Plokhy: When the conflict started, Putin was voicing the opinion of the majority of Russians that there is no real difference between Russians and Ukrainians, but the war is changing that.
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David G. Rowley, University of Wisconsin-Platteville
In The Origins of the Slavic Nations, historian Serhii Plokhy has written a history of identity-building among the East Slavs from the creation of Kyiv Rus' in the ninth century to the formation of the early modern nations of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia in the eighteenth century.
In the course of his exposition, Plokhy displays a masterful command of both the written records of the East Slavs, chronicles, saints lives, treaties, letters, polemics, and memoirs, and of the historiography.
Plokhy appears to have read all relevant interpretations of East Slavic nation-building in the English, Ukrainian, and Russian languages, and his historiographical reviews at the beginning of each chapter will be a boon to all future researchers who take up this field.
Most importantly, Plokhy offers innovative and convincing reinterpretations of the key controversies in the histories of the national development of the East Slavs. In the introduction, Plokhy promises to "suggest a new outline of the development of East Slavic identities and thus prepare the ground for a reconceptualization of the premodern history of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus" (page 9). I believe he has delivered on his promise.
That Plokhy brings a modernist sensibility to his investigation is evident from his treatment of national identity as the construction of elites as well as from his goal of seeking "'to deconstruct the existing nation-based' narrative of East Slavic history" (p. 9). Plokhy characterizes himself as a "revisionist" in the tradition of John Armstrong and Anthony Smith, who recognize that although nations are modern constructions they cannot successfully be built except on the basis of historical ethnicities. However, he provides evidence that is completely consistent with unreconstructed "modernism," and, in fact, he cites Benedict Anderson more often than Armstrong and Smith combined.
In analyzing the identity-building projects of Slavic elites, Plokhy is really looking at "imagined communities", a term he uses a number of times.
He does not attempt to conclude whether any particular East Slavic "people" shared a culture, language, origin myths, or history.
All the evidence provided by Plokhy confirms that identities did not evolve but were periodically remade by new elites for new circumstances, and were heavily influenced by institutions of the state and the church.
In his own words, Plokhy "interprets the growth of East Slavic identities as a succession of identity-building projects. Such projects served as blueprints for the construction of new identities, which in turn are prerequisites for the existence of self-conscious communities" (pp. 354-355).
This is a very different proposition from the revised modernism of Armstrong and Anderson.
Plokhy provides no evidence that an East Slavic ethnie (to say nothing of a Ukrainian, Belarusian, or Russian ethnie) ever existed.
To say that an idea of Kyiv Rus' was invented, that was then used by subsequent elites, is far different from saying that a nation of Kyiv Rus' came into existence and then evolved.
No matter what Serhii Plokhy's own hope, his work reinforces the perspective of the modernists.
In chapter 4, "The Rise of Muscovy," Plokhy shows how a ruling dynasty, a single Church structure, and a homogenous population all supported a nation-building project by Muscovite grand princes. Plokhy concludes that "Great Russian history per se, at least when it comes to self-identification and ethnopolitical identity, begins with the reign of Ivan III (1462-1505)" (p. 158).
Plokhy also points out that Muscovite identity was clearly separated from the identity of the Slavic populations across the Polish-Lithuanian border.
Nevertheless, Plokhy does not claim that modern Russian national identity appeared at this time, since the people (Rus') were defined by their loyalty to a dynasty and a church, not membership in a nation.
In chapter 6, "Was There a Reunification," Plokhy deals with the Cossack uprising against Poland-Lithuania led by Bohdan Khmelnytsky in the mid-seventeenth century.
In this process, Cossack territories and the Rus' Land east of the Dnipro broke away from Poland-Lithuania and put itself under the protection of Moscow. A major element in this rebellion was the religious loyalty of the population to Constantinople and not to Rome.
From the point of view of Great Russian (and Soviet) historiography, the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654 marked the reunification of Moscow and Kyiv. Plokhy, however, refers to it as the "Pereiaslav Disagreement" and demonstrates that neither side saw the unification as an ethnic unification.
Bohdan Khmelnytsky "made no use of the theme of ethnic affinity" (p. 246) and Tsar Aleksei "continued to think not just primarily but almost exclusively in dynastic terms" (p. 247).
In chapter 7, "The Invention of Russia," Plokhy investigates the early modern creation of a Russian identity in the era of Peter the Great.
He examines the complexity and ambiguity of a nation with an imperial mission. He points out that the old national identity, which was rooted in religion, lived on among the Old Believers, while the new vision of an imperial nation owed much to the contributions of Ruthenians such as Teofan Prokopovych.
The new identity did not reunite all the Slavs, however. "The new Russian imperial identity developed with the help of the Kyivans was designed to include the Little Russian (Ukrainian) and Muscovite elites, as well as Westerners who were joining the imperial service. It failed, however, to include Ruthenians west of the Russian imperial boundary and non-Slavs in the borderlands of the empire" (p. 297).
