Trump is a dangerous distraction. Whereas the United States has little at stake in Southeast Asia, Australia has everything to lose. How did our foreign policy elite become so wedded to the US worldview? What do our Southeast Asian neighbours have to tell us, if only we would listen? *The Crucible* is a gripping essay about strategic folly and the future of our region.
"It should be clear that Australia has made the wrong that relying on the US alliance to address the threat of a Chinese-centred Sphere of Deference on its northern doorstep has left it dangerously exposed and unprepared. If anything, Canberra's adherence to the US strategy has led to an increasing divergence of interests and perceptions between Australia and its neighbours. As a consequence, Australia is arguably at an all-time low in its ability to shape events and attitudes in Southeast Asia."—**Michael Wesley, *The Crucible***
126 pages, Paperback
Published March 16, 2026
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June 10, 2026
Towards the end of Blindspot: Southeast Asia and Australia’s Future, Michael Wesley states: “I am anticipating an avalanche of negative responses to my arguments, ranging from derision or horror.” Wesley’s hedging was only half appropriate. Although his thesis does not live up to its grand claims of provoking derision and horror, the reader is ultimately left unconvinced by the strength of the argument. This is due to its reliance on a flawed historical analogy and an overstated reading of Southeast Asian geopolitics. The implication is unsound policy guidance.
Wesley’s essay relies more on assertion than sustained analysis. Much of the essay focuses on China and America, with relatively limited attention given to Southeast Asia and Australia—the titular subjects. The historical overviews are generally facile and lack analytical depth. There is limited engagement with countervailing evidence, and the essay ultimately leaves its practical implications unclear. These structural weaknesses are evident from the outset, as Wesley opens with a dubious historical comparison.
Wesley asserts that China’s rise and America’s relative decline are historically analogous to British capitulation to the Japanese at Singapore in 1942, which precipitated heightened anxieties that Australia might be invaded. The current threat posed by China and the rapidly changing international system, spearheaded by an unpredictable American administration, is apparently so grave that Wesley asserts: “Anthony Albanese probably isn’t retracing [Prime Minister] Curtin’s night-time pacing around the garden of the Lodge. But he should be.”
Wesley does qualify his analogy slightly, stating: “history doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes.” A brief analysis of history, however, demonstrates that Wesley’s “rhyming” analogy still remains highly flawed. Japan had been expanding into China since 1931 and had been at full-scale war with China since 1937; the Philippines had already fallen; the rest of Southeast Asia would soon fall, including Australian territory in Papua; and mainland Australia would also be bombed. And this is all before we mention Germany’s conquest of Europe and advance into the Soviet Union.
Where the analogy marginally holds, China wants to re-establish a form of regional primacy that it believes existed prior to the Century of Humiliation (1839–1949). This ambition is concentrated on Taiwan. China’s dispute over Taiwanese sovereignty is an extension of the internecine, decades-long civil war that erupted with the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911 and the flight of the Kuomintang to Taiwan when the Chinese Communist Party took over mainland China in 1949. Taiwanese sovereignty is central to America’s forward posturing in Asia.
To date, however, China has been reticent to offensively deploy its military to pursue its hegemonic ambitions on a large scale. Although the threat of invading Taiwan is serious, a successful amphibious invasion has proved notoriously difficult throughout history. Even if it were to succeed, there is no guarantee that China would win the subsequent war against Taiwan, which could plausibly become prolonged and strategically indeterminate. Moreover, there is a substantial risk that such a conflict may escalate into a regional war if the US intervenes and possibly into nuclear war.
The Japan–China analogy does not hold. The current strategic context is fundamentally different. Disregarding the speculative nature of the comparison, Taiwan is a closer analogue to Singapore, insofar as its fall would more directly alter the regional balance of power. Despite this, Wesley spotlights a legitimate concern. Australian foreign policy is at a crossroads. Relying solely on America for defence leaves Australia wilfully exposed if the US, for whatever reason, were to lose its hegemonic status, and China in turn establishes a “sphere of deference” in Southeast Asia.
This concern was evinced by Hugh White in Quarterly Essay 98. White contended that Australia, torn between history and geography, should adopt an independent foreign policy that is regionally focused as American power wanes. Wesley extends this focus by arguing that Australia must turn to Southeast Asia, stating: “Geopolitical reasoning tells us that what happens in Southeast Asia is of overwhelming importance to Australia’s safety, prosperity and sovereignty…. There is no other priority that even comes close in existential importance.”
Wesley stipulates that Australia’s priority must be to refocus on the risk of a Chinese sphere of deference in Southeast Asia and to work with regional states to prevent their incorporation into that sphere. If Chinese ambitions were met, Australia’s access to this sphere would depend on the former’s “satisfaction with Australia’s deference to its sensitivities and preferences… Australia would have to make constant choices between its sovereign values and its prosperity…. Unlike in WWII, this is a scenario that no external great power would support Australia [in] or could help Canberra navigate.”
