Generally ignored by prosperity, certainly considered secondary to Stalingrad when remembering the German clashes with Russia during Operation Barbarossa, in his introduction Nagorski calls the battle for Moscow "arguably the most important battle of WWII and inarguably the largest battle between two armies of all time" (7 million fought, up to 2.5 killed or injured).
Certainly the incredible cost of human life that resulted from one madman's attempt to conquer a continent and another sociopath's attempt to prevent it are near impossible to comprehend. But the sheer folly and utter disregard for human life displayed by those leaders is just as difficult to understand.
It happened though, and Nagorski makes it plain that the incredible carnage was wholly due to the "huge miscalculations ... and unremitting ruthlessness" of Hitler and Stalin.
Stalin's major mistakes were, firstly, complete unpreparedness for the Nazi invasion in June 1941, which Nagorski finds all the sources he can to suggest a genuine belief that Hitler would not attack him due to their pact - or at least not this early - despite his constant reference to Russia as merely Lebensraum, and the highly visible movement of German troops to the border.
Secondly he lists the typically paranoid purge of the Red Army just before war, where 44K officers were shot or sent to Siberia, leaving them without experienced leadership. Yep, they really did that kind of thing in Russia back then.
Hitler's mistakes were in launching Operation Barbarossa in the first place before the war in the West was won, which left his army fighting on two fronts at the same time. Then, having made that initial strategic error, he delayed its start until June instead of May as originally planned so that, like Napoleon before him, his troops were caught up in the inhospitable Russian winter before they had a chance to take Moscow.
Maybe the battle for Moscow has never resonated as much as the one in Stalingrad precisely because it was for Moscow, not in Moscow. The Nazis came to within about twenty miles of the capitol, but there was never a pitched battle inside the city.
Because of that and due to the many reasons why Red Army soldiers were subsequently reluctant to talk about their experiences, Nagorski leaves a lot of gaps with regards the actual fighting.
Instead he provides fleeting images of mass graves, fields covered in combinations of bodies, snow and rivers of blood, horrendous truths about the tactics used by both leaders on their own troops, such as the NKGB-managed "blocking units", which stood behind the Red Army shooting deserters, and the hardships suffered by The German rank and file left to freeze in the tundra by a delusional Fuhrer without adequate footwear or winter coats.
In want of an actual battle then, Nagorski concentrates on proving his point that Hitler and Stalin between them blundered their way into disaster. Hitler paid the ultimate cost, whilst Stalin so nearly did.
In a pivotal section of the book, he throws light upon the events of October 16th 1941, a day of chaos in Moscow where there was no visible leadership and amidst a mass exodus the remaining Moscovites looted and plundered the city, decrying the regime.
I am not disagreeing with the author's hypothesis which lays the blame at two of history's biggest monsters, and he has written a fluid, informative book to back it up, despite the limited source material due to Soviet censorship.
On a side note, I read this at the same time as a book about the Battle of New York, just one hundred and fifty years before, where the protagonists were positively gentlemanly in comparison.