“Several dozen men, chanting in Arabic and firing AK-47s into the air, swarmed through the pedestrian entrance at the Compound’s main gate. Eventually their numbers swelled to more than sixty. Some were bearded, some were clean-shaven. Some wore black T-shirts and camouflage pants, some wore jeans and white or brightly colored shirts. Some wore tactical military-style vests…Some carried walkie-talkies. Some were young and lean, others were portly and middle-aged. A few hid their faces with scarves, but most didn’t. The attackers didn’t wear insignia, and none of the Americans saw where they’d assembled or knew exactly when they’d arrived outside the gate. One thing was certain: They displayed a common desire to terrorize Americans at the Special Mission Compound…”
- Mitchell Zuckoff, 13 Hours
Mitchell Zuckoff sets himself a tall task in 13 Hours. He is attempting to take on one of the more politically-fraught events of recent memory, and do so in the guise of a straightforward, apolitical treatment.
The so-called “Battle of Benghazi” took place on September 11-12, 2012, in the Libyan city of Benghazi. It began with an attack on the American diplomatic compound by armed Libyans. The attackers might have been part of a militant group called Ansar al-Sharia. Or they might have been an ad hoc mob inspired by the release of an anti-Muslim video that triggered riots in other cities. Or it might have been a combination.
Whatever the reason, and whatever the makeup of the assaulting force, the attack resulted in the deaths – by smoke inhalation – of Ambassador Christopher Stevens and foreign service officer Sean Smith.
Nearby, there was a secret CIA base in a complex called the Annex. The Annex was guarded by six Global Response Staff (GRS) contractors hired by the CIA. These contractors, all of whom were former military men (including two Navy SEALs), instantly wanted to go to the aid of the diplomatic compound. Following a controversial delay (more on that below), they made their way to the compound, rounded up the survivors, and returned to the Annex. During the night, they fought off two brief, fierce attacks, then were subjected to a ferocious mortar attack, which killed one of the six members of the Annex team, along with another GRS contractor who’d come from Tripoli to help.
In terms of sheer storytelling, of recounting the firefight, 13 Hours is successful. Zuckoff writes in an effortlessly gripping manner about that frenetic, chaotic night. With minimal setup, briefly summarizing Libya’s long, fraught history, including recent upheavals that killed longtime leader Muammar Gaddafi, Zuckoff plunges us into the battle.
13 Hours is lifted by Zuckoff’s novelistic flair and eye for pertinent detail. Zuckoff follows the security force each step of their journey, doing a spectacular job of keeping the reader oriented to place and time (aided by some nice maps). The scenes of battle are tense and sharp. He provides the internal thoughts of the contractors, so that you are seeing the action through their eyes. From what I can tell, this felt like a very accurate description of how the Benghazi assault unfolded. The contractors are certainly not telling war stories. Whereas Michael Bay’s film adaptation of 13 Hours presented a siege on the scale of a Libyan Alamo or Rorke’s Drift, the account found in the book is far more precise, without any action-movie hyperbole.
As I alluded above, however, the Battle of Benghazi presents difficulties that do not exist in narratives about – for example – Gettysburg or Iwo Jima. The battle, as Zuckoff acknowledges on the first pages, has been subsumed by “talking points, electoral politics, and alleged conspiracies and cover-ups.”
All battles include disputed facts; with Benghazi, those disputes were utilized by politicians long before they reached historians. Zuckoff wants to present a story shorn from that baggage. He wants his own Black Hawk Down. It’s an admirable goal, but on this specific point, I don’t think he succeeds.
In my opinion, the issue comes down to the quality of the sourcing.
Zuckoff shares the byline of 13 Hours with the members of “the Annex Security Team,” meaning that the main subjects are also co-authors (though I’m guessing Zuckoff took care of the prose). It is always a bit concerning when sources are paid for their stories, as the setup provides no incentive for contradiction, and every incentive for acceptance of the purchased stories at face value. You don’t need to attend a J-school ethics class to see the potential problems.
In and of itself, though, the money does not take away from the contractors’ credibility. Like I said above, the accounts of the battle have the ring of truth. Instead, it seems like the co-authorial agreement limited the inclusion of other participants.