This, Wesley argues, requires a less didactic, US-proxy approach grounded in a clearer understanding of Southeast Asian preferences. Australia must move beyond treating the American alliance as an end in itself and instead view it as one instrument within a broader regional grand strategy centred on Southeast Asia. Prima facie, Wesley’s argument appears reasonable. However, the evidence supporting its most novel claim, that Australia should adopt a distinctly Southeast Asian strategic lens toward China, does not add up.
Wesley says that a Chinese sphere of deference may eventuate via security agreements, increased economic integration, the building of regional solidarity through an anti-Western orientation, and possibly through elite coercion. Chinese success depends on “convincing [Southeast Asia] that the benefits [of being in their sphere of influence] are greater than the risks. Ultimately, Beijing will need to rely on persuasion, because geography prevents it from exercising the type of military coercion that Russia and the US are currently exercising in their spheres of interest.”
Wesley undermines his own case by noting, only paragraphs earlier, that China’s ability to persuade is becoming increasingly limited as its hegemonic intentions become more overt. China routinely contravenes norms in the South China Sea and exhibits a pan-Chinese solidarity that subverts other countries’ majority ethnicities. The promise of win-win economic partnerships is increasingly chimerical, and the binary choice of siding with China against the West is antithetical to Southeast Asian geopolitics.
Australia-US initiatives like AUKUS and increasing military interoperability are intended to balance and deter China. Such policies are viewed by Southeast Asian states as potentially drawing the region towards an unnecessary war. Wesley consequently asserts that “Australia’s China-threat foreign policy and its ever-closer adherence to US strategy to counter China are eroding its credibility with the governments in [Southeast Asia]…. Canberra’s wilful self-harm has provided Beijing with a chance to further its case for Asians managing Asian security.”
Wesley, however, overlooks the main reason a regional war may erupt—a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, where the US and its Asian allies come to its defence. Further, Southeast Asia is arguably more apprehensive towards Chinese militarism than American militarism. Almost all Southeast states are deepening military ties with America. Southeast Asia may dislike the militarism exhibited by America and Australia, but it relies on American power to deter China. It does not follow that US–Australia militarisation materially advances China’s ability to realise such ambitions.
So far, this critique has treated Southeast Asia as geopolitically and geographically homogeneous. This is because, for the most part, Wesley does too. In the section Without a Map, Wesley provides an overview of Southeast Asian geopolitical history, with particular emphasis on the post-colonial period. In 1955, in Bandung, Indonesia, Southeast Asian and African states gathered to form the non-alignment movement, where post-colonial states, including China, declared they will not formally align with major global power blocs.
Wesley adds that “out of the experience of mutual vulnerability and sensitivity to being caught up in outside power games grew a solidarity among Southeast Asia’s non-communist states,” formalised in Bangkok in 1967 with the creation of ASEAN. He further asserts that “the repeated preference for not aligning collectively is Southeast Asia’s ultimate act of agency, sovereignty and autonomy.” Wesley posits that understanding these geopolitical principles is central to understanding the grand strategies of the region.
Institutions like ASEAN and the theory behind non-alignment are presented superficially and without sufficient analytical grounding. He does not explain the underlying geopolitical forces enabling this posture of “non-alignment,” “independence,” or “sovereign egalitarianism” in the post-colonial era. Although he notes that some states have, and still are, aligned with superpowers, he does not address the tension this introduces. For instance, Wesley mentions the Cold War era Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation, as an act of regional independence rather than what it actually was: an American alliance.
Right now, the Philippines is a major ally of the US, with the latter funnelling billions of dollars over the coming five years to bolster the former’s military capabilities. Singapore hosts major US naval logistical infrastructure and trains with the US military. Indonesia is increasing military ties with America once more, having been closely aligned during the Cold War under Suharto. Thailand is a major non-NATO ally of the US. Malaysia, though not in an official alliance with America, is increasing defence interoperability with the US. Brunei also leans militarily towards America.
Vietnam has close ties to America as well, but during its war of independence, it was ideologically aligned and militarily supported by China and the Soviet Union. Cambodia is widely considered an ally of China despite no formal agreement, and Myanmar is a strong ally of China under its military junta. Southeast Asia’s non-alignment posture appears to be more rhetorical than substantive, with its composite states willing to formally or informally lean towards one superpower or another.
The notion of sovereign independence is also more contested than Wesley suggests. Indonesia has been the primary intra-regional antagonist in territorial expansion. It fought, and lost, against Malaysian independence in Borneo in the 1960s; it fought, and won, over control of West Papua after the Dutch left; and it occupied East Timor until international and domestic pressure forced it to relinquish the territory. Additionally, Vietnam invaded Cambodia in the 1970s and, most recently, Thailand and Cambodia engaged in a brief border war that required a Trump-brokered ceasefire.