In chapter 8, "Ruthenia, Little Russia, Ukraine," Plokhy shows that the unifying Ruthenian identity (described in chapter 6) did not survive Pereiaslav. When Ruthenian and Cossack territories to the east of the Dnipro River united with Russia, they separated from the remaining Ruthenian population in Poland-Lithuania, and a new Ukrainian identity was formed.
Moreover, this new identity did not evolve from old Kyiv Rus.
"The Ukrainian identity of the period was deeply rooted in Cossack practices and traditions, and the elites of the Hetmanate imagined Ukraine as a society led and represented by the Cossack estate" (p. 358).
Plokhy sums up his conclusions regarding the modern East Slavic nations with these words:
"The modern Russian nation grew out of the Russian imperial project and preserved many of its characteristics, including the blurred boundary between the Great Russians per se and the non-Russian subjects of the empire."
"The modern Ukrainian identity developed out of the Ukrainian/Little Russian project of the Hetmanate, excluding Russians and Belarusians and taking over not only the formerly Polish-ruled Right-Bank Ukraine but also Austrian Galicia, Bukovyna, and eventually Transcarpathia, proving legitimacy for the creation of one nation out of historically, culturally, and religiously diverse regions."
"The Belarusian national project was based on the Ruthenian identity that had previously developed in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania but failed to produce a distinct identity in early modern times, given the lack of a proto-Belarusian polity comparable to the Cossack Hetmanate in Left-Bank Ukraine."
"Ultimately, the Ruthenian name was claimed by the Rusyns of Transcarpathia, whose leaders insist today that they are distinct from the Ukrainians" (pp. 360-361).
Serhii Plokhy does not add substantively to the scholarship on general theories of or approaches to the problem of nations and nationalism.
However, his contribution to the history East Slavic identities is huge.
He has, indeed, delivered on his promise to reconceptualize the field. This is must reading for all historians of the East Slavs in the pre-modern period.
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Amazon review
Importat, timely but not an easy read
The Title of this book makes it highly important to read today against the background of the ongoing Russian war against Ukraine. Who are the Russians, Ukrainian and the Belarussians? The Subtitle tells us that this question will be answered from the perspective of what they themselves thought they were and not from any other standpoint.
This is not a popular history book. It is not "fun" to read. It is pure work. Professor Serheii Plokhy are writing for serious students and academics and in order to fully appreciate the book it helps a lot if you know Russian and have a very good knowledge of East European geography. This is not a book you start with if your interest is Slavic history.
The Book starts with the Kiev Rus state a thousand years ago. This is a problem since we know that the Slavs living in todays western Russia, Belarus and Ukraine arrived there at least 500 years earlier.
The Whole platform for a discussion of who they are leaves out where they came from and if all of them came from the same place. There are some references to mythology but nothing at all about archeology or DNA research. There is no answer to the question if all Slavs have the same origin.
The Book then continues to present seven hundred years (the book ends more or less in the early 1700-hundreds) of Slavic religious, political and ethnological discussion on the subject on what to call themselves. Russian, Ukrainian, Rus, White Rus, Ruthenian etc. Professor Plokhy takes us through a large amount of books, documents and letters between various historical figures as well as what other researchers have found out. All of these discussions are supported with a general outline of the history of these territories. There are also some maps that are of great help but as always you need more of them.
It is a complicated history and there are a number of problems in the text that makes it a challenge to take in. There are a lot of different Slavic tribes in the text without any explanation who they were. There are important people with titles that are very hard to understand since they are not explained. Is it a bishop in todays language or a librarian?
Even more problematic is the use of Russian words to explain or clarify something without translating these words.
The Book only has two index. One over authors and one "General". What would have helped and made the book easier to take in are several more like:
- an index over all Slavic tribes with information who they were and were they lived
- a Russian vocabulary for those words used in the text
- a timeline for the history of these areas since in some chapters the presentation jumps back and forward between centuries
- more maps to sort out what the text presents.
What goes through your mind reading the book is the question if it really is only what is in the minds of people that defines if they are Russian, Ukrainian or Belarussian?
There is nothing on archeology and there is nothing on language.
Did all the Slavs speak the same language 1500 years ago?
Today we know that there is a big difference between Russian and Ukrainian (try Google translate and see the difference) but what was the case in 1500?
The Book focuses on who is a Russian. Only in the last fifty pages are there any discussion on who is Ukrainian. There is almost nothing in the book about Belarus except that armies fought there. In fact, there is so little on Belarus that the word Belarus should be stricken from the subtitle of the book.
What is important and well presented in the book is the tremendous importance of the Orthodox Church. Up until Peter the Great the willpower of the Orthodox Church was one of the most important factors in the Slavic history. When you read about the Orthodox Church and read todays news there are a lot of similarities.
Having read the book you will get a clearer picture of what makes these people think and behave today. The Similarity of the problems 3-500 years ago and today are striking.