Without endnotes, it is hard to know who Zuckoff spoke to, or even questioned. To be fair, Zuckoff states he has consulted various reports and documentation. Nevertheless, it certainly feels like the majority of 13 Hours comes solely from the reports of the five contractors, all of whom operated on the same team, and most of whom were close together the whole of the night.
There are a variety of ways that reliance on a limited number of sources can damage historical veracity. Here, one big example is the so-called stand down order, in which the White House allegedly commanded “Bob,” the pseudonymous CIA Chief of Station, to “stand down” rather than allow GRS to immediately go to the Diplomatic Compound to rescue Ambassador Stevens.
There is no way to prove that the GRS contractors could have saved Ambassador Stevens, despite the delay (they eventually made their way to the compound). Certainly, they believed it, and are entitled to that belief. More than that, they put their lives on the line for it.
Yet in presenting Bob as giving or relaying this order, Zuckoff creates a villain far more nefarious than the savage, faceless mob of Libyans. He is a pusillanimous ditherer, allowing Americans to die almost within sight.
Clearly, Bob did not participate in 13 Hours. Based on what I’ve seen elsewhere, Zuckoff did reach out to him, but Bob did not want to cooperate. (It is unknown if this was because he was still working with the CIA, or that he wasn’t being paid like everyone else).
Left without Bob’s side, Zuckoff proceeds as though Bob’s silence is evidence of his timidity. A better book would at least have attempted to divine Bob’s motivations, which to me seem pretty obvious.
According to GRS personnel, Bob was trying to organize a rescue using the local 17 February militia. This is a tactic with which they disagreed. The reader is compelled to agree with the contractors, and essentially told to be outraged that Bob would rely on Libyans rather than his highly skilled, motivated, and courageous guards. But here’s the thing: Bob was running a secret CIA base in a sovereign nation. It’s reasonable to think he wanted 17 February in on the rescue mission, so that he wasn’t simply plunging American military personnel into a gun-battle in a foreign city.
The contractors are clearly men who know their jobs. They are experts in small arms and urban fighting; they move fast, light, and lethal. Despite not having much time to train together, they formed an elite unit. Yet none of this makes them experts on the geopolitical situation in Libya. Indeed, Zuckoff quotes one of the contractors as saying – vis-à-vis East-West relations – that the Crusades were a good thing. This is not exactly a nuanced worldview, and certainly far more simplistic than the actual situation in which Bob was attempting to maneuver. It stands to reason that Bob understood that non-negligible parts of the world hate America because we treat national borders like my neighbor’s dog treats my yard.
Bob eventually released a statement denying the Zuckoff/Annex Team version. Congressional reports – spearheaded by politicians who would have loved to find such an order – support Bob's position. Of course, that doesn’t mean that Bob was right and the contractors wrong. The GRS contractors, after all, were also there. There is, however, a conflict in the evidence, and I don’t think Zuckoff does enough to highlight the rift.
This is important because 13 Hours, intentionally or not, arbitrarily divides the American participants of the Benghazi attacks into distinct categories (the Libyan participants are entirely ignored). First you have the heroes, the GRS contractors, who are given complete ownership over the events that transpired. Second, you have the victims who were killed. Third, you have the CIA, bleakly painted as unappreciative and terrified.
I’m not going to carry water for the Central Intelligence Agency. Their faults have been well-document in books such as Tim Weiner’s Legacy of Ashes. But the CIA is not simply an organization; it is a collection of people, most trying to do their best.
13 Hours could have been written to recognize that this night did not belong solely to the GRS. It could have been written to acknowledge that the CIA men and women at the Annex have devoted their lives to America; that members of the CIA have given their lives for America, all throughout the War on Terror; that the CIA men and women at the Annex were also trying to do a difficult job. This book could have been written – as Bowden did in Black Hawk Down – to acknowledge a range of differing perspectives. It was not. Thus, Bob is not a patriot; he is not a man who spent years at various far-flung outposts. He is shown as a coward at best, and an accomplice to murder at worst.
On its cover, 13 Hours promises to be “the inside account of what really happened in Benghazi.” It is, to be sure, an “inside account.” As to whether this is “what really happened,” I have some doubts. This does not feel like a full story.
Instead, 13 Hours feels emblematic of these times. This is America, today. Even in remembering a long-odds street-fight in an ancient African city, we are impossibly divided, enemies to each other.