Wesley’s disregard for history is further compounded by dismissing the influence of other regional powers like India and Japan. Wesley offers limited justification for the claim that each nation lacks the “compelling motivation, legitimacy or respectability to play a serious stabilising role.” The recent diplomacy of Japan’s current Prime Minister forcefully demonstrates that Japan has no desire to see China establish a sphere of deference in Southeast Asia, and India’s long-standing animosity with China suggests otherwise as well.
Southeast Asia considers Japan to be one of the most trusted major powers. Japan is remilitarising and becoming increasingly hawkish in its foreign policy, including deepening military ties with both the Philippines and the US. Prime Minister Takaichi has asserted that a blockade of Taiwan would be an existential threat to Japan. Similarly, India is viewed by Southeast Asia as an important balancer to China. India is also positioning itself as a leader of the Global South in opposition to Beijing, while increasing security ties in the Quad with Japan, the US and Australia.
When the Southeast Asian lens of Wesley’s argument is broken down, the strategic advice proffered is not as insightful as he claims. He fundamentally misrepresents history, superficially characterises Southeast Asia as non-aligned, and dismisses other regional powers without reason. What is left closely resembles White’s argument from Quarterly Essay 98, though less cogent and unnecessarily reframed through a Southeast Asian lens. Wesley concludes that Australia requires a “new journey of strategic maturation.” However, maturation requires rigour, which this analysis does not have.
Addendum:
Below are a number of standalone discrepancies in Wesley’s article.
“The cavalier way Australia has treated Indonesia — from boat tow-backs to leading an intervention in East Timor — shows how complacent we have become about the non-problematic nature of Southeast Asia.”
Australia’s response to Indonesia’s actions in East Timor does not warrant being described as cavalier. Indonesia invaded and occupied East Timor in 1975 after Portugal withdrew, and Australia did not intervene at that time. It instead intervened in 1999 to restore order following Indonesia‑backed violence after the independence referendum, with UN authorisation. Australia returned again in 2006 at the request of the Timorese government when order broke down.
“Whenever it has featured, it has been as a consequence of American interest in something else. Its deepest involvement in the region, the agonising war fought in Vietnam between 1965 and 1975, was motivated by containing the spread of communism from China, rather than by any intrinsic concern with Southeast Asian geopolitics.”
First, the spread of communism through Southeast Asia was the central geopolitical concern in the region at the time. Second, 1965 is misleading as a start date for American military involvement in Vietnam. Eisenhower had already sent around 700 military personnel before Kennedy took office, and Kennedy authorised 400 Special Forces troops and additional advisers in 1961, with numbers reaching 16,000 by 1963. As for the end date, US troops withdrew in 1973; 1975 is when South Vietnam fell.
“The ANZUS Treaty of 1951 was the price Washington paid to integrate Australia into its Cold War planning… Soon Australian forces were fighting alongside Americans when the Korean War broke out in 1950.”
The timeline contradiction here is self-evident. Australian troops were also sent under the United Nations, not as part of a bilateral American commitment.
“The Tiananmen massacre saw both the United States and Australia suspend cooperation with Beijing, but Australia became the Western state that acted earliest to re-normalise relations.”
Brent Scowcroft, President Bush’s National Security Advisor, made a secret visit to Beijing within a month of the 4 June massacre to reassure Deng Xiaoping of America’s support while publicly maintaining condemnation. A second public visit followed in December 1989. Japan and Germany also moved to restore relations on earlier timelines than Australia.
“If our major ally was concerned about China building a Sphere of Deference in Southeast Asia, it would have invested in a much more deep and sustained way in building up its commitments and credibility there. Instead, as we’ve seen, these have been eroding steadily since the end of the Cold War.”
From the 2010s onward, during the “pivot to Asia”, the US substantially deepened ties with Vietnam, the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan in direct response to China’s rise. That said, American focus on the region has declined under the Trump administration, but that is not the timeline Wesley is referring to.
“Australia is arguably at an all-time low in its ability to shape events and attitudes in Southeast Asia, precisely when it needs to have maximum influence and legitimacy.”
Australia currently ranks fifth on the Lowy Institute’s 2024 Asian Power Index. A 2025 survey cited by ANU’s National Security College also found that Australia ranked behind only Japan and the EU among leading dialogue partners in ASEAN elite opinion.
My Substack: https://callumscolumn.substack.com/
Wesley’s essay relies more on assertion than sustained analysis. Much of the essay focuses on China and America, with relatively limited attention given to Southeast Asia and Australia—the titular subjects. The historical overviews are generally facile and lack analytical depth. There is limited engagement with countervailing evidence, and the essay ultimately leaves its practical implications unclear. These structural weaknesses are evident from the outset, as Wesley opens with a dubious historical comparison.