You will recognize a lot of political statements and propaganda that are being said and used today as based on (or not on) their previous history.
This is very important since there is a very strong political willpower coming out of Moscow today to claim historical background to various things that are simply not supported by what we know.
Granted, professor Plokhy is Ukrainian but I found the book to present an objective story rather than a Ukrainian version of it.
So, is Ukraine a part of Russia that got lost? No. Is Russia the true descendant from Kiev-Rus? No. Are Ukraine? No. Then who are these people? The Book gives us an important part of the answer but not the full answer.
Strv 74
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Casting Light on a Complicated Subject
This was a very interesting book that made me rethink what I know about Russian history.
Plokhy's subject is the development of national identity, and he makes many good points about the development of Russian and Ukrainian national identity, revealing it to be a much longer, much more complicated process than I had realized.
A strong feature of this book is the importance of religion in determining identity, showing that even the Reformation and Counter-Reformation had an impact in Eastern Europe.
This is not a book for beginners in the subject, but anyone with a serious interest in the history of Eastern Europe should read this book. Highly recommended.
Michael Samerdyke
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A current understanding of Putin's Imperialist viewpoint.
I have been reading the History of Eurasia and Central/Eastern Europe for the last 60 years. I have to say that when reading the history of Eastern Europe, it is very difficult to follow the history of any one nation in a linear fashion.
This is the best book written on this topic by any historian and believe me I think I have read most of them.
The first problem are the histories written by the victors and then histories written by the defeated.
Second there is the problem of countries popping up and then disappearing and then popping up and so forth ad nauseum.
Third is the problem of multi-national empires.
Fourth there are Nations without political borders or a National ruling elite.
Fifth the National Elites change their national allegiances.
Ultimately we have the book written by Prof. Plokhy and finally all is clear!
Oksana Piaseckyj
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Brian J. Boeck
Journal of Interdisciplinary History
In the final section of the book, Plokhy argues that although some Ukrainian intellectuals advanced a vision of a Little Russian fatherland that excluded Russians and Belarusians from their imagined community, others played a central role in shaping the “all-Russian identity” that pervaded the Russian imperial project.
Much of what modern Russians believe about their nation, origins, and affinities to other East Slavs can [page 587] be traced to intellectual constructs first articulated in early modern Ukraine.
The only major criticism pertains to the author's contention that early modern Russians lacked a developed ethnonational vocabulary to distinguish themselves and their people (see especially 216, 235).
Abundant examples of vocabulary related to nations and national identity can be documented decades before the Petrine period, and the influence of Western concepts in shaping Russian national identity can be traced to seventeenth-century translations of European newspapers, German cosmographies, and Polish histories.
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Robert H. Greene
Journal of World History
For Plokhy, the East Slavic nations are, indeed, imagined communities, but the processes of collective imagination that created them—what Plokhy refers to as “premodern identity-building projects”—long preceded the eighteenth century and the emergence of modern nationalism.
In his conclusion, Plokhy returns to the fundamental question underlying his work. Had “Kyivan rulers and elites managed to....succeed [page 452] in shaping a coherent Rus’ nationality that later gave birth to the three modern nations of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus?
Or was the East Slavic world divided from the very beginning and did the three nations already exist in Kyivan times?”
Plokhy’s answer is no to both. The Kyivan state was swept away by the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century well before its religious and secular elites had completed the task.
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The New Yorker
How did Putin’s speech this week fit into this conversation that we’re having?
It fits very well in the sense that what you see in his speech is a rejection of the Soviet-era policies. He blamed the Soviet Union for everything, even the creation of Ukraine. So what you see now is a return to a pre-revolutionary understanding of what Russians are. It is a very imperial idea of the Russian nation, consisting of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians. The last two groups don’t have a right to exist as separate nations. We are almost back to the mid-nineteenth century with imperial officers trying to hinder the development of Ukrainian culture and ideas.
Is your sense that, within Russia, even among people who may not like Putin, there is a certain amount of jingoism about the Ukrainian question? Or do you sense more division within Russia?
There was a very strong feeling about Crimea being Russian. Putin had high approval ratings after that. With the rest of Ukraine, I think there is more ambiguity. The distance between Russia and Ukraine, from the perspective of how the populations view each other, has grown since this war started. I am not a sociologist, but my sense is that the Russian narrative of history around Ukraine is in decline. The beginning of Russian history is Kyiv. You go to school and learn about that. So that stuff is there, but realities make this historical mythology problematic.
It seems like you are suggesting that, by waging this war with Ukraine, Putin has made his own population less interested in thinking of the two sides as one country.
Yes, that is my impression, and there is also a Russian resistance that has contributed to that. If Putin keeps talking about the fascists and things like that, it doesn’t help to create a sense of unity. The Maidan protesters were described as radical nationalists by Russian propaganda. When you present the citizens of another country that way, it doesn’t help with the discourse of brotherhood and unity.