In recent writings on popular science, there has been much handwringing about the apparently deterministic picture of human decision making suggested by the latest scientific research. Robert Sapolsky's bestselling Determined boldly argues that morality must be reformed because free will has been effectively refuted. But the question of whether free will and morality can be reconciled with a causally determined world is nothing new, nor is it the sort of question that can be answered by scientists. This Element examines how these questions were answered by Spinoza, history's most forceful defender of the claim that all things are necessarily determined, who also was keenly interested in the prospects for morality in a determined world. The Element aims to show that this figure from the past offers a timely and insightful explanation of how we can be free and responsible even if our actions are inevitable.
Interessante, bondige analyse van de relatie tussen Spinoza's metafysica en de plaats van de (menselijke) vrijheid daarin. Benadrukt het aporetische karakter en het gebrek van een conclusieve oplossing - alsook de vraag naar de verantwoordelijkheid in relatie tot die vrijheid - maar is hier op het einde nogal repetitief in, maar heeft voldoende het vuur extra aangewakkerd voor het schrijven van m'n thesis.
This book, "Spinoza on Free Will" (2026) in the first in a series of monographs on Spinoza's philosophy to be published in the Cambridge Elements series. The series aims to provide "concise, innovative, and insightful introductions to central and under-explored topics in Spinoza’s philosophy" and to be accessible to a wide range of readers. Spinoza scholars Yithak Melamed, Charlotte Bloomberg Professor of Philosophy at Johns Hopkins University, and Hasana Sharp, Professor of Philosophy at McGill University, are the editors of the series. Spinoza scholar Matthew Kisner, Professor and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at the University of South Carolina, wrote this volume. Kisner's earlier writings on Spinoza include his book, "Spinoza on Human Freedom: Reason, Autonomy, and the Good Life" (2011) and an edition of Spinoza's Ethics in the Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (2018), edited and co-translated with Michael Silverthorne.
This monograph examines Spinoza's view on free will. As is virtually every issue in Spinoza's thought this subject is difficult. Broadly, Spinoza often seems to want to have things both ways. One the one hand, he argues for a strict determinism or necessitarianism. On the other hand, as Kisner writes, his philosophy is designed to further and to help understand human freedom. How are these themes to be reconciled?
Kisner's monograph explores some of the difficult philosophical issues, from the ancient world until today, surrounding the issue of free will. He refers to recent books on the subject approaching free will and determinism from the standpoint of modern science. Commendably, Kisner argues that the free will -determinism issue is not resolvable by science but instead is a matter for philosophical analysis and reflection. The first part of his book is an overview of the difficult issue of free will and of the different ways the term "free will" has been used. Again broadly speaking, Kisner identifies three basic positions: determinism, libertarianism, and compatibilism. The first two positions share the view that determinism is inconsistent with free will. The compatibilist position holds that free will and determinism are not necessarily in conflict and can be held and reconciled.
The nature of the free will controversy occupies most of the first four of the seven sections of the book. Kisner argues that Spinoza is a compatibilist because he views the possibility of freedom as a matter of self-determination rather than as determination solely by external forces. Kisner deepens his account with an analysis of Spinoza's metaphysics, focusing on its single substance monism, its mind-body parallism, and its doctrine of conatus, which discusses how things try to preserve themselves and to grow. Kisner argues that Spinoza rejects free will or the will as a mental faculty but he sees the possibility of free action, difficult as it is, in self-determination and in the use of reason. Kisner argues that Spinoza's approach, without some of its metaphysical trappings, offers a convincing account of how actions may be both free and determined.
Kisner then discusses how it is possible to hold individuals responsible for their actions in a deterministic world. This question leads to an interesting discussion of the medieval Jewish philosopher Hasdai Crescas (1340 -- 1410/11) a thinker frequently cited by Spinoza. Crescas was a determinist who also believed it possible to hold people responsible for their actions, based on prospective considerations but also in part based on past activities. The discussion of Crescas is an interesting, somewhat unusual part of this book. Kisner takes Crescas's views and argues based upon some of Spinoza's own cryptic comments that Spinoza held a similar point of view, albeit secularized. In other words, people may be held accountable for their actions without blame, vengeance or anger.
The book is largely accessible to non-professional readers, and Kisner enlives his account with many examples. Still it covers a great deal of ground in a short space, including the nature of the free will question, Spinoza's views, Spinoza's metaphysics, the question of responsibility and accountability, and the thought of Crescas. The book moves quickly and invites further reflection. I was left unconvinced that Spinoza's views, as explained by Kisner, were an adequate answer to determinism.
I was glad to engage with Spinoza's thought in this monograph and look forward to succeeding volumes in the Cambridge Elements series on the philosophy of Spinoza.