Wesley asserts that China’s rise and America’s relative decline are historically analogous to British capitulation to the Japanese at Singapore in 1942, which precipitated heightened anxieties that Australia might be invaded. The current threat posed by China and the rapidly changing international system, spearheaded by an unpredictable American administration, is apparently so grave that Wesley asserts: “Anthony Albanese probably isn’t retracing [Prime Minister] Curtin’s night-time pacing around the garden of the Lodge. But he should be.”
Wesley does qualify his analogy slightly, stating: “history doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes.” A brief analysis of history, however, demonstrates that Wesley’s “rhyming” analogy still remains highly flawed. Japan had been expanding into China since 1931 and had been at full-scale war with China since 1937; the Philippines had already fallen; the rest of Southeast Asia would soon fall, including Australian territory in Papua; and mainland Australia would also be bombed. And this is all before we mention Germany’s conquest of Europe and advance into the Soviet Union.
Where the analogy marginally holds, China wants to re-establish a form of regional primacy that it believes existed prior to the Century of Humiliation (1839–1949). This ambition is concentrated on Taiwan. China’s dispute over Taiwanese sovereignty is an extension of the internecine, decades-long civil war that erupted with the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911 and the flight of the Kuomintang to Taiwan when the Chinese Communist Party took over mainland China in 1949. Taiwanese sovereignty is central to America’s forward posturing in Asia.
To date, however, China has been reticent to offensively deploy its military to pursue its hegemonic ambitions on a large scale. Although the threat of invading Taiwan is serious, a successful amphibious invasion has proved notoriously difficult throughout history. Even if it were to succeed, there is no guarantee that China would win the subsequent war against Taiwan, which could plausibly become prolonged and strategically indeterminate. Moreover, there is a substantial risk that such a conflict may escalate into a regional war if the US intervenes and possibly into nuclear war.
The Japan–China analogy does not hold. The current strategic context is fundamentally different. Disregarding the speculative nature of the comparison, Taiwan is a closer analogue to Singapore, insofar as its fall would more directly alter the regional balance of power. Despite this, Wesley spotlights a legitimate concern. Australian foreign policy is at a crossroads. Relying solely on America for defence leaves Australia wilfully exposed if the US, for whatever reason, were to lose its hegemonic status, and China in turn establishes a “sphere of deference” in Southeast Asia.
This concern was evinced by Hugh White in Quarterly Essay 98. White contended that Australia, torn between history and geography, should adopt an independent foreign policy that is regionally focused as American power wanes. Wesley extends this focus by arguing that Australia must turn to Southeast Asia, stating: “Geopolitical reasoning tells us that what happens in Southeast Asia is of overwhelming importance to Australia’s safety, prosperity and sovereignty…. There is no other priority that even comes close in existential importance.”
Wesley stipulates that Australia’s priority must be to refocus on the risk of a Chinese sphere of deference in Southeast Asia and to work with regional states to prevent their incorporation into that sphere. If Chinese ambitions were met, Australia’s access to this sphere would depend on the former’s “satisfaction with Australia’s deference to its sensitivities and preferences… Australia would have to make constant choices between its sovereign values and its prosperity…. Unlike in WWII, this is a scenario that no external great power would support Australia [in] or could help Canberra navigate.”
This, Wesley argues, requires a less didactic, US-proxy approach grounded in a clearer understanding of Southeast Asian preferences. Australia must move beyond treating the American alliance as an end in itself and instead view it as one instrument within a broader regional grand strategy centred on Southeast Asia. Prima facie, Wesley’s argument appears reasonable. However, the evidence supporting its most novel claim, that Australia should adopt a distinctly Southeast Asian strategic lens toward China, does not add up.
Wesley says that a Chinese sphere of deference may eventuate via security agreements, increased economic integration, the building of regional solidarity through an anti-Western orientation, and possibly through elite coercion. Chinese success depends on “convincing [Southeast Asia] that the benefits [of being in their sphere of influence] are greater than the risks. Ultimately, Beijing will need to rely on persuasion, because geography prevents it from exercising the type of military coercion that Russia and the US are currently exercising in their spheres of interest.”
Wesley undermines his own case by noting, only paragraphs earlier, that China’s ability to persuade is becoming increasingly limited as its hegemonic intentions become more overt. China routinely contravenes norms in the South China Sea and exhibits a pan-Chinese solidarity that subverts other countries’ majority ethnicities. The promise of win-win economic partnerships is increasingly chimerical, and the binary choice of siding with China against the West is antithetical to Southeast Asian geopolitics.
Australia-US initiatives like AUKUS and increasing military interoperability are intended to balance and deter China. Such policies are viewed by Southeast Asian states as potentially drawing the region towards an unnecessary war. Wesley consequently asserts that “Australia’s China-threat foreign policy and its ever-closer adherence to US strategy to counter China are eroding its credibility with the governments in [Southeast Asia]…. Canberra’s wilful self-harm has provided Beijing with a chance to further its case for Asians managing Asian security.”
Wesley, however, overlooks the main reason a regional war may erupt—a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, where the US and its Asian allies come to its defence. Further, Southeast Asia is arguably more apprehensive towards Chinese militarism than American militarism. Almost all Southeast states are deepening military ties with America. Southeast Asia may dislike the militarism exhibited by America and Australia, but it relies on American power to deter China. It does not follow that US–Australia militarisation materially advances China’s ability to realise such ambitions.
So far, this critique has treated Southeast Asia as geopolitically and geographically homogeneous. This is because, for the most part, Wesley does too. In the section Without a Map, Wesley provides an overview of Southeast Asian geopolitical history, with particular emphasis on the post-colonial period. In 1955, in Bandung, Indonesia, Southeast Asian and African states gathered to form the non-alignment movement, where post-colonial states, including China, declared they will not formally align with major global power blocs.
Wesley adds that “out of the experience of mutual vulnerability and sensitivity to being caught up in outside power games grew a solidarity among Southeast Asia’s non-communist states,” formalised in Bangkok in 1967 with the creation of ASEAN. He further asserts that “the repeated preference for not aligning collectively is Southeast Asia’s ultimate act of agency, sovereignty and autonomy.” Wesley posits that understanding these geopolitical principles is central to understanding the grand strategies of the region.
Institutions like ASEAN and the theory behind non-alignment are presented superficially and without sufficient analytical grounding. He does not explain the underlying geopolitical forces enabling this posture of “non-alignment,” “independence,” or “sovereign egalitarianism” in the post-colonial era. Although he notes that some states have, and still are, aligned with superpowers, he does not address the tension this introduces. For instance, Wesley mentions the Cold War era Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation, as an act of regional independence rather than what it actually was: an American alliance.
Right now, the Philippines is a major ally of the US, with the latter funnelling billions of dollars over the coming five years to bolster the former’s military capabilities. Singapore hosts major US naval logistical infrastructure and trains with the US military. Indonesia is increasing military ties with America once more, having been closely aligned during the Cold War under Suharto. Thailand is a major non-NATO ally of the US. Malaysia, though not in an official alliance with America, is increasing defence interoperability with the US. Brunei also leans militarily towards America.
Vietnam has close ties to America as well, but during its war of independence, it was ideologically aligned and militarily supported by China and the Soviet Union. Cambodia is widely considered an ally of China despite no formal agreement, and Myanmar is a strong ally of China under its military junta. Southeast Asia’s non-alignment posture appears to be more rhetorical than substantive, with its composite states willing to formally or informally lean towards one superpower or another.
The notion of sovereign independence is also more contested than Wesley suggests. Indonesia has been the primary intra-regional antagonist in territorial expansion. It fought, and lost, against Malaysian independence in Borneo in the 1960s; it fought, and won, over control of West Papua after the Dutch left; and it occupied East Timor until international and domestic pressure forced it to relinquish the territory. Additionally, Vietnam invaded Cambodia in the 1970s and, most recently, Thailand and Cambodia engaged in a brief border war that required a Trump-brokered ceasefire.
Wesley’s disregard for history is further compounded by dismissing the influence of other regional powers like India and Japan. Wesley offers limited justification for the claim that each nation lacks the “compelling motivation, legitimacy or respectability to play a serious stabilising role.” The recent diplomacy of Japan’s current Prime Minister forcefully demonstrates that Japan has no desire to see China establish a sphere of deference in Southeast Asia, and India’s long-standing animosity with China suggests otherwise as well.
Southeast Asia considers Japan to be one of the most trusted major powers. Japan is remilitarising and becoming increasingly hawkish in its foreign policy, including deepening military ties with both the Philippines and the US. Prime Minister Takaichi has asserted that a blockade of Taiwan would be an existential threat to Japan. Similarly, India is viewed by Southeast Asia as an important balancer to China. India is also positioning itself as a leader of the Global South in opposition to Beijing, while increasing security ties in the Quad with Japan, the US and Australia.
When the Southeast Asian lens of Wesley’s argument is broken down, the strategic advice proffered is not as insightful as he claims. He fundamentally misrepresents history, superficially characterises Southeast Asia as non-aligned, and dismisses other regional powers without reason. What is left closely resembles White’s argument from Quarterly Essay 98, though less cogent and unnecessarily reframed through a Southeast Asian lens. Wesley concludes that Australia requires a “new journey of strategic maturation.” However, maturation requires rigour, which this analysis does not have.
Addendum:
Below are a number of standalone discrepancies in Wesley’s article.
“The cavalier way Australia has treated Indonesia — from boat tow-backs to leading an intervention in East Timor — shows how complacent we have become about the non-problematic nature of Southeast Asia.”
Australia’s response to Indonesia’s actions in East Timor does not warrant being described as cavalier. Indonesia invaded and occupied East Timor in 1975 after Portugal withdrew, and Australia did not intervene at that time. It instead intervened in 1999 to restore order following Indonesia‑backed violence after the independence referendum, with UN authorisation. Australia returned again in 2006 at the request of the Timorese government when order broke down.
“Whenever it has featured, it has been as a consequence of American interest in something else. Its deepest involvement in the region, the agonising war fought in Vietnam between 1965 and 1975, was motivated by containing the spread of communism from China, rather than by any intrinsic concern with Southeast Asian geopolitics.”
First, the spread of communism through Southeast Asia was the central geopolitical concern in the region at the time. Second, 1965 is misleading as a start date for American military involvement in Vietnam. Eisenhower had already sent around 700 military personnel before Kennedy took office, and Kennedy authorised 400 Special Forces troops and additional advisers in 1961, with numbers reaching 16,000 by 1963. As for the end date, US troops withdrew in 1973; 1975 is when South Vietnam fell.
“The ANZUS Treaty of 1951 was the price Washington paid to integrate Australia into its Cold War planning… Soon Australian forces were fighting alongside Americans when the Korean War broke out in 1950.”
The timeline contradiction here is self-evident. Australian troops were also sent under the United Nations, not as part of a bilateral American commitment.
“The Tiananmen massacre saw both the United States and Australia suspend cooperation with Beijing, but Australia became the Western state that acted earliest to re-normalise relations.”
Brent Scowcroft, President Bush’s National Security Advisor, made a secret visit to Beijing within a month of the 4 June massacre to reassure Deng Xiaoping of America’s support while publicly maintaining condemnation. A second public visit followed in December 1989. Japan and Germany also moved to restore relations on earlier timelines than Australia.
“If our major ally was concerned about China building a Sphere of Deference in Southeast Asia, it would have invested in a much more deep and sustained way in building up its commitments and credibility there. Instead, as we’ve seen, these have been eroding steadily since the end of the Cold War.”
From the 2010s onward, during the “pivot to Asia”, the US substantially deepened ties with Vietnam, the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan in direct response to China’s rise. That said, American focus on the region has declined under the Trump administration, but that is not the timeline Wesley is referring to.
“Australia is arguably at an all-time low in its ability to shape events and attitudes in Southeast Asia, precisely when it needs to have maximum influence and legitimacy.”
Australia currently ranks fifth on the Lowy Institute’s 2024 Asian Power Index. A 2025 survey cited by ANU’s National Security College also found that Australia ranked behind only Japan and the EU among leading dialogue partners in ASEAN elite opinion.
My Substack: https://callumscolumn.substack.com/
April 21, 2026
This QE is so ‘okay yes … and what?‘. Wesley steps us through 3 rough stages 1. Characterising the actors, 2.
Describing how incredibly fucked Australia is and then 3. Providing solutions. 1-2 were half baked and 3 was pitiful. This is deserving of high 2, low 3.
Describing how incredibly fucked Australia is and then 3. Providing solutions. 1-2 were half baked and 3 was pitiful. This is deserving of high 2, low 3.
March 24, 2026
Ha ha ha - after slagging off 'The Quarterly' I might have to eat some humble pie - sort of... There are still common discursive threads in the essay - China is bad, America is worse, Australia is fucked. I wish that sometimes the essayists would appeal towards the common - all of us - instead of the elite. It is almost as if Wesley is writing for policy makers. Still it was intriguing if not scary. I wonder if China would ever block our pathways to success (literally). Most certainly this essay - confirms that Donald Trump has made life difficult for everyone (oil excluded!).
June 14, 2026
I read reviews after purchasing the book and was worried that it would be a waste of 30 dollars. Despite this I read and enjoyed the first 70 pages, and was reassured by the 70ish pages left. I was under the impression that the author was giving a thorough contextual background before delving into a thorough analysis, until I realised that the essay was only 70 ish pages long. I literally said to myself “Is that it ?”. I have to give credit where credit is due, it’s well written but it feels like it’s trying to reach a word count yet surprisingly does not reach a desired analytical depth I’d like to see from a 30 dollar booklet.
Unfortunately it can be summed into an opinion piece that talks about what mistakes Australia is committing to, yet does not Ellaborate on why (apart from drawing ties to previous history), or the challenges we would face in separating ourselves from American influence. As such it comes across very one sided, and mentions things irrelevant to the success of the opinion. Despite this it provided a unique perspective, but as mentioned needs to be more fleshed out to provide a real analysis.
Unfortunately it can be summed into an opinion piece that talks about what mistakes Australia is committing to, yet does not Ellaborate on why (apart from drawing ties to previous history), or the challenges we would face in separating ourselves from American influence. As such it comes across very one sided, and mentions things irrelevant to the success of the opinion. Despite this it provided a unique perspective, but as mentioned needs to be more fleshed out to provide a real analysis.
May 13, 2026
It's fine, but if you've read anything about Australia and its relationship with the Southeast Asia region before, then you're not really going to get much new here.
April 20, 2026
The start of the essay made me think that it was just a list of complaints. Noted heavily on the things that Australia has not completed or achieved in South East Asia. However, I feel as though relationships have been formed and economies work together as best as they can.
Yes, South East Asia is important, however other areas of the world were just as if not more important in the last 20 years. That doesn’t mean that Australia should stop diplomacy in the region, I would argue that they didn’t.
Fair assessment of China’s economical stranglehold on Asia generally.
I found that some of the points arguing for or against china seemed to be from a US perspective and maybe that is because of Australia’s alignment with the US. American actions are requiring Australia policies to shift, but those policies could not have only reacted mostly to those changes rather than being preemptive.
I liked the note about our own self-congratulation of “punching above our weight” because as much as I like the quote and hope Australia does, I don’t necessarily think Australia as a country or sections of the country do, despite saying it often enough.
In one part the author notes that we haven’t stood up to china well enough and in the next sentence notes Australia as plucky and little. So, what would you rather Australia do? Become another America?
4 threats
Cyber - the cyber centre releases some information but not all in order to combat other attacks and to not cause panic. So I would say we don’t need all the information.
Economic - it was argued in previous chapters the influences scale. But now it’s arguing against that scale…?
Military - spelt the base wrong and the military and taking steps to deter attacks and align with others to help the deterrence.
Shaping the south east - For this reason is why countries have created have and other forums to increase ties with other countries.
Michael argues for a whole of nation approach with development and defence together. Is that not the defence strategy and current plan? Saying we need to be more knowledgeable is fine, but that is not a physical thing to change things, it’s a nice to have.
I think our policy makers know the risk with aligning with the US and the effect it has on other countries. I don’t like the alignment either personally, but it is the unfortunate necessary evil.
Solutions:
Understand the scale - less defence, more diplomacy
Rethink the US alliance - say no sometimes
Understand Asia more - okay sure
Think more about likelihood and consequences - we already do this in my opinion
It’s not that I disagree with the solutions, it’s that I agree in parts but would argue we are already doing some of those things and/or implementing the solutions won’t have a major impact.
Like what policies would you suggest changing and how should we deal differently when it comes directly to china? Or keep the same policies and implement the small changes you mentioned?
Self reliance is fine, but not enough.
I think we are already working with our neighbours, but yes, maybe we can do more.
“Ideal outcome is for china to be present but not dominant.” I think that is impossible. You have to acknowledge and work alongside (not help) their dominance.
Overall, an interesting perspective and I agree that we should try and change our ways of viewing china in south east Asia. However, I disagree with some of the comments on the threats and solutions.
Yes, South East Asia is important, however other areas of the world were just as if not more important in the last 20 years. That doesn’t mean that Australia should stop diplomacy in the region, I would argue that they didn’t.
Fair assessment of China’s economical stranglehold on Asia generally.
I found that some of the points arguing for or against china seemed to be from a US perspective and maybe that is because of Australia’s alignment with the US. American actions are requiring Australia policies to shift, but those policies could not have only reacted mostly to those changes rather than being preemptive.
I liked the note about our own self-congratulation of “punching above our weight” because as much as I like the quote and hope Australia does, I don’t necessarily think Australia as a country or sections of the country do, despite saying it often enough.
In one part the author notes that we haven’t stood up to china well enough and in the next sentence notes Australia as plucky and little. So, what would you rather Australia do? Become another America?
4 threats
Cyber - the cyber centre releases some information but not all in order to combat other attacks and to not cause panic. So I would say we don’t need all the information.
Economic - it was argued in previous chapters the influences scale. But now it’s arguing against that scale…?
Military - spelt the base wrong and the military and taking steps to deter attacks and align with others to help the deterrence.
Shaping the south east - For this reason is why countries have created have and other forums to increase ties with other countries.
Michael argues for a whole of nation approach with development and defence together. Is that not the defence strategy and current plan? Saying we need to be more knowledgeable is fine, but that is not a physical thing to change things, it’s a nice to have.
I think our policy makers know the risk with aligning with the US and the effect it has on other countries. I don’t like the alignment either personally, but it is the unfortunate necessary evil.
Solutions:
Understand the scale - less defence, more diplomacy
Rethink the US alliance - say no sometimes
Understand Asia more - okay sure
Think more about likelihood and consequences - we already do this in my opinion
It’s not that I disagree with the solutions, it’s that I agree in parts but would argue we are already doing some of those things and/or implementing the solutions won’t have a major impact.
Like what policies would you suggest changing and how should we deal differently when it comes directly to china? Or keep the same policies and implement the small changes you mentioned?
Self reliance is fine, but not enough.
I think we are already working with our neighbours, but yes, maybe we can do more.
“Ideal outcome is for china to be present but not dominant.” I think that is impossible. You have to acknowledge and work alongside (not help) their dominance.
Overall, an interesting perspective and I agree that we should try and change our ways of viewing china in south east Asia. However, I disagree with some of the comments on the threats and solutions.
April 19, 2026
I gave up my subscription to the Australian Foreign Affairs journal because it was nearly always about China, America and AUKUS, and hardly ever about our Australia's relationships with anybody else. So I was pleased to see this latest issue of Quarterly Essay taking up the slack and focussing on our relationship with our Southeast Asian neighbours.
Some time ago, former Australian Prime Minister, Foreign Policy wonk and Sinophile Kevin Rudd PhD (Oxford) wrote a book called The Avoidable War about the imperative to avoid conflict with China. It was very long and I only read the first chapter before it went back to the library, but (I think) I grasped the thrust of his argument which was that Australian had the option to choose 'strategic trust' because China wasn't interested in conflict. Rudd's most recent book, On Xi Jinping, however, declares that he has changed his mind. Summarising its main arguments at Bitter Winter, Massimo Introvigne writes that Rudd now thinks that
On Xi Jinping is about 600 pages long, so I won't be reading that either. Suffice to say that I'm not entirely convinced that Australia should get involved in protecting Taiwan when the Chinese Taiwanese are themselves colonisers of the indigenous people there, and colonisers of the modern era at that.
https://www.youtube.com/shorts/GhNMDV...
Whatever about that, Wesley's essay is a (much shorter) counter to this more recent view of protecting Taiwan militarily.
To read the rest of my review please visit https://anzlitlovers.com/2026/04/19/b...
Some time ago, former Australian Prime Minister, Foreign Policy wonk and Sinophile Kevin Rudd PhD (Oxford) wrote a book called The Avoidable War about the imperative to avoid conflict with China. It was very long and I only read the first chapter before it went back to the library, but (I think) I grasped the thrust of his argument which was that Australian had the option to choose 'strategic trust' because China wasn't interested in conflict. Rudd's most recent book, On Xi Jinping, however, declares that he has changed his mind. Summarising its main arguments at Bitter Winter, Massimo Introvigne writes that Rudd now thinks that
...the only way to protect Taiwan is military, that a 'strategic confusion' making China uncertain about how the West will react to military aggressions may be the best option in the near future, and that Xi Jinping no longer believes (if he ever did) that a major war should be avoided at all costs.
On Xi Jinping is about 600 pages long, so I won't be reading that either. Suffice to say that I'm not entirely convinced that Australia should get involved in protecting Taiwan when the Chinese Taiwanese are themselves colonisers of the indigenous people there, and colonisers of the modern era at that.
https://www.youtube.com/shorts/GhNMDV...
Whatever about that, Wesley's essay is a (much shorter) counter to this more recent view of protecting Taiwan militarily.
To read the rest of my review please visit https://anzlitlovers.com/2026/04/19/b...
April 3, 2026
An interesting discussion about where Australia should be focusing it's attention in terms of defence and security, especially given America's decision to move on from being the protector of the wider South East Asia.
Michael Wesley explores the sphere of influence that matters most to Australia, why the US is really only interested in North Asia, and why Australia must get real and be prepared to invest and engage with south east asia to a degree that it hasn't done in the past...whatever happens post Trump.
Michael Wesley explores the sphere of influence that matters most to Australia, why the US is really only interested in North Asia, and why Australia must get real and be prepared to invest and engage with south east asia to a degree that it hasn't done in the past...whatever happens post Trump.
May 13, 2026
I’m sorry Michael Wesley, but you met me at a very Chinese time of my life.
May 13, 2026
An interesting viewpoint on Australia's relationship with our allies. The commentary that we should look more to Asia and be less reliant on the US is pertinent. A worthwhile read.
May 16, 2026
Disappointing. More summary than higher order analysis, this is not to the usual, exceptionally high standard of the QE.
Did Not Finish
June 1, 2026Never gonna finish this after it was assigned as a reading for a class I hate ❤️❤️
June 16, 2026
A thoughtful look at the politics and policies driving Australia’s security and economic conditions.
July 2, 2026
Wesley commits to a refreshing approach, advocating for a greater self-reliant Australia. Hopefully serves as one catalyst of many in persuading Canberra.
Read
June 19, 2026An excellent essay on why Australia needso to focus more on deepening ties with the countries of South East Asia and less echoing American concerns.
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